ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES
VOLUME 6

MAKING A DIFFERENCE?

Social Assessment Policy and Praxis and its Emergence in China

Edited by
SUSANNA PRICE
& KATHRYN ROBINSON

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Making a Difference?

Asia-Pacific Studies: Past and Present

Series Editors:
Xin Liu, *University of California, Berkeley,* Hans Steinmüller, *London School of Economics and Political Science,* and Dolores Martinez, *SOAS, University of London*

Founding Editors:
David Askew, *Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University,* and J. S. Eades, *Emeritus Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University*

The forces of globalization in the Asia-Pacific region – the most economically dynamic region of the world – are bringing about profound social, political and cultural changes, lifting millions out of poverty and creating a vast new middle class. At the same time, the past continues to cast a long shadow, with unresolved conflicts adding fuel to current tensions between the major regional players over a wide range of issues from the environment to future energy supplies. *Asia-Pacific Studies: Past and Present* provides an outlet for cutting-edge academic research on Asia-Pacific studies. The major focus will be the politics, histories, societies and cultures of individual countries together with overviews of major regional trends and developments.

Volume 1
Media and Nation Building: How the Iban Became Malaysian
John Postill

Volume 2
The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture
Edited by Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi

Volume 3
The Body in Asia
Edited by Bryan S. Turner and Zheng Yangwen

Volume 4
Education Policy and Equal Opportunity in Japan
Akito Okada

Volume 5
Japanese Tourism: Spaces, Places and Structures
Carolin Funck and Malcolm Cooper

Volume 6
Making a Difference? Social Assessment Policy and Praxis and Its Emergence in China
Edited by Susanna Price and Kathryn Robinson

Making a Difference?

Social Assessment Policy and Praxis and Its Emergence in China

Edited by

Susanna Price and Kathryn Robinson

berghahn
NEW YORK • OXFORD
www.berghahnbooks.com

Published by
Berghahn Books
www.berghahnbooks.com

© 2015 Susanna Price and Kathryn Robinson

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages
for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book
may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information
storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented,
without written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Making a difference? : social assessment policy and praxis and its emergence in China / edited by Susanna Price and Kathryn Robinson.
pages cm. — (Asia-Pacific studies: past and present)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-78238-457-1 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-78238-458-8 (ebook)
1. Economic development projects—Social aspects—China. 2. Social planning—China. 3. Needs assessment—China. 4. Public welfare—China. 5. China—Social policy. 6. China—Economic policy. I. Price, Susanna (Social development specialist) II. Robinson, Kathryn May, 1949-
HN737.M35 2015
338.951—dc23

2014029065

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Printed on acid-free paper

ISBN 978-1-78238-457-1 hardback
ISBN 978-1-78238-458-8 ebook

Contents

List of Figures and Tables vii

Preface viii

List of Abbreviations xv

Introduction. Making Economic Growth Socially Sustainable? 1
Susanna Price

Part I. Engaged Social Research in Shifting Development Narratives

Introduction to Part I 32
Susanna Price

1 Landmarks in Development: The Introduction of Social Analysis 35
Michael M. Cernea

2 Social Science and the Mining Sector: Contemporary Roles and Dilemmas for Engagement 60
Deanna Kemp and John R. Owen

3 Practising Social Development: Navigating Local Contexts to Benefit Local Communities 83
Aaron Kyle Dennis and Gregory Eliyu Guldin

4 Striving for Good Practice: Unpacking AusAID's Approach to Community Development 103
Kathryn Robinson and Andrew McWilliam

5 Seeds of Life: Social Research for Improved Farmer Yields in Timor-Leste 126
Andrew McWilliam, Modesto Lopes, Diana Glazebrook, Marcelino de Jesus da Costa and Anita Ximenes

Part II. Applying Sociological Knowledge in China

Introduction to Part II 144
Susanna Price

6 Social Assessment in China: Progress and Application in Domestic Development Projects 147
Li Kaimeng

7 Turning Risks into Opportunities? Social Assessment as Governmental Technologies 164
Bettina Gransow

8 Participatory Monitoring of Development Projects in China 185
Xiao Jianliang and David Arthur

9 How Social Assessment Could Improve Conservation Policy and Projects: Cases from Pastoral Management in China 201
Wang Xiaoyi

10 Improving Social Impact Assessment and Participatory Planning to Identify and Manage Involuntary Resettlement Risks in the People's Republic of China 213
Scott G. Ferguson and Wenlong Zhu

11 Stakeholder Participation in Rural Land Acquisition in China: A Case Study of the Resettlement Decision-making Process 242
Yu Qingnian and Shi Guoqing

Conclusion 262
Susanna Price

Notes on Contributors 278

Glossary 284

Index 287

Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1. Conceptual framework: community relations management systems in mining 71
8.1. The participatory monitoring programme 189
11.1. Decision-making process for the East Village relocation site, and stakeholders' roles 250

Tables

3.1. Assessment of project stakeholder interests, benefits and risks 88
5.1. Storage root yield and palatability taste test data at Maliana (2000–2001) 128
5.2. Participating farmer household members 133
5.3. Tuber crops cultivated by respondent farmers 134
5.4. Food security reporting 135
5.5. Factors reducing yields 135
5.6. Comparison of house type and crop yield 139
8.1. Comparison of participatory versus external monitoring 194
10.1. Resettlement impoverishment risks for farmers affected by land acquisition and house demolition 223
10.2. Degree of risk for land-loss farmers 224
11.1. Main stakeholders and their roles in the relocation site decision-making process 257
11.2. Matrix of relationships among stakeholders in the relocation site decision-making process 258

Preface

Within influential development institutions such as international financial institutions (IFIs), knowledge-generating 'text' evolves and, via their investments, impacts on the local level through complex social and political processes that are increasingly attracting attention. People question the right of the dominant institutions, elites and experts to define development – and the epistemological basis on which their definitions are based (Oliver-Smith 2010). Even as the emerging concept of 'aidnography' explores the representations through which practitioners, especially social researchers, understand and order their world and their work (Mosse 2011), that world is changing. In turn, a rapidly moving global landscape and aid architecture challenges the way development is conceptualized, processed and realized. Cognizant of such changes, this volume focuses on Asia and particularly China, casting a wide net to encompass the private sector operations that increasingly dominate the development landscape.

As a group, international development institutions are perceived as powerful global actors, whether by virtue of their role as global policy and norm-setting bodies, their financial resources, or their hegemonic knowledge about poverty (McNeil and St. Clair 2011). Legal specialists consider IFIs' environmental and social policy standards – designed to address civil society's critiques of development processes – an integral part of international administrative law[1] (Hunter 2010). Whilst they apply internally, such policy standards reverberate outside the organizations for which they were originally designed, moving between and beyond institutions to shape and influence demands for transparency, accountability and participation in managing social risk and reducing poverty in global governance.[2]

Since the 1970s, some social researchers have worked to create disciplinary space for the application of sociological knowledge within IFIs. Located within development agencies dominated by a paradigm of economic growth, they realized that success or failure often depends upon non-economic, unquantifiable factors. They sought to understand the dynamics of social impacts through detailed case study social research and, based on this knowledge, to formulate

methods and tools for using sociological knowledge at key entry points, initially for project investments. Moving beyond critique to action, they developed institution-wide social policies that have spread far beyond the institutions themselves (Cernea 2005; Davis 2004; Bebbington 2006). In this volume, to take a leading example, Michael Cernea reflects on the little-known story of the formative, pioneering efforts in the World Bank to introduce an institution-wide standard for social analysis at the critical point of project appraisal. Whilst the themes converge, the institutional dynamics are very different in the next chapter, where Deanna Kemp and John Owen contemplate social science's growing role and influence in large-scale private sector resource development in the Asia Pacific region.

The policies, methods and tools for social assessment deserve scrutiny. They form the framework in which many social researchers interact with development discourses and institutions, and engage with people at the micro-level. These frameworks, as practised in IFIs, share approaches with social impact assessment (SIA). Located at the intersection of sociological knowledge and development practice, the frameworks have achieved international recognition. The frameworks reflect social science theory and practice in an effort to positively inform development planning and implementation, to understand the perspectives and conditions of people affected, to develop strategies that will engage them, to screen out risks and maximize benefits – and to open up opportunities for local stakeholders to shape and influence developments. This unfolding narrative elucidates practitioners' hard-won experience in formulating and applying methods for social assessment that aim to make social actors central to development investments.

Yet these methods may have different meaning to different actors. Should such methods be viewed as ad hoc, once-off research techniques? Used more systematically, are they intended primarily to serve and support economic growth objectives? Are they most useful as a means to avoid social instability? Are they a means of demonstrating international citizenship credentials? Do they represent an attempt to render sociological knowledge technical, making it a 'scientific' management tool? Are they productive only in the context of an SIA regulatory framework that requires prediction of social externalities for predetermined investments – thus identifying the winners and losers? Are they intended to support social development objectives, however defined? And, in the transposition from research to praxis, do they permit the logic of social research to survive the logic of development?

Social researchers venturing into this terrain find themselves at awkward intersections between competing paradigms, barely recognized political processes, institutional demands and disjunctures between the global and the local. How do they navigate such complex terrain? How does their 'expert knowledge' compare with the often messy realities, and what happens in encounters in transposition of expert knowledge to specific situations? These questions open up a new,

needed space for reflexivity amongst practitioners. Without an understanding of the context in which such methods are applied, their potential and pitfalls cannot be understood.

This volume as a whole encapsulates the experience of social researchers engaged in addressing such questions. Drawing together a group of leading practitioners of methods for social assessment and SIA in development discourse in the Asia region, particularly China, this volume allows them to reflect upon the context of their encounters. The authors elucidate their perceptions of the state of social assessment and the gaps between policy objectives and on-the-ground experience. They elucidate how they have explored the possibilities of applying sociological knowledge, navigated the often competing expectations and aspirations attached to project investments and drawn upon their experience to imagine possibilities for future directions.

This volume is not a social assessment manual or handbook – many are already available.[3] Nor does it intend to detail the chronological history of SIA as practised globally; nor social assessment as conducted by borrower corporations, agencies and states; nor social analysis as practised in specific development organizations – these histories have been at least partially documented.[4] Instead, this volume selects some key points in the trajectory of sociological endeavour within the developmentalist configuration that has both set the context in which social analysts work in international development organizations, and mediated their interactions with people and communities.

This volume has three parts. The introduction, by Susanna Price, reviews some key milestones in the application of sociological knowledge in development policy and practice, both globally and in relation to emerging practice in China specifically. It explores synergies between civil society, development practitioners and scholar-advocates in expanding the normative terrain in which development unfolds. It anticipates the critical question addressed in the conclusion: Do socially informed approaches lead to better outcomes for people?

Part 1 of this volume then addresses the genesis of social assessment as the conscious application of sociological methods, tools and approaches to maximize benefits for social actors through participative social strategies. Focusing on application in development contexts, against a background of shifting narratives of development discourse, the authors explore how such forms have resonated in the public (Cernea) and, increasingly, private (Kemp and Owen) spheres. Aaron Dennis and Gregory Guldin then address some political realities in practice, recognizing the possibility of creating potential benefits and liabilities for different groups of stakeholders through social assessment. The next two chapters focus on the application of social assessments in community-based projects in Asia generally (Kathryn Robinson and Andrew McWilliam) and in East Timor specifically for agricultural planning purposes (Andrew McWilliam et al.).

Part 2 of this volume focuses on China as a significant target of attention. China's government and private investment fuel extraordinary growth, both in

China and, increasingly, abroad, with rapidly expanding Chinese investment and a flourishing Chinese aid profile that uses projects as the primary modality of delivery. Chinese leaders express intentions to achieve 'balanced' growth and a 'harmonious society'. What might this mean for project investment planning and management? In this volume Western and Chinese scholars and practitioners illuminate emerging practices in social assessment in China, highlighting the potentials and the risks of engaged social research. Li Kaimeng identifies some of the challenges from the state's perspective, elucidating recent initiatives to require forms of social assessment for feasibility studies and social risk assessment. Bettina Gransow analyses the conceptualization of social risks in development investments in terms of future-oriented sustainability strategies. Xiao Jianliang and David Arthur present a fascinating case of community monitoring of infrastructure investments, whilst Wang Xiaoyi reflects on social issues in pastoral management.

Development-forced displacement and resettlement feature in the remaining two chapters. Scott Ferguson and Wenlong Zhu suggest strategies for strengthened social impact assessment in resettlement planning, taking account of recent government-initiated efforts at standard setting. Yu Qingnian and Shi Guoqing explore the unfolding of different negotiating perspectives in resettlement planning.

The conclusion of this volume constitutes a postscript linking the conceptual Part 1 with the China cases in Part 2. It scrutinizes the record of social assessment in achieving better outcomes for people and explores some interactions between China's growing international portfolio of project investments and developments in China, underlining some challenges for social analysts in the context of changing global architecture. Two recent events, both with significant global implications, highlight the new challenges: the establishment, firstly, of China's first IFI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (October 2014); and, secondly, a civil society outcry that the World Bank's safeguard review and update will progressively weaken IFI standards, especially in terms of momentum towards a shared human rights agenda. Both events, which are still unfolding, sharpen the contextual framework for this volume.

We are grateful for comments received on one of the draft chapters from Irene Bain in Beijing and Bettina Gransow in Berlin, and for editing support from Geoffrey Swete Kelly, Zazie Bowen, Helen Parsons and the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. We emphasize, however, that all contributing authors take responsibility for views expressed in their respective chapters.

The English titles of Chinese publications follow the official Chinese translations.

Susanna Price
Kathryn Robinson
College of Asia and the Pacific
Australian National University

Notes

1. The IFIs considered here include the World Bank Group and regional multilateral development banks, including the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Inter-American Development Bank, amongst others.
2. Because the legal personality of IFIs entails a responsibility for their conduct, IFIs have sharpened their focus on relationships with their member states, other international organizations and third parties by clarifying accountability (Suzuki and Nanwani 2006). Once third parties like civil society organizations were allowed to participate in the decision-making process of international institutions, accountability mechanisms 'fundamentally altered the relationship between international organizations on the one hand and private individuals and groups on the other' (ibid.: 188). Whilst IFI inspection panels and other accountability functions work to check internal compliance rather than the compliance of borrowers, applying them in borrower countries serves to emphasize the original policy standards to which they refer.
3. Some examples of manuals, handbooks and guidelines for SIA as practised globally are Momtaz and Kabir 2013; Mikkelsen 2005; Becker and Vanclay 2003; Burdge et al. 2004; Taylor, Goodrich and Bryan 2004: Interorganizational Committee on Principles and Guidelines for Social Impact Assessment 2003;. For development organizations specifically see Reitbergen-McCracken and Narayan 1998; World Bank 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005; ADB 1994; 2007, 2009; 2010, 2012; IFC 2003, 2007, 2011. For China-specific manuals see CIECC 2002, 2004; Gransow and Price 2007.
4. The development of SIA internationally is reviewed, e.g., by Finsterbusch et al (eds.) 1990; Becker 1997; Barrow 2000; Burdge 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Esteves et al. 2012; Vanclay 2003. The history of social analysis and related policies at the World Bank is documented, e.g., by Brown 1997; Cernea 1995, 1996, 1997, 2005; Cernea and Kudat 1997; Francis and Jacobs 1999; Davis 2004; Kagia 2005; Coudouel, Dani and Paternostro 2006; Dani and de Haan 2008; Rich, 2013. For review of social analysis in regional multilateral development banks, see Harrison and Thomas 2003 (Caribbean Regional Development Bank).

References

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 1994. *Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects*. Manila: ADB.

———. 2007. *Handbook on Social Analysis*. Manila. Retrieved 1 July 2011 from http://www.adb.org/Documents/Handbooks/Poverty_Social/default.asp.

———. 2009. *Social Analysis in Private Sector Projects*. ADB: Manila.

———. 2010. 'Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations', in *Operations Manual*. OM C3/BP. Retrieved 1 July 2011 from http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Operations/OM-C3.pdf.

———. 2012. 'Handbook on Poverty and Social Analysis: A Working Document'. Manila: ADB. http://www.adb.org/documents/handbook-poverty-and-social-analysis-working-document.

Barrow, C.J. 2000. *Social Impact Assessment: An Introduction*. London: Arnold.

Becker, H. and F. Vanclay (eds). 2003. *The International Handbook of Social Impact Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Bebbington, A.J., et al. (eds). 2006. *The Search for Empowerment: Social Capital as Idea and Practice at the World Bank*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.

Becker, Henk A. 1997 *Social Impact Assessment: Methods and Experience in Europe, North America and the Developing World*, UCL Press.

Brown, J.C. 1997. 'Direct Operational Relevance of Social Assessments', in M.M. Cernea and A. Kudat. (eds). *Social Assessments for Better Development: Case Studies in Russia and Central Asia*. Washington D.C.: World Bank, pp. 21–31.

Burdge, R. 2002. 'Why is Social Impact Assessment the Orphan of the Assessment Process?' *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 20(1): 3–9.

———. 2003. 'Benefiting from the Practice of Social Impact Assessment', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(3): 225–29.

Burdge, R.J. et al. 2004. *The Concepts, Process and Methods of Social Impact Assessment*. Middleton: The Social Ecology Press.

Cernea, M.M. (ed.). 1991. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, Second edition. Washington D.C.: World Bank Publication.

———. 1995. *Social Organization and Development Anthropology: The 1995 Malinowski Award Lecture*, Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monograph Series No. 6. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1996 and 1997. 'Sociological Practice and Action-Research on Population Resettlement', Parts I and II in *Journal of Applied Sociology*. Second Edition. New York and London: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–14, 105–23.

———. 2005. 'The Ripple Effect in Social Policy and Its Political Context: Social Standards in Public and Private Sector Development Projects', in M.B. Likosky (ed.), *Privatising Development: Transnational Law, Infrastructure and Human Rights*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 65–103.

Cernea, M.M. and A. Kudat (eds). 1997. *Social Assessments for Better Development: Case Studies in Russia and Central Asia*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC). 2002. *Guideline of Investment Project Feasibility Study*. Beijing: Electric Power Press.

———. 2004. *Manual on Social Assessment in Investment Projects in China*. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Coudouel, A., A.S. Dani, and S. Paternostro. 2006. *Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of Reforms: Lessons and Examples from Implementation*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Dani, A. and A. de Haan (eds). 2008. *Inclusive States: Social Policy and Structural Inequalities*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Davis, G. 2004. *A History of the Social Development Network in The World Bank, 1973–2002*. Social Development Paper No. 56. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Esteves, A.M., D. Franks and F. Vanclay. 2012. 'Social Impact Assessment: The State of the Art', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*. Retrieved 12 June 2012 from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14615517.2012.660356.

Finsterbusch, K., J. Ingersoll, and L. Llewellyn. (eds.). 1990. *Methods for Social Analysis in Developing Countries*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

Francis, P. and S. Jacobs. 1999. *Institutionalizing Social Analysis at the World Bank*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Gransow, B. and S. Price. (eds). 2007. *Turning Risks into Opportunities: Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China*. Beijing: China International Engineering Company Research Series.

Harrison, J. and Thomas, M. 2003. 'SIA in a Regional Development Bank: The career of a Concept'. *Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal*; 21 (2) 155–61.

Hunter, D.J. 2010. 'International Law and Public Participation in Policy Making', in D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter (eds.). *International Financial Institutions and International Law*. Netherlands: Kluwer International, pp. 199–238.

International Association of Impact Assessment (IAIA). 2003. 'Social Impact Assessment International Principles', Special Publication Series No. 2. Retrieved 1 July 2011 from http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/SP2.pdf.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2003. *Good Practice Note on Social Dimensions of Private Sector Projects*. Washington, D.C.: IFC.

———. 2007. 'Handbook on Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets'. Washington, D.C.: IFC. Retrieved 2 September 2011 from http://www.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StakeholderEngagement_Full/$FILE/IFC_StakeholderEngagement.pdf.

———. 2011. 'Update of IFC's Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Access to Information Policy'. Retrieved 10 March 2012 from http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/fca42a0049800aaaaba2fb336b93d75f/Board-Paper-IFC_SustainabilityFramework-2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

Kagia, R. (ed.). 2005. *Balancing the Transformation of the World Bank Development Agenda under James D. Wolfensohn 1995–2005*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

McNeil, D. and A. St. Clair. 2011. 'The World Bank's Expertise: Observant Participation in the World Development Report, Equity and Development', in D. Mosse (ed.), *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Mikkelsen, B. 2005. *Methods for Development Work and Research: A New Guide for Practitioners*, Second Edition. London: Sage.

Momtaz, S. and S.M.Z. Kabir., eds. 2013. *Evaluating Environmental & Social Impact Assessment*. New York: Elsevier.

Mosse, D. (ed.). 2011. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Oliver-Smith, A. 2010. *Defying Displacement: Grassroots Resistance and the Critique of Development*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Reitbergen-McCracken, J. and D. Narayan. 1999. *Participation and Social Assessment: Tools and Techniques*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Rich, Bruce. 2013. *Foreclosing the Future: The World Bank and the Politics of Environmental Destruction*. Washington D.C.: Island Press.

Taylor, C.N., C.H. Bryan, C.G. Goodrich. 2004. *Social Assessment: Theory, Process and Techniques*. Middleton, WI: The Social Ecology Press.

Vanclay, F. 2003. 'International Principles for Social Impact Assessment', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(1): 5–11.

World Bank. 2003a. *A User's Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 14 July 2011 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-1121114603600/12685_PSIAUsersGuide_Complete.pdf.

———. 2003b. *Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved 15 July 2011 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-1168615404141/Social+Analysis+Sourcebook+FINAL+2003+Dec.pdf?resourceurlname=Social+Analysis+Sourcebook+FINAL+2003+Dec.pdf.

———. 2004. 'Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects'. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2005. 'Social Development Strategy: Empowering People by Transforming Institutions'. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Abbreviations

ACCESS	The Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AGR	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
ANU	Australian National University
AusAID	(Former) Australian Agency for International Development
CD	Community Development
CDD	Community Driven Development
CDS	Community Development Scheme
CIECC	China International Engineering Consulting Corporation
CPRF	The Community Peace and Restoration Fund
CSCIIP	Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Community Support Programme
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CWSSP	Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FPIC	Free, Prior, Informed Consent
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAIA	International Association for Impact Assessment
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Financial Institution

M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Ministry of Environmental Protection
NDRC	National Development Reform Commission
NGO	Nongovernment Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMS	Operational Manual Statement
OPM	Operational Policy Memorandum
PACAP	Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program
PALS	Philippines-Australia Local Sustainability Program
PM&E	Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSIA	Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
RISN	Research Institute for Standards and Norms
RMB	Renminbi, the People's Currency, (China) the primary unit is the yuan
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
SD	Sustainable Development
SDPC	State Development Planning Commission (Now NDRC)
SEPA	State Environmental Protection Agency
SIA	Social Impact Assessment
SLA	Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
SOE	State-owned enterprise
SOL	Seeds of Life
TA	Technical Assistance
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
¥	Chinese yuan (currency unit)

INTRODUCTION

Making Economic Growth Socially Sustainable?

Susanna Price

'Growth first' approaches to development theory and practice have social consequences. These consequences may emerge in focal sites for project interventions that generate specific social costs that markets cannot necessarily resolve. Social practitioners in the development domain invoked sociological knowledge and approaches to show how project success often depends upon factors that are initially invisible, overlooked, unquantifiable. Despite contested terms of engagement in development discourse, social practitioners find growing convergence among flourishing ideas for poverty reduction, gender equity, rights, participation and empowerment. This introduction sets out some milestones in this trajectory as a basis for the following chapters.

China's development path since 1978 exemplifies the theme of 'growth first', with subsequent reengagement with sociological knowledge when the social effects of that growth presented a challenge to cohesion and future growth. Some unique characteristics of the terms of Chinese reengagement with sociological knowledge have emerged, even as governance and planning modes evolve with China's massive post-1978 transformation. This introduction explores this reengagement within China, while China's global sociological practice features in the conclusion.

Sociological Knowledge in the Development Domain

What Is Social Assessment?

Forms of participative social assessment, social analysis and social risk management, as 'texts' representing policies, procedures and guidelines, comprise an inte-

gral element of the business practices of international financial institutions (IFIs) and, increasingly, private sector operations. This introduction explains how these forms developed and intersect with globally practised forms of social impact assessment (SIA), which increasingly feature in countries' regulatory practice. The formal articulation and importance of the 'texts' reflect varying institutional configurations, mandates, cultures and histories – and the dynamic interplay between institutional policy objectives and operational pressures to lend.

The World Bank, for example, defines social analysis as a method for assessing whether country programmes and lending proposals – including projects – will contribute to equitable social and economic development through measures 'to sustain the gains of economic development' by strengthening inclusion, empowerment and security (2003b: vii–ix). Five entry points are social diversity and gender; institutions, rules and behaviour; stakeholder engagement; participation; and social risk mitigation. 'Social assessment', meanwhile, is the term used to describe the borrower's similar examination of the project's likely social sustainability and actions taken to enhance it (ibid.).

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), in support of its poverty reduction and social development objectives, conceptualizes social analysis as a means to prepare country partnership and regional strategies, scope all projects, flag social issues and ensure that each project design 'maximizes social benefits and avoids or minimizes social risks, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups' (ADB 2010). This analysis applies to ADB operations in both the public and, increasingly, private sectors. Regarding issues of gender, stakeholder engagement, resettlement, indigenous peoples or labour, participative social analysis may result in time-bound, costed and monitorable measures or plans to be carried forward into project implementation and beyond.

Reflecting a policy framework of sustainable risk management, the World Bank Group's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), uses the term 'social due diligence' to describe the actions its client private sector companies take to identify risks and impacts, based on recent social baseline data in the project zone of impact. Using 'social assessment', clients then establish and maintain an Environmental and Social Management System that includes policy, identification of risks and impacts, design and management of time-bound and budgeted measures, organizational capacity, emergency preparedness, stakeholder engagement and monitoring and review for the life of the project, in accordance with the IFC's Performance Standards (IFC 2011).

Forms of social analysis and social assessment support the application of social safeguard policies. The ADB and several other regional multilateral development banks (MDBs) use the term 'social impact assessment' for this specific purpose (ADB 2009). Social safeguards include variations on the World Bank's long-standing policy on involuntary resettlement (World Bank 2002), originally approved in 1980, which seeks to reorder outcomes for people displaced by de-

velopment projects – who thus risk impoverishment – by providing for their fair compensation and rehabilitation through resettlement plans. This policy and the World Bank's 1982 policy on indigenous peoples comprise part of 'social safeguards' that have circulated to other multilateral development institutions and to bilateral donors.[1] This includes certain IFIs that provide private sector financing,[2] as well as private sector self-regulatory voluntary codes such as the Equator Principles for financial institutions. Equator signatories adopting this credit risk management framework for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions[3] undertake to meet the IFC's social and environmental performance standards, including standards on involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples (IFC 2007, 2011).[4] This now includes ensuring the free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous peoples to projects that will impact on traditional lands or cultural heritage, or cause displacement (IFC 2011).

For private companies operating in emerging markets, the IFC conceptualizes social assessment in terms of identifying risks early and managing them actively throughout the life of a project. This continuous management approach 'creates broader social support for the investment, reduces risks and uncertainties, helps maintain a "local license to operate," and enhances the reputation of a company' (IFC 2003). The rationale is that ultimately, 'economic development cannot be successful if it is not sustainable, and sustainability cannot be achieved without taking into account the social aspects of an investment. Therefore, promoting the social wellbeing of local communities is an explicit objective of development' (ibid.).

How and why did such standards evolve for these forms of analysis, broadly termed 'social assessment' or 'participative social assessment'?[5] How are they perceived, both within and outside their institutions? How effectively do they support the poverty reduction, social risk management and social development objectives often held by the institutions that promote them? In their transposition through development processes in development institutions, do they still embody recognizable sociological knowledge? And how do practitioners work with them on the ground? In search of answers, this part of this introduction explores some of the origins, drivers and dynamics of social assessment and their future prospects. A second part then explores the emergence of forms of social assessment in China. The conclusion to this volume examines the record in social assessment, reviews recent developments in China and globally and highlights certain challenges ahead.

Contested Terrain

Development has long been contested terrain. An economic growth paradigm, in various shades, has dominated development planning for decades, challenged

by alternative perspectives. Voices of people adversely affected by development investments are increasingly magnified through hyper-connected global movements. The relationship between the social science disciplines and development work has been hotly debated: should anthropologists, for example, critique, reluctantly participate in development activities, or advocate for the poor (Lewis 2005)? This question's focus on agents in turn raises issues of the parameters in which they make their choices and their position regarding social research in the context of the prevailing paradigms of development. Social researchers can take – and may seek to reconcile – all three of Lewis's seemingly opposing positions.

As observers, social researchers have long critiqued mechanistic views of development as a series of modernization sequences moving towards Western standards and institutions (Gardner and Lewis 1996; Arce and Long 2000). They have questioned whether development, as currently constructed, can address the dynamics of poverty and inequality – despite, or indeed because of, long-standing avowed intentions to help the poor. Depicted as a parallel universe, Apthorpe's allegorical Aidland is a site where 'expert knowledges' about aid delivery emerge through refracted processes, and where the right questions are seldom posed to address the social parameters of poverty and inequality (Apthorpe 2011: 214–16).

Following Foucault, social scientists have analysed development in terms of the relationship between 'discourse' – defined as fields of knowledge, statements and development practice – and the wider power relations that serve to maintain existing power structures. Since the 1980s, deconstructing these relations has characterized debates around post-modernism and development (e.g., Ferguson 1990; Gardner and Lewis 1996; Escobar 1997).

Social researchers, through their close encounters with communities impacted by policies and projects, are well placed to observe the disjunctures between development objectives and their outcomes. Ferguson famously charted the differences between development planners' intentions and their effects in Lesotho, showing that the effects were barely recognizable from the original intentions because the planned interventions operated through complex but unacknowledged social and cultural structures. The unintended consequences of repeated project failures extended state and agency power in social fields, depoliticizing development whilst transforming social and economic relations into technical problems amenable to managerial practice (Ferguson 1990: 20).

De Sardan rejected overgeneralizations that would 'tend to produce a caricature or *reductio ad absurdum* of the "developmentalist configuration" … a "narrative" of Western hegemony bent on denying or destroying popular practices and knowledge', calling for 'empirical enquiry into the real processes of the various types of development action' that would illuminate the 'incoherencies, uncertainties and contradictions which are nonetheless inscribed in development institutions' and their continuously shifting policy and strategy (de Sardan 2005: 5). His 'developmentalist configuration' comprises a 'complex set of institutions,

flows and actors for whom development constitutes a resource, a profession, a market, a stake or a strategy', dominated by 'deciders, politicians, technicians, idealists, managers, militants and prophets' (ibid.: 2–3). In this configuration, the logic of development expertise may overwhelm the logic of social research – yet the configuration is not monolithic. Gaps between objectives and results arise as developmental policies and projects roll out, oversimplifications characterize objective-setting and clichés abound as agencies seek to reassure their programmes' resource providers. The developmentalist configuration harbours unfolding ambiguities.

Globally Connected Synergies

On this contested terrain, internationally recognized social assessment standards have emerged through unexpected synergies, fuelled by scholarly critiques based on ethnographic research, grass-roots protests triggered by people suffering development's costs, and the work of internal advocates. The impetus to disseminate social safeguard policies came largely from transformative grass-roots protest movements increasingly linked to global agendas, drawing upon cases of displacement and impoverishment in contentious circumstances, such as the landmark Narmada Dam case in India (Oliver-Smith 2010; Rich 2013).

Uncovering repeated case studies of failed projects during the 1960s, social researchers sought explanations. Why were social processes, social risks and social relations being ignored, when they were so obviously critical to project failure or success? Development institutions packaged investment projects as a key form of intervention, but many projects lacked any strategies to address their own significant social opportunities and costs. Insofar as planners, ruled by a paradigm of economic determinism, considered 'social factors' at all, they viewed them as messy elements, illogical tradition or constraints on progress that did not fit neatly elsewhere – 'merely the residual, inexplicable, or problematic aspects of development' (Francis and Jacobs 1999: 1 fn. 2). In 1970 Apthorpe asked whether this category entitled 'social' was simply the 'troublesome knob on the development machine marked "the human factor" which was twiddled wrongly, inadequately, or not at all, and therefore the "non-economic variables" were left out of the account' (1970: 7). Social researchers began mapping the social terrain to make it visible and comprehensible in planning terms. The concept of social organization in local spaces provided the framework for this mapping (ibid.).

Development discourse, as expressed by the influential World Bank Group, was converging with these efforts. Narratives positing a linear process of developing countries 'catching up' with the developed world were abandoned in the 1970s in favour of a focus on redistribution with growth and, later, basic human needs programmes. This shift called for greater understanding of local communities and their responses to development interventions. But although this new

orientation invited a more sympathetic view of social spaces, 'culture' still signified a potential constraint to progress. In 1975 the bilateral aid agency USAID issued guidelines for social soundness and institutional analysis in project appraisal in developing countries,[6] recognizing cultural and institutional factors affecting adoption rates and distribution of benefits.

The World Bank social specialists went beyond recording project failures to issue a challenge: 'putting people first' should be the starting point, the centre and the end goal of each development intervention (Cernea 1985, 1991: xiv). 'Putting people first' focused attention on social actors, conceptualized as clients, users, intended beneficiaries or target groups – or, alternatively, people in the way of projects who would bear the losses. It implied taking several steps beyond critique and analysis of the social costs of development; collating practices – good and bad alike – gleaned from ethnographic investigation; and consciously constructing methods for applying sociological knowledge to project preparation in an institutional context. These became detailed methodologies for analysing project-specific social dynamics, risks and opportunities involving social actors. 'Putting people first' meant scaling up those methods to formulate policies. In chapter 1 in this volume, Cernea reflects upon efforts to explain and activate often unquantifiable variables – namely, sociological perspectives, approaches and knowledge – in an institutional environment that favoured the quantifiable and measurable being dominated by 'technocratic and econocratic biases'.

In a move later described as 'conceptually pathbreaking' although not systematically implemented (Dani 2003: 8), the World Bank listed social analysis, along with economic, financial, technical, institutional and environmental analysis, as an integral element of project appraisal in its Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.20 (World Bank 1984). Whilst acknowledging (Cernea and Kudat 1997: 6) that full compliance with the new guidelines would require 'profound changes in staff work patterns', Cernea recalled (personal communication, July 2011) that OMS 2.20 was a

> paradigmatic change in conceiving and designing projects; it aimed at actually tailoring the design and content of projects to the kind of populations those projects were intended to serve. We didn't use big words at that time, but in essence, it was a radical change from the way projects were 'manufactured' before, in a cookie-cutter manner, toward designing projects (and project content) meant to match and 'fit' the local social structure, and the 'structure of needs' of the given project population.

The World Bank's involuntary resettlement policy guideline of 1980 used sociological knowledge to identify, mitigate and manage displacement risks in an attempt to keep displaced people from becoming casualties. Sociological knowledge subsequently contributed to a rich literature on resettlement model building (Price 2009). By contrast, its 1984 project appraisal statement utilized sociological knowledge to elicit and sustain support from people singled out as the in-

tended beneficiaries of a project, especially where their support was necessary for project success. In any case, regional MDBs and international and bilateral donors began adopting guidelines on social analysis as an integral part of project planning and appraisal (e.g., ADB 1993; AusAID 1989).

Social Analysis and Poverty Reduction

Social analysis found multiple new shades of meaning in the context of fast-evolving policy agendas. By the 1980s, development discourse had shifted to fiscal austerity under structural adjustment, and in the late 1980s the neoliberal preference for market rule began to prevail over formal development planning.[7] Programmes for structural adjustment and market rule proved uneven in their outcomes.[8] The Washington Consensus had waned by the mid-1990s. Intense public protest campaigns confronted the World Bank Group about the social costs arising from development interventions (Oliver-Smith 2010), whilst private capital flows, exceeding aid flows to developing countries for the first time, challenged the pre-eminence of developmental institutions.

Social analysis achieved prominence in the resultant shift to a 'post-Washington Consensus'[9] of inclusive poverty reduction and good governance in the 1990s. This broadened vision of development objectives employed new terms – 'sustainable, egalitarian, and democratic' – and encompassed improved living standards and social protection (Stiglitz 1998). Influential global events had amplified conceptualizations of the ultimate purpose of development. The United Nations (1987) Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future*, had linked population pressure with environmental issues and human rights. In the early 1990s, the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index expanded the focus on gross national product to include social welfare and equity by measuring gross domestic product per capita, life expectancy and educational attainment. At the Copenhagen UN World Summit for Social Development in 1995, governments reached 'a new consensus on the need to put people at the centre of development, pledging to make the conquest of poverty, the goal of full employment and the fostering of social integration overriding objectives of development' (UN 1995). The 2000 UN Summit on World Development foreshadowed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN 2001), which dropped full employment and social integration from the 1995 formulation but nonetheless focused on people as the ultimate beneficiaries of a social development agenda. Ratified by governments and agencies around the globe, the MDGs set out certain universal rights and entitlements.[10] Amongst certain IFIs, these changes sparked a widening of the terrain of development objectives.

ADB, for example, significantly broadened its policy 'text' in the years 1995–2000, updating early policies on women to refer instead to gender and development, and NGOs (ADB 1998b) and elaborating new policies on involuntary

resettlement (ADB 1995a); the inspection function (ADB 1995b) and indigenous peoples (ADB 1998a). These efforts culminated in ADB's 1999 declaration of an overarching policy on poverty reduction, comprising three complementary 'pillars': pro-poor, inclusive economic growth; social development; and good governance. Conceptually, social development achieved a status on a par with economic growth, encompassing human capital development, social capital development, gender and social protection (ADB 1999).

By 2004, the World Bank had, in its official view, reinvented itself through a new business model encompassing a comprehensive development framework designed to make people and poverty reduction central, prioritize partnerships and promote knowledge (Kagia 2005). This broadened social development agenda drew upon the work of internal practitioners. The bank's World Development Report of 2000/2001 (World Bank 2001), contested within the organization (Mosse 2011), nonetheless set an agenda of poverty reduction through opportunity, empowerment and security.

Moving from the project level to macro-level engagement, the World Bank developed analytical tools to inform pre-project analytical work to deepen understanding of potential opportunities and constraints to civic engagement. These required analysis of poverty and social dimensions in advance as a basis for modifying policy and institutional reforms to be more pro-poor (Johnson 2005). The agenda also moved from preoccupation with risk mitigation, through establishment of safety nets for policy-based loans, to proactively community-driven developments by 2000. Maturing partnerships with representatives of civil society, such as nongovernment organizations (NGOs), were to be reflected in a strengthened enabling framework with civic engagement and social accountability. This was to form a basis for multi-stakeholder participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which also depended upon government partnerships for their realisation (ibid.).

The new business model subsumed the social development agenda of poverty reduction and social justice under the process of economic growth (St. Clair 2006; Mosse 2011). As a tangible commitment to poverty reduction, the World Bank, along with numerous other agencies including the ADB[11] and governments, adopted the MDGs in 2001 and engaged in a regional MDG partnership with UN agencies. The World Bank and ADB, amongst others, had both already adopted explicit poverty reduction objectives (World Bank 2004; ADB 1999; OECD 2006). The new model envisaged the World Bank as harmonizing, or aligning, aid processes between development institutions, partly to simplify procedures.[12]

Meanwhile, the IFC's standards for its private sector activities were critiqued as lower than the World Bank's. After several painful project cases (Oliver-Smith 2010), such criticism led the IFC to adopt the Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Disclosure Policy ('Sustainability Framework') in 2006. This signalled the IFC's intent to shift from satisfying

a set of prescriptive requirements to taking an 'outcomes-based' approach by requiring client companies to engage with host communities early on, to build constructive relationships and to maintain them over time through environmental and social management systems.

Beyond Environmental Impact Assessment

These new 'texts' were intersecting, meanwhile, with developments in environmental impact assessment (EIA) and its associated process of SIA. From 1970 on, and again spurred by scholars' and activists' efforts to predict project impacts on people, EIA and later SIA, formally linked the prediction of social impacts to the process of investment planning in the U.S. regulatory framework.[13] SIA required prediction, before a project's approval, of its likely impacts on human, cultural and physical environments, together with description of mitigative actions to address social risks, in an environmental impact statement.[14] By the late 1980s, many governments were establishing EIA frameworks. This legislation usually formed a starting point for SIA, and some developed countries have enacted the necessary SIA agency regulations and procedures (Burdge 2003).[15]

The 1989 'Pelosi Amendment'[16] in legislation passed by the U.S. Congress required U.S. Executive Directors at the World Bank and all the regional MDBs to abstain or vote against any proposed action with significant environmental effects if it had not received an appropriate environmental assessment, or if the assessment had not been available to the executive directors and the public for 120 days before a vote. This amendment was credited with helping to establish environmental policies and procedures in these organizations. The '120 day rule', which extended to social safeguard plans, gave stakeholders an opportunity to read and comment on the documents before their approval.

Wider application into new global spaces later took SIA beyond its early focus on predicting impacts and protecting personal and property rights in advance (Vanclay 2003), to propose a range of applications – within international, bilateral or national organizations and corporations – or to apply them outside any regulatory framework (Esteves, Franks and Vanclay 2012). SIA is still only starting to realize its potential for determining which interventions should proceed and how they should do so (Esteves et al. 2012).[17] Next to biophysical assessment, SIA may appear less developed, with it's less certain scope, definitions, legal status and requirements and regulatory underpinnings; and it's shifting administrative responsibilities. The lack of expertise among regulators also constrains development. This uncertainty, in turn, limits SIA practitioner's scope to venture beyond secondary data to explore a wide range of methodological approaches that address social complexities directly.[18] Uncertainty undermines the basis for community engagement, limiting participatory strategies to incremental project improvement or, at worst, to project legitimization (ibid.). Uncertainty

may leave analysts with insufficient time and resources to address complex social data 'subsets' – socio-political, socioeconomic, cultural, socio-environmental, health, and demographic variables, for example. Although the number of practitioners is increasing globally, uncertainty undermines their capacity to influence policy and programming levels of decision making. Special interest groups may capture the process (Barrow 2000); whilst nontransparent decision making may undermine the intent of public participation (Burdge et al. 2004; Tang, Wong and Lau 2008: 59).

In response, practitioners have sought to widen the scope of SIA. To this end, the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) launched international principles for SIA (IAIA 2003; Vanclay 2003), which still supported regulation, but also advocated efforts by communities, governments or corporations to undertake their own SIAs outside a regulatory framework as a participative planning exercise to shape and address their own development objectives (Becker and Vanclay 2003: 2–3).[19] The principles encompass processes of analysing, monitoring and managing intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, as well as any social change processes triggered by planned interventions, going beyond projects to policies and programmes. The ambition was to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment through local knowledge, empowerment, poverty reduction, human rights and transparent process (ibid.).

Social specialists at the World Bank explored the possibility of taking social analysis 'beyond the environmental paradigm' to 'realize its full potential' in designing pro-poor and socially strategic development interventions (Dani 2003: 2). This meant centralizing social analysis as an integral part of development decision making, looking beyond project impacts to a field of policy reform that operates at the macro- and sectoral levels (ibid.: 11). Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) links social and economic analysis to form a basis for proactively selecting projects and programmes (ibid.: 2).[20]

Participation has moved from consultation and individual involvement in project implementation, to a broader empowerment agenda involving community-driven development, civic engagement and social accountability. Concern with separate 'marginal and disadvantaged' groups (displaced people, indigenous people and women) has shifted to a broader concern of vulnerability and social inclusion, aimed at establishing supportive policies and institutions. An initial focus on farmer production systems has shifted to studies of local-level institutions and social capital, issues of state and society, and problems of failed states and conflict. This shift paved the way for massive new loans targeting local levels of government and civil society under innovative new governance arrangements (Davis 2004).

Subsequent exploration of social policy approaches to overcoming structural inequalities through greater focus on citizens' rights and obligations to promote

equitable access to opportunities, raised parallels with human rights frameworks of the United Nations (e.g., Dani and de Haan 2008: 128–29). These studies explored how the effects of power relations and political economy at different levels result in poor targeting of benefits and elite capture (ibid.: xxiv), examining the way such power relations, inherent in social structures, affect governance as well as economic and social outcomes.

Summing Up

The social assessment 'texts' and processes of different institutions share common themes that arise from the synergistic endeavours of researchers and scholars, engaged activists and affected people, and are mediated through internal staff reformers. However, each institution shapes the specific scope, content and weight of these texts and processes according to unique institutional values, 'visions', cultures, practices, and procedures – and its experience with contentious cases.

The convergence of SIA with forms of social assessment may be viewed – and used – in different ways. Some practitioners perceive these approaches as a means to render likely social effects and impacts visible by mapping people, processes, relations, impacts and risks in social terms. This perspective is valuable, for example, in conducting project ex-post evaluation of impacts, but the results might then be overlooked in planning the next project. More instrumentally, these approaches can match projects to social contexts – intended user groups, for example – so as to extend and sustain economic growth. In support of social safeguards, its detailed socioeconomic survey work and participative strategies can help determine the best livelihood and living options for those displaced by development projects, for instance. Forms of social assessment and SIA may be deployed through the life of a project, as part of a social risk management system that encompasses mitigation planning. Backed by strong social development goals, social assessment may be used to identify broad strategies, for example, to select and to design dynamic lending activities that tackle the social dynamics of poverty and drivers of social exclusion. The conclusion to this volume will examine the extent to which such assessments generate successful outcomes.

Does any of this experience resonate in China? We now explore different perceptions as forms of social assessment emerge incrementally, building on longer traditions of Chinese social science research.

China: Addressing the Social Costs of Transformation

This volume focuses in particular on China, a key Asian country with a rapidly expanding presence in international project investment. China's growing overseas foreign direct investment has reached commercially and geo-econom-

ically significant levels. Its expanding foreign aid programme concentrates on grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, primarily in project form. Its approaches to project investment planning, therefore, resonate both in China and beyond its borders. As a key investment modality both at home and abroad, projects are potential flashpoints for heightened contestation on environmental and social impacts and sustainability.

Having consciously set aside social equity objectives since 1978 to first pursue economic growth, China is now confronting the social consequences of that decision by exploring new strategies, including forms of social assessment and SIA, both nationally and internationally. Nationally, this means use of governance and planning strategies that take account of the social transformation arising from market-led strategies, and the opening of new social spaces.

This section begins with some key 'social contradictions' arising from China's growth. It then explores new directions in national governance and planning that will help to determine the processes and outcomes of recent initiatives in social assessment. These recent initiatives, encompassing trials in social assessment and SIA for selected projects, as well as new forms of social stability risk assessment, are examined below.

The 'Social Contradictions' of Economic Growth

China has, since 1978, selectively transformed the state and its processes to support market-led growth, industrialization and urbanization, and to align more closely with a range of international standards. This entailed selectively applying elements of the Washington Consensus (Stiglitz 1998) whilst extensively reorganizing state government. Ren (2010) characterized this process in China as a 'neoliberalizing synchronization' whereby a socialist government directs the economic system to be more compatible with global capitalist practices.

The government-initiated, single-minded quest for growth, which was designed to secure better living standards for the Chinese people, focused until recently on economic dimensions (Ren 2010) and significantly reduced poverty. Under President Jiang Zemin (1993–2003), GDP growth became the single most important performance indicator for local government officials (Zheng and Fewsmith 2008). Investment in project infrastructure as a basis for economic development led to certain high-profile, large-scale projects embodying national prestige – the Three Gorges project, for example (Gransow and Price 2007). Intensive spatial transformation, based on massive conversion of rural to urban land and driven by local governments' revenue needs, has increased the urban population from less than one-quarter to over half of the total population (Lin et al. 2014).

However, this state (re)building to support, selectively, the capitalist economic transformation has had its own distinct social effects – most notably re-

sulting from growing social mobility and inequality,[21] rising unemployment and underemployment, rapid urbanization,[22] loss of farmland and fears of food insecurity,[23] and environmental degradation and related health issues.[24] These profound changes are accompanied by social disorientation (Chen 2012), alienation and anomie emerging from a perceived sharpening of differentiation in social status, organization, roles and power structures, as well as in income and educational levels (Li et al. 2010).

Observers have viewed such social consequences through the lens of social stability, implying state action is necessary to resolve the resultant social contradictions. For example, Hu contends that the trend in which 'the rich get richer and the poor get poorer … will bear not only on social justice but also on social stability' (Hu 2011: 160). In this view the main risk to China's growth lies in 'disharmony between economic and social development. Economic development has resulted in many social problems and social contradictions that have yet to be solved' (ibid.: 20). Similarly, Arrighi observed that China's economic expansion, accompanied by rapid growth in income inequality within China, was both restraining the growth of the domestic market and causing social and political tensions that might jeopardize further growth. Recognizing government efforts to achieve a balance development between rural and urban areas, between regions, and between economy and society, he asked: 'What would this new emphasis amount to in terms of actual social reforms, and … will [it] succeed in making continuing economic growth socially sustainable?' (Arrighi 2005: 34).

Leung and Xu predicted that China's experience of 'one of the most rapid increases in income disparities in the world since 1978' (2010: 60) would lead to social destabilization through 'widening income and regional inequalities, rising unemployment and the emergence of urban poverty … higher risks of income loss due to social dislocations, insecure employment' (ibid.: 48). This would test the capacity of existing government-initiated social protection measures whose limitations, exacerbated by corruption, have caused pension benefits to decline while the costs of medical care, housing and education rise. The next section explores some popular responses to these changes.

Responses: Social Protest and Complaints

Escalating protests and complaints from affected people have fanned perceptions of instability and become 'normalized' (Chen 2012). Protests officially escalated tenfold in the 1993–2005 period, after which statistics ceased; the actual figures are probably much higher (Perry 2010; Horsley 2010). Reasons for protests include, in order of descending importance, land disputes, environmental degradation, labour disputes, fiscal recentralization (i.e., forcing local governments to generate revenue), the cadre evaluation system and institutional failure to address grievances (ibid.).

In the emerging discourse of legal rights, however, protestors go to great lengths to demonstrate their loyalty. For example, in the bourgeoning use of *xinfang* – a system of complaints based on letters and visits – complainers present their case in terms authorized, if not always enacted upon, by the state (Perry 2010: 23). In addition, traditions of protest that use folk stories, operas and lawsuits, amongst other vehicles, signal an interest in 'negotiating with an authoritarian state that takes such deferential expressions of popular discontent extremely seriously' (ibid.: 24–26). Thus challenged, the leadership has responded, for example by abolishing the agricultural tax in 2006 and, as explained in chapter 10 of this volume, introducing new directives in 2004 and 2010 designed to safeguard farmers in rural-to-urban land transfers.

Protesters recognize new opportunities arising from competition between departments exercising state power. This ambiguity in responsibilities gives the voices of the powerless entrée but does not seriously challenge the power asymmetries between the powerless and the elites (Chen 2012). The state's dominance and its power to intervene in the market and society are now filtered through multi-agent interactions, due not only to such competition but also to fragmentation, the rising power of local government and the growing demand for legal services from the market and from society (Li and Cheng 2013). In addition, an expanded organizational sphere and social space encompass new civil society voices and groupings. Rarely, however, do such groupings become 'professionalized' – most social protestors have consciously avoided sophisticated organization, preferring to remain in loose associations (Chen 2012).

Civil society actors therefore occupy a tenuous space. Tilt (2010: 156) defined civil society as an 'intermediate realm between family and the state characterized by collective action around shared values, interests and goals'. Dealing with 'public participation, trust, and regulatory transparency presents a problem in China where government respect for individual rights, and views is poor and citizens have little legal recourse to voice concerns about environmental problems' (ibid.). Yet despite the minimal formalized environmental movement, 'subtle, spontaneous ad hoc collectivities … cohere around shared interests regarding environmental problems' (ibid.) every day and undoubtedly exert pressure on regulators, suggesting that opportunities for creative strategies to effect outcomes exist at the margin. The next section explores new modes of governance that permit, and yet contain, these voices.

New Modes of Governance

Governmental technologies have been used to frame analysis of the relationship between the government of the state, the government of others and the government of people. In these terms, the 'conduct of conduct' rejects the top-down image of an elite that governs the masses (Kipnis 2011: 5). More important is

the relationship between government and subjects, and the 'manifold technologies through which we have been historically constituted, and, in turn come to constitute ourselves' (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 4). In this sense, neoliberal technologies of governing and self-governing may be analysed as a set of calculative practices that can be adopted without necessarily changing the entire state apparatus. China's governing strategy precluded dismantling the socialist apparatus; instead, it created space for people to exercise a multitude of private choices within political limits set by the socialist state (Ong and Zhang 2008: 2). Socialist rule appears reanimated by the infusion of neoliberal reasoning in what Ong and Zhang (2008: 4) have called a 'strategy of ruling from afar'. The mix of self-governing and socialist governing at a distance configures a space designated 'the new social' (ibid.: 4) and produced by the interplay of state interests with multiple self-interested actions. Here, in a break with the socialist ethics of the past, communities and individuals are urged to be 'self-responsible' (ibid.: 14). This approach focuses on the 'multiple connections between everyday practices and state policies' so that the social milieu is not conceived as independent of the state, but as constituted through interrelationships with it (ibid.: 13). In such interrelationships, place and context assume new importance for understanding the articulation between socialist rule, neoliberal principles and self-governing practices. This process has created new political and social formations, new sets of values and beliefs, new social identities and new subjectivities, highlighting the importance of culture (Liu 2004). Modes of production and consumption based on flourishing patterns of globalization and China's integration into the world market interact with novel cultural forms based on novel technologies, rapid mobility of information, images and sounds, in a milieu of transnational structures of communication and exchange (Damm and Steen 2008). Government has itself deployed culture – history, aesthetics and everyday life – for example, during the countdown to Hong Kong's return to the mainland, 'aimed at shaping Chinese citizens to develop and improve their capacities of right choices, becoming neoliberal, sovereign individuals' (Ren 2010: xv).

Highly influential but relatively narrow economic policies, such as fiscal discipline, tax reform, trade liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, legal security for property rights and the financialization of capital, initially resonated in China (ibid.). Yet the broader post-Washington consensus has also been influential. For example, a World Bank Report (1992) on governance and development led one Chinese writer to distinguish between 'power of government operating from top down … primarily through orders, statutes, bureaucracy and coercion' and 'power of governance', which operates 'mutually … primarily through collaboration, coordination, negotiation, social networking, identity and consensus' (Yu 2002 in Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 12). Hoffman (2009: 113) described the key role that international organizations, including the United Nations and World Bank, played in 'cataloguing, naming, and monitoring' en-

vironmental issues in China and in 'integrating market rationalities' into environmental governance with a 1979 act requiring environmental assessment for all construction projects. A 1993 notice additionally required all international projects in China to meet the requirements of international agencies, including, where relevant, for participatory social analysis (Tang, Wong and Lau 2008). Analysing moves away from command and control by government towards more neoliberal ways of governing migrant workers, Xu (2009: 38) found that 'Chinese integration into wider institutional arrangements has required adherence to numerous international standards, including business and labour regulations', producing 'a network of actors, both state and non-state and domestic and international, concerned with the governance of peasant migrants' (ibid.: 40). Xu credits the World Bank and United Nations with a recent shift from 'letting the market decide' to correcting 'market imperfections' by 'paying more attention to social aspects of the market economy, especially through governance', with social policy as an element of neoliberal practices in international governance (ibid.). The next section identifies concomitant shifts in the planning mode and the possibilities for social planning in this context.

Beyond Command Planning

From 1993 on, development planning, deprived of its pre-reform central role in target setting and resource allocation, was 'fundamentally transformed in terms of function, content, process, and methods' to master entirely new tasks in new ways (Heilmann and Melton 2013: 581). The five-year economic plan was transformed, reinvigorated, and in 1986 renamed the 'economic and social development plan', remaining central to public policy directions, coordination and oversight, including in sensitive spheres such as environment, social policy and land management.[25]

Initially set aside in pursuit of growth, social issues re-emerged in official discourse, assuming a more significant profile during and after the Sixteenth Party National Congress in 2002. President Jiang Zemin recognized income inequality in China in 2002 and disparities in access to social services, as did President Hu Jintao in 2007. Social problems could now be named and examined, whilst phrases such as 'putting people at the centre' reflected the conceptual reintegration of social issues into the development trajectory (Gransow and Price 2007: 4). The concept of 'ecological civilization', introduced in 2007 and incorporated into the Communist Party's constitution in 2012, offers a vision of a harmonious society sharing the fruits of development and safeguarding social justice and equity (CCICED 2013: 3). Starting with the Tenth Plan (2001–2005), Premier Wen Jiabao's government incorporated long-term social and environmental development programmes and programmes to mitigate urban-rural, interregional, socioeconomic, human-environmental, and domestic-international issues, that

is, 'imbalances and contradictions that the party is unwilling to leave to a free-wheeling evolutionary process' (Heilmann and Melton 2013: 585).

In a new initiative, the 12th Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2011–2015) was formulated through a lengthy but selective consultation process involving key think tanks. This 12th plan built upon the 11th five-year plan (2006–2010), which had expressed a shift from maximizing growth to promoting greater sustainability in a 'harmonious society' through balanced, sustainable economic and social development, including the goal of reducing regional and sectoral income inequality and increasing demand. These aims proved difficult to achieve, although most of the other technical targets were met. Though it retained ambitious economic growth targets, the 11th plan was the first to recognize certain limits to economic growth, promulgating instead the building of a 'harmonious society' prioritizing employment, social security, poverty reduction, education, medical care, environmental protection and safety. This included efforts to readjust the income distribution to narrow the income gap among different regions and social groups in order to achieve social equality (Xinhuanet 2005).

The 12th Five-year Plan addressed local government's critical role in implementing the Plan. Premier Wen Jiabao pointed to the 'outdated mindset and the GDP-oriented criteria for evaluating the performance of government officials as obstacles that might keep the five-year plan from being fully carried out. The central government would adopt new performance evaluation criteria for local governments and give more weight to the efficiency of economic growth, environment protection and living standards' (quoted in Zhang 2011).[26]

As Heilmann and Merton (2013) explained, the five-year plans are executed via thousands of sub-plans at the province, city or county level, and through special plans and macro-regional plans designed to reduce regional inequality through contracts between central and regional governments. Following a long-standing Chinese tradition, decentralized experimentation and discovery of new policy instruments are allowed. Ministries and local governments oversee their own programmes and experiment with policy ideas, within certain limits set at higher levels. Coordination, bargaining and negotiation over individual responsibilities and targets are generally extensive. Higher levels of government, which often engage outside experts to advise on progress, may choose to reassert their policy authority directly through policy revisions, or indirectly via influential performance evaluations.

Yet attempts to lessen inequality in Chinese society and address the social costs of development may conflict with the need to derive maximum economic and strategic advantage from the global economy (Knight 2008: 202). The dynamic planning system has scope for local initiatives, but efforts to achieve a more 'balanced' society are 'swamped by a cyclical intensity of the old pattern' of large-scale resource allocation favouring growth (Naughton 2010: 84). De-

spite top-down public policy reforms, systemic and structural features appear unchanged, notably at the critical level of local government spending, whereby the incentives of fiscal power and prospects for bureaucratic promotion still drive local government behaviour to expand local revenue by means of rapid growth (Li, this volume; Riskin 2010: 101). Because of increasing competing pressures on local government cadres, 'China's efforts at development planning have so far displayed a pronounced weakness in pursuing redistributive goals and improving the development potential of disadvantaged population groups' (Heilmann and Melton 2013: 615). The next section explores what this might mean for sociological knowledge application.

Sociological Knowledge in Planning in China

China's long-standing tradition of social field research offers a basis for shaping social action to promote modernization with Chinese characteristics (Gransow 2003; Guldin 1994). Zheng described a 'tortuous path' (2006: 19) of sociology (and anthropology) characterized by activity and then forced isolation. This path is marked by a recurring theme: indigenization of foreign theories and methods in light of 'Chinese social reality' (ibid. 19–20). Since the 1990s, a small group of social specialists has explored possible ways of conducting social assessments in China (Wang and Marsden 1993; RISN 1995; Gransow and Price 2007; CIECC 2004).

Zheng ascribed the origins of the term 'harmonious social development', which articulates a vision of a more socially aware, less destructive type of growth, to the Chinese discipline of sociology (2006: 34). Central government has called on specifically social and local forces to provide social services, thereby assisting the state in building the 'harmonious society' – under the auspices of the governing Party. Thus 'Chinese sociologists, demographers and statisticians are at the forefront in providing the expert knowledge required for a discursive and epistemological shift away from GDP oriented growth' with a new focus on inequality (Xu 2009: 46). Increasingly, social analysts participate in investment planning and appraisal preceding decisions on major state investment projects (CIECC 2004).

The naming of social problems has opened the door to new approaches: incremental steps to social risk mitigation mediated by 'Chinese social reality'. Since 1995 some social researchers have called for SIA, in its more inclusive international form, to improve social equity, enhance social inclusion and mitigate social risk through systematic public involvement in project investments (Tang, Wong and Lau 2008).

The fading of the pre-reform, planning-centric mindset into 'socialism from afar' unlocks possibilities for the emergence of more participative approaches in planning, as examined by Gransow, this volume. These may focus on 'social harmony' rather than individual empowerment. One legacy of central planning

processes, in which the state determined social interests, was an expectation that individuals should sacrifice for state interests. In rural areas, collective rather than individual rights have continued, for example, in land use. In this context participatory strategies may primarily aim to support project investment decisions already made rather than to canvas serious alternatives or to deal with tensions arising (Tang, Wong and Lau 2008). Planners may still view participative social assessment as an unnecessary expense, believing that they themselves hold the requisite expertise whereas affected communities lack the knowledge and capacity for participation; or as counterproductive because opening the door to public participation threatens to dilute their own discretionary power. Case studies in this volume show that new approaches are beginning to emerge, albeit unevenly.

From the 1980s, China's project investment planners initially adopted internationally-practiced methods for economic and financial project assessment, then EIA under the environmental regulatory system (CIECC 2004), and, from 1993, participatory social assessments for internationally funded projects. The EIA Act of 2003 expanded earlier laws, requiring participation in environmental management but not specifying how participation would be arranged and legally defended, nor social issues formally addressed (Tang, Wong and Lau 2008). Rapid industrialization means more financing is available for EIA and SIA, and local governments recognize the importance of 'harmonious development' for their own spheres (ibid.). Yet local governments have been challenged by the constraints on realizing SIA systematically: absence of understanding of SIA among key decision makers; absence of clear responsibilities and local regulations for initiating, approving and enforcing SIA; lack of incentives and time for rigorous and participative SIA; intense pressures to approve investments speedily, whereby EIA may be undertaken as a formality only after high-level project approval without consideration of alternatives; and lack of authoritative SIA methods, organizations and expertise (ibid.; Ren 2013; Zhao and Yao 2011; Li, this volume). In short, local government cadres are not held responsible for the adverse social impacts of their projects.

As Xiao and Arthur explain in chapter 8, a Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) Technical Guidance for Public Consultation in EIA was created in 2011; meanwhile, this Ministry's Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guideline of 2011 strengthens requirements for stakeholder engagement 'up front' and requires some pilot SIA for projects with construction impacts. Regulating these guidelines through the EIA framework, however, will be subject to the constraints identified earlier. Several authors in Part II of this volume express a range of views on the significance of the 2011 requirement, Wang (chapter 9) in relation to conservation projects, and Xiao and Arthur (chapter 8) in the context of traditional project decision-making processes. More generally, in chapter 7 Gransow explains how participatory approaches are enacted in varying contexts that affect the quality of outcomes for risk identification and management.

These developments follow a series of incremental steps towards social assessment in China over several decades. As Li explains in chapter 6, from 1993 various corporations and sector ministries developed methods and guidelines for social assessment in investment planning (e.g., Wang and Marsden 1993; RISN 1995; China Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation 1993; Chinese Research Association for Water Supply 1999; Civil Aviation Administration of China 1999; Ministry of Railway 2001). In 2002 China's paramount planning agency, the then State Development Planning Commission, now the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), endorsed a comprehensive guideline requiring participatory social assessments as an integral element of feasibility studies for certain investment projects (CIECC 2002). Li and Gransow, in chapters 6 and 7 respectively, explore this initiative, which probably constitutes the clearest, most comprehensive guideline of the purpose, methods and outcomes of social assessment in the Chinese context. Importantly, this document conceptualizes the aims of social assessment: acceptability among users, enhanced coordination between economy and society, streamlined implementation, higher returns and more generous project benefits, as well as mitigated risks, monitoring potential and dispute resolution mechanisms (CIECC 2002, 2004).

How would the investment management system, as transformed in 2004 (see chapter 6) address the 2002 guideline and its social development content? An NDRC 2007 format for Project Application Reports mandated both SIA and land use and resettlement impact assessment, undertaken at the project application stage, for key public and private sector projects. In chapter 10 Ferguson and Zhu explain these instructions' significance for both SIA and resettlement planning.

Since then, NDRC has issued Interim Measures (in 2012) and Report Requirements on Social Stability Risk Assessment for Major Capital Projects (Trial) (in 2013). In chapter 7, Li asks whether these requirements simply reflect the current overarching concern to reduce project-generated causes of social instability. Such risk assessment tools lack the wider mandate to achieve the social acceptability, benefit enhancement, streamlined implementation, comprehensive risk mitigation, dispute resolution and monitoring contained in the CIECC's 2002 formulation. As Gransow (2014) has pointed out, greater attention to socially sustainable project planning and implementation from the beginning may preclude the effort and expenses perceived as necessary 'to maintain social stability'.

Social Assessment in Land Transfers and Expropriation

Development-forced displacement carries a number of risks for the people affected through lost networks, housing, income or resources. It is not surprising that land disputes are a flashpoint for conflict in China, especially at rural-urban peripheries, where land politics increasingly dominate urban revenue generation strategies and drive the rapid conversion of rural land into urban land. Perry

(2010: 20) documented widespread, often violent land disputes arising when villagers contested 'lucrative sale of collective lands by corrupt village and township cadres who neglected to consult or adequately compensate their fellow villagers.' To ensure that authorities understand and address a sense of loss that goes beyond mere possessions to the very basis of culture, collective memory and identity, protesters use various forms of collective action: ritualized protests depicting narratives of suffering, petitions, documentation of losses (Oliver-Smith 2010). Politically skilful urban residents employ socialist slogans and demand justice and social protection from the Party (Hsing 2008: 69). Rural people, meanwhile, are less empowered legally and politically (Tang, Wong and Lau 2008).

These conflicts reflect differing rationalities and social constructions of land, which may at once represent a space of power and a revenue source for local government; a commodity for a developer; and food, livelihood, home, security in injury, sickness and retirement, and identity for a farmer (Yang 2012). An asymmetry of interest's results, as the relative bargaining power of the negotiating stakeholders is unequal. Yu and Shi (chapter 11) explore these differences in a fascinating case study. The vulnerability of land losing farmers – especially women, who marry outside their natal communities and thus generally have less secure use rights – has prompted calls for separate strategies to ensure their basic living, job training and social security, in addition to land compensation (Yang 2012).

The dynamics of land appropriation highlight the state's dual role: having formally established a leasehold land market in 1988 separating ownership from use rights, it also retains ultimate ownership of all land. Local governments, as the state's representatives, develop the land but simultaneously represent the rights of the people occupying that land. When agricultural land is converted to urban land on grounds of the 'public interest', its agricultural production value for compensation purposes is inevitably lower than its subsequent value as commercial land. Thus rural producers lose, whilst urban governments and often private developers gain (Lin 2009).

Recognizing the social risks of potentially increased rural-urban inequality, the State Council issued Urgent Notices in 2004 and 2010 to address the plight of affected persons. This has meant longer project lead times to ensure procedural compliance – although, as Ferguson and Zhu point out in chapter 10, the increased attention does not yet require full SIA or even systematic resettlement planning. The preoccupation with monetary compensation, which is determined by assets, not household vulnerability, is structurally insufficient to prevent impoverishment in all cases (ADB 2007), especially when rural householders are older, infirm, less well educated, less resourced or less well connected to alternative employment options.

To deal with the risks facing people displaced by project developments and land transfers, the central government has amassed urban, rural and sector-based

regulatory requirements for land acquisition, compensation and resettlement for displaced people. Preservation of arable land as the basis of food security as well as farmers' livelihoods has been a key concern throughout the 11th and 12th Five-year plans, with a binding target of zero cumulative change in arable land included in the 12th Five Year plan. However, a very broad definition of 'public interest' permits land acquisition for both public and private purposes. There is little requirement for resettlement planning or livelihood assistance, whilst 'people's right to know, participate, or appeal is frequently not respected' (ADB 2012: 10). Ferguson and Zhu take up these themes in chapter 10, cogently arguing a case for better and more systematic SIA as an integral part of resettlement planning and management in selected sectors.

Conclusion

Recent initiatives to integrate social dimensions into planning through social assessment and SIA in China present new opportunities for application of sociological knowledge to understand and address the social costs of development. Yet the initiatives also pose new challenges in their coordination and implementation: designation of responsibilities and formulation of local administrative regulations for initiating, approving, disclosing, involving public participation in, and effecting SIA; and coverage for non-major, non–state approved projects, especially locally initiated ones. Time, resources, understandings and permissions are needed for the participative planning mode; and sensitive management systems will allow monitoring, feedback and correction through the project life.

Part II of this volume holds chapters that explore planning changes, participatory experiences, and land acquisition and resettlement processes in China in greater detail, whilst the conclusion provides some closing remarks linking China's global practice with this introduction.

Notes

1. The policy spread to bilateral donors through Guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1992).
2. The IFC and ADB both require their private sector sponsors to meet their resettlement policy standards.
3. Signatory financial institutions undertake to apply the voluntarily adopted Principles where total project capital costs exceed US$10 million (retrieved 1 September 2011 from http://www.equator-principles.com/).
4. The IFC's updated Sustainability Framework with revised performance standards, approved by the IFC board of directors on 12 May 2011 (IFC 2011), was effective as of 1 January 2012.
5. Some practitioners have used the term 'social assessment' to signify social analysis with greater emphasis on participatory approaches, for example, as a 'methodology for incorporating an anal-

ysis of social issues and developing a framework for stakeholder participation in the design of a project' (Reitbergen-McCracken and Narayan 1999).

6. The guidelines required assessment of three main components: proposals' compatibility with local sociocultural conditions; likely spillover effects; and the distribution of effects among groups, both positive and negative (Barrow 2000).
7. The Washington Consensus, originating among economists from the United States, International Monetary Fund and World Bank addressing problems in Latin America in the 1980s, concentrated on a neoliberal paradigm addressing market-opening economic growth. Whilst economists differ on the exact formula for growth and stability (Cao 2005), a leading practitioner described this consensus as requiring liberalized trade, macro-stability and getting the prices right, whereupon markets could allocate resources efficiently, generating robust growth (Stiglitz 1998).
8. In 1997 the Asian financial crisis began to unfold in a region long considered a success story, with attendant questioning of the role of global capital flows and their social costs.
9. Though still basing their arguments on neoliberal economic fundamentals, some economists posited a post-Washington consensus in which working markets also required sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies to facilitate technical transfer and encourage transparency.
10. The MDGs are a set of eight time-bound, measurable targets for combating problems including poverty, hunger, disease, environmental degradation and discrimination against women. The goals are to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml.
11. ADB partnered with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP). The partnership also produces annual MDG updates and sector-specific reports for the region. Retrieved 21 May 2011 from http://www.adb.org/poverty/mdgs.asp.
12. Several international declarations (Rome 2003 and Paris 2005) 'committed the development community to harmonizing aid processes' (Johnson 2005: 41).
13. The U.S. National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969 was approved in 1970.
14. Recognizing that negative impacts from investments could reduce or outweigh their benefits, jeopardizing success and degrading environments on which communities depend, NEPA required the application of the social sciences, as well as the natural sciences, in advance (Burdge et al. 2004). This called for advance understanding of how people and communities would react to planned investments. Anthropological and sociological techniques would be used to collect baseline and follow-up data for population variables in the sphere of impact – demographic characteristics; community and institutional structures; political, social and community resources – and to predict likely changes in those variables based on comparative cases, modelling and expert testimony. Mitigative measures, such as compensation, were then designed to protect personal and property rights (ibid.).
15. Burdge (2003) includes Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. This book contends that several developing countries, including China and India in Asia, have introduced forms of SIA in certain circumstances.
16. The Pelosi Amendment, which owed its existence at least partly to NGO activity, became active in 1991 (Sanford and Fletcher 1998).
17. Practitioners of SIA have described it as a 'poor relation' in the United Kingdom planning regime compared to EIA (Glasson and Wood 2009: 283); as 'a discipline that still grapples with

credibility issues' (Rowan 2009: 185); and as subject to 'myths and misunderstandings' in that measuring social impacts increases the cost of projects and slows projects down (Burdge 2003).

18. See, e.g., SIA handbooks: Barrow 2000, Becker and Vanclay 2003, Burdge et al. 2004; Momtaz and Kabir 2013.
19. This meant moving away from the 'positivist/technocratic characteristics' to the broader, 'more democratic, participatory, constructivist International Principles' (Vanclay 2006: 12). These urged SIA practitioners to adopt an ethic of openness and accountability, equity, and defence of human rights, in which processes that 'infringe the human rights of any section of society should not be accepted' (Vanclay 2003: 9).
20. The World Bank's User's Guide on PSIA (World Bank 2003a) includes prior analysis of specific reforms' likely impacts, analysis during reform implementation and analysis of completed reforms. Prior PSIA is intended to inform the choice, design and sequencing of alternative policy options. During implementation, the monitoring of a reform and its impacts can lead to refinement of the reform, reconsideration of the pace/sequencing or institutional arrangements of the reform, or the introduction or strengthening of mitigation measures. Finally, after a reform's completion PSIA assesses its actual distributional impacts, helping analysts understand the likely impacts of future reforms.
21. Since 1978 income inequality has increased rapidly in China. In January 2014 the Gini coefficient was almost 0.5. World Bank website, retrieved 15 May 2014 from http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9.
22. China's urban population is estimated to have expanded from 172 million in 1978 to 691 million in 2011, with massive increases in built-up areas (Lin et al. 2014: 3).
23. China has only 8 per cent of the globe's arable land but must feed 20 per cent of the world's population, even as its population grows and consumption patterns change.
24. The rapid pace of urbanization fosters environmental degradation, lowering ambient air and water quality. China has seven of the world's ten most polluted cities (Lin et al. 2014). This harms people's health, including through contamination of food and medicine. Population growth and the aging of the population exacerbate gaps in health service provision, and lower-income groups lack access to health services, education and social security.
25. Heilemann and Melton (2013: 583) set out the basic purpose as to achieve "strategic policy coordination (prioritizing and coordinating state policies from an anticipatory, long-term, cross-sectoral perspective); resource mobilization (mobilizing and pooling limited resources to bring about structural changes identified by policy makers as necessary to achieve sustained economic and social development); and macroeconomic control (controlling the level and growth of principal economic variables to achieve a predetermined set of development objectives, prevent severe cyclical fluctuations, and contain the effects of external shocks)."
26. Recognizing that income increases had lagged behind economic growth, the plan's core goal was to build a fairer society, spreading wealth more evenly among China's 1.34 billion people, through increased spending on education, health care and public housing, and initiatives intended to narrow the wealth gap between the rich and poor.

References

Apthorpe, R. (ed.). 1970. *People, Planning and Development Studies: Some Reflections on Social Planning*. London: Frank Cass.

———. 2011. 'Coda: Alice in Aidland, A Seriously Satirical Allegory', in D. Mosse (ed.), *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 199–219.

Arce, A. and N. Long. 2000. *Anthropology, Development, and Modernities: Exploring Discourses, Counter-Tendencies and Violence*. London: Routledge.

Arrighi, G. 2005. 'States, Markets and Capitalism, East and West', *UNESCO International Seminar Alternativas Globalização, Rio de Janeiro, 8 to 13 October 2005*. Retrieved 11 May 2011 from http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/reggen/pp25.pdf

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 1993. *Guidelines on Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations*. Manila, Asian Development Bank.

———. 1995a. *Policy on Involuntary Resettlement*. Manila, Asian Development Bank. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/1995/involuntary_resettlement.pdf.

———. 1995b. 'Establishment of an Inspection Function'. Manila, Asian Development Bank.

———. 1998a. 'Policy on Indigenous Peoples'. Manila, Asian Development Bank. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/policy-indigenous-peoples.pdf.

———. 1998b. 'Policy on Co-operation with Non-Government Organizations'. Manila, Asian Development Bank. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-ngo-policy.pdf.

———. 1999. *Poverty Reduction Strategy*. Manila, Asian Development Bank. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.adb.org/themes/poverty/strategy.

———. 2007. *Capacity Building for Resettlement Risk Management: People's Republic of China*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

———. 2009. 'Safeguard Policy Statement: ADB Policy Paper'. Manila, Asian Development Bank.

———. 2010. 'Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations', in *Operations Manual*. OM C3/BP. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/OM-C3.pdf.

———. 2012. 'Legal Framework and Implementation Practices for Land Acquisition and Resettlement in the People's Republic of China', *Country Safeguard Systems Regional Workshop Proceedings Towards Common Approaches and Better Results 18–19 April, ADB Headquarters, Manila*: Asian Development Bank, pp. 10–11.

AusAID. 1989. *Social Analysis and Community Participation Guidelines*. Canberra: AusAID.

Barrow, C.J. 2000. *Social Impact Assessment: An Introduction*. London: Arnold.

Becker, H. and F. Vanclay (eds). 2003. *The International Handbook of Social Impact Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Burdge, R. 2003. 'Benefiting from the Practice of Social Impact Assessment', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(3): 225–29.

Burdge, R.J. et al. 2004. *The Concepts, Process and Methods of Social Impact Assessment*. Middleton: The Social Ecology Press.

Cao, L. 2005. 'An Evaluation of the World Bank's New Comprehensive Development Framework', in M.B. Likosky (ed.), *Privatising Development: Transnational Law, Infrastructure and Human Rights*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 27–64.

Cernea M.M. (ed.). 1985. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. (ed.). 1991. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Cernea, M.M. and A. Kudat (eds). 1997. *Social Assessments for Better Development: Case Studies in Russia and Central Asia*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Chen, X. 2012, *Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED). 2013. 'China's Environmental Protection And Social Development CCICED Task Force Summary Report' *CCICED 2013 Annual General Meeting, 13–15 November 2013*. Retrieved 10 April 2014 from http://www.cciced.net/encciced/event/AGM_1/2013agm/speeches2011/201311/P020131106443218117388.pdf.

China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC). [Zhongguo guoji gongcheng zixun gongsi]. 2002. '*Touzi xiangmu kexingxing yanjiu zhinan bianxiezu*' [Guideline for investment project feasibility studies], 2 vols (Chinese and English). The Compiling Group. Beijing: China Electric Power Press.

———. 2004. *Zhongguo touzi xiangmu shehui pingjia zhinan* [Manual on social assessment in investment projects in China]. Beijing: China Planning Press.

China Ministry of Railways. 2001. *Methods of Social Assessment on Railway Projects*. Beijing: 4th Bureau of Survey and Design, and State Development Planning Commission, Institute of Investment.

China Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation. 1993. 'Rules for Social Assessment for Oil and Natural Gas Projects'. Unpublished.

Chinese Research Association for Water Supply. 1999. *Guidelines on Social Assessment for the Construction of Water Resource Projects*. Beijing: China Ministry of Water Resources.

Civil Aviation Administration of China. 1999. 'Assessment Methods for Civil Airport Construction Projects'. Unpublished.

Damm, J. and A. Steen (eds). 2008. 'Postmodern China', *Chinese History and Society, Berliner China-Heft* 34: 130–48.

Dani, A. 2003. 'From Mitigating Impacts to Improving Outcomes', *New Directions in Impact Assessment for Development: Methods and Practice Conference, Manchester, 24–25 November 2003*. Manchester: University of Manchester.

Dani, A. and A. de Haan (eds). 2008. *Inclusive States: Social Policy and Structural Inequalities*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Davis, G. 2004. *A History of the Social Development Network in the World Bank, 1973–2002*. Social Development Paper No. 56. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

de Sardan, J.O. 2005. *Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social Change*. London: Zed Books.

Escobar, A. 1997. 'Anthropology and Development', *International Social Science Journal* 49(154): 497–515.

Esteves, A.M., D. Franks and F. Vanclay. 2012. 'Social Impact Assessment: The State of the Art', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*. Retrieved 12 June 2012 from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14615517.2012.660356.

Ferguson, J. 1990. *The Anti-politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Wiltshire: Cambridge University Press.

Francis, P. and S. Jacobs. 1999. *Institutionalizing Social Analysis at the World Bank*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Gardner, K. and D. Lewis. 1996. *Anthropology, Development and the Post-Modern Challenge*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Glasson, J. and G. Wood. 2009. 'Urban Regeneration and Impact Assessment for Social Sustainability', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 27(4): 283–90.

Gransow, B. 2003. 'The Social Sciences in China', in T. M. Porter and D. Ross (eds), *Modern Social Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 498–514.

———. 2014 'Reclaiming the Neighbourhood – Urban Redevelopment, Citizen Activism and Conflicts of Recognition in Guangzhou City', in *Contested Urban Spaces: Whose Right to the City?* Special issue, *China Perspectives* 2:17–25.

Gransow, B. and S. Price. (eds). 2007. *Turning Risks into Opportunities: Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China*. Beijing: China International Engineering Company Research Series.

Guldin, G. 1994. *The Saga of Anthropology in China: From Malinowski to Moscow to Mao*. Studies on Modern China Series. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Heilmann, S. and O. Melton. 2013. 'The Reinvention of Development Planning in China, 1993–2012', *Modern China* 39: 580.

Hoffman, L. 2009. 'Governmental Rationalities of Environment in Contemporary China', in E. Jeffreys (ed.), *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 107–24.

Horsley, J. 2010. 'The Rule of Law: Pushing the Limits of Party Rule', in J. Fewsmith (ed.), *China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hsing, Y. 2008. 'Socialist Land Masters: The Territorial Politics of Accumulation', in L. Zhang and A. Ong (eds), *Privatizing China: Socialism from Afar*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 57–70.

Hu, A. 2011. *China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

International Association of Impact Assessment (IAIA). 2003. 'Social Impact Assessment International Principles', Special Publication Series No. 2. Retrieved 1 July 2011 from http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/SP2.pdf.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2003. *Good Practice Note on Social Dimensions of Private Sector Projects*. Washington, D.C.: IFC.

———. 2007. 'Handbook on Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets'. Washington, D.C.: IFC. Retrieved 30 August 2011 from http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/938f1a0048855805beacfe6a6515bb18/IFC_StakeholderEngagement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

———. 2011. 'Update of IFC's Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Access to Information Policy'. Retrieved 10 March 2012 from http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/fca42a0049800aaaaba2fb336b93d75f/Board-Paper-IFC_SustainabilityFramework-2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

Jeffreys, E. and G. Sigley. 2009. 'Introduction', in E. Jeffreys (ed.), *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–23.

Johnson, I. 2005. 'Sustaining Development', in R. Kagia (ed.), *Balancing the Transformation of the World Bank Development Agenda under James D. Wolfensohn 1995–2005*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, pp. 40–47.

Kagia, R. (ed.). 2005. *Balancing the Transformation of the World Bank Development Agenda under James D. Wolfensohn 1995–2005*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Kipnis, A.B. 2011. *Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics and Schooling in China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Knight, N. 2008. *Imagining Globalisation in China: Debates on Ideology, Politics and Culture*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Leung, J.C.B. and Y.B. Xu. 2010. 'The Emergence of Social Assistance in China', in J. Midgley and K. Tang (eds), *Social Policy and Poverty in East Asia: The Role of Social Security*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 47–65.

Lewis, D. 2005. *Anthropology and Development: The Uneasy Relationship*. LSE Research Online Book Section. Retrieved 10 August 2011 from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/253/1/Anthropology_and_development_a_brief_overview.pdf.

Li, H. et al. 2010. 'Structural Strains during the Process of Social Change', *Social Sciences in China* 31(3): 50–68.

Li, X. and J. Cheng. 2013. 'Structural Constraints on Legal Change: Chinese Lawyers in the Interaction between the State, the Market and Society', *Social Sciences in China* 34(1): 58–77.

Lin, G.C.S. 2009. *Developing China: Land, Politics and Social Conditions*. London and New York: Routledge.

Lin, G.S., et al. 2014. 'Strategizing Urbanism in the Era of Neoliberalization: State Power Reshuffling, Land Development and Municipal Finance in Urbanizing China', *Urban Studies* Vol 20 (10)1–21.

Liu, K. 2004. *Globalization and Cultural Trends in China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Ministry of Environmental Protection. 2011. *Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guideline: Overview (HJ2.1–2011) Sector 7*, 8. Beijing: Ministry of Environmental Protection.

Momtaz, S. and S.M.Z. Kabir., eds. 2013. *Evaluating Environmental & Social Impact Assessment*. New York: Elsevier.

Mosse, D. (ed.). 2011. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Naughton, B. 2010. 'Economic Growth', in J. Fewsmith (ed.), *China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 71–90.

Oliver-Smith, A. 2010. *Defying Displacement: Grassroots Resistance and the Critique of Development*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Ong, A. and L. Zhang. 2008. 'Introduction: Privatizing China: Powers of the Self, Socialism from Afar', in L. Zhang and A. Ong (eds), *Privatizing China: Socialism from Afar*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 1–19.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1992. *Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement*. Paris: OECD. Retrieved 11 March 2012 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/27/1887708.pdf.

———. 2006. *Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Policy Guidance for Donors, Part V Infrastructure*. Retrieved 1 March 2012 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/46/36301078.pdf.

Perry, E.J. 2010. 'Popular Protest: Playing by the Rules', in J. Fewsmith (ed.), *China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 11–28.

Price, S. 2007. 'Social Assessment for Investment Projects in the People's Republic of China', *Development Bulletin* 18: 56–59.

Price, S. 2009. 'Prologue: Victims or Partners? The Social Perspective in Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement' in *The Asia–Pacific Journal of Anthropology* (TAPJA) Volume 10 No. 4, December, 2009. Special Focus Edition on Displacement and Resettlement, pp. 266–82.

Reitbergen-McCracken, J. and D. Narayan. 1999. *Participation and Social Assessment: Tools and Techniques*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Ren, H. 2010. *Neoliberalism and Culture in China and Hong Kong: The Countdown of Time*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Research Institute for Standards and Norms (RISN). 1995. *Operational Guidelines for the Social Assessment of Investment Projects in China*. Beijing and Swansea: RISN and Centre for Development Studies.

Rich, B. 2013. *Foreclosing the Future: The World Bank and the Politics of Environmental Destruction*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Riskin, C. 2010. 'Inequality: Overcoming the Great Divide', in J. Fewsmith (ed.), *China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 91–108.

Rowan, M. 2009. 'Refining the Attribution of Significance in Social Impact Assessment', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 27(3): 185–91.

Sanford, J.V. and S. Fletcher. 1998. *CRS Report for Congress Multilateral Development Banks' Environmental Assessment and Information Policies: Impact of the Pelosi Amendment*. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 20 August 2014 from http://congressionalresearch.com/98-180/document.php?study=MULTILATERAL+DEVELOPMENT+BANKS+ENVIRONMENTAL+ASSESSMENT+AND+INFORMATION+POLICIES+IMPACT+OF+THE+PELOSI+AMENDMENT.

St. Clair, A.L. 2006. 'The World Bank as a Transnational Expertised Institution', *Global Governance 12(1)*: 77–95.

Stiglitz, J.E. 1998. *More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving towards the Post-Washington Consensus*. Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economic and Social Research.

Tang, B., S. Wong and M. C. Lau. 2008. 'Social Impact Assessment and Public Participation in China: A Case Study of Land Requisition in Guizhou', *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 28: 57–72.

Tilt, B. 2010. *The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.

United Nations (UN). 1987. 'Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future'. Retrieved 30 September 2011 from http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.

———. 1995. *Final Report of the World Summit for Social Development*. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/116/51/PDF/N9511651.pdf?OpenElement.

———. 2001. 'Roadmap for Millennium Summit Goals', Press Release, P1/1380. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/sgreport2001.pdf?OpenElement.

Vanclay, F. 2003. 'International Principles for Social Impact Assessment', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(1): 5–11.

Vanclay, F. 2006. 'Principles for Social Impact Assessment: A critical comparison between the International and US documents', *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 26(1), 3–14. Retrieved 15 September 2012 from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2005.05.002.

Wang, C. and D. Marsden. 1993. *Social Analysis for Investment Projects*. Research Paper No. 3 (first draft). London: Overseas Development Administration (ODA).

World Bank. 1984. *Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.20*. Washington, D.C.

———. 1992. *Governance and Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved 12 August 2011 from http://publications.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=20725.

———. 2001. *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000090341_20070706133508.

———. 2002. *Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/toc2/CA2D01A4D1BDF58085256B19008197F6?OpenDocument.

———. 2003a. *A User's Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-1121114603600/12685_PSIAUsersGuide_Complete.pdf.

———. 2003b. *Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 15 July 2011 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-1168615404141/Social+Analysis+Sourcebook+FINAL+2003+Dec.pdf?resourceurlname=Social+Analysis+Sourcebook+FINAL+2003+Dec.pdf.

———. 2004. *Operational Policy on Poverty Reduction 1.00*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,contentMDK:20064696~menuPK:4564185~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html.

Xinhuanet. 2005. 'New 5-Year Plan to See Revolutionary Changes'. Retrieved 1 July 2007 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/11/content_3606848.htm.

Xu, F. 2009. 'Governing China's Peasant Migrants: Building Xiaokang Society Socialism and Harmonious Society', in E. Jeffreys (ed.), *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 38–62.

Yang, Y.-F. 2012. 'Basic Land Security and Livelihood: A Study of Basic Compensation and Social Security Policy for Land Expropriated Peasants in China', *Public Administration and Development* 32: 385–401.

Zhang, Z. 2011. 'China Adopts 5-year Blueprint, Aiming for Fairer, Greener Growth'. *Xinhuanet English News*. Retrieved 21 May 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/14/c_13777814.htm.

Zheng, H. 2006. 'The Radical Changes of Chinese Society and the Stable Progress of Chinese Sociology', in T. Jing, M. Sasaki and P. Li (eds), *Social Change in the Age of Globalization*. The Annals of the International Institute of Sociology 10. Leiden: Brill.

Zheng, Y. and J. Fewsmith (eds). 2008. *China's Opening Society: The Non-State Sector and Governance*. London and New York: Routledge.

Zhao, Y. and Y. Yao. 2011. 'Lagging Social Impact Assessment for Public Project Management in China: Inappropriate Method or Lack of Interest', *Fourth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering*. Wuhan, Hubei China. October 17–18, Wuhan: IEE Computer Society. bife, pp. 508–11.

Part I

Engaged Social Research in Shifting Development Narratives

Introduction to Part I

Susanna Price

How do social researchers utilize sociological knowledge to craft new approaches to project investments? In chapter 1, entitled 'Landmarks in Development: The Introduction of Social Analysis', Michael Cernea relates, with the immediate impact of a first-person account, the pioneering efforts to theorize and secure support for the 'conceptually path breaking' World Bank Operational Manual Statement 2.20. Sociological knowledge had been neglected in this economic fortress, even though unquantifiable social factors often determined project failure or success. Cernea explains how he and his colleagues realized that research utilizing sociological knowledge, if conducted in isolation, would be ineffective in shaping development interventions – and in preventing the social tragedies that resulted from poor design. He shows how they went from analysis of outcomes to rule-making for new proposals by writing the 'text' for an appraisal standard that projects would need to meet before their approval.

Cernea describes in detail the institutional resistance to new ideas, and the need to consciously tailor recommendations to organizational parameters and procedures – to 'learn for myself what kind of "social appraisal" would be effective and usable in this context, as distinct from what might appear "sociological" but would be of little use to the rest of my colleagues in the project team.' He confirms the continuing challenge of applying sociological knowledge in this complex terrain, reflecting on the impacts of the OMS 2.20.

In chapter 2, 'Social Science and the Mining Sector: Contemporary Roles and Dilemmas for Engagement', Deanna Kemp and John Owen ask how social science has affected large-scale private sector development, with a particular focus on mining in the Asia Pacific region. Initially taking a broad theoretical and historical perspective, they trace the emergence of contemporary concepts of sustainable development and corporate social responsibility and their resonance in the mining sector. Moving from the theoretical to the practical, the authors examine where and how social science–informed research is commissioned and undertaken, and its recommendations implemented (or not) in the extractives sector. They find a range of processes, from project start-up studies such as social baselines and impact assessments, to systems that are put in place to 'manage'

social impacts and development contributions. Writing from first-hand experience as social researchers in mining, the authors illuminate some methodological and practical challenges that social researchers and community practitioners face on the ground. To increase the mining industry's capacity to implement corporate social responsibility, they argue, social researchers should aim to generate dialogue and understanding of social dynamics, thus moving beyond the current 'predict and problematize' model of social research towards one that engages with the politics and discourse of organization. The authors conclude by exploring some 'new frontiers' being forged in the ongoing quest to ensure that social researchers influence large-scale private sector development in positive, constructive, powerful ways.

In chapter 3, titled 'Practising Social Development: Navigating Local Contexts to Benefit Local Communities', Aaron Dennis and Gregory Guldin draw attention to the political context of social assessment, arguing that whereas practitioners think of their tools as neutral and universal, such tools are culturally embedded, reflecting a specific set of Western values including equality, openness and direct action. Uncritical application of these tools and approaches may raise political and social resistance that can curtail their intended benefits and even marginalize vulnerable groups. The authors argue that practitioners must be aware of political realities and considerate of local contexts, recognizing the potential to create benefits and liabilities for different groups of stakeholders. Having acknowledged that the practice of social development is inherently political and predicated in non-universal values, social development practitioners are better positioned to negotiate local social and political contexts to the benefit of local communities. Practitioners are then better equipped to make the hard choices in each case – in what circumstances, for example, should they withdraw on grounds of doing more harm than good to local people? Drawing upon examples from China, Russia, the Philippines and Indonesia, the authors explore the political context of social analysis.

The final two chapters exemplify social assessments that demonstrably achieve intended goals but nonetheless face uncertain futures. Chapter Four addresses the application of social analysis in community oriented approaches. In 'Striving for Good Practice: Unpacking AusAID's Approach to Community Development', Kathryn Robinson and Andrew McWilliam review community development (CD) approaches in AusAID projects in the Asia Pacific region. Despite domestic political changes, the agency staff remained committed to CD approaches as important tools for economic and social development that address poverty alleviation and good governance. A review of seven substantial CD projects provides opportunity to reflect on and iterate the underlying CD principles: their creative application has achieved significant outcomes relating to community empowerment, demands for good governance, poverty alleviation and service delivery in diverse social, economic and political contexts. The authors examine these

principles and social scientists' significant role in promoting and ensuring that CD practice continues.

In chapter 5, 'Seeds of Life: Social Research for Improved Farmer Yields in East Timor', Andrew McWilliam and colleagues demonstrate social assessment's contribution to food security, a topic of great importance to East Timor, one of Asia's poorest nations, where people rely on near-subsistence rain-fed agriculture. This chapter offers critical perspectives on the field-based social component and its contribution to project achievements in a participatory programme of crop trialling and production aimed at developing low-input, high-yield staple food crops with local Timorese farmers. McWilliam et al. conclude that this project offers an important opportunity to demonstrate the utility and relevance of social research and especially ethnographic approaches. The holistic, localized nature of social and ethnographic enquiry highlights interrelated aspects of contemporary agriculture – focusing solely upon individual farm production, for example, overlooks significant reciprocal exchange relationships between Timorese households that are critical to supporting food security and local resilience. Social assessment and research made a difference by generating a framework for insights into the cultural complex that constitutes Timorese farming practices. This offers farmers themselves a creative opportunity to play a significant role in determining their own agricultural futures.

1

Landmarks in Development
The Introduction of Social Analysis

Michael M. Cernea

In November 2012, the State Council of China announced its decision to institute a mandatory assessment of 'social instability risks' involved in all of China's major new industrial projects *before* such projects are started (Bradsher 2012). The Chinese leadership's decision reflected a deep concern that social instability risks could lead to political instability. Protests and public incidents directly related to major projects had been taking place for years (about 90,000 incidents in 2006, for instance). The *New York Times* cited Chinese press reports that such risks had caused 'increasingly violent environment-related protests which forced the suspension or cancellation of chemical plants, coal-fire power plants, and a giant copper smelter' (ibid.). In announcing the new policy the Minister for the Environment, Zhou Shengxian, stated: 'No major projects can be launched any longer without social risk evaluations. By doing so, I hope we can reduce the number of mass incidents in the future' (ibid.).

Assessment of social instability risks, however, is just one element of social analysis for development projects: protection against social instability risks cannot result just from assessment disjointed from other social risks and variables, but requires full-scale social analysis. This chapter addresses *when* and *how* sociological analysis and social appraisal were introduced into the World Bank's operational policies and in its development projects, and *to what extent* the World Bank furthered the introduction of social analysis in China's development projects. My discussion of these questions is based on the documentary record, analyses by other researchers, and my first-hand involvement as both actor and 'participant observer'. The World Bank's adoption of social analysis is still a little known page of history.[1] Few researchers have reflected on the far-reaching significance of this

major turnaround in the World Bank's performance of its role as a development agency.[2] As this volume proves, and as Susanna Price noted elsewhere, there have been 'formative efforts by pioneering social researchers in development institutions to step into the realm of policy-making to construct processes for project preparation and management through social analysis' (Price 2012: 361).

This change did not happen overnight. The path towards this new operational policy, which is more responsive to the needs of the poor and vastly increases the sheer efficiency of investments for inducing development, has been nonlinear. Blocked by huge obstacles inside the World Bank and suffering setbacks before it succeeded in dislocating prior practices and obsolete norms, it continued to sustain setbacks even once in place. Just a glimpse of the 'aidnography' (Mosse 2011) of that process and its constant negotiations, renegotiations, and confrontations can illuminate lessons as significant as analysis of the end result. The terms 'public sociology' (Burawoy 2005) or 'public anthropology' (Borofsky 2000; Lamphere 2004) were not in use during the 1980s, when the 'formative efforts' described in the following pages took place. The pioneering effort to restructure the World Bank's methodology of conducting development interventions today is an early example of social scientists' 'public militancy' to change the ways of a major international aid agency.

Advance in Strategy and Onset of a Deep Discrepancy

In its first twenty years or so, The World Bank, created shortly after World War II, had little interest in the social fabric of the countries where it invested. But in 1973, the bank's then President Robert McNamara made a major change, reorienting the bank's lending towards poverty reduction in the developing world. In the prior decade, scores of former colonial countries had become politically independent, but their national economies were in tatters. Poverty was rampant and deepening. The World Bank's new policy defined its 'target group' as the poorest 40 per cent of those countries' populations. However, despite this declaration of new strategic intent, the bank did not change its methodology of 'project making' to address the poorest populations. The critical path towards achieving this strategic goal was uncharted and had to be fathomed by trial and error. Two macro-dimensional books by economists offered some conceptual guidance: Hollis Chenery et al.'s *Redistribution with Growth* (1974) and Uma Lele's *The Design of Rural Development* (1975). Only the second of these two was notably sensitive to some local sociocultural and demographic variables.

The global Rural Development Division was created with a mandate to design a new type of project: the 'integrated rural development project', oriented to the rural poor. Recruited from outside the bank into that division as its 'rural sociologist', I was privileged to become involved in that experiment by filling the World

Bank's first-ever full staff position for a professional sociologist, seen at the time as an 'experiment within an experiment'.[3] Palpable enthusiasm for 'doing the new thing', distinct from routine post-World War II infrastructural reconstruction, was growing inside the institution. Yet we had little theoretical or operational knowledge.

On the operational side of project work, the bank's procedural norms remained frozen and obsolescent. Procedures for validating a project as worthy of an investment loan were outlined in its 1971 Operational Policy Memorandum (OPM) 2.20 on Project Appraisal (World Bank 1971: article 4), which predated the bank's reorientation to poverty reduction. Despite its narrowness, its preamble pompously proclaimed that 'the Bank's approach to the appraisal of projects reflects its character as a development institution' (ibid.). The OPM held not the faintest hint that social analysis or social knowledge might be necessary in development work, yet its prescriptions were entrenched in the bank's books and its staff's mindsets. The dysfunctional result was a deep discrepancy, a textbook case of old procedures trumping and undermining new policy. Changing the methods of 'project-making' was a huge challenge, because it meant changing the World Bank's 'character as a development institution'.

The Long Road to Institutionalizing Social Analysis

In 1984, more than a decade after its reorientation to poverty reduction, the World Bank finally formally included social analysis in its policy and project work methodology. It still was the first international financial institution to adopt such a policy change in its operations. The landmark World Bank document embodying its decision was the Operational Policy Statement (OPS) 2.20, with a new Operational Manual Statement (OMS) on Project Appraisal 2.20, issued on 6 February 1984 to replace the 1971 OPM. This historic, highly consequential innovation in the World Bank's status as an agency ushered in a crucial shift in the bank's objective, which went from *economic* development to the broader *social* development. It replaced, deeply restructured and reformed the preexisting narrow methodology. This change gradually reverberated worldwide; in 1986 China became the first member country to express serious interest in the new policy.

Starting from a Puzzling Document

In the very first week of my work at the World Bank in summer 1974, I was sent on two appraisal missions. I was handed an 'Operational Policy Memorandum' promisingly titled 'Project Appraisal' and told it contained all I needed to know about appraisals. The 1971 OPM policy statement defined the bank's investment aim narrowly: to 'make a maximum impact on the *economic development* of its

member countries' (World Bank 1971: article 1; my emphasis). Consistent in its economic blinkers, it further stated that 'the aim of appraisal is to examine the *economic need* which a project is designed to meet' (ibid.: article 2; my emphasis).[4] *Social* needs and objectives, let alone integrated *social development*, were not on the radar.

That document left me puzzled. I understood, more or less, what Project Appraisal was, and that a set of professional analyses – economic, financial, technical and commercial – had to be carried out. But that set of prescriptions held nothing that I felt professionally able to do, as a sociologist; that is, the document did not appear to require what I *did* assume I could usefully do for a project. I asked the mission leader what I would specifically contribute, as a sociologist. Disarmingly, he answered that he didn't exactly know either but suggested I observe what the others do: 'Listen to our discussion of the project issues that come up, and propose what a rural sociologist could contribute.' My apprenticeship therefore had to start in the trenches of actual appraisal work, rather than from the bank's formal documents.

It was not just the 'technology' of doing social analysis that was missing from the policy documents: the gap was philosophical and cognitive, for they contained no theory or social philosophy about the role of people as development actors. Development sociology and development anthropology were new fields of research and thinking. Concepts such as 'consultations', 'information' and 'participation' were not yet part of the development vocabulary. The World Bank did not yet have an articulated methodology for inducing social change, except through financing and purchases of technology. The intellectual backpack of the bank staff at large rarely held knowledge of social sciences other than economics. Many development projects were deeply tributary to reductionist paradigms – 'econocentric, technocentric or commodocentric development models' (Cernea 1996). The projects' expected beneficiaries were not seen as active participants but as 'targets', passive recipients, although the imperfect concept of 'target group' – the idea of focusing on a specific social group – was a great leap forward.

Kardam (1993), who examined the history of social analysis in the bank, noted that in the 1960s and early 1970s, 'sociological issues did not naturally fit into the goals and procedures of the World Bank. Neither had the major donors pressured the Bank to incorporate sociological issues into their operations. … Yet, since the 1970s, the Bank has begun to respond to concern about the human impact of its projects' (Kardam 1993: 1777). The part of the bank most likely to clash with the old procedures and innovate them was the Rural Development Division and more broadly, the central Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (AGR).[5] In experimenting with ways to reduce local poverty, this division needed to understand the roots and patterns of local poverty, particularly its immediate causes, and the content and composition of the 'black box' that was the 'lower 40 per cent'. It became largely my task to determine what kinds

of knowledge about the area population would be most useful in crafting a project's technical and economic content to respond to their needs and unrealized capabilities.[6] This became the way I reflected and learned for myself what kind of 'social appraisal' would be effective and usable in this context, as distinct from what might appear 'sociological' but would be of little use to the rest of my colleagues in the project team.

In the 'trenches' of those projects, this direct work preparing coherent documentation and inputs into their appraisal and supervision became the testing ground for identifying and selecting consequential social variables and processes. These began to cohere into cases and patterns of project-relevant social analyses and 'social appraisals'. Challenges differed significantly from one project to the next. Not everything that was interesting sociologically was necessarily relevant for the project. Conversely, sometimes idiosyncratic social features had to be explored and explained. These, too, needed a place in the mapping and preparation of a project.

Indisputably, it was the World Bank's economists and agriculturalists who took the leading role in promoting poverty reduction projects. Lending for agriculture represented one-third of the bank's total lending, and poverty was seen as primarily a rural problem, to be addressed through projects to enhance small farmers' productivity. Agro-technical knowledge and economic science were the principle knowledge employed in most poverty-oriented projects

Perceiving this as incomplete, I set a goal of providing the projects with additional knowledge about rural community, modes of social organization, stratification and production, so as to illuminate the constraints embedded in existing traditional social structures and practices. Such 'social constraints' were often taken as given and unchangeable, but I thought that appropriate intervention could reform not only physical technologies but social infrastructures as well. Each project needed a 'project social strategy': a social communication and involvement strategy, to enable those packages of additional knowledge to be accepted and absorbed (Cernea 1983, 1985.).

Six Key Road Signs for Social Analysis

My advocacy for introducing social analysis in the process of project preparation started in earnest in 1977, when I realized the limitations of working only on individual projects. Only in 1984 did the idea of including 'social appraisal' in bank policy at last prevail. Meantime, many in-house intellectual battles unfolded. We undertook other social policy initiatives, but the activities that directly advanced social analysis of projects were the following:

a) Defining 'minimal' and 'optimal' requirements for social information in appraisal reports;

b) Formulation and promotion of a Model of Entry Points for Sociological Knowledge in the Project Cycle;
c) The establishment of the bank's Sociological Group in 1977 and its subsequent expanding membership and in-house influence;
d) The formal adoption of the first two explicit World Bank 'social policies': on involuntary population resettlement (February 1980); and on indigenous populations in the areas of World Bank-assisted projects (1983);
e) Preparation and submission in 1982 of a template for 'sociological appraisal' of projects;
f) The establishment of a World Bank task force for writing a new Operational Manual Statement (OMS) on Project Appraisal, and the management decision to adopt it in February 1984.

Insiders and Outsiders: Organized Interaction

Outsiders' help with this agenda came through two different channels. Academic social scientists studying development processes were often happy to speak at the bank. We invited scholars with knowledge about bank projects that had failed or succeeded in confronting complex social issues, so that cases at both ends of the performance spectrum could be deconstructed as lessons for bank staff.

In the same period, the international NGO movement was intensifying in the U.S. and developing countries. Many were critical of numerous bank practices and failures. Our Sociological Group actively elicited internal discussions about these critiques. Outside criticism of the bank by academics and civil society organizations helped to chip away in-house resistance to our internal advocacy. In fact, the expanding community of social scientists inside the bank was not shy about pointing to the 'justified criticism' levelled at many World Bank projects. Insiders taking on this risky role must diplomatically manage their in-house credibility capital.

Fighting Strong Formal Norms with Weak Semiformal Guidelines

Two circumstances in particular prompted me to raise social analysis as an issue to be addressed generically at the policy level rather than on a project-by-project basis. First, my involvement in a substantial number of field missions focused on preparing and appraising new development projects constructed around poverty reduction objectives led me to realize that the bank's methodology held no explicit guidance for understanding, approaching, and defining a 'target group', especially when there was no sociologist on the team. Most of my colleagues were professional economists, agronomists, engineers, transportation specialists and so forth, and thus lacked the professional skills to analyse and describe the

characteristics of the project population; moreover, the bank did not recommend a method for doing this. The absence of such guidelines and a lack of time for this work resulted at best in haphazard, incomplete descriptions.

Second, I realized from my observations reviewing appraisal reports that this was a systemic, bank-wide problem. The central AGR department where I was based receiving all the appraisal reports the bank produced for agricultural projects in all regions for internal review and comments to meet quality norms.[7] I found a recurrent disproportion between the comparatively plentiful detailed economic and agro-technical analysis, and equally documented and informed analysis of target populations' social and cultural characteristics. This bank review process became a good vehicle for promoting novel ways of project work.

In October 1978 I wrote a detailed prescriptive memorandum, emphasizing that the appraisal reports fell short of grasping the social issues of projects during their preparation, and that this had repercussions on the design and quality of projects. I proposed two levels of requirements: *minimal* and *optimal*. The memorandum, addressed to my department managers and colleagues, was intended to structure and unify the policy-based guidance that my central AGR department was offering to operational divisions, and to get everybody in AGR to speak with one voice in positing social requirements to operational colleagues in the regional departments.

My 1978 memorandum[8] proposed that AGR reviewers of the required yellow cover appraisal reports request the inclusion of social information meeting a set of either minimal or optimum requirements regarding the target group. My department supported this initiative and addressed such requests to the regional operational divisions. Though formal procedures (OPM 2.20) did not demand such data, bank staff tended to take these requests seriously, as final versions of the appraisal report had to be cleared by AGR.

My October 1978 memorandum stated:

> During the review of yellow-cover appraisal reports, attention should be paid to … the following 4 minimally required social aspects:
>
> **Minimum Requirements:**
>
> (a) Sociological characteristics of the population in the project area (demographic data, patterns of social organization, farmers' productive strategies);
>
> (b) Social constraints impeding the social and economic development of the target group and adequate action for addressing these constraints;
>
> (c) Social engineering provisions to create a supportive pattern of social organization for the new technological and economic development financed by the project;
>
> (d) Communication strategy for informing the area population about, and involving it in, the implementation of the project.

Further, it set out optimum requirements for situations where more systematic knowledge about the local population was indispensable:

Optimum Requirements:

…

(I) Socio-economic analysis of the typical family production unit in the project area

(II) Characterization of community organization, power and authority structures, customary law relevant to project activities, and strategy for promoting participation

(III) Discussion of the current (traditional) and alternative (project proposed) incentive systems to achieve behavioural change and planned project goals

(IV) Analysis of the appropriateness of proposed technologies in terms of the local socio-cultural system

(V) Discussion of the assumptions made on response(s) of individuals or groups to project components. The discussion should explore project risks associated with these assumptions and whether enough time for cooperation to develop is allowed in the project's implementation schedule.

With this checklist in hand, my AGR colleagues could offer more or less unified similar guidance in reviewing project documents in their early stage.

Today, these requirements may appear insufficient, but at that time they represented a major step forward, and in truth were difficult to carry out, given the lack of staff with social skills in the bank and in developing countries. Moreover, in the bank's formal documents did not officially back our requirement for such information. In other words, it reflected what could be done by relying largely on collegial persuasion in the absence of a formally mandated operational policy prescribing such indicators.

The impact of this procedure was, over time, significant, but of course it did not happen at once. The participant observer could note a broad range of reactions to such requirements, from opposition to surprised reluctance, raised eyebrows, half-hearted compliance, disciplined acceptance or, sometimes, even enthusiastic embrace. Many staff members had been trained to abstract out incidental social factors, even at top universities, and had not been purposively attuned to development work.[9] It was hard to meet the minimal or optimal requirements, even when accepted willingly, because pre-appraisal project preparation was largely done at the country level, where social analysis skills were scarce and generally not used in development. Yet even partial compliance represented a significant step forward.

That early set of requirements was key in alerting our colleagues in operational departments not only to expectations for current projects, but also about what they needed to do in future projects. Positing such requirements beyond the letter of the bank's official internal documents was possible because those requirements came to the regional offices from the bank's Vice Presidency in charge of policy.

An Epistemic Innovation: The Model of 'Entry Points for Social Knowledge in the Project Cycle'

A major lever for familiarizing World Bank staff with social analysis was the vast system of in-house training. At our request, the bank's internal training division organized some special courses on various methods of addressing social issues within their projects. One, entitled 'Sociology for Non-Sociologists', lasted three and half days; another was the 'Sociological Dimensions of Project Work' (Kardam 1993).

One approach to educating bank staff consisted in a series of 'Meet the Author' seminars in which staff could interact with authors of recently published research on development issues. One of the best attended series of Sociological Group seminars, it helped to introduce up-to-date knowledge to technical staff inside the organization and to legitimize sociocultural issues. Together with my closest comrade-in-arms, anthropologist Scott Guggenheim, we arranged for the World Bank to host a panel of American Sociological Association meetings, to present the sociological and anthropological work carried out (and published outside the bank) in connection with bank activities.

The most powerful intellectual tool proved to be a model, used in seminars throughout the bank, showing what skills a sociologist working with the project's team could offer at each of the main stages of a project. The background paper for this seminar, titled 'The Entry Points for Sociological Knowledge in the Project Cycle', was subsequently published as an article;[10] later it was also incorporated in the lead study for our first sociological volume, *Putting People First* (Cernea 1985, 1991).

That model represented an important escalation of our argument and a strong case for pioneering a new approach of modifying and enriching the bank's knowledge platform by inviting a novel discipline into it. Whereas we had initially recommended social analysis during appraisal, the 'entry points' model argued that each of the main stages of a project could benefit from a social specialist who would produce a body of knowledge and recommendations for actions, tailored to the specificity of that given stage in the project cycle and throughout the project's life: project identification, design, preparation, appraisal and implementation/supervision.

Two Inadequate Models

Two divergent models for considering the social aspects of projects were advocated and sometimes used outside the World Bank at that time: ex-post evaluation by a social specialist; and social impact assessment (SIA), employed for instance in some USAID development projects (Hoben 1980). Which of the two would better suit World Bank work? Which should we promote?

Ex-post evaluation was an after-the-fact exercise, not a design and planning tool. When social specialists are used only as *evaluators*, they are brought in when the project is completed, long after all other experts have contributed. They appear to be wise only after the fact, often criticizing ex-post what others have done. And in all candour, nobody likes second-guessers.

Regarding SIA, Rabel Burdge, one of its foremost proponents, wrote: 'the SIA [is] the systematic analysis, in advance, of the likely impacts a proposed action will have' (Burdge 1999:2). The goal is to 'understand and better anticipate the possible social consequences for human populations of planned and unplanned change' (Burdge 2003: 84). In this role, the sociologist is asked to examine a project package prepared by a group of other technical experts. Instead of calling on the sociologist to be a co-architect from its initial design stage, SIA asks him/her only to anticipate whether or not the given package is likely to have negative social impacts and how they might be 'mitigated'. To respond, the specialist is to do much 'guesstimating' through inferences from past cases, but little if any research on the ground.[11]

So, though the question concerning 'the most effective points for the social expert's knowledge to enter the planning process' had been asked before, no action-oriented solution had been found or practised. The kind of development work the bank was doing demanded a deeper, more extensive presence of social skills and knowledge than ex-post evaluation or SIA was proposing. I concluded that neither was apt to accomplish what the World Bank and project work actually needed: an approach that would fit the bank's patterned process of project making, and also the teamwork culture of the bank.

Adjusting the Argument to Existing Institutional Culture

I felt that potential 'entrances' for sociological knowledge should be multiplied, opening every important juncture of the planning and execution of projects to us. Social scientists' single most important content contribution should be the design for social action (Cernea 1985). Thus I outlined an operational model of 'entrance points for sociological knowledge into the project cycle'. I started from something familiar to all World Bank staff: namely, a short text circulated by the bank's Vice President for Operational Policies, aimed at standardizing work during the project process. The project work process was described as a cycle broadly divided into stages (project identification, design, preparation, appraisal, implementation/supervision). Specific activities were germane to each stage. I used this as a matrix for my argument. The sociologist's contribution would be tailored to the issues addressed at each stage. The entrance point model aimed to persuade each project team leader that he/she could integrate this new input organically in the work at each stage.

As noted above, most bank staff members were unfamiliar with what a social specialist could do for a project, so the entrance point model explained how to overcome that lack of familiarity. I deconstructed the broad concepts of sociological knowledge into smaller, easily understandable subsets that demonstrated a social specialist's relevant contributions to the work agenda of every project stage. The background paper I wrote for this purpose, titled 'The Entry Points of Sociological Knowledge in the Project Cycle', became the staple of many seminars in the same subject offered to staff in numerous bank departments and, as mentioned above, was subsequently published repeatedly, serving also as a plank for constructing the World Bank's first major sociological book, *Putting People First* (Cernea 1985; also see Baum 1982). Aside from some local variations and differences in terminology, the essential stages of the cycle to which sociological contributions conceivably can be matched are:

1. Project identification and the discussion of the initial project concept (brief);
2. Project preparation and design;
3. Project appraisal or feasibility assessment (including design improvements);
4. Project implementation (including monitoring and supervision work); and
5. Post-project evaluation.

Our overall argument was that the entire project process, as a purposive intervention for accelerating and targeting development, offers a context to employ a wide array of social science products and approaches to inducing change. At the same time, the sociology of development offers a *theoretical* argument for an alternative model for projects, a model in which social actors are the pivotal element around which all other resources should be marshalled. Each stage in the life cycle of a development intervention requires different tasks and therefore substantively different contributions (informational, analytical, or predictive) from sociologists and anthropologists, in much the same way that contributions of economists or technical specialists vary from one stage to another.

Dialogue Between Disciplines

Dialogue between disciplines engendered 'battlefields of knowledge' (Long and Long 1992). At times the battles became heated, as in the hostile rebuke we received once from a mid-level manager, who declared that 'there is nothing that an anthropologist can do which a good economist cannot do even better'. By that time, the number of staff social scientists was increasing, so more 'voices' joined in the dialogue. The Bank Sociological Group (see below) already existed. But most importantly, our battle was not defensive but constructively critical and proactive. We explained and argued by doing useful project work within units

and project teams, which was living proof that indeed, even a 'good economist' in fact did *not* do the highly useful work they contributed to projects.[12]

Constant streams of one- or two-day training seminars were offered to staff. Their premise was that by its very content, social knowledge *is* – and should become institutionally – the foundation of the knowledge platform for development work, not a second-rate late add-on or a discrete quick fix here and there. Though development projects are used as vehicles for financially induced change, our argument was that the bank's most important product was not the loan, but the project itself as a multidimensional development plan; the financing was only its fuel, a simple means to the project as an end. This view challenged what many saw as World Bank orthodoxy, and we were rebuked in frequent debates and confrontations. But we could already demonstrate that the changes triggered by projects are social *and* economic, justifying the need for inputs of sociological knowledge at each of the project cycle's successive stages.

Commenting on this history in her study of social analysis in the bank, Kardam (1993: 1778) wrote: 'How can this be explained? My research shows that the rise of an international environmental movement that influenced the bank … went hand in hand with an internal process of self-evaluation and self-criticisms, aided by staff members who acted as policy advocates. The Bank began to respond to concerns about the human impact of its projects in the 1970s.' Kardam concluded that her research confirmed that when informal structures coalesce inside large-scale formal organizations, they may achieve significant impacts in terms of changing the formal organization itself, its policies and its procedures: 'While external pressure played a larger role … insiders were the ones who introduced the issues in ways that fit the goals and procedures of the World Bank in an otherwise resistant environment and forged links with outside allies, thereby contributing to new policy guidelines to the hiring of more staff with social science training, and, in general, to the increased legitimacy of these issues in the World Bank' (ibid.: 1773).

Social Structures as Development Determinants

Bank projects must, but often do not, explicitly provide for local social reorganization and promote the creation of better 'social infrastructure' in the form of local patterns of social organization to foster higher productivity, higher yields, savings, and better use and management of available natural resources. While trying to link our contributions to the economic content and purpose of projects, we also tried to get the economists to embrace our 'social determinants' as project components that were justified economically as well. Sue Jones, an independent British anthropologist, wrote pertinently about our work in this respect. She thought that the bank's sociologists were 'most successful in avoiding the obvious

attitude pitfall – *"[M]ove over economics, now it's the turn of social analysis!"* Their argument is not for self-promotion … it sensibly shows *where* and *why* social skills are relevant and a contributing and integral part of development programmes' (Jones 1993: 20).

The theoretical substance of our argument was that internally generated resources evolve in ways commensurate with the socioeconomic structure's capacity to absorb and use surplus. However, if financial resources *alone* grow suddenly by external injection (as in a bank project) while the patterns of social organization or institutional structure remains the same, then serious discrepancies set in. Congruence between accelerated techno-economic activities and the existing structure of social relations is a practical problem as well as an academic one.

Development does not result from high-yield crops or more productive physical technologies alone – it also requires creation of high-yield social organizations (Cernea and Tepping 1977, Cernea and Guggenheim 1985). In other words, social institutional infrastructure needs to be crafted as well. This draws upon the creativity of social specialists with knowledge of social organization patterns that have emerged in other settings and could be replicated, with project support, among the population targeted by a new project.

When a development project fosters such an emergent social organization, it introduces additional 'social determinants' of development. William Foote Whyte (1982) also stressed the idea of necessary and possible 'social inventions for solving human problems'.

The Bank Sociological Group: Can the Informal Influence the Formal?

Another strong pivot in the internal advocacy for social analysis was the establishment of the World Bank Sociological Group in 1977 and its continuous activities for eighteen years. Kardam (1993) highlighted the importance of reciprocal leverage between the informal group and the formal positions that sociologists increasingly held in various organizational units of the World Bank. She underscored the 'enhanced impact that can be achieved through convergent activities of the informal structure (the Sociology Group) and of the bank's formal structure (the Office of the Sociology Adviser, who chaired the group, and the bank's Internal Training Division), a convergence which allowed numerous initiatives as well as helping with the non-trivial issues of resources necessary for the new initiatives' (Kardam 1993: 1780). As the lone Sociology Adviser in the bank, having often to go out on a limb, I felt much reinforced by being able to say that 'the bank Sociological Group is fully behind me in supporting' one or another proposal.

The Sociological Group's streams of meetings proved critical in terms of gaining space for social analysis in the bank's methodologies. We invited team leaders

of projects considered successful and of projects known as painful failures to share their experiences and explanations with the group. Projects were deconstructed to understand – not evaluate or criticize – the reasons for success or failure. Even team leaders who had experienced major failures in their projects were willing to discuss them and query the group about what could have been done differently. Discussions revolved around the level of knowledge and understanding of the social fabric and institutional factors at work in those projects.

The group also held discussions on policy issues and many meetings on the social policies proposed for adoption by the bank. We invited highly reputed sociologists and anthropologists from outside the bank to speak to the sociological group about research on processes that were integral to the bank's development assistance, including studies of irrigation programmes, rainforest agriculture, forestry, rural cooperatives, transportation and road-building, health-care systems, land tenure, animal husbandry, ethnic structures and countless other topics.[13] Kardam (1993: 1980) noted that out of the eighty meetings held between May 1977 and September 1988, only seven were solely for Sociology Group members, whereas the large majority of seminars were organized as open meetings concentrating on how the lack of sociological consideration affects specific projects and how World Bank projects could be made more effective by incorporating these variables (ibid.: 1980). She labelled this a 'strategy for persuasion' and also identified other strategies used by the group: skilful mobilization of facts, exploiting the performance gaps, involving external allies and devising strategies for change.

Kardam (1993) also recorded obstacles, opposition, and critical and derogatory attitudes faced by the Sociology Group. A disenchanted staff member described the sociology group to her as a 'minor gadfly', a 'special interests' group that was wrong to bring social-anthropological issues like 'marginal groups' or forcibly displaced populations into the bank's work. But Kardam also quoted non-sociologist staff members who recognized that the sociological group 'generated new interest and converted some people to new approaches', and referenced internal statistics that 'report increases in the use of social scientists by both the bank and some of its borrowers' (ibid.: 1783). Kardam observed that 'the focus on resettlement had the added gains of highlighting the relevance of social issues in more general terms and it acted as a catalyst for gaining recognition of other social issues' (ibid.).

Adoption of Two Social Policies

Forced population resettlement was a major issue in the Sociology Group's advocacy for introducing social knowledge in project work. The problem erupted when a major World Bank-financed dam-building project in Brazil (the Sobradinho Dam on the Sao Francisco River) failed to resettle the reservoir area

population, numbering over 60,000 people. The dam was impounded while the population was still residing in the reservoir, and the resultant impending social disaster aroused internationally publicized alarm and became a major problem inside the bank. We took the initiative to propose that the bank adopt guidelines for regulating compulsory resettlement in future projects. After the Sobradinho case taught the bank a painful lesson, the guidelines advanced rapidly, and the bank's then president issued them as formal World Bank policy in the OMS 2.33 adopted in early 1980 (World Bank 1980). This represented the bank's first ever full-scale social policy, addressing the 'social issues' in compulsory population resettlement caused by World Bank-financed projects, a major social breakthrough as the first instance of sociological/anthropological knowledge translating into an explicit formal policy on the bank's books (Cernea 2005). It was also the first policy on forced resettlement ever issued by any international development agency.

Soon thereafter, the bank adopted guidelines for dealing with development projects' impacts on indigenous populations living in areas affected by World Bank-financed projects. They were initially prepared by the bank's Environmental Advisor Robert Goodland and Sheldon Davis, an anthropologist specializing in the study of indigenous people, who jointly carried out intensive advocacy work within the bank in those areas. The Sociological Group discussed, supported and cleared the guidelines. After the World Bank management eventually became convinced of their importance, they were officially adopted (World Bank 1983). These two social policies considerably elevated the profile of social issues and social specialists in the World Bank's work overall.[14] The policies required significant social analysis during the early preparatory stages of projects with a resettlement component, or in an area with tribal groups among the population. They powerfully reinvigorated the adoption of social analysis as a regular part in all World Bank appraisals and reports. The bank's Vice Presidency for Policy set up a working group to reexamine the obsolete OPM 2.20 on Project Appraisal. A proposal on the sociological appraisal of projects had already been drafted, and its time had arrived.

Culmination of a Long Effort: The Formal Adoption of Sociological Appraisal

The working group decided to introduce two new sections – one on sociological analysis at the appraisal stage, and another on institutional appraisal – while also updating sections on economic, technical, financial and commercial appraisal. The waiting draft proposal's treatment of the kind of social analysis to be required for World Bank projects was far more elaborate than that in the much earlier 1977 draft proposing minimal and optimum social requirements for appraisal reports. It reflected a clear awareness that social specialists must be brought in to

work on a new project from its very beginnings, not just at appraisal and in later stages, like implementation and supervision activities. It empowered the social specialist to recommend project activities to create social infrastructure and include the social determinants of economic activities. Almost all the proposals in the November 1982 draft were maintained in the final, official version of the OMS 2.20 issued in February 1984 (World Bank 1984).

The OMS 2.20 defined the sociological analysis of development project worthiness and feasibility as consisting of 'the explicit consideration of the social organization, traditions, and values bearing upon the feasibility, implementation, and operation of projects; and the pursuit of objectives such as poverty alleviation' (ibid.: para. 55). It stressed that 'projects designed to assist specific beneficiaries … depend upon [their] participation'. Therefore, the project appraisal

> … should focus on the extent to which projects adequately take into account…
>
> a) the socio-cultural and demographic characteristics of local beneficiaries [and set out a comprehensive set of guiding questions to collect this information]
>
> b) the social organization of productive activities of the population in the project area [again with a set of guiding questions regarding access to and use of productive resources]
>
> c) the cultural acceptability of the project and its compatibility with the behaviour and perceived needs of the intended beneficiaries and
>
> d) the social strategy for project implementation and operation needed to elicit and sustain beneficiaries' participation. (para. 56)

For (c) above, the OMS outlined the premises for *fostering agency* at the project's grass-roots level. For (d) above, the OMS 2.20 officially formulated, for the first time in the World Bank, the principle of *people's participation* in terms explicitly related to the project's cycles. The OMS explicitly mandated that for implementation, project preparers and appraisers must think also in terms of a new concept: 'a *social strategy* for eliciting the full commitment to the project of the beneficiaries and their institutions. In such cases, appraisal should verify that the expected beneficiaries were involved in project identification and preparation and that they will continue such participation in project implementation, maintenance, operation, monitoring, and evaluation. If necessary, the project should be specifically designed to help organize beneficiaries to carry out these functions' (para. 60).

The OMS additionally addressed the gender perspective as integral to social appraisal by including an explicit requirement to enable 'the contribution that women could make to achieving the project's objectives' as well as a precautionary warning against changes introduced by the project that might be disadvantageous to women (para. 62). The OMS's conclusion brought up another major issue, namely, the consideration of social risks. It took a firm stand on the unac-

ceptability of imposing high social risks on a project's population: such a project should be either modified to proceed as a pilot or postponed altogether.

Hence, the official text of the OMS policy 2.20 introduced a full set of new issues, concepts and parameters into the World Bank's thinking and its project-making toolkit. In 1984, they were an innovation in the vanguard of development thinking and an integral part of our argument that the bank's main products are – and must be seen as – its development policies and projects, not its financial loans. In other words, the goal is the anticipated development, whereas the financial loan is just the *means* for achieving the programme.

The Sociology Group celebrated the successful inclusion of social analysis and institutional analysis in the new OMS by scheduling a special session to discuss what had to be done to get the new policy absorbed, genuinely internalized and practised by bank staff at large. The bank's Senior Vice President for Policy Warren Baum and Vice President for Environmental Sustainability V. Rajagopalan attended the meeting to congratulate the Sociology Group, but the meeting focused on the practical tasks at hand (Cernea 1984). The formal issuance of the new OMS 2.20 can be seen as an important formal step, but this is not to say that the entire World Bank behemoth shifted to its systematic application overnight. The formal adoption opened a new period during which the trust of the work shifted from advocacy to systematic in-house training, and to bringing in additional staff trained in sociology and anthropology. The new policy immediately created a gap between mandate and capacity, but it was a positive gap, the normal stimulus that a new policy exercises on practice. The adoption of the new pattern for project appraisal successfully culminated an advocacy effort extending over a period of six to seven years. Nevertheless, at the same time it demanded engagement in a new, two-track effort.

Follow-up on Two Tracks: International and In-house

The World Bank had to explain the new pattern to developing member countries, so that they could include the novel demands in the early preparation of projects for consideration and financing. Also, new efforts were launched inside the bank to mainstream the new policy, that is, to give it real life within the bank's day-to-day practice (Davis 2004).

The International Track of Social Analysis Adoption

While at face value the bank's policy for sociological appraisal refers to just one of the project cycle stages – the appraisal – the strategic importance of the appraisal in practice enables the guidelines to influence the work along the entire project cycle. The appraisal process is both culmination and reassessment of work from

the preliminary project brief and sub-stages of preparation. The appraisal team is not expected to do extensive research on its own or to address ab initio the social data requirements defined in the OMS for the appraisal stage. But the team must satisfy itself that the guidelines have been addressed during the several years of project preparation. If those issues were not addressed and the data not collected and used for project design, the project would not be considered ready for appraisal. That is, the social content of a project appraisal report needs to be built and incorporated into the report throughout the pre-appraisal stages. As a result, project staff and the borrowing countries look to the appraisal OMS as the document guiding the work to be done before appraisal is even scheduled.

Similarly, the project appraisal OMS sets the bar for post-implementation work over five to seven years. Implementation must be consistent with the appraisal report. The bank sends supervision missions composed of World Bank specialists to examine whether implementation, done by country staff, is accomplishing the social content and objectives incorporated into the appraisal report. Therefore, implementation and supervision necessarily concern the social issues, social provisions and social risks discussed in the crucial appraisal report. This clearly indicates the strategic position of appraisal within the entire order of project stages. The operational policy guidelines for appraisal extend their reach over the entire project cycle, including the ex-post evaluation after project completion.

The other most important consequence of adopting social appraisal guidelines is their indirect guidance of the work done in the developing countries. There, vast cohorts of local specialists involved in preparing projects for World Bank financing must learn from the bank's operational policy how to proceed so that their projects' preparation and implementation are consistent with the bank's requirements. The bank, as a development institution, becomes a multiplier and an innovation diffusion mechanism throughout the developing world.

The World Bank's pioneering of mandatory formal introduction of social analysis for its projects was recognized, within different institutional frameworks and in different forms, by other international financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as many bilateral development agencies, albeit some of these agencies took as long as 10–12 years to adopt appropriate operational practice, with inevitable costs for project-affected people. Other agencies defined their social analyses guidelines differently.

China's Introduction of Social Analysis

Regarding the ripple effect (Cernea 2005) at the country level, perhaps one of the most interesting examples is China's early interest in learning about social

analysis and replicating it within its gigantic effort to induce and accelerate development. China's high-level policy and political decision in 2012 to require social instability risks assessment for major development and environmental projects was a logical part of a much longer and systematic process. China learned about the OMS 2.20 with its new chapter on social appraisal quite soon after its adoption. At that time, China was a very recent bank member; its first World Bank-assisted projects were hydropower projects. The bank was aware that China, though well advanced in the technology of building dams, was paying much less attention to the dams' social dimension, risks and impacts, particularly with regard to involuntary population displacement and resettlement.

I was part of a large appraisal mission tasked to go to one of China's new dams – the Shuikou Dam in Fujian province – and acquaint higher-level Chinese officials with the bank's policies on social analysis at appraisal, as well as the policy on population resettlement. It was my first trip to China, and none of us knew how the Chinese officials would react to the bank's requirements for social analysis at appraisal and careful, protective planning in cases of displacement and resettlement. I took several copies of these two policies to my first meeting with government officials, where I had to explain the bank's rather unusual requirements. To my surprise, instead of the cold or at best reserved reception I had expected, my talk elicited strong expression of great interest in both policies. The officials asked many questions and promised a quick response to our proposals and requirements.

The next day we heard that the documents we had handed over were being translated rapidly into Chinese, after which a more detailed discussion was possible. The officials agreed that the bank's policy requirements should be met in carrying out the project at hand. Moreover, they assured the mission that China was interested in taking steps to use similar social approaches in other dam projects under consideration that had not been submitted for World Bank financing. The appraisal report for Shuikou Dam included social analysis of the population affected by resettlement and a time-bound resettlement plan (World Bank 1986). Supervision missions in the following years, some of which I participated in, confirmed the Chinese side's constant efforts to carry out the social provisions in the appraisal report. The Shuikou resettlement ended up as one of the earliest, and at the time rather rare, successes with such operations in World Bank-financed hydroelectric projects (Zhu, ter Woort, and Trembach, n.d.).

China's interest in the bank's experience with social analysis led to other significant steps in the next few years. The Institute of Standards and Norms attached to China's State Planning Commission took the initiative to translate the 500 plus pages of the bank's book *Putting People First* and publish it in China in a large print run.[15] Subsequently, China worked with other international development agencies and took a series of further steps towards adopting its own guidelines for social assessment.

The Inside Bank Track for Mainstreaming Social Analysis

As with any policy, the adoption of the OMS created the usual gap between a new normative framework and ongoing daily performance. Adjustment to new norms takes time and resources. Progress had already been made in carrying out social analyses for some projects even without a formal policy, but these were only a part of the World Bank's project portfolio (totalling around 200 new projects per year). The challenge now was to apply the new policy in every project. Key to this effort was creating a much larger skill pool inside the bank to carry out social analysis for increasing numbers of projects. Various bank units needed to hire sociologists and anthropologists both as staff and as consultants.

Two publications represented additional significant steps in the new direction. The World Bank's first sociological book, *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Development Project* (Cernea 1985, 1991), came out in 1985. This book contains the most detailed substantive argument for the indispensability of non-economic social science knowledge in projects to induce development. Its opening chapter argues explicitly that the World Bank needs to adopt 'Putting People First' as a paradigm, not just as an optional goodwill idea.[16] The massive volume *Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience* appeared in 1986 (Baum and Tolbert 1986). It featured a very detailed section on social analysis, consisting of four parts: elements of social analysis; the role of women in development; applying social analysis (with case studies from Mexico, Indonesia and El Salvador); and the professional approach to social analysis.

In 1985 a bank-wide review was undertaken to assess performance in implementing the bank's policy on involuntary resettlement, adopted five years earlier. That review, discussed and approved by senior bank management, led in 1986 to a new internal document – Policy Note 10.08 – that strengthened and expanded the 1980 policy on resettlement, and later to the first public World Bank paper on policy guidelines for involuntary population resettlement processes (Cernea et.al. 1988). Similar work was done on assessing implementation of the policy on indigenous and tribal populations. We also produced the World Bank's first published paper arguing that the bank should broaden its work in developing countries by officially interacting not just with governments and official agencies but with nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) too (ibid.). Soon thereafter the bank adopted another formal policy requiring staff also to interact and consult with NGOs during their field project work.

The late 1980s brought the collapse of the Soviet system, and the resulting new states joined the World Bank en masse as the 1990s began. Since very little was known about the societies and economies of the former Soviet republics, now independent countries, social analysis became the bank's instrument of choice for taking stock of these countries. The anthropologist Ayse Kudat took the lead in

organizing the bank's social assessments for numerous projects in those countries. A volume of social analyses for several such countries (Azerbaijan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and others) demonstrated the methodology, outcomes, and utility of such social analysis (Cernea and Kudat 1997).

The bank's social community tested the possibility of reissuing the social analysis guidelines contained in the OMS 2.20 by preparing a stand-alone OMS devoted entirely to social analysis in the later 1990s. This idea met resistance inside the bank and was not realized. Instead, the social community engaged in a very creative effort to produce much more detailed guidelines for doing social analysis. Leading this effort were two anthropologists, first Gloria Davis (2004), followed by Anis Dani (2003, 2007) and many other social scientists, such as Dan Aronson, Cynthia Cook, Chona Cruz, Sheldon Davis, Ashraf Ghani, Maninder Gill, Scott Guggenheim, Reidar Kvam, Maritta Koch-Weser, Alexander Mark, Maria Clara Mejia, Caroline Moser, Deepa Narayan, William Partridge, Stan Peabody, Jacomina de Regt and others who contributed to the production of a rich series of studies, manuals and handbooks. This important literature is still in use today both inside and outside the bank.

In parallel with work at the project level, the bank's social specialists, now more numerous, also addressed selected theoretical issues and promoted new concepts in the bank. Most notable in this respect has been the work on social capital, which has spawned a series of publications in turn (e.g., Bebbington, Guggenheim, and Woolcock 2006; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).

With the benefit of hindsight, it is altogether indisputable that the adoption of social analysis, having stood the test of time as one of the bank's basic methods of project preparation and policymaking, was a major turning point in the bank's history. Its multilevel snowballing effects gradually changed both the World Bank as a development agency and its products. All the same, however, in many instances the bank has not consistently adhered to its policy prescriptions for social assessments, to the detriment of project quality in every case. The same old knowledge battles continue, but today the bank's institutional and intellectual structures are very different due to prior battles' success in gaining 'citizenship' for social knowledge in a major international development agency.

Acknowledgements

The author is sincerely grateful to Turan Atay and Don Upendra for their constant help in tracking down documents and papers from the World Bank's library and archives, and to Erik Champenois and Natalie Wheeler, who were highly helpful in processing and preparing several drafts of this study.

Notes

1. This contrasts with other social policies that social scientists militated – and succeeded – to place on the World Bank's policy books. For instance, the first ever policy on involuntary population development and resettlement had been extensively described, discussed and analyzed in international social science literature in terms of its origin, evolution, ripple effects and impacts.
2. A recent Ph.D. dissertation defended (2011) by Michiyo Kakegawa at the University of California, Santa Cruz, also examined the adoption of social analysis at the World Bank and, after several years, at the ADB as well.
3. For a detailed description of that experimental division, including the recruitment of the first sociologist, see Christoffersen 2011.
4. The strictly economic justification of projects was further elaborated into even more compelling demands on staff in another OPM on the 'Economic Tests of Project Acceptability' (OPM 2.21).
5. The division was headed by Leif Christoffersen, and Department Director Montague Yudelman. Besides the division, the other part of the department consisted of a powerful group of advisers led by Dou Pickering and tasked with reviewing the appraisal report drafts (called 'yellow cover' reports) prepared in the regional agricultural divisions. These reviews gradually became a relevant mechanism for countering the narrowness of OPM 2.20.
6. This included various World Bank projects: in Mauritius, the Rural Development Project; in Tanzania, the Kogoma Rural Development Project and subsequently also the Mwanza and Shynianga Rural Development Project; in Mexico, PIDER (Programa Integral para el Desarollo Rural); in Senegal, the Eastern Senegal Livestock Development Project; and in Pakistan, the Azad Kashmir Livestock Development Project. Some of these case analyses were written up as lessons learned and published later (Cernea 1983, 1985).
7. The internal route for processing projects required each new project report to go through several stages of readiness before its final version was sent to the bank's Loan Committee and Board of Executive Directors. These stages were colour-coded and distinctly named: project brief; project preparation; white, yellow, and green cover appraisal reports; and the final, approved Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), named the 'gray cover'. Internal norms mandated a review of each new agricultural project at the 'yellow cover' stage by AGR's group of agricultural advisers.
8. Michael M. Cernea, Memorandum to Ted J. Davis and Musa Ahmad (AGR), 'Minimum and Optimum Requirements for Review of Sociological Project Issues', 20 October 1978.
9. Obviously, World Bank staff members taken individually were not bad professionals; on the contrary, virtually all excelled at their own specialty. But the university training they had received years before as economists or technical specialists was one-sided, as it almost never included sociological training and knowledge: it was essentially economic and technical training. Coming to work in the World Bank, they acting professionally on what they were taught academically. I have argued that the failure of social scientists teaching at Ivy League universities to teach social sciences to much larger cohorts of technical and economics students was one root of the biased intellectual paradigms followed by many World Bank staff (Cernea 1995: 17).
10. Michael M. Cernea, 'Entrance Points for Sociological Knowledge in Planned Rural Development', mimeo, processed, AGR 1979.
11. While militating heroically for the SIA, Burdge and other SIA proponents noted also that in practice, SIA was chronically an overshadowed subset of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and remained the 'the orphan of the assessment process' (Burdge 1999).
12. One anecdotal yet noteworthy fact encapsulates the climate of that period: The hostile manager quoted above, an irrigation division chief, heard an anthropological specialist teaching about irrigation systems in Indonesia at an Ivy League university and invited her as a consultant to give a seminar in his division. She gave the seminar, impressed all the engineers with her minute under-

standing of irrigation systems operations in Indonesia's small farming, which she had studied as an anthropologist for her Ph.D. thesis. After a while, that same chief hired her as a staff member in his unit, whereupon she left the university and became World Bank staff. I teased the division chief, observing that it seemed after all that the engineers and economists in his division were in fact not able to do 'what the anthropologist you hired is capable of doing'. Yet he refused to admit his prejudice and denied the evidence with another memorably demeaning answer: 'What she is doing is not due to her anthropology, but simply due to her intelligence and smart observations of irrigation practices.' This answer only proves how difficult it was to change mindsets and entrenched prejudices. The anthropologist, Gloria Davis, went on to make a brilliant professional career in the World Bank, becoming one of my closest colleagues and collaborators and ending up leading a bank division and department for social development.

13. Scholars of national and international repute who came to speak at open meetings of the bank's Sociological Group included David Maybury-Lewis, Frederick Barth, Neil Smelser, Ted Downing, Thayer Scudder, Walter Coward, Robert Chambers, Norman Uphoff, Neville Dyson-Hudson, Conrad Kottak, Ben Bagadion and Frances Korten.
14. An independent testimony of this recognition was received in 1982, when the internal monthly World Bank newsletter *REPORT* devoted almost an entire issue to sociology in project work. One massive article was on projects with population resettlement. Another feature was a long interview done with me by the newsletter's editors, Barbara Koepell and Emmanuel D'Silva, about the agenda and work of World Bank sociologists. The interview is worth mention because of a coinage in it: the wording 'putting people first' was used for the first time. It became the interview's title and later the title of our first World Bank–published sociological book. To this day, 'Putting People First' remains the logo of the bank's Social Development Department (Cernea 1982).
15. The translation was done by the Institute's Deputy Director Chaogang Wang, who later also became a World Bank staff member.
16. This internationally acclaimed volume had several print runs in the U.S. Its second, enlarged edition from Oxford University Press in 1991 was followed by translations in five different languages: Spanish, Bahasa Indonesia, Chinese, Japanese and French. It influenced the work of all multilateral agencies and of researchers in many countries.

References

Baum, W.C. 1982. *The Project Cycle*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Baum, W.C. and S.M. Tolbert. 1985. *Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience*. London and New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Bebbington, A, S. Guggenheim and M. Woolcock. 2006. 'The Ideas-Practice Nexus in International Development Organizations: Social Capital at the World Bank', *Journal of Development Studies* 40(5): 33–64.

Borofsky, R. 2000. 'Commentary: Public Anthropology. Where To? What Next?' *Anthropology News* 41(5): 9–10.

Bradsher, K. 2012. 'Social Risk Test Ordered by China for Big Projects', *New York Times*, 12 November. Retrieved 5 July 2014 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/world/asia/china-mandates-social-risk-reviews-for-big-projects.html.

Burawoy, M. 2005. '2004 American Sociological Association Presidential Address: For Public Sociology', *The British Journal of Sociology* 56(2): 259–94.

Burdge, R.J. 1999. *A Community Guide to Social Impact Assessment*. Middletown, WI: Social Ecology Press.

———. 2003. 'The Practice of Social Impact Assessment – Background', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(2): 84–88.

Cernea, M.M. 1982. 'Interview: "Sociologists: Putting People First in Projects"', *REPORT: News and Views from the World Bank* (March–April): 5.

———. 1983. *A Social Methodology for Community Participation in Local Investments: The Experience of Mexico's PIDER Program*. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 598. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

———. 1984. *Memorandum to Members of the Sociological Group: The Adoption of OMS 2.20 on Project Appraisal*. (Internal World Bank document, author's files).

———. (ed.). 1985. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*. London and New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

———. 1987. 'Entry Points for Sociological Knowledge in Planned Rural Development'. In Harry K. Schwarzweller (ed.), *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, vol. 3. Bristol U.K.: Emerald Group.

———. 1988. *Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects*. World Bank Technical Paper No. 40. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1991. 'Knowledge from Social Science for Development Projects'. In M.M. Cernea (ed.), *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged. London and New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

———. 1995. 'Social Integration and Population Displacement: The Contribution of Social Science', *International Social Science Journal* 1: 91–112.

———. 1996. *The 1995 Malinowski Award Lecture: Social Organization and Development Anthropology*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2005. 'The Ripple Effect in Social Policy and Its Political Content: A Debate on Social Standards in Public and Private Development Projects'. In Michael B. Likosky (ed.), *Privatising Development: Transnational Law, Infrastructure, and Human Rights*. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 65–101.

Cernea, M.M. and S.E. Guggenheim. 1985. 'Is Anthropology Superfluous in Farming System Research?', in C. Flora (ed), *Farming Systems Research*, Kansas: Kansas University Press, University Research Series, 4(9), pp 504–16.

Cernea, M.M. and A. Kudat. 1997. 'Social Analysis for Investment Projects: Rationale, Content, and Methods', in M.M. Cernea and A. Kudat (eds), *Social Assessments for Better Development: Case Studies in Russia and Central Asia*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Cernea, M.M. and B. Tepping. 1977. *A System for Monitoring and Evaluating Agricultural Extension Projects*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Chenery, H., et al. 1974. *Redistribution with Growth: Polices to Improve Income Distribution in Developing Countries in the Context of Economic Growth*. London: Oxford University Press.

Christoffersen, L.E. 2011. 'The Contribution of Rural Sociology to Problem-Solving in International Development', *International Conference on Social Policy and Practice, Bieberstein. Forum on Environment and Development, 27–29 May 2011*, Bieberstein, Germany.

Dani, A.A. 2003. *World Bank Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2007. *Tools for Institutional, Political, and Social Analysis of Policy Reform: A Sourcebook for Development Practitioners*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Davis, G. 2004. *A History of the Social Development Network in the World Bank, 1973–2002*. Social Development Paper No. 56. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Hoben, A. 1980. 'Agricultural Decision Making in Foreign Assistance: An Anthropological Analysis', in Peggy F. Barlett (ed.), *Agricultural Decision Making: Anthropological Contributions to Rural Development*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 337–69.

Jones, S. 1993. 'Anthropology in Action: Putting People First', *BASAPP Journal of the British Association for Social Anthropology in Policy and Practice* 14.

Kakegawa, M. 2011. 'Improving Institutional Accountability: Environmental and Social Policy Compliance in ADB-Funded Projects', Ph.D. thesis. University of California, Santa Cruz.

Kardam, N. 1993. 'Development Approaches and the Role of Policy Advocacy: The Case of the World Bank', *World Development* 21(11): 1773–786.

Lamphere, L. 2004. 'The Convergence of Applied, Practicing and Public Anthropology in the 21st Century', *Human Organization* 63(4): 431–43.

Lele, U. 1975. *The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Long, N. and A. Long (eds). 1992. *Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*. London and New York: Routledge.

Mosse, D. (ed.). 2011. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. Studies in Public and Applied Anthropology, Vol. 6., Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Price, S. 2012. 'Social Analysis in Development: Policy Construct or Constructive Transformation?' *Revista Română de Sociologie* 5/6: 361–84.

Whyte, W.F. 1982. 'Social Inventions for Solving Human Problems'. *American Sociological Review* 47(1): 1–13.

Woolcock, M. and D. Narayan. 2000. 'Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy', *World Bank Research Observer* 15(2): 225–49.

World Bank. 1971. *Operational Policy Memorandum 2.20 on Project Appraisal*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1980. *Operational Manual Statement 2.33: Social Issues in Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1983. *Operational Manual Statement 2.34 – Tribal Populations in World Bank Project Areas*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1984. *Operational Manual Statement Project Appraisal No. 2.20*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1986. *Staff Appraisal Report: 'China: Shuikou Hydroelectric Project' (Report No. 6189-CHA)*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Zhu, Y., M. ter Woort and B. Trembath. N.d. *Successful Reservoir Resettlement in China: Shuikou Hydroelectric Project*. Washington, D.C.: East Asia Environment and Social Development Unit, World Bank.

2

Social Science and the Mining Sector
Contemporary Roles and Dilemmas for Engagement

Deanna Kemp and John R. Owen

As a powerful driver of development, mining plays a critical role across Asia and the Pacific. The region holds reserves of various key commodities, such as bauxite, copper, iron ore, gold, lead, nickel, zinc and coal. Mining contributes significantly to state revenues and to national infrastructure, while also providing employment, training and business opportunities at the regional, provincial and local levels. In 2011, the Asia Pacific metals and mining industry had total revenues of US$1,950.2 billion, representing a compound annual growth rate of 17 per cent between 2007 and 2011 (Datamonitor 2011). Growth is set to continue, with demand from China, South Korea and India driving mineral exploration in the region, and Indonesia, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Philippines continuing to attract the vast majority of exploration expenditure (Metals Economics Group 2011). In fact, China is an increasingly important investor in mineral exploration worldwide. Developing nations looking to reach their Millennium Development Goals by 2015 frequently see mining as an avenue for advancing their economic ambitions. But in addition to the promise of unparalleled growth and the inflow of taxes, royalties and rents, mining brings rapid social and environmental change, uncertainty and risk.

This chapter moves from the conceptual to the practical by considering where and how social science–informed research is being commissioned and undertaken, and its recommendations implemented (or not) in the mining sector. We consider the changing role and influence that social science has had on large-scale mining-related development, focusing in particular on mining in the Asia Pacific region. Initially taking a broad theoretical and historical perspective of social science and its engagement with development thinking, the chapter considers how

the work of social theorists has influenced contemporary concepts such as 'sustainable development' (SD) and 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR). Today, these concepts increasingly serve to shape how observers construct and interpret the social performance of mining companies. We examine a range of 'modern' social assessment processes, from social baselines and impact assessments, to systems that are put in place to 'manage' and interpret social impacts and development contributions. We write from first-hand experience as social researchers in mining, illustrating some of the methodological and practical challenges social scientists face in undertaking their work. Social researchers, we argue, should aim to generate dialogue, debate and understanding of social dynamics within the sector in order to increase the mining industry's capacity to understand its social impacts and obligations. The chapter concludes by considering some of the new frontiers being forged in the ongoing quest to ensure that social researchers influence large-scale private sector development in positive and constructive ways.

Social Science and the Historical Intersection of Development Thinking

Social scientists have always had a keen interest in business. Even Karl Marx's now infamous, slightly comedic quip 'Sell a man a fish, he eats for a day; teach a man how to fish, you ruin a wonderful business opportunity' illustrates a curious fascination with commodities, human relationships and the systems created to bind them together. From the 1920s to the 1940s, social scientists of various persuasions, including economists, shifted their gaze from broad and general organizing principles, such as 'competition' or 'liberty', towards specific mechanisms and institutions that in effect drove or supported the business cycle (Schumpeter 1934; J. Robinson 1933; Keynes 1936). Indeed, this shift, which is routinely considered a major turning point in social scientific discourse, strongly reflected changing interests and perspectives around the role and transformative potential of the so-called private sector. In development studies, a prominent subdiscipline of the social sciences, the unique intersection of private companies, national governments, international regulatory bodies, civil society and local communities has provided a wealth of intrigue, data and debate, fuelling an agenda of research spanning over half a century (Chinkin 1989; Meyer et al. 1997; Harriss 2002; Schulpen and Gibbon 2002; Chang 2008). Recently these debates have been further bolstered by the advent of new globalized technologies providing access to more rapid and instantaneous forms of communication.

This intersection has not only offered social scientists a vast empirical terrain within which to conduct research but also provided a mouthpiece through which to articulate strong normative preferences and views about how best to effect social change in poorer but essentially resource-rich nations, and 'humanize' con-

cepts of development (Sen 1999a; Sano 2000). Over time, social theorists have challenged mainstream development approaches to draw attention to previously unexplored issues, concepts and trends.

Epitomized by Sen's (1999b) focus on 'capabilities', the gaze of the social sciences has of late turned decidedly towards capturing the human or more localized experience of development, often spurred by civil society's response to and mobilization over specific cases. This renewed focus on a more localized domain of inquiry includes a marked tendency to rethink received norms about what constitutes appropriate development objectives in which contexts; which actors should be involved in making development happen, and with what degree of ownership and control; and how development activity should be enacted to ensure consistency of approach. This alignment of development discourse with changing patterns of practice on the ground came as no surprise to some practitioners, particularly given the rise of 'participatory' and 'capacity-building' approaches that emphasize the need for wholesale changes around the logic of development and developmental initiatives (Chambers 1983; Eade 1997; Botes and van Rensburg 2000; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Cornwall 2003).

The rise of participation in development discourse brings with it a concomitant interest in methods of practice (e.g., Kumar 2002; Mukherjee 2002). The subject of this interest in methods of practice has mainly been non-government organizations (NGOs) operating in developing countries, with the primary focus on expatriates and their interactions with local village populations. These debates are also beginning to emerge in the resources sector, as civil society and a range of other actors pressure companies to strategically align their social performance with both global mainstream development goals and mining-specific norms around local-level participation and community engagement (e.g. International Council on Mining and Metals 2003; Equator Principles 2003; International Finance Corporation 2012; World Resources Institute 2009). World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) standards centre around the recognition that development projects, while potentially beneficial to host nations, can also run afoul of broader human development objectives, particularly by focusing too heavily on 'national interest' or the 'greater good' at local communities' expense. International standards in the development arena, including those that apply specifically to the resources sector, serve to remind project developers of the importance of transparent, principled practice, with provisions that explicitly recognize local communities' (often neglected) rights to negotiate with companies in relation to basic entitlements.

Although anthropology has long been renowned for providing insight into the social processes and phenomena of groups and communities, a significant shift at the turn of the twentieth century altered the way that anthropologists understood and practised their discipline. In its early history, anthropological research involved theoretical analysis of second-hand textual accounts, typified by

Sir Edward Burnett Tylor's (1871) *Primitive Culture* and Sir James George Frazer's (1890) *The Golden Bough*. Both Tylor and Frazer relied extensively on reports by ethnographic amateurs when preparing their comparative evolutionary studies for publication. Over time, this style of 'armchair anthropology' came under severe criticism from a new generation of anthropologists heavily influenced by the methodological 'fieldwork revolution' that emerged from Franz Boas's (1911) *The Mind of Primitive Man* and Bronislaw Malinowski's (1922) *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. The new generation of scholars argued forcefully that speculative generalizations and theorizing should be replaced by intensive empirical methods. Anthropologists were encouraged to renounce the comfort of the armchair and instead immerse themselves in the field, where direct and systematic observations could be made through local, face-to-face learning. This shift towards empirical, evidence-based and engaged research meant that subjects were now, for the first time, understood as human contemporaries and thus active participants in the making of their own history.

According to Strathern and Stewart (2001: 3), in today's context commissioned research emerges as a 'contemporary transformation' of applied anthropology. Government agencies, companies and international financial institutions are increasingly commissioning anthropologists and other social researchers as consultative advisors and evaluators in areas of development that is expected to have considerable cultural, social and political consequences for human populations (Morris and Bastin 2004). Baba (2005) highlighted three core aspects of anthropological expertise seen as bringing significant value to private enterprise: general knowledge about culture and cultural theory, methodological skills in ethnographic practice and specialized knowledge about particular cultures and languages. Commissioned social research often involves monitoring and assessing compliance with social safeguard standards, such as those set by the IFC and the Equator Principles for major infrastructure and extractive projects, particularly where they are socially and environmentally disruptive. Social researchers are also involved in investigating the purported aims and objectives of community engagement and development projects and policies, advising on the intended and unintended social and cultural implications of project impacts, and helping projects synchronize better with localized conditions and needs (Panayiotopoulos 2002). At the same time, as commissioned social research is often bound by the time constraints and commercial priorities set by project developers or funding agencies, it must be equipped with various methodological tools suited to the nature of private sector work.

Since the 1970s, a series of more rapid research methodologies has emerged with the collective aim of reducing the time needed to develop a preliminary understanding of a local context or situation (Beebe 2001). Most common among these are rapid assessments or assessment procedures, which accommodate shorter, issue-centric ethnographic assessments (Kedia and van Willigen 2005; Hand-

werker 2001). Meanwhile, the 'professionalization' of anthropology through private sector practice is not without its critics. In particular, much debate concerns the ethics of anthropologists in development advocacy work (Kirsch 2002).

Towards a New Paradigm of Social Relations in Business

What is known historically as mainstream or orthodox economic discourse represents a paradigmatic shift away from a more universal, holistic approach to understanding resourcing and relationships, to a discourse that has sought to isolate itself from earlier historical traditions in which markets were a central facet of everyday social life (Owen 2009). This break with the 'old tradition' of economic thinking was described by the well-known economic historian Karl Polanyi, who regarded the economics of the nineteenth and subsequent centuries as an attempt to essentially 'disembed' economics as a field of human and social inquiry. One of the principal shifts in logic, as Polanyi argued in *The Great Transformation* (1944), was the move from seeing the 'economy being embedded in social relations' to a claim that 'social relations are embedded in the economic system'. According to Polanyi, the growing importance of the economy in the development of the industrial order of the nineteenth century in essence 'preclude[d] any other result'.

Polanyi's critique of conventional approaches to the study and practice of economics has attracted widespread attention. The counterclaim that all economies are embedded in social relationships has resonated across diverse social science disciplines, including economics itself (Knowles and Owen, 2008). Indeed, many of the central tenets of institutional and evolutionary economics derive from the proposition that various social institutions, though they may in fact be governed by separate rules and accorded unique status, are nonetheless connected by the fact that they, and the individuals who populate them, share a common societal base. Similarly, private sector enterprises like mining companies can also be tied to local or regional populations by virtue of a shared interest or reliance on a physical or primary resource.

CSR subsequently developed as a normative framework in the 1960s. In the same vein as Polyani, CSR can be read as an attempt to reestablish linkages between economics and social context. Contemporary definitions of CSR highlight two central threads: the need for business to move beyond purely financial responsibilities (van Marrewijk 2003); and an intensified interest at all levels of society in the impacts of industry, including industry-specific governance mechanisms to monitor and mitigate potential harms created by business. In the decades that followed, the CSR construct expanded to include the specific interests of 'stakeholders' in the 1970s, and in the 1980s and 1990s to encompass an expansive set of ethical, legal and extralegal principles. Whatever the variety of definition, the guiding premise behind the notion of CSR is that any attempt to impose strong,

legitimating divisions between business and society was simply untenable, for much the same reasons articulated by Polanyi some decades earlier. The cumulative effect of a changing, increasingly normative CSR landscape, together with concern about unconstrained development's impact on the environment, is well depicted in Elkington's (1997) introduction of the 'triple bottom-line' concept, which re-presented the concept of SD for a business audience. Elkington's triple bottom line approach called for an urgent revision of both the internal and external restraints applied to corporations to ease harms created by the private sector. While conceptually drawing on a framework mimicking Polanyi's account of the embedded economy, Elkington's triple bottom line thesis is distinct in that it 'equalizes' of the economic with ecological and social dimensions.

Notwithstanding this realignment of economic with social and environmental dimensions, in the triple bottom line interpretation of SD, as it has been applied in the mining context, social dimensions have often been overshadowed by environmental aspects or 'business case' arguments for a more ethical approach, challenging the 'equal footing' of the three pillars. Yet despite the primacy of other dimensions in the mining industry's approach to SD, social policy has recently and observably been strengthened so that this dimension runs on par with, if not dominating, the SD frameworks of many large mining companies, particularly those operating globally.

Several factors explain this conceptual realignment. Firstly, although environmental considerations remain complex, many mining industry–specific environmental issues are now better understood. Even when these issues remain topics of public debate, such as the science behind deep-sea tailings placement, the industry is actively engaged in debate. This expanded normative terrain has created a conceptual space for companies to examine other problematic areas in their field, including social dilemmas and development opportunities. Secondly, concern about land access in an era of resource scarcity increasingly centres on the social dimension via the wider expectations of stakeholders and locally affected communities. Civil society groups and NGOs have continued to demand a greater degree of collective, local-level participation in decisions about changes in land use and land relations. As the demand for community participation and attention to social issues has grown, so too has the hiring of mining industry professionals with social science and development backgrounds who have engaged in policy and practice in the social domain.

Location and Position of Social Researchers in Mining

The social aspects of mining have emerged as an area of contemporary scholarship in their own right (Ballard and Banks 2003), with significant coverage of the Asia Pacific. Scholarship on mining has concentrated on PNG (Filer 1999;

Filer, Henton and Jackson 2000; Denoon et al. 1995; Bainton 2008, 2010), as well as elsewhere in the region, such as in Indonesia with Welker's (2009) study of the Batu Hijau mine and Kathryn Robinson's longitudinal focus on the Soroako nickel operation (1980, 1986, 1991). Robinson (2002) has also contributed to work and scholarship on the thematic area of gender and mining in the Asia Pacific, along with several others (Gerritsen and Macintyre 1991; Silitonga, Ruddick and Wignall 2002; Macintyre 2002, 2003; Lahiri-Dutt and Macintyre 2006; Lahiri-Dutt and Robinson 2008). Much of this scholarship has been driven by anthropologists seeking to illuminate mining's impacts on social groups and cultural systems. Other scholars are interested in the activities of foreign mining investments within the Asia Pacific (see Smith 2011, on Chinese investment in PNG). Social researchers are also becoming more active in emerging mining economies, where few accessible studies have treated the social aspects of mining to date. In the Asia Pacific, developments can be observed in the Vietnamese (Van Tuan 2010) and Mongolian (Bulag 2009; Murray 2003) contexts, where the work of social scientists is gaining prominence.

Mining advocacy groups have long relied on social scientific methods for recording and retelling the stories of mine-affected communities. Social researchers have also directly assisted advocacy campaigns of communities that themselves seek to raise concerns over mining impacts (Kirsch 2002; Phillips 2002). Oxfam Australia has been a prominent voice in high-profile international NGO advocacy in the Asia Pacific.

Oxfam's first mining-specific publication, *Undermined: The Impact of Australian Mining Companies in Developing Countries* (Atkinson 1998), precipitated the establishment of the Oxfam Australia Mining Ombudsman. In the absence of an industry mechanism to handle community grievances and complaints about Australian mining companies operating offshore, the Ombudsman heard cases and documented claims using ethnographic as well as other scientific methods, such as water and soil sampling, to launch and drive advocacy campaigns. Oxfam Australia worked in Vatokula in Fiji; Rapu Rapu, Didipio and Marinduque in the Philippines; Indo Muro, Kelian and Gag Island in Indonesia; and Tolukuma, Porgera and Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea, among others.

Another case in point is the high-profile campaign by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in relation to Barrick Gold's Porgera Joint Venture mine in the PNG Highlands. The HRW campaign thrust a succession of serious social issues relating to conflict, security and egregious abuses of women's rights into the international spotlight. The campaign was based on ethnographic evidence, particularly a series of interviews and engagements with local people and mine management. Utilizing social networking mediums, HRW produced a short online documentary that went viral within industry and NGO circles in a matter of weeks.

The industry itself increasingly engages anthropologists and other social science researchers both directly, by hiring community relations practitioners and

managers, and indirectly, through consultative or research arrangements. Research organizations that influence the industry's approach to CSR have also strengthened their social science expertise. Agencies like the IFC and international NGOs including Oxfam and Amnesty International keep extractive industry specialists from social science disciplines on permanent staff. International and national industry membership and certification bodies, such as the International Council on Mining and Metals, the Minerals Council of Australia and the Responsible Jewellery Council also draw on expertise and knowledge from the social sciences to develop policies, build standards and configure evaluation schemes. In sum, the infusion of social science thinking into industry is substantial. Questions remain, however, as to whether its influence is meaningful, or symbolic.

A decade ago, in a piece titled *Sociology before Geology,* Bruce Harvey (2002: 3) highlighted the mining industry's general reluctance to hire people with social science backgrounds, arguing that '[s]ociological research is required to the same extent as geological, environmental, metallurgical and other disciplines are deployed in putting together a comprehensive mine development plan'. Harvey's comments remain pertinent today, as natural and engineering-based professions continue to dominate the industry, which has historically regarded social issues as peripheral to the 'real' issues of mineral extraction (Moody 2007; Kemp and Owen 2013). Making social science 'matter' to industry is hence a challenge, one also faced by the development sector more broadly (Cernea 1991). This challenge relates in part to the frequent difficulty of quantifying and predicting social outcomes, and to the impression that social science studies reveal more problems than resolutions, since the pathways forward are neither clear nor assured. Environmental scientists and other non-engineering science professionals seem to have had more success in communicating across the disciplinary divide, perhaps because environmental science relies on epistemologies and methodologies that are seemingly more compatible with the mining industry's highly technical orientation. Nevertheless, with SD and CSR now permanent fixtures on the industry's radar, the capacity to recognize, understand and respond to a broad array of social issues is increasingly considered a necessary management skill and a key competency (Humphreys 2000).

The roles and positions of social researchers within CSR in mining can be described in relation to four overlapping, interrelated dimensions of the researcher's work: alignment with the corporate agenda, approach to critique, connection to the 'field' and involvement in implementation and review. In the first dimension, some social science researchers align themselves with a company or government agency, whereas others only work for a community group or NGO for fear of 'corporate capture' (O'Dwyer 2003). Sometimes researchers work closely with companies through research partnerships. Notable initiatives include the Australian National University's research partnership with Kaltim Prima Coal in Indonesia,

which has produced studies and guidance materials for gender analysis (Lahiri-Dutt and Mahy 2005; Dowling 2008), and the University of Queensland's partnership with Newcrest's Gold Mine on Lihir Island in PNG, which has focused on issues associated with cultural heritage and social impact monitoring (Bainton et al. 2011).

Sometimes researchers move between different roles and positions. For example, they are integral to the composition of mining-related consultancies and commissioned research in this region. Of those scholars listed earlier, Jackson and Filer were involved in early baseline studies at Lihir, and Macintyre worked as an independent social assessor there for many years. Scholars are also commissioned to undertake independent reviews, such as Newmont's global *Community Relationships Review* (Smith and Feldman, 2009), with case studies on its two Indonesian operations – Batu Hijau in Sumbawa and Minahasa in Sulawesi. These reviews were conducted by a team of social scientists overseen by an independent review panel of experts, including other academics, NGOs and community representative groups.

The second dimension concerns the researcher's approach to industry critique, which tends to reflect the way a practitioner works to achieve change. Some researchers vigorously critique the status quo and call for wholesale changes, whereas others take a more dialogical approach, negotiating and navigating within organizational and institutional spaces to achieve incremental change. Both approaches can add value. Practitioners with a strong critical voice can still be directly employed by a particular organization or, alternatively, can work in an educative or capacity-building role at an NGO. Certainly close association with a company does not preclude a critical stance towards company policy or practice.

The third dimension relates to the researcher's connection to people in the field. Some researchers work at the level of global policy, with aggregated data sets and trends and a focus on universally applicable standards, principles and norms, whereas others work with data from the field, drawing on particular cases and situations. The two ends of this continuum are not unrelated, as the social landscape is far more complex than a simple divide between the local and the global.

Researchers often combine their knowledge of the global level to interpret or influence local-level practice. The fourth dimension, therefore, represents the degree to which practitioners are involved in implementation at the programmatic level. Some social researchers provide independent perspective or advice through review and/or evaluation, either to companies or operations; others become directly involved in programme implementation in spheres such as community development, conflict and dispute resolution, community engagement or cultural heritage management. In the mainstream development sector, Cernea (1991: 21) suggests, social scientists can assert their views more effectively by becoming 'insiders' to the project-making process, whether via organizational

position or intellectual influence on the planning process: 'Sociological knowledge can thus aspire to statutorially inhabit the project process, rather than be temporarily called in from the cold for an in-and-out, yo-yo type contribution.'

Whatever the social researchers' location or position in mining, in the applied realm they use several tools, techniques, methods and processes to engage in particular contexts. The next section explains some of the approaches to social assessment in mining.

Mining and Social Assessment

Largely in response to pressure from the 'outside', for the past decade the mining industry has claimed to have significantly changed its approach to social and community issues (Evans and Kemp 2011). Notably, it has started to articulate mining benefits using mainstream development benchmarks, such as the UN Human Development Index and the Millennium Development Goals, as part of CSR commitments. Here, the steady influence of development discourse is discernible, along with a range of expectations about development outcomes, their relevance to local populations, their implementation and the measurement of their success. However, the degree of CSR implementation in mining and the industry's actual contribution to development and poverty alleviation are subjects of ongoing debate (Banks et al. 2013; Owen and Kemp 2013; Kemp 2010b; Kapelus 2002).

Attempts to deliver sustainable benefits and mitigate mining's negative impacts on the environment and people involve application of a range of social assessment tools, techniques and processes, especially social mapping, demographic profiling, socioeconomic baseline studies and social impact and risk assessments. Social mapping and demographic profiling require understanding of a community's social and physical infrastructure, including such aspects as village layout, household and community assets, networks, relationships, gender roles and so forth. They can also include scoping and early identification of cultural aspects of a community, such as traditional or customary law, values, sites of significance and livelihoods (Gibson, MacDonald and O'Faircheallaigh 2011). Baseline studies, also called situational analyses, provide information on a community's socioeconomic status and priorities. Such studies typically include a desktop review of existing research, information and data, and a period of fieldwork. Social mapping or profiling is ideally undertaken early in the project life cycle – well before permitting – and should be regularly updated to indicate significant change, such as a project delay or a mine extension or closure (Vanclay and Esteves 2011).

Some researchers define SIA as a suite of processes incorporating management systems and ongoing monitoring (ibid.; Vanclay 2002, 2006), whereas others consider management as separate from, but linked to, SIA (Franks 2011).

Whatever the scope and definition, it is generally agreed that contemporary SIA encompasses processes that hold potential for managing the social aspects of development, rather than merely the expert-driven technique of predicting impacts in a regulatory context (Vanclay 2003, 2006; Vanclay and Esteves 2011). These studies are typically commissioned by companies (as the project developers) and carried out by consultant researchers. Communities, groups within communities or other parties, such as government agencies or NGOs, also undertake SIAs. Commonly utilized methods are largely ethnographic and include interviews, observation, focus groups, surveys and so on (Franks 2011). These assessments can inform the development of company management systems and planning processes. In this sense, the company relies on contracted social assessments to build knowledge and understanding of the social domain, knowledge that is (ideally) supplemented by personnel inside the company who engage externally with stakeholders and local communities.

Findings from social assessments are intended to inform conventional project decision-making processes via a practice commonly referred to as 'toll-gating'. Toll-gating guides companies' determination of project risks by dividing a project into phases in which 'go forward' decisions hinge on resolution of major risks. Increasingly, social science knowledge is reflected in key criteria for each of the different phases, including pre-project phases like due diligence for new project acquisition. However, assessment according to such criteria is premised on social scientific research having been undertaken, or taken seriously, which is not always the case. Social assessment is not always mandated for exploration, for example – or, where it is mandated, it is often too superficial to generate deep knowledge and understanding about socioeconomic and political contexts and community risks and opportunities. Social science increasingly influences project start-up, but the fact remains that many projects proceed (or are acquired) with limited understanding of social and community dimensions, largely, it seems, because the economic gains of the project appear to outweigh the social risks involved.

Once projects are underway, CSR and SD discourse in mining tends to emphasize 'management systems' as tools for ensuring continuous improvement and internalizing the social agenda (Kemp 2010a). This practice has been driven by the industry's orientation to schemes such as the International Standards Organization's 14001 series for environmental considerations as well as by organizations outside the mining industry that promote systematic approaches to community relations, as demonstrated by the IFC's 2012 review of its performance standards. Management systems for community relations at the operational level in mining entail an extension of the approach taken to other functions like health, safety and environment (Harvey and Brereton 2005). The conventional systems approach is exemplified by the 'Plan-Do-Check-Act' cycle, or the Deming cycle, which establishes a continuous feedback loop for managers to identify and change parts of a process that need improvement (Tague 2004).



Figure 2.1. Conceptual framework: community relations management systems in mining

Figure 2.1 represents an adjusted management systems framework for community relations in mining, comprised of four 'phases' around a core practice of inclusive engagement. This positioning offers several important 'entry points' for this kind of social scientific engagement with mining. Multiple entry points serve to enhance the 'operationalization' of social knowledge for action purposes (Cernea 1991: 29).

The idea of 'inclusive engagement' draws on emerging global norms, contemporary social science theory and participatory development techniques and methods. The central tenets of this approach are embodied in the IFC's *Handbook on Stakeholder Engagement* (IFC 2007) – which provides snapshot examples of private sector investments in the Asia Pacific that embedded engagement as the central guiding principle – as well as in the aforementioned IFC performance standards. This approach requires mining companies to align their engagement practices with the principles of participation, inclusivity, accountability, non-discrimination and, in the case of indigenous peoples, free prior and informed consent (Doyle and Carino 2013). It involves 'listening to people', and the social knowledge thus developed becomes a 'hearing system' in which social researchers work to 'amplify' key findings (Cernea 1991: 31) – in this context, for mining company personnel. Mining operations must engage communities in order to respond to actual – rather than supposed – concerns, aspirations and requests for information. Engagement also means engaging cross-functionally *within* the organizational domain, not only company-to-community, but across departmental, disciplinary and hierarchical boundaries. Within the framework, engagement is firmly linked to all other dimensions.

There is no predetermined sequence to the framework – the process can start at any given point. The first phase builds knowledge about the operating context and from there establishes and fosters local-level relationships. During this phase, social science researchers tend to be directly involved in social assessment using the techniques mentioned above (i.e., social mapping, socioeconomic baselines, social impact assessment and social risk assessment). Whereas the first phase uncovers particular issues and relationships, analyses them and ranks their importance (if risk assessment is applied), the second phase focuses on advancing issues of importance to both the community and the operation. In this framework, planning and implementation are linked, unlike in conventional management systems, which decouple these processes. In this phase, objectives, targets, strategies and procedures are articulated, and resources allocated. Planning and implementation must be linked to engagement (the core element), established knowledge and understanding (from phase 1), existing corporate policy and legal and other obligations. Another key feature of the framework for community relations management systems in mining is a difference from the unidirectional Deming cycle: the framework's dynamic interaction allows policies, plans and procedures to be adjusted based on engagement with and feedback from locals and other stakeholders at all stages in the process, reflecting the often iterative nature of research and relationships.

The third phase pertains to monitoring, review and evaluation – key features of any management system. By drawing on and linking to existing engagement processes, knowledge, relationships and understandings, social monitoring, review and evaluation can incorporate both locally agreed indicators and global 'hyper' norms. Ideally, monitoring and evaluation build further knowledge and strengthen local-level relationships by enabling learning and prompting adjustment of plans and systems. The fourth phase requires operations to respond to the monitoring, review and evaluation process and any issues identified through engagement. It also requires companies to engage with local people and other stakeholders to discuss possibilities for change and communicate decisions. The two driving principles of the framework are accountability and transparency. If these two principles are not kept in frame, community relations management systems cannot support local-level development or company-community relationships. Alignment with such principles is thus a defining feature of the framework, as opposed to conventional management systems that are delinked from a principled approach.

Challenges in Social Assessment in Mining

Social issues in mining are increasingly regarded as potential sites of significant risk to companies and projects. Yet in terms of both comprehending and address-

ing a full range of risks, the mining industry's ability is weaker for social than for environmental and technical aspects of risk (Hodge 2011). Given the general technical bias of the sector, social scientists working to influence mining industry policy and practice face a raft of challenges. This section considers some of those challenges – those that are internal to the social science professions as well as those associated with the unique place social scientists often occupy in the interface between company and community.

One perennial issue is the debate about social scientists' roles and responsibilities in areas of intense contestation, including the question of whether researchers should work as 'independent outsiders', 'facilitators of dialogue' and/or 'agents of change'. Similarly, there are far-reaching concerns about social scientists' role in legitimating industry practices that have historically been considered antithetical to principles and ethics underpinning social science discourse. Dialogue and debate about the role of social assessment within and between organizations is needed to establish agreement about the assessment process itself, the conditions under which researchers and their work become somehow compromised, and mechanisms that can work to avoid this, or at least make transparent the conditions under which social assessment is undertaken and utilized by the private sector.

More than a decade ago, Becker (1997) suggested that social assessment should include assessment of organizational capacity in order to expose, understand and act on internal impediments to SIA implementation. Such an assessment would determine an organization's 'readiness' to respond to social risks, impacts and development opportunities, thus moving beyond the current, externally orientated model of social assessment to one that starts from the premise of internal engagement and reflection. In essence, while assessors and project-affected people can become frustrated with private sector developers' inadequate responses to social assessment findings, developers can become equally frustrated with assessors who fail to consider organizational realities (Kemp 2011). Some of these tensions are partly determined by the political, regulatory, historical, cultural and economic context, but they can also become manifest because the organizational or corporate-level context is unreceptive or even hostile to a particular social agenda.

Organizational issues that can impede implementation of social assessment findings include, for example, tensions in the strategic business framework; management systems and planning processes that do not support, or are not open to incorporating, social assessment processes and findings; structural arrangements that weaken the organization's capacity to respond to assessment findings; and internal lines of communication that are not conducive to collaboration or fostering change. For example, regarding the strategic framework, identifying community development opportunities requires a company to shift from pure competition towards partnership and collaboration, from defending company interests to also understanding community interests, and from centralized power towards deci-

sion making and control shared with others external to the organization (Kemp 2011). If such internal shifts are not under way within both the corporation and the community, any social assessment will have limited practical or applied value.

In mining, concepts of power and control are intimately entwined with the concept of 'risk'. According to Beck (1992), since the 1990s modern society has become so oriented to risk that some scholars frame social structure and human interaction in its terms – that is, we now live in a 'risk society'. In mining, risk management is a structured approach to assessing risk and developing strategies to manage or mitigate that risk so as to achieve a higher level of control and predictability. Companies taking this decidedly self-interested position prioritize initiatives that provide them with the greatest benefit or protection, potentially overlooking initiatives that may provide direct value to the local community, or indeed indirect value to the company by way of improved stakeholder capacity (Owen and Kemp, 2012). In an attempt to broaden thinking about opportunities for development, the social assessment process has begun to include a 'risk and opportunity' orientation (Evans and Brereton 2006). Nonetheless, when companies open discussion about development opportunities as part of risk assessment, processes are rarely participatory; in fact, community participation itself is often conceived as a risk. Under these conditions, social assessment will remain a tool for management, and an 'analytical tool of modernity' (Goldman 2009: 11), rather than becoming a mutually self-determining tool for company personnel or the community.

The dominance of risk-based assessment also plays into questions about process and methods. For example, Lockie (2001) suggests that corporate fear of political mobilization early in the project development cycle is perceived to precipitate the delay or halting of a project. This fear is often sufficient reason for companies to minimize exposure to potential challenges or opposition from outside, or indeed inside, the company. However, not providing opportunities for people to participate in the development process may be greater reason for mobilization than the development itself. Poor community consultation can produce a legacy of noncooperation and continual obstruction from the community, sometimes with disastrous effects. At Newmont's Minahasa Raya mine in Indonesia, for instance, issues of development inequity and lack of engagement with the stories and experiences of a small squatter community contributed, in the mine's final years of operation, to a protracted conflict involving Newmont as the parent company, Indonesian politicians and government departments, global media, NGOs and local community groups. Despite a series of strong legal victories in Newmont's favour, the company's reputation was very publicly called into question (Kemp et al. 2008).

Working with indigenous communities in the Canadian mining context, Gibson et al. (2011: 1809) observed that '[t]he stories, oral histories and works of the culture holders are often discounted [by mining companies] in favour of evidence

that is easier to quantify'. The qualitative data derived from social science methods is something of a challenge for mining companies, which are technically and historically accustomed to handling quantitative data. The latter is generally understood as being more certain, whereas qualitative researchers rarely collect or frame data as fixed or finite. Qualitative data is by its very nature open to interpretation, largely because researchers themselves are open to deeper, richer understandings of their subjects. This approach to research is typically time-consuming because of the importance of building relationships, or rapport, with interview participants and immersing oneself in the field. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the time constraints on deep qualitative or ethnographic work are often mitigated by undertaking systematic or rapid appraisals.

In practical terms, this time-wise approach relies on the researcher being strategic and selective about whom to engage and what to observe while in the field. In time-reduced circumstances, the selection of community members requires care and forethought. Using rapid assessment procedures, researchers seek out individuals who either are considered influential or knowledgeable in their respective contexts, or are somehow vulnerable or marginalized. By tapping into local knowledge, researchers seek to capture and extract information about communities without spending significant lengths of time in the field. This more time- and resource-efficient approach is often a response to budgetary constraints imposed by companies and time limits of regulatory, permitting and other internal processes such as toll-gating.

Despite rapid research's obvious benefits for companies and applied researchers, it has several limitations that can prove critical from the standpoint of both research quality and the impact of social scientific research on host communities. Rapid identification of community leaders is important, but still more vital is that researchers ensure their engagement extends beyond the local elite. In most cases, village or community elites establish committees or associations that enable them to engage with companies in a more structured, formal manner. These committees vary considerably in their effectiveness in achieving their stated (or unstated) objectives, but overall, local membership organizations, such as landowner associations, consistently feature a focus on self-advocacy. Rapid research risks overlooking the voices of community members whose leaders may not represent them, or whose strengths and needs are not reflected or articulated in such forums. Even though researchers accept that, whatever their approach, they will only ever produce a partial view, representation of marginal voices is a crucial endeavour of social research.

Issues of representation are related to issues of transparency and ownership of knowledge generated from the social assessment process. When companies or other agencies commission social research, questions often arise about control over research data and findings. Rapid research is often more extractive in nature and less reciprocal, prioritizing issues over relationships and limiting opportuni-

ties for mutual discovery and co-creation of knowledge. It often also overlooks sensitivities associated with traditional knowledge, such as women's and men's knowledge, that cannot be shared, often not even with social researchers, making it difficult for companies to consider such knowledge (Gibson et al. 2011). Such challenges raise important questions about the social responsibility of researchers when social assessment is associated with company processes that are temporally and financially bounded. This suggests a need for a more expansive proposition around research ethics that is yet to be fully explored.

Finally, ever since the rise and acceptance of global norms and industry standards, the international mining sector has witnessed growing interest and investment in building key skills around social science and development themes like community development, community engagement and participation. Yet building such knowledge, skills and capacities within the industry remains a challenge. The professional training and enculturation of managers in heavy footprint industries such as mining does not prepare them to facilitate community interaction and participatory decision making. In fact, participatory methodologies challenge the very basis of professionalized, rationalist, technically oriented, predictive professions (Chambers 1983). Until the education and training of mining industry professionals reflect the new realities of development, understanding will have to be encouraged by social researchers both inside and external to private sector organizations.

New Frontiers for Social Scientific Engagement in Private Sector Development

Following in the footsteps of social theorists who push the boundaries of conventional thinking and practice, it becomes possible to draw lessons from across the social sciences repertoire to influence the content and function of CSR as a grounded practice. The mining industry's current approach to social research is deficiency-oriented; that is, the focus is primarily on 'needs' and 'risk' analysis. Social scientists have great potential to move mining-industry thinking towards an approach that privileges the 'assets' and 'strengths' of both the community and the company (Owen and Kemp 2012). Strength-based approaches may prove a more productive basis for interrogating the seemingly 'wicked problem' (Conklin 2005) of dependency in post-closure mining communities. They may also help to prevent situations where communities abandon a focus on their own internal strengths in the process of seeking to secure external 'mining benefits'. The potential for strength-based approaches to act as circuit-breakers for resource curse theories merits exploration by applied social researchers and theorists alike.

Given its inherently extractive orientation, the mining industry tends to commission extractive social research, calling upon social scientists to 'dig up'

and 'deliver' data and information to mitigate risk to the project. Social research enacted this way does little to empower and engage communities affected by mineral development. Neither does it encourage company decision-makers to deliberate over how best to align development with global norms while also meeting local expectations. In such circumstances, social researchers must apply creative push-pull strategies, pushing companies to expand the scope of social research and give researchers adequate time to engage, understand and build relationships, and consequently pulling companies towards a new vision of development by encouraging greater internal reflection and multi-party debate about possible pathways forward. As an ethical proposition, this approach incorporates applied social research as a three-dimensional proposition: researchers are not merely building their own knowledge, but actively building knowledge and understanding amongst other parties to stimulate shifts in thinking and practice.

Shifts and movements will only be achieved through imaginative applications of social science theory and method that recognize the roots of the discipline and the work of those who came before. Long-standing sub-disciplines of the social sciences could be brought into frame to stimulate new and productive approaches. For example, the mining industry has come to accept company-community conflict as inevitable, but its current 'resolve and manage' orientation may obscure the underlying basis for peace. Concepts of 'sustainable peace', for example, which emphasize conflict transformation as a substantive, relational process, may deserve greater prominence in the industry's approach to sustainable development (Bond 2011). Also, in the organizational space – that is, within mining companies – opportunities may arise to apply community development methodologies so as to encourage cross-functional engagement between disparate disciplines as a means to grow, harness and articulate internal change (Bourke and Kemp 2011; Owen and Kemp 2012). There are also rediscoveries to be made. Community development theory encourages different methods of engagement in different relational circumstances. Such thinking offers great diagnostic and practical value to companies and communities that need to distinguish multi-level, multi-dimensional and multi-actor complexities of CSR in mining, both internally and externally.

Social scientific researchers and project-affected peoples face a key dilemma of whether to appeal to the rationalist, risk-focused project planning approach by using the language of risk to attract attention, or to challenge the overarching paradigm – a much larger, more complex task that can involve more normative appeals for change in an institutional context where moral claims are poorly regarded. These options are often framed in binary terms, whereby social assessors must either appeal to the established paradigm or challenge it. However, the path forward should not be conceived as 'either/or', but as 'both/and', for social researchers can engage in existing discourses through established frameworks while at the same time challenging and questioning them. This is achievable

when social scientists introduce new ideas, reopen previously closed points of discussion and demonstrate the benefits of participatory, iterative social research. It is within these contradictory spaces that paradigm shifts, organizational transformation and new institutional realities for understanding and responding to private sector development may become possible.

Acknowledgements

The authors are very grateful for the research assistance provided by Ms Shashi van de Graaff in preparing the original draft of this chapter, and acknowledge her support.

References

Atkinson, J. 1998. *Undermined: The Impact of Australian Mining Companies in Developing Countries*. Melbourne, Victoria: Community Aid Abroad.

Baba, M.L. 2005. 'Anthropological Practice in Business and Industry', in S. Kedia and J. van Willigen (eds), *Applied Anthropology: Domains of Application*. London: Praeger, pp. 221–62.

Bainton, N.A. 2008. 'Men of Kastom and the Customs of Men: Status, Legitimacy and Persistent Values in Lahir, Papua New Guinea', *Australian Journal of Anthropology* 19(2): 194–212.

———. 2010. *Lihir Destiny: Cultural Responses to Mining in Melanesia*. Canberra: ANU E Press.

Bainton, N., et al. 2011. 'Stepping Stones Across the Lihir Islands: Developing Cultural Heritage Management in the Context of a Gold-Mining Operation', *International Journal of Cultural Property* 18: 81–110.

Ballard, C. and G. Banks. 2003. 'Resource Wars: Mining and Anthropology', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32: 287–313.

Banks, G., et al. 2013. 'Conceptualising Mining Impacts, Livelihoods and Corporate Community Development in Melanesia', *Community Development Journal*. doi: 10.1093/cdj/bst025.

Beck, U. 1992. *The Risk Society*. London: Sage.

Becker, H. 1997. *Social Impact Assessment: Methods and Experience in Europe, North America and the Developing World*. London: UCL Press.

Beebe, J. 2001. *Rapid Assessment Process: An Introduction*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Boas, F. 1911. *The Mind of Primitive Man*. New York: Macmillan.

Bond, C. 2011. 'Sustainable Peace and Conflict Transformation in the Mining Context', unpublished. Brisbane: University of Queensland.

Botes, L. and D. van Rensburg. 2000. 'Community Participation in Development: Nine Plagues and Twelve Commandments', *Community Development Journal* 35(1): 41–58.

Bourke, P. and D. Kemp. 2011. 'The Role of Community Relations Practitioners as Change Agents in the Minerals Industry', *Proceedings of the First International Seminar on Social Responsibility in Mining, First International Seminar on Social Responsibility in Mining, Santiago, Chile, 19–21 October 2011*.

Bulag, U.E. 2009. 'Mongolia in 2008: From Mongolia to Mine-golia', *Asian Survey* 49(1): 129–34.

Cernea, M.M. (ed.). 1991. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chambers, R. 1983. *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. London: Longman.

Chang, H. 2008. *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism*. New York: Bloomsbury.

Chinkin, C. 1989. 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 38: 850–66.

Conklin, J. 2005. *Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems*. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons.

Cooke, B. and U. Kothari (eds). 2001. *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books.

Cornwall, A. 2003. 'Whose Voices? Whose Choices? Reflections on Gender and Participatory Development', *World Development* 31(8): 1325–342.

Datamonitor. 2011. 'Industry Profile: Metals & Mining in Asia-Pacific'. Retrieved 25 October 2013 from http://www.datamonitor.com/store/Browse/?N=357+4294669542+4294853755&Ns=title&Nso=0.

Denoon, D., et al. 1995. *Mining and Mineral Resource Policy Issues in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for the 21st Century*. Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies.

Dowling, S. 2008. 'Gender Analysis: An Introductory Guide', prepared for PT Kaltim Prima Coal Project Partner. Retrieved 15 August 2011 from http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/09534811011071298.

Doyle, C. and J. Carino. 2013. *Making Free Prior Informed Consent a Reality: Indigenous Peoples and The Extractives Sector*. Indigenous Peoples Links, Middlesex University School of Law and the Ecumenical Council for Corporate Social Responsibility. Retrieved 27 October 2013 from http://www.piplinks.org/report%3A-making-free-prior-%2526amp%3B-informed-consent-reality-indigenous-peoples-and-extractive-sector.

Eade, D. 1997. *Capacity Building: An Approach to People-Centred Development*. Oxford: Oxfam.

Elkington, J. 1997. *Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business*. Oxford: Capstone.

Equator Principles. 2003. *About the Equator Principles*. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/all-adoption/adoption-news-by-year/65-2003.

Evans, R. and D. Brereton. 2006. 'Community Risks and Opportunities: A Site Level Tool', CSRM Working Paper. Retrieved 15 August 2011 from http://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/docs/SMI%20Community%20Risks%20and%20Opportunities.pdf.

Evans, R. and D. Kemp. 2011. 'Community Issues', in P. Darling (ed.), *SME Mining Engineering Handbook*, 3rd ed. Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, pp. 1767–777.

Filer, C. 1999. *Dilemmas of Development: The Social and Economic Impact of the Porgera Gold Mine, 1989–1994*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press.

Filer, C., D. Henton and R. Jackson. 2000. *Landowner Compensation in Papua New Guinea's Mining and Petroleum Sectors*. Port Moresby: PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum.

Franks, D.M. 2011. 'Management of the Social Impacts of Mining', in P. Darling (ed.), *SME Mining Engineering Handbook*, 3rd ed. Colorado, USA: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, pp. 1817–825.

Frazer, J.G. 1890. *The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative Religion*. London: Macmillan.

Gerritsen, R. and M. Macintyre. 1991. 'Dilemmas of Distribution: The Misima Gold Mine, Papua New Guinea', in J. Connell and R. Howitt (eds), *Mining and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia*. Sydney: Sydney University Press, pp. 34–53.

Gibson, G., MacDonald, A. and C. O'Faircheallaigh. 2011, 'Cultural Considerations for Mining and Indigenous Communities' in P. Darling (ed.), *SME Mining Engineering Handbook*, 3rd ed. Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, pp. 1797–816.

Goldman, L. 2009. 'So Much Gas? Realities and Rhetoric in Social Impact Monitoring – Lessons from the PNG LNG Project', *ACMER Workshop on Innovations in SIA & Monitoring for the Resources Sector, Brisbane, 1–2 April 2009*. Brisbane: Australian Centre for Minesite Rehabilitation Research.

Handwerker, W.P. 2001. *Quick Ethnography*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Harriss, J. 2002. *Depoliticising Development: The World Bank and Social Capital*. London: Anthem Press.

Harvey, B. 2002. 'Sociology before Geology: The Development of Social Competencies in Rio Tinto', *Sustainable Development Conference, Newcastle, 10–15 November 2002*. Melbourne: Rio Tinto. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://old.stage.riotintodev.com/documents/Media-Speeches/BEHSociology_before_Geology.pdf.

Harvey, B. and D. Brereton. 2005. 'Emerging Models of Community Engagement in the Australian Minerals Industry', *International Conference on Engaging Communities, Brisbane, 14–17 August 2005*. Brisbane: United Nations. Retrieved 15 August 2011 from http://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/docs/ICEC.pdf.

Hodge, R.A. 2011. 'Mining and Sustainability', in P. Darling (ed.), *SME Mining Engineering Handbook,* 3rd ed. Colorado: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration, pp. 1665–688.

Humphreys, D. 2000. 'A Business Perspective on Community Relations in Mining', *Resources Policy* 26: 127–31.

International Council on Mining and Metals. 2003. 'ICMM Sustainable Development Framework: 10 Principles'. Retrieved 5 July 2011 from http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-development-framework/10-principles.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2007. *Handbook on Stakeholder Engagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing Business in Emerging Markets*. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/938f1a0048855805beacfe6a6515bb18/IFC_StakeholderEngagement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

———. 2012. *International Finance Corporation's Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability*. Retrieved 5 July 2011 from http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/IFC+Sustainability/Sustainability+Framework/Sustainability+Framework+-+2012/Performance+Standards+and+Guidance+Notes+2012/.

Kapelus, P. 2002. 'Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility and the "Community": The Case of Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and the Mbonambi', *Journal of Business Ethics* 39: 275–96.

Kedia, S. and J. van Willigen. 2005. 'Applied Anthropology: Context for Domains of Application', in S. Kedia and J. van Willigen (eds), *Applied Anthropology: Domains of Application*. London: Praeger.

Kemp, D. 2010a. 'Community Relations in the Global Mining Industry: Exploring the Internal Dimensions of Externally Oriented Work', *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* 17(1): 1–14.

———. 2010b. 'Mining and Community Development: Problems and Possibilities of Local-Level Practice', *Community Development Journal* 45(2): 198–218.

———. 2011. 'Understanding Organizational Context: Implementing SIA Findings and Recommendations', in F. Vanclay and A.M. Esteves (eds), *New Directions in Social Impact Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 20–37.

Kemp, D., R. Evans, J. Plavina and B. Sharp. 2008. *Newmont's Global Community Relationships Review: Organisational Learnings from the Minahasa Case Study*. Brisbane: Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM).

Kemp, D. and J.R. Owen. 2013. 'Community Relations in Mining: Core to Business but Not "Core Business"', *Resources Policy* 38: 523–31.

Keynes, J.M. 1936. *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. London: Macmillan.

Kirsch, S. 2002. 'Anthropology and Advocacy: A Case Study of the Campaign Against the Ok Tedi Mine', *Critique of Anthropology* 22(2): 175–200.

Knowles, S. and J.R Owen. 2008. 'Karl Polanyi for Historians: An Alternative Economic Narrative', *The European Legacy Towards New Paradigms* 13(2):175–91.

Kumar, S. 2002. *Methods for Community Participation: A Complete Guide for Practitioners*. London: ITDG.

Lahiri-Dutt, K. and M. Macintyre (eds). 2006. *Women Miners in Developing Countries: Pit Women and Others*. Ashgate: Aldershot.

Lahiri-Dutt, K. and P. Mahy. 2005. 'Impacts of Mining on Women and Youth in Indonesia: Two Mining Locations', *Creating Empowered Communities: Gender and Sustainable Livelihoods in a Coal Mining Region in Indonesia Project*. Canberra: ANU. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from https://crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/staff/rmap/lahiridutt/CR3_KLD_Mahy_Impacts_Mining_Indonesia.pdf.

Lahiri-Dutt, K. and K. Robinson. 2008. '"Period Problems" at the Coalface', *Feminist Review* 89: 102–21.

Lockie, S. 2001. 'SIA in Review: Setting the Agenda for Impact Assessment in the 21st Century', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 19(4): 277–87.

Macintyre, M. 2002. 'Women and Mining Projects in Papua New Guinea: Problems of Consultation, Representation and Women's Rights', in I. Macdonald and C. Rowland (eds), *Tunnel Vision: Women, Mining and Communities*. Melbourne: Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, pp. 26–29.

———. 2003. 'Petztorme Women: Responding to Change in Lihir, Papua New Guinea', *Oceania* 74: 120–32.

Malinowski, B. 1922. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagos of Melanesian New Guinea*. London: Routledge.

Metals Economics Group. 2011. *World Exploration Trends 2011: A Special Report from Metals Economics Group for the PDAC International Convention*. Halifax. Retrieved 15 August 2011 from http://cesco.cl/assets/docs/estudios-y-presentaciones/2011-04_MEG_World_Exploration_Trends.pdf.

Meyer, J., et al. 1997. 'World Society and the Nation-State', *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1): 144–81.

Moody, R. 2007. *Rocks and Hard Places: The Globalization of Mining*. New York: Zed Books.

Morris, B. and R. Bastin. 2004. 'Introduction', in B. Morris and R. Bastin (eds), *Expert Knowledge*. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 1–11.

Mukherjee, N. 2002. *Participatory Learning and Action: With 100 Field Methods*. New Delhi: Concept.

Murray, W. 2003. 'Informal Gold Mining and National Development: The Case of Mongolia', *International Development Planning and Review* 25(2): 111–28.

O'Dwyer, B. 2003. 'Conceptions of Corporate Social Responsibility: The Nature of Managerial Capture', *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal* 16(4): 523–57.

Owen, J.R. 2009. *A History of the Moral Economy*. Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Owen, J.R. and D. Kemp. 2013. 'Social Licence and Mining: A Critical Perspective', *Resources Policy* 38(1): 29–35.

———. 2012. 'Assets, Capitals and Resources: Frameworks for Corporate Community Development in Mining', *Business and Society* 51(3): 382–408.

Panayiotopoulos, P. 2002. 'Anthropology Consultancy in the UK and Community Development in the Third World: A Difficult Dialogue', *Development in Practice* 12(1): 45–58.

Phillips, R. 2002. 'Is Corporate Engagement an Advocacy Strategy for NGOs? The Community Aid Abroad Experience', *Nonprofit Management and Leadership* 13(2): 123–37.

Polanyi, K. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Books.

Robinson, J. 1933. *The Economics of Imperfect Competition*. London: Macmillan.

Robinson, K. 1980. 'Development or Dependency: The Soroako Nickel Project', in R. Garnaut and P. McCawley (eds), *Indonesia: Dualism, Growth and Poverty*. Canberra: Australian National University, pp. 399–412.

———. 1986. *Stepchildren of Progress: The Political Economy of Development in an Indonesian Mining Town*. New York: State University of New York Press.

———. 1991. 'Land Rights, Labour Relations and Fertility in the Soroako Nickel Project', in J. Connell and R. Howitt (eds), *Mining and Indigenous Peoples in the Pacific Rim*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 107–18.

———. 2002. 'Labour, Love and Loss: Mining and the Displacement of Women's Labour', in I. Macdonald and C. Rowland (eds), *Tunnel Vision: Women, Mining and Communities*. Melbourne: Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, pp. 40–43.

Sano, H. 2000. 'Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of Human Rights and Development', *Human Rights Quarterly* 22(3): 734–52.

Schulpen, L. and P. Gibbon. 2002. 'Private Sector Development: Policies, Practices and Problems', *World Development* 30(1): 1–15.

Schumpeter, J.A., 1934. *The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sen, A. 1999a. 'Democracy as a Universal Value', *Journal of Democracy* 10(3): 3–17.

———. 1999b. *Commodities and Capabilities*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Silitonga, N., A. Ruddick and F.S. Wignall. 2002. 'Mining, HIV/AIDS and Women: Timika, Papua Province', in I. Macdonald and C. Rowland (eds), *Tunnel Vision: Women, Mining and Communities*. Melbourne: Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, pp. 44–47.

Smith, G. 2011. 'Chinese Interests in Pacific Nations: Mining Ventures in PNG'. Retrieved 15 August 2011 from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/19/chinese-interests-in-pacific-nations-mining-ventures-in-png/.

Smith, G.A. and D. Feldman. 2009. 'Community Relationships Review, Global Summary Report, March 2009'. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/u110/CRR%20Global%20Summary%20Report%20and%20Appendices-%20English.pdf.

Strathern, A. and P.J. Stewart. 2001. 'Introduction: Anthropology and Consultancy: Ethnographic Dilemmas and Opportunities', *Social Analysis* 45(2): 3–22.

Tague, N.R. 2004. *The Quality Toolbox*, 2nd ed. Milwaukee: ASQ Quality Press.

Tylor, E.B. 1871. *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom*, 2 vols. London: John Murray.

Vanclay, F. 2002. 'Conceptualising Social Impacts', *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 22(3): 183–211.

———. 2003. 'International Principles for Social Impact Assessment', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(1): 5–11.

———. 2006. 'Principles for Social Impact Assessment: A Critical Comparison between the International and US Documents', *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 26(1): 3–14.

Vanclay, F. and A.M. Esteves. 2011. 'Current Issues and Trends in Social Impact Assessment', in F. Vanclay and A.M. Esteves (eds), *New Directions in Social Impact Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 3–19.

Van Marrewijk, M. 2003. 'Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: Between Agency and Communion', *Journal of Business Ethics* 43(2/3): 95–105.

Van Tuan, T. 2010. 'Meanings of Sex, Concepts of Risk and Sexual Practices among Migrant Coal Miners in Quang Ninh, Vietnam', *Culture, Health and Sexuality* 12(Suppl. 1): S31–40.

Welker, M.A. 2009. '"Corporate Security Beings in the Community": Mining, the Corporate Social Responsibility Industry, and Environmental Advocacy in Indonesia', *Cultural Anthropology* 24(1): 142–79.

World Resources Institute. 2009. 'Breaking Ground: Engaging Communities in Extractive and Infrastructure Projects'. Retrieved 5 July 2011 from http://www.wri.org/publication/breaking-ground-engaging-communities.

3

Practising Social Development

Navigating Local Contexts to Benefit Local Communities

Aaron Kyle Dennis and Gregory Eliyu Guldin

Social development[1] practices are inherently political, value-laden constructs, and practitioners need to keep this in mind to effectively employ our methodological tools for the benefit of local communities. In this chapter we examine how the social development paradigm creates potential benefits and liabilities for different stakeholders and discuss the role of social development practitioners within this context. Our aim is to illuminate the dynamics of social policy and related methodologies to inform future efforts at reforming and revitalizing social development practice.

Social Development as Political Process

International financial institutions, bilateral donors and (increasingly) corporate sponsors require the incorporation of social due diligence in the planning and implementation of national development project initiatives.[2] Especially among international financial institutions (IFIs), the last three decades have witnessed considerable efforts to develop policy instruments and operational procedures (collectively: social policy) to protect vulnerable people and communities worldwide by preventing and mitigating undue harm to people and their environment in the development process (ADB 2010; World Bank 2011). Specific social policy instruments have been articulated for high-risk situations, such as projects that involve physical or economic displacement (especially involuntary resettlement), affect indigenous communities or result in severe negative change to

ecosystems and natural environments (IFC 2006; EBRD 2008; ADB 2009; IDB 2011; World Bank 2011). Operationalization[3] of social policy, in turn, occurs via various (and often quite specific) methodologies, with social assessment, poverty analysis and community-driven development among the most common today.

Although the aim of social policy and associated operational methods is to provide (quasi-)standardized means for ensuring that locally affected communities benefit from the development process (Davis 2004), the practice of social development is inherently political and ideological, marked by cultural assumptions and outcome-oriented objectives based in a Western (Euro-American) social science paradigm. The values and approaches promoted by the current international social development paradigm are far from mere 'technical' or 'scientific' operations.

To illustrate this last point, consider two related concepts that entered mainstream developmental discourses around the 1990s[4] and which are now central to the social policy paradigm: participation and empowerment.[5] Both can be considered 'democratic' justifications for turning over responsibilities for project or programme activities to a private sector–civil society partnership in support of neoliberal agendas of state withdrawal from provision of social services. Policy compliance requires participatory inputs from diverse actors (i.e., stakeholders[6]) to help ensure that all (and especially marginalized groups) are part of the decision-making processes affecting their lives. In other words, participation means ensuring that project-affected people[7] are involved actively in project design and implementation (i.e., beyond just having knowledge of it or being a source of labour). Ideally, participation also fosters a sense of development project ownership among locally affected communities. 'Empowerment' is the favoured trope for justifying, or at least rationalizing, participatory approaches. Understood as going beyond participation, empowerment means placing actual (albeit usually very limited) decision-making authority over some aspects of project design in the hands of community members as a group.[8] Interviews with and observations of social development professionals in multilateral development banks and in different countries (China, the United States, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam) suggest that practitioners generally share these values – reasoning them to be intrinsic to ensuring 'better' development interventions.

It is not illogical to assume that greater participation in project decision making is empowering for people and communities. After all, if project-affected people are given the chance to make direct contributions to project planning – including defining benefits-sharing schemes and approving mitigation measures for project impacts – doesn't this mean they are further empowered to determine the course of their own destinies? Were not vulnerable groups (women, youth, the elderly, minority communities) simply victims of the development process a few short years ago? Yet just as 'participation' and 'empowerment' can be deployed in the name of improving the development process and engendering sustainable

economic development, so too can they be understood as agents of democratic reform, mechanisms for insulating policy choices from political contestation, or evidence of the bureaucratic co-option of social development practices – or even as means for legitimating the broader multilateral development paradigm itself. Herein is the crux of the issue: social development processes can effectively be *anti*-participatory and *dis*-empowering. For instance, what happens to groups that are not formally recognized in the process of project design? If a social development intervention has received an IFI stamp of approval, what recourse is there, after fund disbursement for complaint or remedial action, for those not appropriately taken into account? If the participation mechanisms written into social development do effectively give speaking rights to previously subaltern voices, are these speaking rights commensurate with true empowerment? A cautious approach requires that social development practitioners at least be aware of the broader implications of our work and scholarship.

The Importance of Understanding Political Contexts

Social development methodologies can be helpful to local people – but not without keen knowledge of, and sensitivity to, local social and political contexts. No social development methodology should be construed as readily applicable to all actors and all contexts. One must account for the different agendas and pressures of each actor involved – local people, companies, trade unions, politicians, bureaucrats, government agencies, financing institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs), and so on – as well the different coping strategies used by each group or agent.

Illustrative of the above point is the disparity between the official story of social development practice in China and the reality often faced by social development practitioners. The official version[9] is that, despite shaky beginnings, the Chinese government now embraces the virtues of social-development methods, and top-level government officials have brought the country on board with international best practices. A flurry of guidance notes for incorporating social assessment can be cited as evidence, starting in 1997 with the *Guidelines on Social Assessment for Investment Projects* issued through the Ministry of Construction, followed by the NDRC[10]-endorsed 2002 *Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Studies*[11] and a subsequent manual for social assessment in 2004 (Gransow and Price 2007). Presumably, line-agent cadres, in turn, worked diligently to ensure that these processes were justly implemented.

However, the experiences of social development practitioners evoke a different telling – a story in which social development practices are opposed locally and undermined by strategic political manoeuvring. Conducting a participatory rapid/rural appraisal exercise in China's Gansu province in 2001, Guldin, for in-

stance, noticed local officials ostentatiously placing cadres in all focus groups, where they would speak first in favour of the project – clearly to model expected behaviour for other participants and thus effectively preventing farmers from participating *too* actively in the process (Guldin and Dennis 2007).

If one is sensitive to Chinese cultural contexts, the reasons for this disparity between hyperbole and practice are easy to surmise. At the macro-level, client states (i.e., 'borrower countries') embrace social policy and other normative behavioural codes[12] to ensure heightened measures of legitimacy in the international political theatre.[13] Indeed, the Chinese government's adoption of many international standards for sustainable social and environmental development is commonly ascribed to this motive. Yet for cadres at the local level – in stark contrast to the gains in political legitimacy realized by the national government – accepting social development interventions is tantamount to forfeiting their autonomy and possibly even jeopardizing their legitimacy. Social policy gives an opening to outside agents (read: social development practitioners) to encroach on local cadre turf, to meddle in matters of governance by restructuring power relations and reorganizing chains of command (not least by defining who should and can participate in political decision-making processes; and to establish state-like institutions under the jurisdiction of civil society (Guldin and Dennis 2007). For example, an influential *Social Analysis Sourcebook* states:

> Participation refers to the extent to which stakeholders can influence development by contributing to project design, influencing public choices, and holding public institutions accountable for the goods and services they are bound to provide… and also refers to giving poor or excluded people access to opportunity (World Bank 2003).

The tools of social development practitioners may even be viewed as infringements on national sovereignty and a form of cultural imperialism. Moreover, the ideological assumptions embedded in social assessment, and in similar forms of social development practice that people on the 'bottom' know best, smack of the failed 'mass politics'[14] of the Cultural Revolution. Prior to the reform era, the saying in the People's Republic of China went 'Better Red than Expert',[15] as Maoist ideology celebrated the wisdom of the peasant and worker classes along with the spirit of political activists, and downplayed the 'mere' technical knowledge of experts. Today, an aversion to such bottom-up practices and approaches lingers.

Our point is simple: understanding different stakeholders' perceptions and anxieties about social development processes is not difficult, but it does require a certain amount of cultural familiarity. The practice of social development is itself a political game carried out on the terms of political elites and governing agents. Failure to recognize this reality – and the different perceptions of the role and function of social development more generally – affects practitioners' ability to carry out development interventions that benefit local communities.

Understanding How to Negotiate Political Contexts: A Stakeholder Analysis

Recognition that the practice of social development is inherently political and predicated in non-universal values puts social development practitioners in a better position to negotiate local social and political contexts to the benefit of local communities (indeed, our very raison d'être). Understanding the manifold applications of the methods – from participatory, empowerment-oriented mechanisms for achieving social development outcomes, to damage and liability control tools for donor agencies and implementing institutions, and even instruments for promoting democratic expansion – helps practitioners better identify the benefits and threats that the practice of social development might represent to different project stakeholders. Perhaps ironically, a practitioner wishing to better understand the stakes of social policy and practices in different social and political contexts may profit from subjecting key players in development initiatives to a stakeholder analysis (see Table 3.1).

Project Proponent

A project proponent is the institution (private or public sector) with primary contractual responsibility for implementing a development project. The overt goal of the social policy commonly espoused by project proponents is to achieve socially responsible, sustainable development outcomes. When the project proponent is a national government, overt goals may also include heightened effectiveness of economic development interventions for achieving poverty reduction targets and improved government transparency and accountability. When the project proponent is a private sector company, an additional overt goal may be to meet international and/or industry 'good practice' standards.

Project proponents generally understand that social development practices have tangible benefits. Though not a stated 'goal' per se, demonstrating compliance with social policy is a prerequisite to accessing many external investments, such as IFI financing. Additionally, well-designed, earnestly implemented social development practices can be a buffer between project proponents and reputational damage, especially in cases of unforeseen project-induced negative consequences; reduce potential project delays; and ensure domestic stability, a key concern for national governments.

Suspected covert goals of project proponents' adherence to social policy include extending the reach of state power; effecting technocratic population control; or otherwise serving as a form of reputational 'liability insurance'[16] whereby, for instance, the national government can shift blame for negative project outcomes and failed development onto local implementing agents, civil society partners or others. When project implementation leads to social problems, project

Table 3.1. Assessment of project stakeholder interests, benefits and risks

Stakeholder Category		Overt Goals for Social Policy	Benefits of Social Development Practice for Project Implementation	Suspected Covert Goals of Social Policy	Risks of Obstructing Social Development Practices during Project Implementation
Project Proponent	National Government	• socially responsible and sustainable development • poverty reduction • transparency	• accessing external investment funds • buffering against reputational damage • ensuring domestic stability • reducing potential project delays	• extending the reach of state power • technocratic population control	• backlash from international community for poor social management • loss of foreign investment • direct interventions for human rights violations
	Private Company	• good practice		• reputational 'liability insurance'[1]	• inadequate or no returns on investment moneys
Implementing Agency	Local Government	• aid project implementation	• ensuring good relations with the national government/ parent company • building capacity at techniques for social management	• strengthening local power/ autonomy • technocratic population control	• civil unrest/backlash from local community • loss of favour with national government/parent company • legal and financial penalization for inadequate performance
	Local Partner/ Private Contractors	• good practice		• reputational 'liability insurance'	
Financer/ Project Donor	International Financial Institution(s)	• poverty reduction • socially responsible and sustainable development	• ensuring long-term economic viability in project design • maintaining reputation and good public relations	• embedding democratic values • eroding state autonomy/ sovereignty	• backlash from international civil society • reputational harm • withdraw of capital
	Private Banks	• good practice		• reputational 'liability insurance'	• inadequate or no returns on investment moneys

Project Affected Peoples	Local Communities	• realizing community empowerment • realizing community benefits	• mitigation of negative project effects • protection from economic shocks • reduced instances of poverty	• publically criticizing government (both national and local) • demanding more than their share of project benefits • causing trouble for the project because of unreasonable expectations	• inability to access project benefits • further marginalization and increased vulnerability • exploitation • culture loss
	Local Enterprises	• sustained market access	• mitigation of potential economic displacement • access to project-generated economies	• acquiring unfair comparative advantages	• economic displacement • competitive *dis*-advantage
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	International community sector organizations	• community empowerment	• assisting local people to resist hegemonic international institutions • acquiring a positive reputation	• inroad for anti-state political manoeuvring	• negative reputation • drop in funding
	Local community sector organizations	• Community empowerment	• mitigation of negative project effects • acquiring a positive reputation • allying with local governments or corporate interests	• inroad for anti-state political manoeuvring	• negative reputation • loss of business opportunities

[1] This term is shorthand for nominal adherence to social policy used as a stakeholder strategy for blame- shifting as a face-saving mechanism.

proponents risk backlash from the international community (governments as well as civil society), particularly if the consequences are severe enough to be construed as violating human rights. When governments acting as project proponents face such criticism, a feared scenario is that loss of foreign investors' confidence in the country will trigger capital flight. Worst-case scenarios, such as those involving systemic violations of human rights, may also culminate in economic sanctions or other forms of international intervention.

Implementing Agency

An implementing agency may be a local operational department of a central government ministry or other regional- or district-level government department or agency. It may also be a local company or a locally incorporated company jointly owned and operated by a group of larger companies collectively serving as the project proponent. The implementing agency is responsible for carrying out the project activities, including management of subcontracting arrangements. Implementing agencies usually (sometimes at best) see social policy as a mere aid in project planning or something carried out to meet the requirements of project proponents and financers. Implementing agencies benefit from appropriate deployment of social development practices, as it upholds good relations with the project proponent and improves the agencies' capacity for social management.

When the implementing agency is a local government department, its primary suspected covert goal is bids to strengthen local power and autonomy. Local governments may also deploy social development practices to increase their capacities for technocratic population control (a more insidious reading of the idea of 'social management'[17]). Like national governments, local governments as implementing agents fear civil unrest resulting from project activities; in such cases they additionally risk losing favour with the national government (which may lead to cuts in state-allocated finances, greater limitations on autonomy in future economic decision-making and social planning activities, etc.). As implementing agents, both local governments and companies fear legal and financial penalization for inadequate social performance. Covert goals of the implementing agency may thus also be to ensure some measure of liability insurance in the case of failed project implementation (i.e., as a counterargument to state blame).

Project Donors/Financer

The basis of developmental initiative funding is a given project's projected revenue-generating potential (as opposed to the balance sheets of project proponents/sponsors). When the financier is an IFI the monies lent to client projects have been 'donated' by constituent state parties. IFIs are chartered by more than one country, so their actions are subject to international law. Two overt goals of IFI

social policies are to achieve the institutions' charter objectives of poverty reduction and socially responsible, sustainable development, and to ensure acknowledgement and observance of international laws.

Yet IFIs also have a stated interest in promoting market expansion – an objective often closely tied to governmental deregulation and the promotion of democratic values (predicated on the self-same concepts of participation and empowerment discussed above). By establishing a rigorous set of prerequisites for access to project loans, IFIs can effectively demand that borrower countries accept nonlocal value systems and economic rationales (of which social policy is a part). Sceptics regard social policy as overtly postured to open yet another avenue to infringe on state sovereignty and autonomy. For private banks acting as project financers, the overt goal of social policy often relates to 'good practice' models for ethical lending.

The primary benefit of social policy for project financers is that it promotes the long-term economic viability of investments by better tailoring project design to local contexts and accounting for and managing social and political risks (Sohn 2007). Project financers that fail to adhere to social policy risk substantial backlash from international civil society and concomitant reputational harm. For IFIs, severe cases of failed social policy application could, in theory, spur states to threaten to withdraw financing capital.[18] Private banks, meanwhile, face the very real risk of poor social management strategies causing ongoing project delays, resulting in inadequate or no return on investments.

Project-Affected People / Local Communities

Although a commonly employed stakeholder category (and used here for heuristic purposes), 'project-affected people' should always be interpreted as subsuming a broad range of community stakeholder groups as well as vulnerable population sub-segments (women, youth, the elderly, the disabled, the very poor). Local communities are interested in realizing opportunities for empowerment and gaining access to project benefits. Social development practices can help local communities by adequately fulfilling their intended role of mitigating the potential for negative consequences of project implementation by adding more robust protections from economic shock and reducing instances of project-induced poverty. However, when social development practices are not carried out in earnest, local communities risk further marginalization and increased vulnerability. Cultural loss and forced assimilation are also potential threats. In some cases, project noncompliance with social policy is read as direct exploitation of local communities.

Project-affected people and local communities are sometimes suspected of using social development practices as a forum for publicly criticizing government (both national and local); for commanding greater than 'deserved' shares of project benefits; or for causing trouble to the project (e.g., trying to stop a project via

public protest or appeals to national and international media), especially when their 'unreasonable' expectations are unfulfilled. Often such suspicions are wildly overdrawn, but sometimes they are borne out. For example, when acting as external monitor for a project in Russia, Guldin was confronted with community allegations of corruption arising from black market activities – a situation that was investigated, identified and subsequently resolved. On a World Bank project in China, in the course of developing an Indigenous Peoples Plan, people approached Guldin surreptitiously regarding allegations of government malfeasance. On this occasion the 'reality' was something less severe than was claimed, but it was still a case of social development practices enabling a local community to bring grievances to bear on higher-ranking government officials. People affected by a third project, this time in Indonesia, heavily criticized the project and appealed for drastic increases in project benefits, apparently at the instigation of the local district lead. In this case, the claims were mostly a political manoeuvre that leveraged the affected communities' rights in an attempt to benefit a specific group of claimants.

Civil Society / NGOs

In many places, CSOs see social policy requirements as a means to pursue community empowerment objectives. IFIs generally support these institutions' involvement as part of 'getting the institutional mix right: private enterprise to promote economic growth, NGOs to instil people with democratic values, and governments to safeguard civil rights and provide an "enabling environment" for foreign investors' (Igoe 2004: 114). Yet NGOs in the Philippines told Guldin they were keen to work on World Bank projects because the requirements for consultation meant they could charge the bank to pursue their own agendas. Unsurprisingly, both local and central governments tend to be suspicious of such agendas and are alert to signs of CSOs developing grass-roots institutions that could act as a counterpoint to state and local power structures – especially within hierarchical class societies.

Understanding How to Negotiate Political Contexts: The Awkward Place of Social Development Practitioners

Social development practitioners are often caught amidst competing powers and divergent interests. Our roles, influenced by our own expectations and assumptions about the goals of social development, also depend substantively on the expectations of our direct clients – contracted as we are to government planning teams, corporations, international financers and so forth. In other words, social development practitioners are expected to help accomplish *stakeholders*' major

aims. Fulfilling this role depends not just on practitioners' skills as cultural brokers, but also on our understanding of how stakeholder interests intersect and diverge.

Work for multilateral development banks and other international institutions that finance development projects (and wrap them in a web of social and environmental policies) comes with its own challenges. Institutional team leaders often want to avoid raising critical issues that could invite public scrutiny, especially if the issues might otherwise go unnoticed. Yet social development practitioners have a professional responsibility to ensure that a project proceeds in the best interests of local people – not necessarily the interests of the client. Meanwhile, social policy is generally understood as just one of an array of technical tools assisting project design. Operational personnel at borrower institutions are often wholly devoted to other aspects of project design, such as the master Project Implementation Plan, which brings together the various 'technical' elements of the project (engineering plans, environmental sustainability schemes, etc.). Whereas attending to 'technical' documentation is considered a critical element of project regulatory compliance, production of even minimal social safeguard documents[19] tends to be viewed as a time- and resource-wasting exercise at best and politically dangerous at worst. Many project proponents or implementing agents favour limiting participation in the application of social safeguard practices[20] to only village heads and representatives, local experts and other notables, as they expect these community members are able to make substantive, important contributions. By contrast, they tend to regard individual villagers as generally "too uneducated" (and to assume that local leaders represent local views). Social development practitioners (and many civil society representatives as well) see this view of social policy as supportive of state control more than the 'proper' goal of ensuring community participation, so practitioners and their clients often find themselves working at cross purposes. The challenge becomes accessing critical community voices and ensuring that they are factored into the project design and implementation when client interests exert conflicting pressures.

Social development practitioners face other challenges as well. Working in communities, our role is at times misconstrued as that of an outside authority (rather than a mere consultant). While serving as external monitor for the Sakhalin 2 project in the Russian Federation, Guldin was asked by members of a local indigenous community to attend an open community meeting. On arriving at the meeting, he faced a room filled with nearly fifty indigenous community members who came with grievances about their perception that other indigenous community members had 'captured' the project's Indigenous Peoples Plan, titled the *Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan* (Sakhalin Energy Investment Company 2006). They had ignored the project's official grievance procedure in the belief that Guldin, as an external, powerful, 'just' authority who was objective towards both local concerns and Russian-indigenous differences, could somehow

'resolve' their concerns. Guldin sat quietly for over an hour before stating that the official grievance mechanisms were the sole official means for receiving community claims. Fortunately, the community members heeded his advice, and within one week, five new complaints had been filed (compared to just three recorded in the previous four years). What might local government authorities make of such a performance? Depending on their relationship with the local community, they might take the situation in their stride, but the outsider in whom community members placed such faith could also easily be seen as an unwelcome intrusion on the local political scene: Why had the local people not come earlier to city hall to complain?

Similarly, social development practitioners can be viewed as allies of CSOs and, as such, suspected of promoting anti-state agendas (this view seems especially common among local government cadres). Sometimes too, practitioners are seen as front-line infantry in international political battles. On Sakhalin, for instance, the foreign social assessment specialists' insistence on recording baseline data and distributing project benefits according to nationality group elicited accusations from one local government official of 'attempting to divide Russian social unity'. The social development practitioner's role is an awkward one indeed.

"Technical" Issues as Political Issues

Methodological minutiae, such as the definition of the project area, contents of an interview protocol or designations for sampling adequacy, are also fraught with political implications for, and risks to, local players – from social development practitioners in the precarious position of brokering across stakeholder groups, to the local government agencies, to different strata of company administrative, managerial and operational personnel, and importantly also to the various factions within project-affected local communities.

For instance, defining the 'area of impact' for a World Bank roads project in Western China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region was a matter of spirited debate between the bank's social issues consultant (Guldin) and the project director, then head of the provincial Communications Department.[21] Guldin wanted the assessment team's geographical scope of work to include up to 20 kilometres on either side of an express highway right-of-way in order to account for potential project effects on nearby villages and allow for an account of how the roadway might affect the movement of the area's pastoralists. The Communications Department head, however, was adamant that the boundaries of the social assessment be no more than 5 kilometres on either side of the right-of-way. Why? Unstated in the project paperwork was the presence of both 'reform through labour' camps[22] and controversial settlements of the Chinese Han majority in an area otherwise peopled by minority nationalities. Given the sensitivity of both

issues, the cadre saw the project-area definition as an inroad for foreign interference in issues best managed by the Chinese state.

Even the simple requirement to hold consultations is culturally and thus politically embedded. In Vietnam, we found that local cadres and project officials continually referred to participation methodologies as 'mobilization campaigns' (a party-state technique for influencing the population's adherence to government prescripts). In the Philippines, provincial officials responsible for a project in the conflict-ridden areas of Mindanao saw 'participation/consultation' – demonstrating to local people how government-related programmes involved them to address local problems – as a clear counter-insurgency strategy. In Indonesia, requirements for consultation, often cast in the state's language of *socialisasi* (socialization), are more akin to information-sharing meetings than they are to participatory development approaches.

And what of issues such as ensuring sample adequacy? In attempting to include the 'very poor' in project social assessments in both China and Indonesia, we have encountered local officials' systematic exclusion of the poorest community members from participation in focus groups. Likewise, in the case of getting access to women for their input, few have attended social assessment meetings without explicit requests for their presence. Other development professionals report the deliberate replacement of potentially critical individuals or groups with those more willing to cast a project in a positive light. The *New York Times*, for instance, carried a story (Eckholm 1998) describing how local officials garnered apparent political support for the Three Gorges Dam project by barring discontented citizens from meeting with former Prime Minister Li during his visit to the project site. The 'model resettlers' (families happy with the project and their new lives) who were chosen to speak about the project were later found to have been compensated at levels four times above the average (ibid.), presumably for the service of being brought out for display at such key political functions. Although the practice of setting quotas for the number or percentage of poor, minority and other marginalized people to be interviewed or consulted as part of project social development practices may be intended to ensure adequate inclusion of vulnerable peoples in project design, it can also be interpreted (especially by those in local government) as yet another concerted effort by external agents to find an avenue for criticism of a project or nation.

Another issue prone to controversy is whether and how to afford anonymity to community members in interviews or focus group meetings. Social development practitioners must find ways to enable open discussion of issues and attitudes towards the project without potentially exposing participants to retaliation by local power holders. Meetings with community members therefore are often conducted in the absence of government officials or other state agents. But from another perspective, such 'secrecy' encourages 'irresponsible criticism' by hiding people or eliminating any need for them to defend their negative claims (even

though IFIs seem to regard information derived from such local-level interviews as 'truth'). Thus, what one party understands as professional and ethical conduct is seen as another avenue for insidious meddling by another. Indeed, maintaining anonymity is a thorny issue for many reasons. Can one control for the possibility that focus groups might have an assigned 'informant' tasked with reporting back to the local authorities on the statements of meeting participants? Random samples for focus group discussions are especially hard to gather in countries where local government must authorize such community meetings in advance – not to mention when researchers' own protocols for public disclosure necessitate advance notification of consultation activities. It is hard also to manage many villagers' expectations that participants' names will be documented to confirm their important contribution to village development. In Guldin's experience in China, villagers have asked that their names be attached to records of what they said – the desire for recognition trumped any felt need to mask their identity.

Clearly, the list of highly political 'technical' questions goes on. How should interviews be conducted – should questions be fixed in advanced, semi-structured or impromptu? Are there measurable thresholds for such international policy prescripts as 'broad community support', 'free, prior and informed consultation' and the highly politicized (especially at the international level) question of how to operationalize policy requirements for obtaining community 'consent'.

Benefiting Local Communities: Suggestions for Social Development Specialists

For social scientists working in the development paradigm set by IFIs, this milieu of clandestine politics and covert agendas is a serious concern. In our opinion, all social development practitioners have an obligation to increase the likelihood that peoples confronted with the development process are, at the very least, not harmed by it – though preferably the benefits of such projects and interventions also accrue in part to the people most directly affected. Towards these aims, we find that it is best to work in such a way as to see the interests of the project-affected people realized within their local socio-political context. Being aware of the political context of social development, how might practitioners ensure our contributions help the people they are tasked to assist without unwittingly brokering foreign political agendas? We, the authors of this chapter, regard three injunctions as especially important:

Be Aware of the Political Reality

The history of social interventions in the areas where one is operating is crucial knowledge to a social development practitioner. Familiarity with the different

manifestations of social policy and the range of operational tools and methods is key, as is research on both positive and negative instances of social policy implementation in the countries and areas of work. This information should be sought not just in the literature but also by interviewing other experts, government officials, local elites and (perhaps most importantly) the people in the communities served. Many areas will already have experienced some form of social assessment – what perceptions do different people have of past experiences? Whose interests did past social development efforts serve? Whose interests were harmed? Do people expect the project's social programming to repeat their previous experience? Social development practitioners might anticipate political resistance or support accordingly.

Project experience points to three predictors of government attitudes towards the social development process:

- how much the assessment process contributes to the borrower's project preparation capacity
- the perception of how much the social assessment can bolster or undermine government authority and legitimacy
- how much inconvenience the assessment poses to the government.

A significant factor in the reception of social practitioners' work (and even in whether it is permitted or compromised) is the extent to which they can increase the support provided to project planning and bolster the perceived authority and legitimacy of different tiers of government (particularly local government) while refraining from treading heavily on politically sensitive issues or slowing project implementation.

Respect the Political Reality

Given that international social development protocols can be insensitive to local contexts, it is incumbent upon social development practitioners to assess the merit and appropriateness of their practices in light of local political realities and determine whether alternate approaches are preferable. In the Chinese context, social development work often has to be tailored to better account for the sensitivities of working in a hierarchical, authoritarian sociopolitical structure and should attend to the necessity of 'giving face'[23] to local notables. For instance, standard international good practice protocol often stipulates that local authorities be held at a distance while social development practices are ongoing in rural or urban communities, reckoning that this prevents authorities from unduly influencing the nature of ordinary people's discussions and participation. Yet if this approach itself elicits obstructionist counteractions from local authorities, practitioners will fail to access the views of local people. To overcome such chal-

lenges, we recommend that local officials and other community notables be given their due face by first meeting with them to ask permission to interview local people and lower-level local government authorities. All local leaders should be treated as colleagues due an explanation of the social assessment process and what it intends to accomplish; one can then propose to hold the first focus groups with political higher-ups (as they are also stakeholders) and so gain their trust by showing them what social development is all about.

Ultimately, positive social development interventions are realized by effective cooperation with local actors and established country systems. Social development practitioners need to take precautions to limit potential resistance to perceived external agendas that might impair social policy application, especially in the light of limited budgets and strong pressure to quickly prepare and certify projects for financing. Working collaboratively and with sensitivity to the local context can help project teams avoid conflicts and proceed faster and more efficiently towards project implementation, which can result in greater resources being channelled to those people who are most in need.

Make the Hard Choices

Finally, social development practitioners should be prepared to make some hard choices. Evaluation of the cumulative effect of continued project involvement is one: does our input ameliorate negative project impacts? Does our involvement give legitimacy to a politically repressive regime or set of circumstances? Where can our support of local people be most useful – in work with development institutions, or externally to them? Culturally attuned practitioners' involvement on project teams is likely to be helpful to local people. Yet if practitioners begin to suspect that our work is not helping local people realize a positive experience but rather legitimating a project or project activities with intrinsically negative effects on local people, then the ethical thing to do is to withdraw from the project and continue to struggle to improve the project-affected people's lot by other means.

Notes

1. The term 'social development' is used here to refer broadly to those aspects of the international development paradigm that seek to effect more socially aware, inclusive, equitable implementation of economic development initiatives. Our usage of the term subsumes both policy and methodological approaches to policy application, as well as other strategies for enhancing understanding of international development's social dimensions (mainstreaming of gender awareness, etc.).

2. The World Bank and regional multilateral development banks (e.g., the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) have been developing and refining their policy protections for vulnerable groups for decades. More recently, private lenders, such as the Equator Banks, have also been developing similar protections.
3. The term 'operationalization' in social development refers to the process of putting a conceptual framework into practice. Beyond mere 'implementation', operationalizing a concept involves establishing definitions that are measurable (either qualitatively or quantitatively) and verifiable, and enable comparisons to be made across cases. Since several developmental concepts cannot be measured directly (e.g., 'social capital' such as it exists between people and within social interactions), operationalization in such cases involves identification of relevant indirect variables – proxies or indicators, determinants or phenomenological manifestations.
4. In the 1990s, the World Bank and others undertook broader reform initiatives to move towards greater emphasis on social capital and sustainable development approaches and away from the overt structural adjustment and shock therapy packages that were dominant in the 1980s. For the bank, the shift was (from the macro-perspective) meant to buffer communities against volatile markets and situations of economic dislocation (Rodan 2004: 5), and (more relevant to the concepts of participation and empowerment) stimulated in part by the high visibility of several Inspection Panel cases focused on adverse social impacts and the complaints of affected groups. The resultant changes in policy and methodological approaches to implementation were framed as 'technical' matters for improved governance (see Harriss 2002: 101–2, 124).
5. This is not to say that these terms were not used prior to the 1990s; our point is that mainstream development discourse shifted to focus more on social issues.
6. The term 'stakeholder' refers to any person, group or organization with an interest (stake) in a development project or initiative, especially those who can influence, or be influenced by, a project or its outcomes. The gamut of project stakeholders is often incredibly vast, ranging from project lenders and financial intermediaries to national and local governments, project personnel, contractors and suppliers, communities within the project area, CSOs and others.
7. 'Project-affected people' refers to communities inhabiting areas near a development initiative. Specific definitions of project-affected people vary by project. Some projects define 'affected people' solely by geographical criteria. Others refer to peoples whose livelihoods or living standard may change as a result of project operations; people whose property, land or place of residence stand to be acquired, damaged or destroyed; or those slated to receive project entitlements or benefits as project-affected people. A development project might affect indigenous peoples in terms of project-induced cultural change.
8. Whereas heightened participation may result from some social development interventions, greater empowerment of marginalized groups is debatable.
9. This 'official telling' of the adoption of social development practices in China is epitomized in Gloria Davis's (2004) report for the World Bank. Davis includes a box (ibid.: 22) citing a recounting of the history of social assessment by a senior World Bank social scientist (Dan Gibson): 'After initial reservations about the utility of social assessment, China now officially recognizes social assessment as an important tool for development planning. The China Academy of Social Sciences, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have collaborated on development of a draft China social assessment manual, and in 2002 the State Development Planning Commission officially approved publication of a feasibility study manual recommending social assessment for major state-sanctioned development projects. Adoption of social assessment in China's development program, and particularly in infrastructure projects financed by Chinese government is expected to reduce adverse impacts and to improve development benefits in one of the world's largest civil works programs'.

10. *Guójiā Fāzhǎn hé Gǎigé Wěiyuánhuì*, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), formerly the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC).
11. The NDRC (SDPC)-endorsed *Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Study* was completed and published by the China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC) in May 2002. A separate manual – a jointly supported initiative of the Asian Development Bank and World Bank – was published in Chinese in 2004 (CIECC 2004) and in English and Chinese in 2007 (Gransow and Price 2007).
12. Also referred to as 'desirable forms of conduct' or 'best practices'.
13. Compliance with international safeguards is purported to increase a state's legitimacy in the eyes of project-affected people specifically and its greater domestic population more generally. For some states, however, compliance with social policy may even be seen as necessary to maintaining the sovereign right to rule. Indeed, failure to manage national-level conflict (e.g., that resulting from mass protests against development initiatives) or continual (perceived) breaches of human rights are often the grounds on which sovereign nations, including the U.S., justify 'corrective' actions against one another.
14. *dàzhòng zhèngzhì*
15. *xiān hóng hòu zhuān*
16. The term 'liability insurance' is shorthand for nominal adherence to social policy used as a stakeholder strategy for blame-shifting as a face-saving mechanism.
17. The term 'social management' refers to institutional arrangements and other regimes of governance designed to regulate resources and ensure that benefits accrue to the social managers' preferred recipients. In developmental contexts, social management often resonates with ethical commitments and corporate social responsibility, so that beneficiary targets of such management would likely be socially disadvantaged groups or others greatly affected by a project. Often, social management emphasizes (and even mandates) that implementing agencies or local regulatory institutions should adhere to principles of participation, inclusiveness, accountability, responsiveness and transparency.
18. We have not heard of cases of withdrawal of project financing as result of poor application of social policy, although during negotiations of IFI social policy reforms we have heard state representatives imply that such a threat exists.
19. 'Social safeguards' are the precautionary environmental and social principles and considerations adapted for and integrated into decision-making processes at the earliest possible planning stage to prevent and mitigate undue harm to the environment and people. 'Social safeguard documents' are due-diligence reports and action plans required under the social and environmental policies of IFIs and other project finance organizations. The specific names of social safeguard documents vary across institutions; they include the project stakeholder analysis, social (risk/impact) assessment, public consultation and disclosure plans, community development plan, resettlement framework / action plan, cultural heritage assessments, etc.
20. 'Social safeguard practices' are the methods and standards used when implementing social policy. They range from meaningful consultation with, and participation by, affected people during the design, preparation and implementation of development projects; to specific types of risk and impact analysis, such as those aiming to protect the interests of indigenous peoples and economically and physically displaced people; to measures to prevent damage or loss of cultural heritage resources.
21. *Shěng Jiāotōng Tīng;* designation for China's Provincial Highways/Communication Department
22. *Láodòng Gǎizào* (*LáoGǎi* for short) or 'Reform thru Labour' is a slogan of the Chinese criminal justice system and a synonym for a system of punishing minor crimes with administrative detention similar to a penal colony.
23. *gěi miànzi*

References

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2009. *Safeguard Policy Statement*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.adb.org/documents/safeguard-policy-statement.

———. 2010. *Safeguards*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://www.adb.org/site/safeguards/main.

China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC). 2002. *Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Studies* 'Tóuzī Xiàngmù Kěxíng Xìng Yánjiū Zhǐnán'. The Compiling Group (Biānxiě Zǔ Biānxiě Zǔ). 2 Volumes (English and Chinese). Beijing: China Electric Power Press (Zhōngguó diànlì chūbǎn shè). Retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEAPCHINAINCHINESE/Resources/3885741-1199439668180/xiamen_ppt7.pdf.

———. 2004. *Zhongguo touzi xiangmu shehui pingjia zhinan* [*Manual on Social Assessment in Investment Projects in China*]. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Davis, G. 2004. 'A History of the Social Development Network in the World Bank, 1973–2002', *Social Development Papers* 56. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Miscellaneous/20907142/History+of+SD+in+WB.pdf.

Eckholm, E. 1998. 'Relocations for China Dam Are Found to Lag', *New York Times*, 12 March. Retrieved 14 May 2006 from http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F70B16FB3A540C718DDDAA0894D0494D81.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2008. *Environmental and Social Policy 2008*. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Retrieved 4 July 2010 from http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/policies/environmental.shtml.

Gransow, B. 2007. 'Social Transformation in China and the Development of Social Assessment', *International Review of Sociology* 17(3): 539–58.

Gransow, B. and S. Price (eds). 2007. *Turning Risks into Opportunities: Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China*. China International Engineering Company (CIECC) Research Series. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Guldin, G.E. and A.K. Dennis. 2007. 'The Party Secretary, The Village Head, and the Masses: Negotiating Real Contexts in Social Assessment', *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 36(1–2): 9–38.

Harriss, J. 2002. *Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capital*. New York: Anthem Press.

Igoe, J. 2004. *Conservation and Globalization: A Study of National Parks and Indigenous Communities from East Africa to South Dakota*. Toronto: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2011. 'Sustainability Standards'. Retrieved 4 July 2010 from http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/sustainability/policies-and-initiatives,1517.html.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2011. 'Performance Standards and Guidance Notes - 2006 Edition'. *Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability*. Washington D.C.: World Bank Group. Retrieved 4 July 2010 from http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content?IFC_External_Corporate_site/IFC+Sustainability/Sustainability+Framework/Sustainability+Framework+-+2006/Performance+Standards+and+Guidance+Notes.

Rodan, G. 2004. *Neoliberalism and Transparency: Political Versus Economic Liberalism*, Working Paper No. 112. Perth: Murdoch University. Retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp112.pdf.

Sakhalin Energy Investment Company. 2006. *Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan: First Five-Year Plan (2006–2010)*. Yuzhno Sakhalinsk: Sakhalin Energy Investment Company. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.simdp.ru/eng.php?id=34.

Sohn, J. (ed.). 2007. *Development Without Conflict: The Business Case for Community Consent*. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute. Retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://pdf.wri.org/development_without_conflict_fpic.pdf.

World Bank. 2003. Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions into Bank-Supported Projects. Retrieved 31 August 2014 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTSR/Resources/SocialAnalysisSourcebookFINAL2003Dec.pdf.

World Bank. 2011. *Safeguard Policies*. Washington. D.C.: World Bank Group. Retrieved 31 August 2014 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL/0,,contentMDK:20543990~menuPK:1286666~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:584435,00.html.

4

Striving for Good Practice

Unpacking AusAID's Approach to Community Development

Kathryn Robinson and Andrew McWilliam

Community development (CD) as a strategic approach to poverty alleviation has long been popular among bilateral and multilateral donors. The phrase has come to encapsulate a wide range of interventions that direct technical assistance and funding to local communities promoting social development and economic opportunity. CD approaches typically stress participation, consultation and accountability, and their practitioners have adapted to changes in funding agencies' operating rationales[1] that reflect shifts in global development discourses, national political ideologies and development 'styles' (Kenny 2002). Recent CD approaches emphasize demand-driven responses with inclusive participatory interventions to address basic local needs.

Over recent decades, however, approaches to CD have been contested and devalued as aid agencies look for ways to reduce poverty in line with Millennium Development Goals. CD's popularity has been challenged by concerns that its focus on micro-social frameworks and dynamics makes it difficult to generalize or replicate on a wider scale. CD approaches – particularly those that embrace small grant facilities – appear too local to be directly relevant to broad donor goals in the fields of good governance, economic growth and alleviation of acute social problems in post-conflict settings (Mosse 2004).[2] The desire for wider impact interventions in economic development has consequently encouraged a stronger emphasis on aid in policy setting and capacity building at the level of institutional governance, rather than direct practical assistance and project-specific activity. The result is constant tension between the aim to foster processes of community empowerment and the need to account for funds under development agency audit procedures (Kenny 2002: 285).

In this chapter we examine the recent history of CD practice under the auspices of the former official Australian development assistance agency, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).[3] At the time of our research (2006), the prevailing view of CD within AusAID was somewhat negative, mirroring the broader international debate changes, but at a practical level the agency continued to use CD in many poverty alleviation programmes in the Asia Pacific. Our chapter highlights both the continuing importance of CD approaches in the delivery of aid and the achievements of recent Australian development assistance in this field.

Changing Perspectives on CD Assistance

From the 1990s the UK-based Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) to development reconfigured CD as a strategy focused on human rights and equity while also promoting empowerment, participation and accountability. One study (Carney 1998) identified six underlying qualities of poverty-focused development assistance: people-centred, responsive, participatory, multilevel, dynamic, sustainable and partnership-based. For a time SLA was taken up by many agencies, including international NGOs, but more recently interest has waned and SLA has largely been abandoned as an approach to poverty alleviation (Moser 2005: 14). Brocklesby and Fisher (2003: 190) attribute its demise to the rise of the 'managerial and structural perspective' with its 'universal solutions', and to a shift away from participatory approaches that allow people to define their own situations and solutions (2003: 188).

Since 2000, the World Bank has promoted community-driven development (CDD) as its preferred approach. CDD approaches are framed by CD rhetoric prioritizing improved services for the poor, building on community assets and social accountability. The approach is intended to focus on processes of empowering communities to make more effective demands[4] on government.[5] It also aims to develop 'social capital' and foster fundamental change in power relations at the village level (Chase and Woolcock 2005).

The World Bank global portfolio of CDD support programmes totalled over U.S.$2 billion in 2006 and, importantly, was partly funded through mechanisms for grant funding, especially in pro-poor interventions. However, experience shows that communities' poorest segments have tended to miss out in CDD, in favour of those with more social and cultural capital. CDD activities are now subject to substantial World Bank evaluation, and the bank recently acknowledged the strategy's limitations (Chase and Woolcock 2005), such as its constrained capacity to provide technical assistance to support local programme delivery (World Bank 2005).

AusAID, used 'community development' to refer to approaches that engage local people directly in projects designed to alleviate poverty and enhance

well-being. Australian funding for CD expanded significantly between 1995 and 2005, rising from A$32 million to A$82 million by 2005. Four major recipient countries (Vietnam, China, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines), received nearly A$50 million, or 62 per cent of the 2005 budget allocation to the CD sector, all of which was delivered by way of grant funding and relatively high levels of technical assistance.

The literature on CD and participatory approaches is wary of strategies that assume universal definitions of 'community'. Anthropologists in particular have criticized assumptions of communities' homogeneity that do not allow for social difference and individual agency (Amit and Rapport 2002: 16). In practice this concern is reflected in processes of engagement that tend to be 'holistic'[6] and acknowledge differing points of view to address the specific social dynamics of local contexts.

To address CD as an 'operating framework' rather than a 'procedural formula' is to reject a one-size-fits-all approach to communities and promote interventions that emphasize principles of practice, rather than prescriptive design. The approach is consistent with much contemporary thinking in development and moves away from rigid project designs and methodologies with predefined outputs. At the same time, literature on social assessment emphasizes the benefits of participant engagement in all phases of the project cycle, including planning and design, financial decision making, monitoring and evaluation. Social assessment methods provide critical tools for generating flexible designs to accommodate complex social, cultural, political and economic environments.

Studies in Practice

In 2006, AusAID's Advisory Group[7] commissioned us to undertake an analytical overview of CD approaches in seven of its large aid programmes across the Asia Pacific for the 1995–2005 period. We are both professional anthropologists extensively engaged with community-level development projects in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The overview's terms of reference required us to take a 'holistic' approach, understood to mean an 'ethnography of practice' (Mosse 2004) aimed at understanding the institutional process of aid delivery and the 'mechanisms' of local effects: what works, and why? To this end we reviewed a wide range of project documents, interviewed key AusAID and project personnel in Australia and overseas, and made site visits to five of the seven identified programmes discussed below. We were guided by the following questions:

- Could the agency claim to have an identifiable CD approach?
- What were its distinctive features?
- What were effective examples of 'good practice' in community development?

- How might CD contribute to enhanced policy and programming for poverty alleviation in AusAID's bilateral assistance to the region?

In our comparative analysis, we sought to identify the principles and practices underlying the design and delivery of CD projects that emerged in the implementation of bilateral programmes with an identified CD approach. We were not evaluating the individual programmes as such: as per the selection criteria in our terms of reference, all had undergone successful midterm reviews and been found to be meeting the stated project objectives and/or to have introduced changes to improve performance.

Various CD applications were evident in the designated programmes. Many had in common their origins as forms of open-menu funding schemes offering relatively small cash grants to community groups based on written applications. Cash grants remained a core activity in some cases, whereas in other projects this approach provided a complementary methodology for enhancing local participation in service delivery or community planning.

Our review occurred during a period of conservative Australian government (1996–2007) committed to the idea that 'expanded private investor interest will advance the public good' (Anderson 2006). In AusAID this emerged as renewed interest in promoting market engagements for poverty alleviation, and a reemphasis on trickle-down effects of economic development to improve the lives of the poor. CD approaches championed by the Advisory Group – ones that spotlighted the enabling effects of promoting micro-level social empowerment as a fundamental poverty alleviation strategy – were in some ways out of step with this view.[8]

An important continuity throughout the AusAID programme was the role of the Advisory Group's community development adviser. In AusAID bilateral assistance, projects were planned and managed under specific country programmes. But the agency also supported a Policy Advisory Group with officers responsible for selected sectoral issues. In 2006 this included advisers for gender, health and population, infrastructure and CD. Within sections of AusAID at the time of our study, consensus was emerging about the desirability of treating CD approaches as a distinctive sector rather than a cross-cutting theme.

At a practical level, CD has too often been collapsed into broader objectives of social development such as health or gender equity. Repositioning CD at the centre of the development planning process, it was felt, would attract dedicated resources and improved planning for design and implementation. This innovative thinking had diverse operational benefits. In the AusAID programmes we reviewed, we found that CD approaches enabled 'on-the-ground activities' to remain practical and responsive to changing local requirements, while still engaging the broader goals of poverty alleviation, good governance and improved access to services such as health or education.

In 2011 the Australian government commissioned an independent review of its official development assistance programme, delivered through AusAID (Australian Government 2011). The review strongly recommended that poverty alleviation be the central driving principle behind Australian development assistance. It focused on broad strategic directions with management and budgetary structures that could assist in effective aid delivery. However, it did not consider CD approaches to Australian aid delivery on the ground.[9] For this reason we felt it timely to revisit our 2006 report and reflect on what we found to be one of the key strengths of Australian aid approaches to poverty alleviation.

Review of CD in AusAID Programmes

Despite significant variation between developing country contexts and specific project activities, our review concluded that AusAID took a distinctive approach to CD. This approach featured a set of core development attributes or guidelines for effective CD approaches to poverty alleviation, one that increasingly benefited from the strategy of utilizing the expertise of local personnel in the respective countries to deliver CD-based technical assistance.

Another important general finding was that all of the projects demonstrated a range of effective contributions to the overarching goals of development, including poverty alleviation, improved governance and service provision, and local economic growth. CD programmes, in other words, could have leverage and impact well beyond their immediate practical effects. The following CD projects were reviewed.

The Community Development Scheme (CDS), Papua New Guinea 1998–2007

The objectives of the CDS were to help reduce poverty through small grant community-based projects and strengthen the capacity of PNG civil society organizations (CSOs) to plan and implement priority CD activities, working parallel to, and with, government agencies.

The Community Peace and Restoration Fund (CPRF), Solomon Islands 2000–2005

The CPRF exemplified the use of CD approaches to address emergency or transitional contexts where government was in crisis or particularly weak, or where the delivery of essential services was failing. It was established to contribute to restoring peace and development in the Solomon Islands following a government collapse, and to work directly with local communities in the practical absence of the state.

The Community Sector Programme (CSP), Solomon Islands 2005–2007

The CSP grew out of a prior peace restoration initiative (CPRF), building on its approach while adopting increased analytical and strategic approaches to CD and more direct 'stakeholder' involvement in decision making. The CSP reengaged all CPRF coordinators who at the time constituted the principle service delivery mechanism in the post-conflict environment.

The Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project (CWSSP), East Timor 2002–2005

In the post-conflict setting of a newly independent nation, conditions for sanitation facilities and environmental health services remained highly constrained by limited national budgets and weak institutional capacity. CWSSP was originally designed as a three-year programme for working with communities in sub-district towns and rural villages to improve access to clean water. It built on several earlier AusAID-funded initiatives in the sector.

The Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme (ACCESS), Indonesia 2002–2007

ACCESS evolved from earlier AusAID-funded small grant schemes providing direct assistance to communities via small-scale open-access funding with minimal facilitation. Its detailed participatory planning processes for local communities were termed the Community Led Assessment and Planning Process. This approach included strong pro-poor and gender mainstreaming aspects in community planning and directed programme assistance to identified vulnerable groups in participating communities.

The Philippines-Australia Local Sustainability Program (PALS), 1999–2005

The PALS project differed from the other reviewed activities in that its goal was to strengthen local government planning and programming. However, it sought to facilitate bottom-up planning and improved governance of CSOs with a 'rights-literate' approach.

The Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP), 1986–1997

PACAP, one of AusAID's longest running CD initiatives, began in 1986 in the post-Marcos era as a small funds distribution mechanism out of the Australian embassy in Manila. Following a review in 1997, the project developed the area-focused approach, which clustered community initiatives in a specific location around a common issue/problem, using local NGOs to oversee grant distribution.

Operational Principles of Good Practice in CD

A common factor in the success of each of these programmes was design diversity in the shaping of CD strategies. AusAID had no single formal model of CD, no standardized or 'best practice' design being replicated in different development interventions. Rather, the practices and approach of AusAID CD reflected a shared philosophy of design and implementation based on a set of guiding principles for good practice. Fundamental to the shared philosophy has been a commitment to participatory planning processes in support of chosen development objectives. The measure of CD's success is the extent to which the initiatives continue to engage local communities and reflect direct success in poverty alleviation.

Our analysis of the AusAID programmes uncovered six principles that constituted good practice in CD. Not all the principles were found to operate across all seven reviewed programmes, and some apply also to good practice in non-CD initiatives (e.g., the first and the sixth). But collectively they comprise an interrelated mix of strategies that support the planning, design, organization and implementation of effective CD interventions in local contexts. Some principles confirm the general consensus about good development practice (e.g., the first and second); others (the third, fourth and fifth) differentiate AusAID's approach or offer innovative 'lessons learned'.

A Programme Approach

Trends in aid delivery have shifted from project to programme-based interventions, namely, sub-projects identified and formulated around a set of enabling criteria or guiding principles rather than a prescribed project design. Programme approaches feature 'evolving design' principles that are flexible and adaptive to changing local conditions and opportunities. They favour incremental rather than transformative development, allowing for experimentation, reflection and response in the scope and form of project sub-implementation. The 'evolving design' approach allows improvement of their effectiveness through regular reviews that encourage reflection on existing local conditions and constraints, cultural values and social practices and institutions. The programme approach is an essential design component for interventions to improve participation and understanding among stakeholders, enhance capacity among project agents and further appreciation of the specific cultural values of the development context. Support for this approach reflects a growing dissatisfaction with highly prescriptive project interventions based on short duration design missions, predetermined targets and numbers of beneficiaries, and tightly defined project implementation schedules.

Typically, budgets for these AusAID CD projects included funds for dispersal through participatory CD processes, rather than pre-allocated funds for particular activities. In the final year of Phase One of ACCESS, for example, funds were made available to undertake community planning processes, but not to fund

the activities thereby identified. The project managers took this as a challenge to extend their pro-poor, pro-gender approach by encouraging communities to identify initiatives they could implement in the absence of donor funding. The flexibility of programme-style development projects allowed them to build on their growing familiarity with local development contexts. In interviews with stakeholders, flexibility in design and opportunities to boost efficacy by adapting interventions over time were frequently expressed features of good practice. Key elements included the capacity for reflection and responsiveness among programme implementation teams.

Another example of flexibility in programme funding arrangements was the Philippines PACAP programme, which an internal AusAID review in 2003 found was both highly responsive to new opportunities and able to rapidly evolve new models of intervention. PACAP developed an area-focused approach to address poverty reduction in specific localities through a consortium of major local NGOs working together to finance livelihood activities in poor rural communities. In Panay, the gateway to the resort island of Baracay, a consortium of local NGOs focused on activities that enabled participation in the tourism economy – food production, handicrafts, cultural performances – and a local micro-finance organization to facilitate members' economic activities. The consortium was able to build its own guest house and restaurant, establish a travel agency and develop a low-cost clinic using funds generated by members. Flexibility also enabled PACAP to work more conventionally by supporting credible organizations working on human rights issues such as sexually abused, trafficked or neglected children, and assistance for the disabled.

The exploratory, demand-driven approach that characterizes programme interventions poses a key challenge to the management team and its partners: to translate the guiding CD principles into effective operational practice. The quality of technical assistance, that is, the experience and capacity of project managers and contractors to effect translation, was central to programme success. Strong working relationships between project-managing contractors, the implementation team and AusAID were important factors in programme success, as was the development of effective channels for communication and reporting. A notable feature of the implementation teams in most of these projects has been that they are comprised principally of experienced national development workers, with minimal numbers of expatriate staff in management positions.[10]

The critical role of the implementation team was highlighted in the early phase of Solomon Islands activity in face of a political crisis and the pressing need for a rapid response. In this case no formal design was undertaken, nor was the particular strategic approach clearly articulated. Despite these constraints, an independent completion report for the programme noted that developments 'were often well considered and resulted in high quality outcomes'.[11] The evaluation found that although in some cases the physical quality of infrastructure construc-

tion was poor, it was still an effective 'trade-off' for important post-conflict and peace-building benefits. The AusAID evaluation mission directly attributed this success to the quality of the implementation team and cautioned that in other circumstances, such positive outcomes may not have been realized. The comment reinforces Mosse's observation (2004: 656) that successful development interventions result from 'practical improvisation, institutional and political relations'.

While highlighting the importance of flexibility in programming, it is also important to nurture established partnerships through consultation about changes in programme directions. PACAP builds an exit strategy into each long-term intervention. It signals an end point for external support while respecting the relationships established via project intervention. But bilateral aid by definition works in defined time frames, and management of partnership relations once funding has ended remains a key challenge for CD.

Balancing Demand and Strategic Provision

Concepts such as 'demand-driven' and 'informed and constrained' choice have emerged as common rhetoric, even dogma, in discussions concerning projects' sustainability. They express an assumption that communities that have clear preferences for particular project interventions and are willing to contribute their own resources to a project are more likely to succeed in achieving sustainable project results.

CD approaches to poverty alleviation place a strong thematic focus on equity, directing interventions towards vulnerable groups and emphasizing gender equity and pro-poor initiatives. This objective can be in tension with pure demand-driven or self-selection practices for funding support, in which vulnerable groups are least able to articulate and assert their interests in community-wide planning or consultation. The ACCESS project addressed these issues by facilitating support for communities' most vulnerable groups while seeking alternative rewards for demanding the wider community's involvement in the extended participatory planning processes. One strategy was to use the programme planning processes to facilitate access to alternate funding sources so that the provision of services was not limited to what the project funded. Successful initiatives in participatory planning processes (ACCESS, PACAP and PALS) have empowered communities to articulate demand for services from government and to develop more effective proposals for alternative donor funding.

The emphasis on building social capacity through open-menu community planning processes means that it can be difficult to source technical support for the community initiatives. In some instances (PALS, ACCESS) this has been addressed through strategic partnerships with government. Other cases (CDS, ACCESS, PALS) have included a process of NGO accreditation and 'grading'. Accreditation helps manage risk for future initiatives by building a pool of identi-

fiable, experienced local development workers. Nevertheless, many programmes under study struggled to facilitate effective service delivery through local partner organizations. Water supply and sanitation programmes, including CWSSP, require significant levels of local resources and capacity building to be successful. Provision of effective technical advice to facilitate informed choices among recipient communities is a challenge that requires further consideration in project design, but we found that AusAID projects involving grant funding had a degree of flexibility to develop local technical expertise for communities to implement and manage infrastructure projects.

The CDS programme in PNG sought to enhance ownership and sustainability of funded activities (frequently infrastructure) by requiring a cash contribution of 10 per cent of the procurement cost from participating communities. In an interesting development of community/CSO/government partnerships, in some instances provincial governments, having assessed the costs and benefits of the proposals, assisted communities by providing the 10 per cent contribution. A CD approach to aid funding enabled creative partnerships with local government, and with local government personnel who could leverage aid funds to deliver government services that were otherwise unfunded. Popular choices included schools and health and community centres. The partnerships improved communities' ability to obtain government services: for example, a schoolhouse was built as a CDS project and then the government supplied the teachers.

PALS and PACAP featured a similar strategy of requiring up-front contributions by communities. However, for PALS, the objective to address the development needs of every Barangay in the province complicates implementation of the demand-driven principle, principally due to the number of Barangay involved relative to project capacity, time frames and budgets. Successful demand-driven initiatives (ACCESS, PACAP and PALS) have used inclusive, participatory planning to empower communities to articulate demands for government services and develop more effective proposals for alternative donor funding.

Are the physical outputs identified in community planning (e.g., buildings, water supply) more significant than the community processes set in train? There is evidence that communities develop effective planning skills through CD processes that can be transferred to other development processes. This points to development of the social capital valorized in CDD.

Developing Partnerships and Networks

Building partnerships – a long-standing motif in NGO development rhetoric – was also a strong theme in AusAID CD projects. One of the ancillary benefits of these flexibly designed and facilitated fund distribution interventions has been the emergence of civil society networks for service delivery. Responding to emerging opportunities in service delivery by CSOs, CDS in PNG promoted a

national accreditation scheme for CD fieldworkers, in association with the Department of Social Affairs. The initiative provided training standards and graded qualifications for improved quality assurance, as well as employment opportunities for national development workers. It was part of the 'strategic learning and training' component of a programme for building capacity regionally and nationally. In addition, university students gained work experience in the CDS office. Province-level Core Groups, formed by CDS to approve proposals, included diverse representatives from civil society and government and provided a good example of governance capacity building.

Quick-response fund distribution schemes have typically provided platforms for more complex support programmes directed to CD initiatives and emergent civil society networks. That is, they have provided opportunities for 'learning by doing' in the complex process of social intervention. This observation applies equally to the CDS programme in PNG, CPRF (now CSP) in the Solomon Islands, the ACCESS programme in Indonesia and PACAP in the Philippines. The latter projects began as small grant schemes but have since evolved, through periodic reviews and evaluation, to contribute significantly to capacity building and the sustainability of CD programmes in a kind of organic 'scaling-up' embedded in the social and political realities of each place.

A notable difference between the development contexts reviewed here is the variability in CSOs' capacity. For example, the Philippines has many NGO organizations with established processes for accreditation, CD methodologies and partnership networks, whereas PNG's institutional environment for CSOs and NGOs is so weak its strengthening had to feature in the programme's organizational objectives. Local partners in the East Timor CWSSP were similarly poorly equipped in terms of capacity and service orientation. In both PNG and East Timor, however, alternatives to implementing community-level programmes were few, and the appropriate response was to recognize risks and seek effective ways to identify and develop local capacities. The important lesson was the necessity of flexible approaches to building capacity using existing opportunities and appropriate technical assistance.

Partnerships necessarily involve longer-term commitments to build effective development initiatives and secure sustainable livelihoods. Many AusAID initiatives in the CD sector reflected this orientation, particularly in their staffing arrangements and in collaborative work with local NGOs and other CSOs. At several CDS-supported NGOs that we visited, an experienced PNG national development worker helped Australian organizations or volunteers operate more effectively in the PNG environment.

In most of the case studies, project teams established partnerships with existing social organizations, but in at least one instance the partnership has involved brokering the development of new organizations. The CDS project has successfully brokered new forms of partnership between PNG national and provincial

governments and local-level NGOs. In the process, it overcame mutual suspicions to achieve a more collaborative relationship for addressing rural people's needs. At the national level, and in the absence of an existing NGO forum, CDS has fostered collaborative partnerships by networking between NGOs with complementary skills.

Networks in CD are a vital component for improving governance, enabling local groups to enter into new configurations and relationships that improved their articulation of service delivery demands to local government. The trend of building collaborative links between local communities, CSOs and local governments was evident in AusAID's more complex CD initiatives (PACAP, PALS, ACCESS, CWSSP). Facilitating networks of knowledge and problem solving provides enhanced opportunities for improved service delivery to impoverished communities and lays the foundation for important expressions of community demands on government.

Time Frames and Success

As is often observed, the pace of social change does not conform to the usually limited time frames of the project cycle. Several of the AusAID programmes under review ran continuously for long periods: twenty years in the case of PACAP, ten years in the Solomon Islands, eight years for CDS. Such long-term commitment allows for regular review and incremental development of activities. As noted, a number of the AusAID projects began as small grant distribution mechanisms offering a timely, cost effective, equitable means of distributing funds to communities. However, small grant distribution mechanisms have limited application for broader development goals or in fostering community resilience and good governance. Longer time frames have allowed for CD interventions to produce societal changes that underpin activities' sustainability and attract development dividends. In the case of CSP (Solomon Islands) and its predecessor CPRF, small grant funds supported a transition to longer-term development by building on lessons learned. The small grants activity was able to 'capture the imagination' of poor communities in post-conflict situations and rebuild local communities through collective action around agreed goals (Sullivan and Patterson 2004).

Longer time frames allow for the incremental development of locally appropriate approaches with relevant training materials, and permit both mistakes and creative innovations to be made. Initial assumptions can be routinely revisited as the development environment changes, sometimes due to the success of the intervention itself. Examples are the national coordinator network established in post-conflict Solomon Islands, which for a time was the only nationwide institutional framework; and the provincial Core Groups in PNG that allowed CDS to engage with large numbers of people in face of weak government.

The political reality is that targeted, multi-year grant funding for specific development interventions over long periods (ten to twenty years) is not feasible due to the political cycle and its susceptibility to policy changes, especially following a change of government. But pre-planning is not a necessary prerequisite for long-term commitments when the progress of project activities is subject to regular independent evaluation. The broad framework of activities provided by a Country Programme Strategy can also provide long-term support for CD initiatives, especially when CD principles are conceived of as an 'operational framework' reinforced by the view of CD as a 'sector', rather than a prescriptive methodology. This is the good practice lesson of projects like PACAP in the Philippines, which in its twentieth year of continuous operation remained widely respected, though its design and operation had changed significantly since its earlier iteration as a small grants fund. The CSP informed AusAID's Country Programme Strategy for the Solomon Islands as a whole. The strategy committed AusAID to a ten-year time frame in recognition of the need for a sustained focus on community sector engagement, capacity building and a progressive approach to more effective and responsive governance.

Uncertainties over continuation of support, however, can negatively impact on CD initiatives. The logics of community decision-making and implementation seldom apply to a fixed, donor-driven cycle, and uncertainty about time frames can influence the project's response to community proposals or compromise exit strategies.

Technical Assistance and Grant Funding

Relative to other donor agencies – especially global financial institutions – AusAID bilateral development assistance had the advantage of providing grant funding and significant levels of local technical assistance. High levels of technical support enabled AusAID programmes to adopt more responsive, iterative approaches to changing requirements and opportunities for enhancing CD initiatives. It is worth noting that in the CD initiatives reviewed here, technical assistance was overwhelmingly provided by 'national' staff, not Western expatriates.[12]

By contrast, IFIs like the World Bank or the ADB tend to operate through loan funding with minimal local technical expertise, and to depend more heavily on a programme's conceptual design and reviews to achieve their objectives.[13] Opportunities to facilitate good practice during implementation and fine-tune the programme's overall approach tend to be constrained by ineffective facilitation and support of local processes of community planning. The recent commitment to substantial grant funding by the World Bank in their own CDD programmes is tacit recognition of the advantages and good practice of AusAID's approach to CD.

AusAID CD projects commonly grew out of initial small grant funds programmes to meet changing development conditions and evolving development assistance objectives. Regular project reviews (e.g., midterm reviews) and monitoring by AusAID-appointed Technical Advisory Groups led to refinements in design that enabled CD initiatives to receive new funding within a broader Country Programme commitment of partnership.

Technical assistance (TA) adds costs to service delivery, and the 2011 independent review (Australian Government 2011) criticized the high cost of TA in AusAID programmes. But well-directed TA increases effectiveness and contributes to more sustainable interventions. Much of the AusAID technical input on CD projects was provided by very small numbers of expatriate advisers among significantly larger groups of national staff. In the CDS programme in PNG, 31 of the 35 management staff were PNG nationals. Projects such as PACAP and PALS in the Philippines were almost wholly implemented by national staff whose language skills, experience and cultural knowledge enhanced development outcomes and contributed to the emergence of a skilled cadre of trained local field workers and activity managers who carried lessons and experience into other realms of development practice. Thus AusAID technical assistance for CD indirectly improved communities' capacity to pursue development aspirations and economic opportunities.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation systems are essential to successful management and operation of development assistance. They have a very specific role in programme-style approaches, where sub-project designs and activities emerge over time through iterative learning processes. Monitoring and evaluation of CD activities necessarily involves not only recording and evaluating the inputs, progress and achievements of programme initiatives, but also making effective use of social assessment approaches to document qualitative aspects of social processes, including:

- measures of community empowerment
- social and cultural factors underpinning decision-making processes
- gender inclusion and responses to disadvantage
- civil society's capacity to articulate needs and to plan, monitor, implement and evaluate its own development initiatives.

Capturing these qualitative processes effectively is difficult, especially in emergency or transitional situations where project outputs (like infrastructure) may be secondary to the benefits of peace building or reconciliation objectives. Meanwhile, bilateral projects that work through partner government record-keeping can become casualties of weak or absent government. This issue arose in the

second phase of CDS in PNG, when the absence of a database that recorded the destination of funds and their respective sub-projects made evaluation particularly difficult. Conversely, the continuity of long-term initiatives like PACAP (which for many years was run from the Australian embassy in Manila) was able to sustain significant staff changes through consistent monitoring and evaluation of programme activities.

Many of the projects reviewed developed innovative monitoring and evaluation systems that contributed to the effectiveness of CD initiatives. The understanding that greater attention to CD strategies would boost small grant distribution funds' effectiveness arose from programme evaluations following the initial grant distribution phase (e.g., in CDS and even PACAP after many years of operation). The inherent 'messiness' of social development processes can be difficult to capture in any intervention. Several of the innovative monitoring systems developed in the projects reviewed used social assessment techniques to capture something of the complexity of social development in context. The ACCESS database was one example: it recorded multiple project indicators, including six monthly 'community snapshots' based on participatory evaluations and incorporating progress towards gender equity and poverty alleviation objectives.

In summary, these six principles formed the foundation of an operating framework (see Kenny 2002) for the CD sector. Their application reflected good CD practice for crafting effective approaches to poverty alleviation. Key features that distinguished AusAID's approaches from those of other donors were the avoidance of a highly specified operational framework, the use of grant funding for community initiatives and the effective use of technical assistance, especially local CD expertise. Interestingly, much of this commonality emerged as a feature of a 'community of practice' among development professionals working for a small group of programme contractors that provided services at all phases of the project cycle, and closely followed the philosophical approach and guidance of AusAID's Advisory Group.

CD and the Achievement of Development Goals

Our review found that the CD approaches demonstrated effective methods to address poverty alleviation in ways that integrated gender equity and improved governance. They were particularly effective in post-conflict and fragile state contexts.

Poverty Alleviation and Economic Development

Common to the CD initiatives in our study is the understanding that poverty alleviation is only partly a question of economics. Weak or dysfunctional regulatory

frameworks, malfeasance, the absence of effective CSOs and poor infrastructure combine to disempower communities while limiting opportunities for services delivery and economic development. In these contexts, CD approaches play an important role in strengthening governance and accountability at the village and district levels.

A key feature of the case studies is the way that the 'evolving design' strategy enabled responsiveness to local sociopolitical environments. The approach allowed time to identify effective local partners for mobilizing participatory strategies and building local economic resilience. The Philippines projects (PALS, PACAP) exemplify the positive benefits of working with a well-established CSO sector drawn from a relatively well-educated population. Meanwhile, the Solomon Islands initiative responded flexibly to a weakened civil society and high levels of conflict by choosing church organizations, which constituted the principle national network to survive the civil war, as initial partners.

A closely related issue is the strategy selected for working with governments. In all the case studies where the state apparatus was weak or engaged in post-conflict rebuilding, approaches were linked to providing basic services or facilitating access to services. Mobilizing community resources with technical and organizational support from NGOs gave poor communities access to a range of improved services, such as water and sanitation, health, microfinance and education. In some cases, engagement with nongovernment service providers involved local private contractors, or facilitated NGOs' financial independence over time through fee-for-service arrangements. And CD initiatives' contribution to economic development is highlighted in their support for collaborative networks between civil society and government to facilitate small-scale economic enterprise. Facilitated CD programmes are well placed to provide targeted support for small-scale enterprises run by poor people who are ill-equipped to manage the regulatory and financial accounting requirements for successful small business development.

As to CD approaches' cost effectiveness, few would deny that outlays on direct or 'face-to-face' engagements in development with grant-funded technical assistance over extended periods of time are expensive, relative to the immediate project impacts. However, the diverse benefits and difficult-to-measure impacts of accumulated skills and capacity across communities, of peace building achievements and of local governance support have clear, significant multiplier effects across civil society. By focusing on the capacities of the poor, CD approaches demonstrate pathways for economic empowerment.

Enabling Environments for Good Governance

CD approaches have increasingly provided entry points for improved governance, especially for local and regional governments with direct responsibilities for ser-

vice delivery. The AusAID-funded initiatives reviewed here illustrate the trend of promoting bilateral partnerships with national government agencies. These programmes may be said to build governance (social capital) from the bottom up. They did this by focusing on the governance of the bilateral partners themselves, building capacity in organizational and financial management through accountability, transparency and responsiveness to community demands. These lessons ideally flow on to the national government's interactions with local government, which may be local governments newly empowered by decentralization as in the Philippines and Indonesia, or local governments struggling for visibility as in PNG and the Solomon Islands. The availability of grant funding for local service delivery captures the attention of local governments and helps to engage them in CD initiatives.

In some cases (ACCESS, CDS), mutual suspicion between NGOs and governments constrained efforts to promote cooperation. In the Philippines, however, legislation requires NGO participation in the Barangay (Village) Development Council. Expanded forms of CD emphasizing community planning, capacity building, institutional strengthening and more effective governance were most clearly articulated in the PALS project. Both PALS and PACAP (Philippines) used participatory planning for village and municipal governments to better target improved livelihoods for the poor.

Indonesia's ACCESS programme progressively engaged district government officials it identified as 'champions' of its approach to technical service provision and utilized their expertise in appraising community proposals. Direct engagement with community planning was often a new experience for officials accustomed to top-down approaches and encouraged a more responsive attitude to communities. ACCESS staff reported situations where community members directly challenged officials over poor service provision (including teachers who left their posts but continued to receive salaries). An Indonesian government official who assessed plans arising from the ACCESS community planning process commented that one of the reasons ACCESS mobilized communities so effectively was that it was 'not government money'.

The trend of building collaborative links and networks between local communities, CSOs and local governments was evident in most AusAID CD initiatives. For example, the CDS project in PNG established a valuable set of nationwide civil society networks that could be developed and enhanced through periodic review over a longer time frame. In the context of declining government services, these networks provided a critical complementary framework for service delivery and a basis for gradually integrating government engagement and building civil society. Similar forms of governance support to foster and mobilize civil society for CD were evident in East Timor's CWSSP, focused on community-based water and sanitation services. The project's design principles emphasized participatory, demand-driven design with informed choice; an engagement with NGOs and

community-based organizations specializing in the water sector; and promotion of linkages and capacities within relevant government service agencies and between communities, NGOs and government.

Effective Approaches in Post-conflict and Fragile States

Across the Asia Pacific, AusAID had been increasingly called upon to deliver development assistance in politically challenging environments (Australian Government 2011). These contexts included so-called fragile or post-conflict states characterized by weak governments, declining essential services and sometimes debilitating communal conflicts and tensions. A visible trend in AusAID's approaches to initial support in post-conflict or fragile state contexts was to intervene through broad distribution and quick-response funding that engaged or established local service delivery networks, communication and collaboration. The priority for CD was to facilitate peace building and conflict resolution among local groups. Over time, these short-term measures could be modified in response to more stable political conditions. However, in order to transition from quick response to more facilitated CD, the initial phase needed to incorporate informed analysis drawing on social assessment of the changing context, so as to prepare for the next phase of adaptive capacity building.

Among the AusAID programmes under review, the CPRF and the CSP (Solomon Islands) best reflected these principles. Following eighteen months of armed conflict, social dislocation and government paralysis, AusAID development activities were closely linked to reconciliation and peace building grounded in community participation. Development funding through a small-grants fund was directly distributed countrywide to communities and effective informal networks, including church groups, to promote small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation and livelihood projects.[14] In practice, the activities created a focus for collective decision-making and cooperation as a step towards reconciliation. In the post-conflict situation, initial iterations of the programme featured limited community facilitation procedures or coordination with the reemerging government institutions. The second phase drew on lessons learned to improve the targeting and sustainability of funded initiatives.

The tendency to direct greater resources to capacity building, a clear trend in PNG's CDS programme, Indonesia's ACCESS initiative and East Timor's CWSSP, reflected the recognition that CSOs are often poorly equipped to respond effectively to economic development opportunities. A consultant involved in reviewing the Solomon Islands' funded livelihood projects found that just one of 120 projects (less than 1 per cent) was still a viable activity (pers. comm.). Such results confirm the short-term nature (i.e., low sustainability) of quick-response funding activities.[15] The project's primary objective, however, was to support peace and reconciliation initiatives through cooperation and commu-

nication in local community contexts. It was judged to have met this objective effectively and was probably the correct response in the circumstances (Sullivan and Patterson 2004). The case study highlighted the challenge of delivering emergency support funding while maintaining a commitment to constrained choice, accountability and transparency of process and selection (ibid.). In all five of the countries covered in this review, operating environments for effective government and governance remain fragile and challenging to varying degrees.

Conclusion

The key understanding emerging from this review of AusAID approaches to CD in the Asia Pacific region is that CD can be an effective strategy for poverty alleviation in a range of development contexts. Furthermore, we argue, a CD approach is necessarily an operational framework that adapts to local social, economic and political circumstances. CD draws on social assessment approaches in all phases, and it complements and facilitates broader development objectives like a strengthened civil society, economic resilience and improved governance. Good practice in CD includes a focus on gender equity and pro-poor strategies, combined with effective monitoring and evaluation systems that provide timely impact analysis and measures of progress.

Half of the reviewed CD initiatives were still being implemented at the time of our review, and it was premature to judge the programmes' final achievements against their objectives. However, it was apparent even then that some components of the activities would fall short of expectations. The complex, changing development contexts in which they operated combined to undermine specific initiatives. In the CDS project, for example, not all provincial Core Groups proved up to the task of effectively managing community initiatives. CWSSP has struggled to create successful multi-village water supply schemes and achieve effective sanitation. PALS aimed to have village-level coverage across the whole province, an improbably ambitious objective. However, we argue that weaknesses in particular aspects of the projects should not be seen as judgements on the value of CD as a strategy. On the contrary, the iterative nature of 'rolling design' planning and the complexities of community engagement in specific sociopolitical contexts allow for adaptive integration of programme initiatives to improve outcomes.

In the context of fragile states or post-conflict reconstruction, where government services are weak and service delivery infrastructure is poor, AusAID experience demonstrated that CD initiatives can highly effectively provide for timely and alternative service delivery arrangements. Just as importantly, these initiatives offered innovative support for peace-building processes by strengthening civil society networks and defining needs. CD is also a powerful tool for

channelling development assistance to grass-roots actors, particularly where institutional corruption is endemic, state capacity is weak and financial accountability poor. Though fiduciary compliance is hard to ensure in CD/CDD projects (as evidenced by internal documents of AusAID, and the World Bank), experience also shows that CD activities can build upward accountability in policy and institutional systems (evidenced in documents from AusAID and the U.K. Department for International Development) and promote good governance at local levels (evidenced in AusAID documents).

Because CD processes are complex, at times messy and often experimental, successful programmes tend to benefit from flexible design and longer time frames (AusAID) for success. Monitoring and supervising the resource use of numerous activities in scattered communities poses a challenge. An advantage of treating CD from a sectoral perspective is that it encourages improved measurement of the economic impact and cost benefits of programme investments. CD programmes often have significant flow-on or multiplier effects that extend well beyond the initial objectives but are difficult to capture or quantify. A midterm review is an excellent intervention: it offers an opportunity for productive dialogue with the implementation team and a chance to reflect on the learning process of initial phases of implementation, but it avoids radical redesign.

Based on this comparative review, we conclude that AusAID successfully developed a series of effective approaches to CD in the Asia Pacific, achieving several programme objectives in areas where the World Bank has acknowledged operational difficulties. These achievements include successful methods for

- reaching the poor (ACCESS, CDS)
- delivering services in difficult operational environments (CPRF)
- building mechanisms for upward accountability (CDS, PACAP, PALS, CWSSP)
- promoting transparency (CDS)
- devising responsive systems for monitoring and evaluation (ACCESS)
- building context-specific capacity (CDS, PACAP, ACCESS).

It is also important to recognize the limits of any particular CD programme. In the course of this review, we have noted several features that undermine sustainability. Donors tend to reward a successful project by loading its programmes with an array of additional tasks and objectives. In this process, CD activities may expand beyond their effective limits and undermine the very success they have created. CD programmes do best when they directly facilitate and fund local community initiatives and CSOs that support local governments and their development contexts.

Our review of good practice in AusAID's CD initiatives has also highlighted the benefits of longer-term time frames within a programme horizon, including:

- Increased efficiency and reduced transactions costs by avoiding frequent re-design and contract tendering;
- Recognition that it takes time to facilitate beneficial social change (empowerment, resilience, self-reliance) and to develop constructive partnerships and improved local governance;
- Recognition that in a diverse, changeable operative environment for development, effective development interventions need to be flexible and adaptive. Programme designs need to be realistic and can be scaled up as they achieve results and develop effective implementation strategies;
- The importance of open-access, small-grant funding as a platform for building informed, effective development interventions. Even when implemented in the context of civil unrest or political uncertainty, small- block grant funding needs to be framed by constrained choices and a commitment to accountability and transparency;
- The central understanding that a sustained focus on gender equity and pro-poor interventions can have societal impacts.

Many AusAID programmes with CD as a core methodology have expanded over time to promote collaboration and partnerships between different levels of government and various groups in civil society. These elaborations sometimes test the limits of direct CD approaches. They also call into question how far CD initiatives can expand their scope and application and still remain effective as CD approaches. Our response is that if a measure of community development is the extent to which initiatives continue to engage local communities directly in the challenge of poverty alleviation and empower their choices, then AusAID's efforts to implement CD as a central feature of development assistance in the Asia Pacific have been successful.

Acknowledgements

In undertaking our review, we had access to a full array of internal AusAID documents, including project designs, feasibility studies, mid-term reviews, and monitoring reports by Technical Advisory Groups and others on the aid programmes discussed above. Most of these reports are not in the public domain, so we have not cited them. In preparing this work we acknowledge the guidance and support of key AusAID staff, including Nesche Teckle (Community Development Advisor), Geof Fox (Rural Development Advisor), Annette Madvig (Philippines Desk) and Kate Sullivan (Rural Development Advisory Group). We are also grateful for the generosity and forthright views of the many project staff and supporters who shared their experiences of the operations and successes of the AusAID programmes discussed in this chapter. Both authors acknowledge previous

advisory work undertaken in association with a project addressed in this report, namely, the Community Water and Sanitation Project in East Timor.

Notes

1. An 'operating rationale' is a set of values, assumptions and principles underpinning organizational forms, everyday activities, practices and social relations' (Kenny 2002)
2. Mosse (2004: 656) noted that although long-term aid projects often have to relate to several policy shifts in their lifetime, reports on project successes have to attribute them to the policy, rather than the messy improvisations and relationships that allow them to succeed.
3. In 2013, the agency was reintegrated into the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, following a change of government. In 2014 it was abolished as a separate entity and has been fully assimilated into Foreign Affairs.
4. Broadly defined, CDD is an approach that allots control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups and local governments. CDD programmes operate on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, demand-responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability and enhanced local capacity. Experience has shown that given clear rules of the game, access to information and appropriate capacity and financial support, poor men and women can effectively organize to identify community priorities and address local problems, by working in partnership with local governments and other supportive institutions.
5. For critique of such 'social inclusion' strategies see Craig and Porter (2005).
6. Holistic approaches reflect a presumption that the properties of particular elements in a complex of sociopolitical relations are determined by relations they bear to other elements.
7. The Advisory Group is the group of technical experts who provide specialist advice to country programmes.
8. Some comments we received in the internal peer review of our report reflected this assumption, namely, that trickle-down from economic growth was the effective mode of poverty alleviation, and that CD approaches were too 'messy' and localized to have contemporary relevance.
9. Indeed, CD hardly rated mention, appearing most notably in a text box describing Plan International Australia's child-centred community development approach.
10. The practice of employing Technical Advisory Groups or Project Monitoring and Reporting Groups as informed observers of programme activity has provided useful independent perspectives and constructive criticism.
11. This was one of the internal documents made available to us in our review.
12. The 2011 review of aid effectiveness (Australian Government 2011) was especially critical of the high levels of TA in some AusAID bilateral programmes, especially high fees paid to Australian consultants. However, the review of CD approaches shows another side of the picture: the ways to enable deployment of expertise appropriate to the task.
13. The 2011 review recommended that more of the bilateral programme be delivered through multilateral agencies.
14. This is consistent with international experience such as the World Bank's work on low-income countries under stress in 2002.
15. Reviews of the CWSSP also highlighted the lack of sustainability in initial quick-response support for rehabilitating water supply schemes in East Timor.

References

Amit, V. and N. Rapport. 2002. *The Trouble with Community: Anthropological Reflections on Movement, Identity and Collectivity*. London: Pluto Press.

Anderson, T. 2006. 'The Howard Government, Australian Aid and the Consequences', *Australian Review of Public Affairs* (*Symposium: A Decade of Howard Government*). Retrieved 25 August 2014, http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2006/02/anderson.html.

Australian Government. 2011. *Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness*. Canberra: Commmonwealth of Australia.

Brocklesby, M. and E. Fisher. 2003. 'Community Development in Sustainable Livelihoods', *Community Development Journal* 38(3): 185–98.

Carney, D. 1998. 'Implementing the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach', in D. Carney (ed.), *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contribution Can We Make?* London: Department of International Development, pp. 3–23.

Chase, R. and M. Woolcock. 2005. 'Social Capital and the Micro-institutional Foundations of CDD Approaches in East Asia: Evidence, Theory and Policy Implications', *Arusha Conference, New Frontiers of Social Policy, 12–14 December 2005, Arusha, Tanzania*. Retrieved 25 August 2014 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Chase%26Woolcock.rev.1.pdf.

Craig, D. and D. Porter. 2005. 'The Third Way and the Third World: Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion Strategies in the Rise of "Inclusive" Liberalism', *Review of International Political Economy* 12(2): 226–63.

Kenny, S. 2002. 'Tensions and Dilemmas in Community Development: New Discourses, New Trojans?' *Community Development Journal* 37(4): 284–99.

Moser, C. 2005. 'Assets, Livelihoods and Social Policy', *Arusha Conference, New Frontiers of Social Policy, 12–14 December 2005*. Arusha Tanzania. Retrieved 31 August 2014 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Moserpaperrev2.pdf.

Mosse, D. 2004. 'Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice', *Development and Change* 35(4): 639–71.

Sullivan, M. and J. Patterson. 2004. 'Judging Success in a Post-conflict Environment: Whose Criteria? Solomon Islands CPRF as a Case Study', *Development Bulletin* 65: 85–90.

World Bank. 2005. 'The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and -Driven Development: An OED Evaluation'. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

5

Seeds of Life

Social Research for Improved Farmer Yields in Timor-Leste

Andrew McWilliam, Modesto Lopes, Diana Glazebrook, Marcelino de Jesus da Costa and Anita Ximenes

The Seeds of Life project (*Fini ba Moris* in the Tetun vernacular) is an applied research activity to promote sustained improvements in the production and productivity of staple food crops in Timor-Leste (Borges et al. 2009). A key element of the strategy is the introduction of high-yield seed germplasm to supplement well adapted but often low yielding local varieties. On-farm participatory testing of seed varieties combined with bulk seed multiplication programmes offers an important new opportunity for agriculture in Timor-Leste.

The second phase of the project (2005–2010) included a social research component that sought to develop a range of field-based social assessment methodologies for use with baseline social indicators, to monitor farmer adoption rates of the new crop varieties and to provide insights into the range of constraints and opportunities facing smallholder Timorese farmers. This chapter reports on the results of those efforts to date. It offers some critical reflections on the role and prospects of applied social science in Timor-Leste agriculture, especially in vulnerable upland farming systems, and on the prospects for strengthening the socioeconomic research capacity of the National Government of Timor-Leste.

Social science perspectives and social assessment provide a potentially valuable complementary resource for policy development and programme intervention. However, they remain comparatively underdeveloped within both Timorese technical services agencies and government administration. The reluctance to

integrate applied social science within government bureaucracies is part of a continuing preference for addressing specific identified problems or commodities with technical applications, rather than taking a more holistic approach to social knowledge and understanding risk and diversification as key factors informing livelihood choices in developing contexts.

Subsistence Agriculture in Timor-Leste

In Timor-Leste, agriculture is a critical sector providing the principal livelihoods of 70 per cent of the population.[1] The majority of households engage in near-subsistence farming, producing little surplus or significant off-farm income.[2] Farmers have long practised low-input, low-production food cultivation based around extensive swidden agriculture with maize[3] and secondary cultivars, complemented by smallholder livestock production and the seasonal gathering of wild foods and game. Trading of agricultural produce, particularly in the prevailing environment of depressed market conditions and high transport costs, tends to be limited to local markets and seasonal sales of higher-value commodities such as coffee, copra, sugar palm products and dry season vegetables like red onions, lettuce and tomatoes.

The Timor-Leste style of farming reflects topography, climatic conditions and especially rainfall patterns that have a strong and variable influence on production. Soils are generally poor, and yields are subject to the vagaries of monsoon rains, damaging winds and the ravages of crop diseases and pests. Over generations farmers have adapted to these challenges, selecting the food varieties best suited to intercropping under the prevailing conditions. Crop varieties also tend to be selected and retained for their post-harvest storage qualities rather than for maximizing yields (WFP and FAO 2003).[4] The impact of these combined factors is unreliability in farming throughout Timor-Leste. Seasonal food shortages and sometimes complete crop failure are not uncommon; nor are significant post-harvest storage losses (up to 30 per cent). Food insecurity and impoverishment are widespread among rural households (da Costa et al. 2013).

Recent surveys and agricultural assessments highlight the consequences of households' inability to ensure a year-round food supply (WFP 2005; Borges et al. 2009). Food shortages have obvious nutritional implications for farmer households, particularly for pregnant and lactating mothers, infants and young children. Timor-Leste is considered one of the countries most vulnerable to malnutrition, and very high rates of stunting, wasting and low body weights were recorded among children under the age of five (WFP 2005; see also CARE International 2004; UNICEF 2003). One report estimated that up to 64 per cent of the population suffered from food insecurity (UNDP 2006: 20).

The Seeds of Life Project

Chronic staple food shortages and the critical importance of agriculture to most Timorese provided the rationale for the Seeds of Life (SOL) project. The project's initial phase from 2000 to 2005 identified and tested new and improved seed germplasm. A small project team assessed a series of new crop varieties against local seed stock (especially for rice, maize, sweet potato, cassava, peanuts and pigeon pea). The agricultural trials were undertaken in collaboration with government staff of the then Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF).[5] The project drew upon the expertise of global research centres associated with the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research, which has been at the forefront of food crop variety testing and development since the early 1970s.[6] Over several cropping seasons, the project team identified a series of promising cultivars that had significantly higher yields than local varieties and were well adapted to local agro-ecological conditions (see da Costa et al. 2003 for initial findings). The selected characteristics tested to assess suitability for the range of conditions in Timor-Leste included drought resistance, high food yield relative to vegetative growth, resistance to mildew and to high winds, and weevil tolerance for varieties that stored well under local post-harvest conditions (on post-harvest maize storage see Guterres and Williams 2006).

Table 5.1 offers an example of this process of testing by illustrating the results of one season of sweet potato variety cultivation at an agricultural station on the Maliana Plain (Bobonaro district). The results included a taste test, on the understanding that high-yield crop varieties also need to be palatable to the farmers themselves. A seed variety may be highly productive but have other qualities that reduce its attractiveness.[7] In this case (Table 5.1) the CIP-8 variety far exceeded the production of the local variety and was also judged more palatable than its local counterpart.

Table 5.1. Storage root yield and palatability taste test data at Maliana (2000–2001)

Variety	Yield 2001 (t/ha)	Taste test 1 = most palatable 10 = least palatable
CIP-8	19.1	6
CIP-6	14.0	2
CIP-4	13.3	9
CIP-7	12.8	4
CIP-3	12.6	1
CIP-2	12.2	8
CIP-5	8.4	10
CIP-1	4.8	3
Local Maliana	3.2	7
CIP-9	0.0*	4

* (no significant harvest)

The variety testing demonstrated that increased crop productivity in the upland and rainfed areas of the country could significantly improve food security.[8] Increased productivity, derived from raising production per unit of labour (or land), means that more food can be harvested for the same amount of effort.[9] This is particularly important for extensive upland farming practices, where labour shortages at critical times, especially for clearing, weeding and protecting ripening crops,[10] can seriously reduce harvest yields.

The trial results justified a second phase of the programme, so in mid-2005, SOL2 commenced[11] to extend the earlier initiatives and continue efforts to increase food production as part of the broader goal of improving food security. The five-year phase (2005–2010) formed a key component of support programming under the Timorese Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, with plans for national coverage over the ensuing few years. Under SOL2, variety testing was continued at government research stations and included two important additional initiatives that helped shape the direction of the project.

Participatory On-farm Research

The SOL2 programme made a significant decision to adopt a more participatory approach using on-farm variety trials and demonstrations that required the cooperation and collaboration of large numbers of Timorese farmer households. This decision had less to do with an explicit commitment to social inclusion or participatory agriculture per se, than with the design imperative to test the new seed varieties under a wide range of diverse 'actual' conditions across Timor-Leste. Feedback from the trials arguably represented a form of participatory assessment of the socioeconomic potential or utility of the seed variety.

Self-selecting farmers[12] were invited to plant a section of their garden area (5 m x 5 m) with new food crop varieties and compare the results with their own local production under the same conditions. A team of Timorese SOL2 agricultural field staff (Tetun: *pescizador agricultura*) monitored the cultivation process and measured the production yields. The freshly harvested new variety remained the farmers' property, to keep, replant, consume, distribute or sell as they wished.

Engaging with farmers over a whole cropping season was a novel and innovative approach. However, for logistical reasons and with the exception of farmers contracted to produce seed stock, partnerships could not continue beyond the initial on-farm trial, partly because of the project's ambitious objectives. Beginning with 400 participating farmers in eight sub-districts distributed across the regions of Liquiça, Ailieu, Bobonaro and Baucau, the project planned to extend the programme across half the country (six or seven districts) by its fifth year, reaching around 3,000 farmers and reliably achieving yield increases of around 30 per cent. As supplies of the new seed varieties were multiplied through on-farm production and government-operated seed multiplication centres, trade and

exchange of the more productive food staple crops were expected to develop and expand through both formal and informal channels.

Social Research

SOL2's second initiative added a social research component to the technical agricultural focus of the project, forming a complementary set of enquiries designed to explore the broader sociological issues surrounding Timorese farming practices and to generate socioeconomic and cultural baseline data for comparative assessment over time. In particular we were interested in comparing the new crop varieties' impacts on Timorese farmer households. Were they being adopted? What kinds of constraints to adoption were emerging? How were the new crops being integrated into local smallholder farming systems? The research was intended to provide more qualitative and ethnographic understandings of farmers' choices and perspectives than could be obtained from the on-farm research trials, which were largely focused on the agronomic characteristics of yield. Project planners required gender-disaggregated data highlighting the needs of women and dependent members of Timorese households.

As in other aspects of the project, the social science team[13] aimed to promote institutional capacity-building and a sustained transfer of skills to agricultural ministry staff so that they could assume full responsibility for their own agricultural planning and programme implementation over time. During the initial phase of the research, training in social research techniques formed a significant part of the field activities, which tended to limit the depth and scope of subsequent social analysis.

Survey Approaches

The sociocultural surveys on Timor-Leste farming practices could draw on little previous research. Most available information on the farming systems is focused on broader agronomic, demographic and macro-economic factors such as agro-climatic conditions, production and marketing constraints, population characteristics and the condition of supporting infrastructure. Many reports have been produced as preparation documents for specific development project interventions.[14] Numerous policy-related and project design studies have also been undertaken by donor organizations and bilateral technical assistance missions in conjunction with the government of Timor-Leste (Ministry of Planning and Finance 2005). These survey-based studies[15] lack any detailed qualitative data on the highly diverse character of Timorese farming systems or analysis of Timorese farmer perceptions and choices or the cultural context in which decision making and food production practices are pursued and made meaningful. Consequently,

many assumptions about Timorese farmers and their cultivation strategies, including prospects for significantly improving crop production and yields, lack convincing supporting empirical evidence.

The SOL project sought to overcome this paucity of information by extensively monitoring the participatory on-farm variety testing by many local rural households that were actively and directly involved in the production and evaluation of results. For example, over the 2006–2007 period, staff extension officers from the agricultural ministry supported and monitored 710 participating farmer households to record the results of the crop production process. The outcome of the farmers' efforts and evaluations formed the basis for selecting specific crop packages for different agro-climatic regions.[16]

The social research component provided detailed contextual data in support of the agronomic variety testing (McWilliam 2006). Its operational objectives sought two related sets of information: on current farming practice, and on the key issues that constrain and undermine food security. The programme also sought to identify factors that inhibit or facilitate the adoption of specific improved seed crop varieties and to explore the social patterns and implications of adoption as expressions of cultural networks. A technique known as 'seed mapping' followed the journey of seed varieties through the acquisition and production process to markets and more informal local distributions.

Taking into consideration the operational constraints around survey logistics and field research training, the chosen approach combined two related methods for generating relevant socioeconomic data and analysis. The first method explored a set of minimal, standardized but highly representative baseline data about the participating SOL farmers.[17] This approach was combined with a second strategy that pursued a series of more detailed longitudinal, thematic studies generated from extensive social research in areas of SOL activity. The sample of respondents in the latter studies was more spatially constrained but highly focused. This combination of approaches was designed to generate detailed comparative understandings of Timor-Leste farming practices across a range of representative agro-economic and cultural-linguistic domains.

The first method used a two-page information sheet with a series of standardized questions about the participating farmer households. Colloquially referred to in Tetun as *Buka Data Los* (looking for true or correct data), the survey sheet was completed by SOL agronomy field staff when initiating on-farm participatory trials. They completed the data compilation as part of a research extension protocol for monitoring visits with groups of participating farmers. Sosek staff then analysed the results and provided a baseline snapshot or situation report of the socioeconomic status and conditions of participating farmer households. Like all baseline studies, the findings allowed measurement of change over time and guided the identification of more specific issues and subject groups for subsequent research (McWilliam and da Costa 2007).[18]

The second method was developed for focused thematic studies of various aspects of farmer livelihoods over time. They included a Commodity Production Survey (Glazebrook, Lopes and Ximenes 2007a) based on interviews with participating farmers and local community leaders in the initial four districts of SOL operations. The survey undertook a detailed analysis of production requirements, labour constraints and work exchange patterns, as well as cultural and ceremonial aspects of production. It also covered each of the targeted staple food crop varieties promoted by the project: maize, irrigated lowland rice, sweet potato, cassava, peanuts and pigeon pea.

Complementing these investigations was the development of a series of forty-one Agricultural Calendars reflecting the agro-ecological diversity of farming conditions in trial areas of the project. In addition, a longitudinal consumption study was initiated based on monthly interviews with a dispersed group of fourteen participating farmer households across the project area from 2006 to 2008. The study was designed to explore seasonal patterns of food consumption and wild food gathering strategies, especially during the food deficit period or 'hungry season' (*rai hamlaha*) before the maize harvest in the new agricultural year. The initial survey period (2006–2007) included 119 separate interviews and provided an opportunity for the SOL trainee researchers to practice less structured ethnographic approaches to data gathering and farming systems research (Glazebrook, Lopes and Ximenes 2007b). Subsequent surveys broadened the scope of researched activities to include an analysis of marketing and seed exchange, comparative studies with female farmers on food preparation times and preferences between local and improved varieties (Ximenes 2008), and the recording of farmers' impact stories of outcomes and benefits of the higher yielding new varieties (Lopes 2008; da Costa et al. 2013).

Results and Impact

Although this chapter focuses on methodological and organizational issues related to the social research and assessment programme rather than on specific empirical findings, some commentary on the findings is instructive. The following discussion highlights the results of the respective field-based data gathering approaches, namely the Buka Data Los two-page information sheet and the more in-depth focused surveys on crop production and household consumption.

Buka Data Los

Under the SOL operating procedures, each participatory on-farm variety trial correlated to specific, named participating farmers. In most cases (90 per cent), the farmers identified and recorded were male. However, agricultural life in

Timor-Leste is very much based around farmer households (Tetun: *uma kain*) as production units. Furthermore, households in Timor-Leste are also quite variable in membership and age structures. For this reason, one of the questions asked in the Buka Data Los survey focused on farmer household composition. The question investigated both the diversity of Timorese farming households and the socially embedded character of swidden farming systems. Implicitly the approach sought to avoid the (continuing) tendency in much agricultural research that equates farmers with male 'heads of household', thus eliding the household-based nature of farming and the different contributions of family members.

One finding of the survey was that most of the participating farmers identified as male in the 'On-Farm Demonstration Trials' (as they were known) had co-resident female partners. Similarly, most of the 10 per cent of women identified as 'participating farmers' had male partners. This result highlights the tendency for the term 'participating farmer' in the SOL programme to favour male 'heads of households', who in fact were usually just one member of a farming household where all members contributed varying amounts of labour to the production of the domestic economy. This included children, who typically contributed to household chores such as herding and feeding domestic livestock, carting water, tending gardens and other support activities.

In terms of gender-based participation in the SOL on-farm activities, the survey showed that the 340 identified participating households comprised 1,888 persons, of whom 44.3 per cent (836) were female and 55.7 per cent (1,052) male. Table 5.2 shows the proportional representation of participating families by household size. Some 58 per cent (194) of the participants came from households with five to eight members. Typically these households were nuclear families

Table 5.2. Participating farmer household members

Members per household	Numbers of households	% of total*
1	39	11.7
2	14	4.2
3	20	6.0
4	38	11.4
5	50	15
6	43	12.9
7	58	17.3
8	43	12.9
9	9	2.7
10	15	4.5
11	4	1.1
12	1	0.3
Total	**334**	**100**

* % rounded up

composed of parents and their children.[19] Indeed, children were well represented in the participating households: 485 household members, or 25.5 per cent of the sample, were aged ten years or under.

However, the results also highlighted significant variation in participating households. For example, 11.7 per cent (39) of the respondent households contained only one representative, typically single men (33). At the other extreme, 6 per cent (20) of the participating households had between ten and twelve residents. In some cases these larger households included one or more elderly members, probably aging relatives.

Another set of questions sought information on crop composition and farming practices. While maize remained a principal staple for most farmers (around 80 per cent of respondents), one of the striking features of the reported range of cultivars was the relative significance of tubers in rural diets (see Table 5.3). Cassava and sweet potato in particular were significant secondary food staples after the grain crops of maize and rice (see also da Costa et al. 2013: 86). This supports the SOL focus on improving tuber production and planting stock.

Table 5.3. Tuber crops cultivated by respondent farmers

Tuber crop	% of respondents
Cassava	81.2
Sweet potato	73.2
Potato	3.2
Kumbili (wild tuber)	49.4
Singkumas	27.9
Arrowroot	55.3
Taro	59.7
Maek (wild tuber)	22.6

Tubers are a key component of both crop selection and rural diets, highlighting both the diversified nature of Timorese dryland agriculture and the challenge of achieving sustainable household food security. Based on a related question that sought information on farmer perceptions of food production adequacy, Table 5.4 illustrates a subjective measure of food security based on the previous season's agricultural harvest. Varying numbers of farmers from different areas of Timor-Leste were asked about the adequacy of their previous food harvest. The results emphasize the perennial problem of achieving family food security in Timor-Leste.

In the survey, 37 per cent of respondents identified their previous harvest as insufficient for domestic consumption over the ensuing year. Within that category, some areas stand out as food deficit regions in terms of harvest yields. For example, none of the respondents in the dissected mountains of Lequidoe (1,300 m above sea level in the Aileu district) were able to harvest sufficient food for their household needs. Communities from Liquiça, Baucau and Laga on the northern

Table 5.4. Food security reporting

Sub-district	Insufficient yield	%* of sample	Sufficient yield	% of sample	Surplus yield	% of sample	Total farmers
Alas	–	0	28	93	2	7	30
Same	9	22	30	73	2	5	41
Baucau	33	67	15	31	1	2	49
Laga	11	61	6	33	1	6	18
Quilicai	–	0	20	95	1	5	21
Vemasse	13	57	7	30	3	13	23
Venelale	1	4	21	91	1	4	23
Liquica	13	72	5	28	–	0	18
Maubara	2	10	15	71	4	19	21
Aileu	17	30	37	66	2	4	56
Liquidoe	17	100	–	–	–	0	17
Remexio	2	67	1	33		0	3
Total	**118**	**37**	**185**	**58**	**17**	**5**	**320**

* % refers to farmer responses in different areas

littoral also reported grossly inadequate harvests. Seasonal rainfall patterns dictate that these areas have just one cropping cycle during the year, and the results highlight the vulnerability of dependent farmer households.

Those farmers reporting reduced or insufficient food crop harvests were asked a follow-up question seeking the main reasons for diminished yields. These are listed in Table 5.5. The most commonly reported causes of crop failure and damage included variable monsoon rainfall that limits plant growth (30 per cent of respondents); strong winds that flatten ripening crops (24.5 per cent), especially maize; and the deleterious impact of rats and other vermin on harvest yields (26.5 per cent). The findings are consistent with evidence from field observations and support the SOL strategic decision to focus on factors such as drought tolerance, reduced stem height for maize, pest control and post-harvest storage improve-

Table 5.5. Factors reducing yields

No.	Cause	Total	% of farmer responses
1	Lack of rain	165	30.0
2	Weed effects	42	7.64
3	Damage from livestock	52	9.45
4	Pests	6	1.09
5	Rats	146	26.55
6	Strong winds	135	24.55
7	Other	4	0.73
Total		**550***	**100**

* Some farmers gave multiple causes

ments, all of which could reduce the key identified environmental threats to crop production.

Focused Household Surveys

For each of the eight sub-districts where the SOL project operated, detailed agricultural calendars were developed through informal focus group discussions with participating farmers and prominent community members within many communities. The calendars provided information on the timing of all significant activities associated with agriculture and the pursuit of rural livelihoods. They included typical weather patterns, cultivation phases and associated ritual activities, and local-language names for agriculturally related matters. The results depicted the regional diversity of agricultural activity in Timor-Leste in rich detail. Not just a useful record of diversity, the calendars have also been popular as extension tools for agricultural staff and regional development planning.

A significant result of the social science surveys was a much better appreciation of the diversity of mutual labour assistance groups (*servisu hamutuk*) that allow farmer households to engage relatives and neighbours in reciprocal forms of assistance in agriculture. These common practices are important, both as a risk diversification measure and as a source of food security and social capital within close-knit rural communities. The results illustrate the socially embedded character of farming practice in Timor-Leste and the need to understand farming systems as expressions of cultural systems of exchange, mutual obligation and interdependence.

The results of the longitudinal food consumption surveys of farmer households confirm that the widely reported annual 'hungry season' typically falls between December and February prior to the new harvest.[20] Timorese distinguish between degrees of privation, from food shortages (*tempo ai han menus*), to conditions resembling famine (*tempo rai hamlaha*).[21] The data offers nuanced insights into farmer strategies during this period, including food rationing, food exchange and the shift in reliance on maize and rice towards tuber crops, especially cassava. Buying food at local markets, another common strategy, reflects these markets' importance in the provision of basic domestic necessities (cooking oil, salt, sugar, kerosene, shampoo, etc.). Milled rice, in particular, was a common purchase among those who could afford it, particularly during times of food shortage.[22]

Another significant finding from the research on food deficits was the common experience of farmers consuming all their grain, including reserves that are notionally set aside as seed for the following year.[23] Various strategies are subsequently used to source new planting stock, including borrowing from relatives and purchasing maize and other food crops at market. Mapping seed sources and acquisition strategies provides insights into the informal seed distribution networks operating within the country.

Another focus of research interest, consumption of wild tubers, leaves and small game from forested areas, was found to represent an important supplementary food security strategy. A range of wild-growing foods contributed to seasonal diets across the eight sub-districts of the study.[24] Examples include wild yams (kumbili; *Dioscorea eculenta*), elephant foot yam (maek; *Amorphophallus paeoniifolious*), various wild bean varieties (bitter bean; *koto moruk*) and yam bean (singkumas; *Pachyrhizus sp.*). In addition, many households take advantage of a range of species of wild-growing sago palms, including true swamp sago (*metroxylon sagu*) as well as the widely growing sugar palms, areng (ai tua metan; *Arenga pinnata*), gewang (ai tali; *Corypha elata*) and lontar (akadiru; *Borassus flabellifer*). These ancient, reliable sources of additional nutrition supplement household grain stores that run low when the new harvest is still some way off.

However, preparation of wild foods is time consuming, often needing repeated boiling to remove bitterness and poisons,[25] and most of the labour burden falls on women. Based on this study, we would argue that one indicator of improved agricultural production among Timorese farmer households will be reduced reliance on wild food gathering and consumption, with associated reallocation of labour opportunities, particularly among women (Glazebrook, Lopes and Ximenes 2007a).

Making a Difference

As Timor-Leste society pursues the challenge of nation building, the use of social science research in its government planning and programming remains an underutilized opportunity. In part this reflects policymakers' and government leaders' lack of appreciation of the potential value and applications that social research and social assessment have for development goals. It also highlights the institutional bias of the many 'technical' ministries and donor agencies that tend to favour professional skills that correspond more closely to their perceived functional objectives. Timor-Leste's agriculture ministry is a case in point. Its staff appointments are drawn principally from disciplines such as agronomy, forestry or fisheries management, and it offers social scientists few career prospects within the ministerial organizational structure. Instead it tends to focus almost exclusively on technical qualifications and solutions that reflect the ministry's core institutional responsibilities. Therefore only limited opportunities remain for building institutional capacity and competence in social sciences and allied disciplines that support communication and a broader understanding of Timorese farming practices. In such agencies, social science contributions other than quantitative economic analysis may be devalued and criticized for their perceived lack of 'scientific objectivity' or rigor in the creation and acquisition of knowledge.

Historically in Timor-Leste, particularly during the Indonesian period of governance (1975–1999), when social science skills were somewhat recognized and often included in programme budgets, research support was typically sought outside government ministries, mainly from universities or private consulting companies. This option is also likely to be a favoured strategic policy direction in the future. However, at present such opportunities remain limited in contemporary Timor-Leste as the university and private sectors struggle to rebuild capacity and expertise. In this context the social research work in the SOL project has provided an important opportunity to demonstrate the uses and relevance of social science approaches to a still sceptical but sympathetic audience willing to be persuaded. To that end the programme worked to build capacity and understanding within the agriculture ministry, and to forge research partnerships with the agricultural faculty at the National University.[26]

However, it takes time to implant these kinds of initiatives and understandings within organizations. After five years of sustained endeavour, the social component of SOL remained in a formative stage of capacity building. Despite its strong contribution to social evaluation in the Seeds of Life programme, it still lacked effective integration within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. During the planning process for stage 3 of the project (2010–2015), while acknowledging the good work of the Sosek team, the ministry opted for a more standardized monitoring and evaluation function instead. It deemed the dedicated autonomous social research option costly in terms of the specific goals and objectives of food security and difficult to mainstream within the agriculture ministry.

Notwithstanding this outcome, and leaving open the possibility that direct social research may yet be undertaken for specific rural livelihood purposes, arguably the social research experiment within the SOL project well demonstrated its value and utility in multiple ways and contributed to a broader appreciation of the social ecologies of agriculture in Timor-Leste (see da Costa et al. 2013 for recent corroboration). Key among its findings was the understanding that promoting agricultural innovation and change in a place like Timor-Leste is more than a straightforward matter of agronomy and yield improvements. Timorese farming practices are simultaneously deeply cultural practices that inform and guide the rhythm of agriculture and help reproduce fundamental exchange relationships and social safety nets. They also highlight the resilience of farming practices under conditions of marked climatic variability. A better appreciation of these considerations and constraints will enable the development of more effective agricultural extension services and social protection policies for the different farming communities.[27]

The holistic, localized nature of social and ethnographic enquiry also draws attention to the importance of livelihood diversity for the great majority of farmer households across the island. Efforts to promote greater focus on market-oriented cultivation of staple food crops and commercialized agriculture without improving infrastructure, inputs and farmer support are likely to have disappointing

results. Comparative work has demonstrated the relationship between wealth effects and harvest yields. When quality of housing among participant farmers (a proxy indicator of relative wealth) is compared against the measured yields of their maize crops, the data clearly illustrates that economically stronger households secure higher yields (greater productivity) than their poorer counterparts (see Table 5.6). The specific reasons for this result require further investigation, but one possible explanation is that economically stronger households have the wherewithal to secure additional labour at critical times when poorer households lack such resources. As ever in Timor, it is labour, not land, that remains the critical constraint.

Table 5.6. Comparison of house type and crop yield

House type	Measured yield (t/ha)
Uma mutin / fatuk: Concrete block, tiled roof	2.29
Uma mea parede: Concrete base, clad walls	1.94
Uma du'ut: Basic thatched house, dirt floor	1.29

Finally, social science research of the type pursued under the SOL programme offers a creative opportunity for local farming communities and farmers themselves to wield influence in determining their own agricultural futures. The feedback and evaluations they offer on the performance and suitability of different food crops form the basis for recommended technology packages and associated government supported extension services to promote wider dissemination (SOL 2006). The choices farmers make in terms of seed selection and varietal adoption are crucial to the future direction of upland agriculture in Timor-Leste. Given that such a large percentage of the population of Timor-Leste derives its livelihood directly from cultivation of the soil, this important opportunity will hopefully translate into an empowered rural constituency and more effective government policies and support services tailored to their expressed needs.

Acknowledgements

The project is a bilateral initiative of the Australian and Timor-Leste governments, specifically the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, in cooperation with the Australian Agency for International Development, now integrated within the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Timor-Leste Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). The establishment of the 'socioeconomic unit' within the project organization, staffed by graduates of the University of Timor Lorosa'e, grew out of discussions between the principal funding agency, the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and anthropologists from the Australian National University (ANU).

Notes

1. The high percentage is tempered by a sustained rural-to-urban drift, particularly of young people seeking alternative futures (Timor-Leste Census 2010).
2. Of the estimated 139,000 rural households, some 54,000 (39 per cent) are engaged in purely subsistence farming with little trading of agricultural commodities (WFP and FAO 2003).
3. Average maize yields in Timor are estimated to be around 1.4 t/ha.
4. Seed for planting is generally selected from the grain supply and other harvested crops that have been stored over the dry season and remain free of fungus and weevil infestation.
5. Subsequently changed after the national elections in late 2007 to the current Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio da Agricultura e Pesce). The Australian managing contractor is the Centre for Legumes in Mediterranean Agriculture of the University of Western Australia.
6. Rice seed, for instance, was sourced and tested from the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines; maize varieties from the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre in Mexico; sweet potato from the International Potato Center based in Peru; cassava and beans from the International Center for Tropical Agriculture in Colombia; and groundnuts and pigeon peas from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics in India.
7. For example, some maize varieties produce high volumes of seed cob, but their seed hardness significantly increases food preparation time and labour (for women in particular). For further studies on taste and favoured characteristics of food crops among farmers, see Glazebrook, Lopes and Ximenes 2007a and Ximenes 2008.
8. Historically, little use has been made of fertilizers in upland Timorese agriculture, and although greater yields could be achieved from wider application of fertilizers (especially nitrogen and superphosphates), this is not a primary focus of the Seeds of Life research at this stage. Continuing constraints around both supply and demand for fertilizer and the real investment risks for subsistence farmers have tended to lower the priority. However, fertilizer trials with participating farmers in seed multiplication contract farming is currently being promoted (Mr Rob Williams, Seeds of Life Team Leader, pers. comm. 2008)
9. Increased productivity can also reduce the area under cultivation, which may reduce land clearing and soil erosion as well as increase fallow periods and thereby enhance soil fertility and biodiversity (Dove 1986: 225).
10. As crops ripen they attract the attention of hungry birds, feral pigs, monkeys and rats, as well as domestic goats, dogs and cattle. Surveillance of the crop at this time can be critical to the harvest result.
11. SOL2 received supplementary financing of around A$6 million from AusAID.
12. This aspect of the project was difficult to monitor and manage, and despite attempts to provide broad opportunity for farmers to participate, village elites and their family connections often took precedence. Subsequent surveys, however, demonstrated that large numbers of poor farmer households were able to participate in the project.
13. From 2006 to 2009, the social science component was coordinated by Diana Glazebrook and later Angie Bexley, both of the ANU, in conjunction with the ANU–based research advisor Andrew McWilliam. They worked closely with three Timorese staff members – Anita Ximenes, Modesto Lopes and Marcelino de Jesus da Costa – all recent graduates in socioeconomics in the Faculty of Agronomy at the National University of Timor Lorosa'e. They were commonly referred to as the *Sosek* team, based on the common Indonesian orientation to 'socioeconomic' studies.
14. The volumes of reports produced for different phases of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Project funded by the World Bank and the European Union are examples (see MAFF 2004).
15. See Alexander (2004) and the World Food Programme Report (WFP 2006) for more informed research in this respect.

16. In 2006, seven new varieties of food crops were approved for release. They included two maize varieties (*sele* and *suwan* 5), three sweet potato varieties (*hohrae* 1, 2 and 3), a rice variety (*nakroma*) and a peanut variety (*utamua*). The crop names were based on local selections.
17. Ideally, a control group or series of control groups (nonparticipating farmer households) should be surveyed to strengthen the baseline conditions.
18. In the initial survey conducted over the 2006–2007 period, 340 participating farmers and households (*uma kain*) were interviewed. This represented over 95 per cent of participating farmers for maize varieties in the programme at the time and 80 per cent of all participating farmer households. Since then, a more complete compilation has been undertaken for the 710 participating households over the same period.
19. The result is consistent with the high fertility index in Timor-Leste following the end of the Indonesian occupation.
20. The hungry season, it is said, is reflected in people's physical condition, including greater frequency of maladies such as weight loss (Tetun: *isin tu'un*), diarrhoea (*kabun moras*), dizziness (*oin halai*), headaches (*ulun moras*), indigestion/stomach ulcers (*estomak*), fever (*isin manas*) and lethargy (*isin baruk* or *kolen*). Diarrhoea is said to result from eating quantities of coarse leaves and plant shoots foraged from the forest. This period of bodily malaise occurs at precisely the time when labour requirements for weeding the food crops are highest (Glazebrook, Lopes and Ximenes 2007a: 11).
21. Also distinguished by degree: *lo'os* (true) and *bo'ot* (extreme).
22. An apparent preference for rice over other staples revolves largely around issues of labour, resources and taste. Rice cooks in five to ten minutes when boiled and therefore requires little fuel (e.g., firewood), whereas maize takes up to forty minutes to boil. Cooked rice that is not refrigerated overnight can be readily reheated and eaten the following day and maintains good taste. Because cooked rice becomes soft, it may be consumed by the entire family, including the elderly and babies. Rice is said to sate the appetite and, following a generation of exposure to Indonesian influences, is increasingly a culturally esteemed food (Glazebrook, Lopes and Ximenes 2007a: 35).
23. A World Food Programme survey (2006) found that as many as 17 per cent of respondents consumed seed stock in the event of 'unavailability of food.'
24. The tapping of sugar palms is an important activity in favourable locations across Timor. The results of the consumption survey show that fermented and distilled palm wine is the second most commonly traded commodity (after domestic chickens) and functions as an important source of cash revenue that depletes neither food reserves nor assets.
25. Tetun has developed the word *tisi*' to describe this process of preparation.
26. These initiatives are directed towards collaborative research activities and opportunities for applied research by students as a basis of their theses (*skripsi*). Several students undertook socioeconomic research with assistance from the Sosek unit.
27. The failure of the pilot agricultural services centres programme is an example of supply-side development without an understanding of the needs and requirements of farming community participants. See also comparative analysis of agricultural approaches in Shepherd and McWilliam (2011).

References

Alexander, B. 2004. 'Food Economy Analysis for Risk Management and Improved Food and Income Security: Indicative Results from the Seical Watershed of Timor-Leste', *First Timor-Leste Conference on Agriculture and the Environment*. 21–25 January 2001, Dili, Timor-Leste, University of Hawai'i, Manoa.

Borges, L.F., et al. 2009. 'Improving Food Security through Agricultural Development in Timor-Leste: A Country Emerging from Conflict', *Food Security* 1: 403–12.

CARE International. 2004. *Assessment of Nutritional Status and Vaccine Coverage in Timor-Leste: Liquica, Covalima and Bobonaro Districts*. Dili, CARE International.

Da Costa M., M. Lopes, A. Ximenes, A. do R. Ferreira, L. Spyckerelle, R. Williams, H. Nesbitt and W. Erskine. 2013. 'Household Food Insecurity in Timor-Leste', *Food Security* 5: 83–94.

Da Costa, H, et al. (eds). 2003. *Agriculture: New Directions for a New Nation Timor-Leste*, Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research Proceedings No. 113. Canberra: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research.

Dove, M. 1986. 'The Ideology of Agricultural Development in Indonesia', in C. MacAndrews (ed.), *Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, pp. 221–47.

Glazebrook, D., M. Lopes and A. Ximenes. 2007a. *Cultivation Practices for Staple Food Crops (Maize, Rice, Sweet Potato, Cassava, Peanuts, Pigeon Pea): A Study of Seeds of Life Farmers in Aileu, Baucau, Liquica and Manufahi Districts (Timor-Leste)*. Dili: Social Research Report to the Seeds of Life Project.

———. 2007b. *Patterns of Food Consumption and Acquisition during the Wet and Dry Seasons in Timor-Leste: A Longitudinal Case Study among Subsistence Farmers in Aileu, Baucau, Liquica and Manufahi District*. Dili: Social Research Report to the Seeds of Life Project.

Guterres, A. and R. Williams. 2006. *Maize Production and Storage in Timor-Leste*. Dili: Department of Agronomy, National University of Timor Lorosa'e.

Lopes, D. 2008. *Reaping the Benefits: Economic Benefits Some Farmers Derived from Seeds of Life Varieties in 2007–2008. Seeds of Life Report*. Retrieved 11 May 2011 from http://seedsoflifetimor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Reaping-the-Benefits.pdf.

McWilliam, A. 2006. *Conditions and Characteristics of Food Crop Production in Timor-Leste 2005-6, Situation Report*. Dili: Report to the Seeds of Life Program.

McWilliam, A. and M. da Costa. 2007. *Buka Data Los: Baseline Survey of the Seeds of Life Participating Farmer Households: 2006–2007*. Dili: Seeds of Life (Phase II) Project Report.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). 2004. 'Impact Survey of ARP II and Baseline Survey of ARP III: Analysis Report'. Dili, Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Timor-Leste.

Ministry of Planning and Finance. 2005. *Timor-Leste: Overview of Sector Investment Programs: Strategies and Priorities for the Medium Term*, vol. 1. Dili, Ministry of Planning and Finance, Timor-Leste.

Seeds of Life (SOL). 2006. *Relatóriu Peskiza Annual [Annual Research Report]*. Dili: Report of the Ministerio da Agricultural Florestas e Pescas.

Shepherd, C. and A. McWilliam. 2011. 'Ethnography, Agency, and Materiality: Anthropological Perspectives on Rice Development in Timor-Leste', *East Asia Science and Technology Studies, An International Journal*, Special Issue 5(1): 189–215.

Timor-Leste Census 2010. General Directorate of Statistics, Government of Timor Leste.

UNICEF. 2003. 'Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS 2002)'. Dili, UNICEF.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2006. *The Path out of Poverty: Integrated Rural Development*. Dili, Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

World Food Program (WFP). 2005. *Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Analysis Timor-Leste*, Dili.

———. 2006. *Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis*. Dili, Timor-Leste, World Food Program.

World Food Programme and Food and Agriculture Organization (WFP and FAO). 2003. *Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Timor-Leste*, Dili, Timor-Leste, pp. 1–17.

Ximenes, A. 2008. *Comparative Studies on Food Preparation Times and Gender Implications for Improved Seed Varieties in Timor-Leste: Relatoriu Projecto Fini ba Mori*. Dili: Ministerio da Agricultura e Pescas.

Part II

Applying Sociological Knowledge in China

Introduction to Part II

Susanna Price

The next chapters highlight contemporary experience in developing and applying social assessment in China specifically. In chapter 6, 'Social Assessment in China: Progress and Application in Domestic Development Projects', Li Kaimeng traces the evolution of forms of social assessment, including most recent developments. The government has taken important steps towards a framework for social assessment. Li sets out the challenges that remain to its full implementation. Despite the recent shift in project selection away from growth towards a balance between economic, environmental and social concerns, Li finds that in practice, financial imperatives still largely drive project preparation. The legislative and organizational basis of responsibility for social assessment in China remains a challenge for national and local governments countrywide, for both government- and enterprise- financed investments. Not only is there a lack of trained personnel, but the documentary requirements for social assessment also need strengthening to provide norms and standards to guide projects' approval, verification and filing process. The most recent directive from NDRC, issued in 2012/2013, is specifically designed to assess likely social unrest risk arising from project implementation. Li contends that this is not the same thing as a comprehensive social risk or social assessment.

In chapter 7, entitled 'Turning Risks into Opportunities? Social Assessments as Governmental Technologies', Bettina Gransow presents a thought-provoking analysis of the conceptualization of social risks in development investments – undertaken as an integral part of a larger complex of future-oriented sustainability strategies in China – as particular 'governmental technologies' in the Foucauldian sense. China's experience with infrastructure projects demonstrates that the ways in which social risks are defined constitute, to some extent, the ways in which government is exercised. The very process of generating (new) knowledge about social impact and risks – that is, the question of whose knowledge and needs are included or excluded in this process – not only is decisive in defining and assessing social risks but also represents certain specific governmental technologies. The essay presents a preliminary typology of governmental technologies of social assessment in China as having paternalistic, neoliberal and participatory ap-

proaches. Whereas neoliberal approaches, largely informed by expert knowledge, externalize social costs except those required by law, participatory approaches, in contrast, rely on both expert and local knowledge, resulting in the distribution of social risks and project benefits among a wider selection of project stakeholders. The essay leaves the reader reflecting on a question: Does participatory social assessment tame protests and solve problems by 'arts of government' rather than by finding more fundamental solutions?

In chapter 8, 'Participatory Monitoring of Development Projects in China', Xiao Jianliang and David Arthur take up one of Gransow's types to present a fascinating case study. The administrative and legal framework in China, coupled with a history of 'command and control' governance, challenged effective public consultation and participation for development projects. However, the authors provide a successful example of how civil society can be involved in – and beneficially contribute to – the implementation of major infrastructure projects in China. They show how specific strategies fostered people's participation in the monitoring of environmental and social management of a major infrastructure development project, demonstrating how better communication with local people benefited the project progress. The chapter presents details of the rationale, methodology and procedures adopted by the participation programme and canvases possible broader applications to projects elsewhere in China.

In chapter 9, entitled 'How Social Assessment Could Improve Conservation Policy and Projects: Cases from Pastoral Management in China', Wang Xiaoyi contemplates lessons from two cases in Inner Mongolia, in which neglect of social factors caused conservation projects to fail. As more factories and mining enterprises were established in the northern grasslands of China, herders' livelihood patterns changed – with negative impacts on the environment. Although enterprises were inclined to pay compensation to herders for the grasslands they took, this was not enough to restore livelihoods. Wang recommends introducing social assessment into the implementation of conservation policy and projects, especially in areas where most peoples are vulnerable minorities, to identify social complexities in production and to reduce negative impacts, including the indirect impact on the environment. Local knowledge could improve the project design to ensure herders' future sustainable livelihoods.

In chapter 10, 'Improving Social Impact Assessment and Participatory Planning to Identify and Manage Involuntary Resettlement Risks in the People's Republic of China', Scott Ferguson and Wenlong Zhu recognize China's singular achievements in enhancing the regulatory framework for compensation and resettlement. Notwithstanding this achievement, they make a uniquely informed and compelling case for more and better SIA in resettlement planning in China, especially to address social risks. Starting from the premise that China's approach to resettlement is largely compensation-based, valuing lost or damaged assets, the authors find that compensation is necessary but rarely sufficient for rehabilitation

of people for whom land is not just an asset but much more – security, insurance, subsistence, livelihood and cultural identity. Despite rising levels of compensation, social conflict may still delay project implementation and cause social stress and unrest. Recent national level steps towards making SIA and resettlement plans mandatory at the feasibility stage for selected key projects open up opportunity for a systematic SIA that sets the basis for better rehabilitation. A combined effort from governments and those displaced would rebuild affected communities with economic and social benefits.

In chapter 11, 'Stakeholder Participation in Rural Land Acquisition in China: A Case Study of the Resettlement Decision-making Process', two well-known, highly experienced resettlement specialists, Yu Qingnian and Shi Guoqing, focus on the process of negotiations among asymmetrically located stakeholders in rural land acquisition and resettlement, and the dynamics of village-level participation in decision making. They show how key participating agents took different negotiating positions at different times and for different reasons on an important question: the choice of a relocation strategy for the soon-to-be-displaced farming households. Lower-level stakeholders employed the strategy of under-reporting on their landholdings – a strategy widespread amongst rural communities in response to the asymmetry in negotiating positions on land deals and the speed of development applications. Having observed the negotiating positions of the key agents, from the provincial government down to the village level, the authors conclude that public participation in rural resettlement is still in its infancy in China. The affected farm households had little input in the decision-making process concerning the vital question of their relocation, which would determine their future occupations, livelihoods, and living standards. This chapter explores the actions and motives of key agents, including farming households, to better understand the gap between the requirements for a participatory process and the reality in practice.

6

Social Assessment in China

Progress and Application in Domestic Development Projects

Li Kaimeng

Social factors impact upon investment projects' potential for success and sustainability, whilst investment projects simultaneously induce social impacts, whether slight, medium or severe. Neglecting the needs, preferences and capacities of expected beneficiaries can undermine the objectives of an investment project. Though some projects manage to avoid major social risks, they may also squander opportunities to benefit more people. Some projects cannot gain local support or mobilize local resources because the targeted people are not given a chance to participate fully in the project design. The neglect of social assessment in project design and implementation may result in projects that do not actually benefit the targeted beneficiaries. Projects can also have unintended consequences, such as loss of resources, income, status and other assets, that can further jeopardize specific vulnerable groups – and risk social unrest.

Social assessment in China has been developed as an 'approach and a tool to incorporate social analysis and people's participation into the design and implementation of investment projects' (Gransow and Price 2007: 1). When utilized in investment projects, social assessment can minimize social risks by facilitating coordination between the project and local stakeholders, thereby helping to balance economic and social perspectives. Social assessment emphasizes the analysis of human perspectives through systematic research, identifying the potential social impacts of a proposed investment and evaluating mutual adaptability between the project and society. By also analysing potential social risks associated with project investments and proposing risk mitigation countermea-

sures, social assessment can contribute to project sustainability and reduce risks of social unrest.

With the growing recognition of the importance of social assessment in China, its theory and methodologies have been evolving in practice. Nevertheless, considerable barriers must be overcome to achieve widespread application. This chapter analyses some of these obstacles and proposes possible countermeasures to solve the problems.

The Social Costs of Economic Transformation in China

As a major developing country, China has experienced over thirty years of reform and opening up to new ideas. This has helped maintain rapid, sustained economic growth and has also shaped many features of social life. For example, more than 2.6 million Chinese studied overseas from 1978 to the end of 2012, making China the world's top source of overseas students. The growth rate continues to climb each year. In 2012 alone, 399,600 Chinese went abroad to study (Xinhua 2013). As increasing numbers of Chinese people travel abroad, their horizons broaden, and their understanding of values recognized in the international community increases. In particular, China's development focus has shifted away from pure economic growth towards coordinated development that aspires to address a combination of economic, environmental and social issues. For example, planned investment in the field of social development is set to grow significantly in the comprehensive 12th Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development for the 2011–2015 period.[1]

Although its most dramatic accomplishments have been in the sphere of economic development,[2] China has achieved a similarly astonishing social transformation, with both positive and negative impacts. Despite working a miracle in human development history by lifting more than 200 million people out of poverty in the last three decades,[3] China's rapid economic development has also given rise to a series of social problems (Gransow and Price 2007: 2).

First, absolute poverty has never been eliminated in remote regions, and the prevailing scarcity of natural resources and environmental degradation has worsened the situation. Moreover, poverty is increasingly concentrated in ethnic minority areas. For example, the gross income per capita in China's east in 2009 was RMB 38,587, but it was only RMB 18,090 in the west, where ethnic minorities are more concentrated. In Guizhou province, where minorities account for more than one third of the population, it was only RMB 9,187 – 67,789 RMB lower than in Shanghai (NDRC 2010).[4] The poverty headcount shows that 94.1 per cent of the poor are located in China's central and western areas (ibid.). Second, a growing number of urban people live in absolute poverty and face decreasing employment opportunities (Wu et al. 2010). This has disproportionately affected elderly people, whose pensions have often been reduced.

A third social problem, inequality in terms of income level and public services, has not been effectively eliminated between men and women or between coastal areas and inland areas; meanwhile, inequality between rural and urban areas is on the rise (Logan 2008). Fourth, social security systems and social services do not fully cover the whole population. Recent government efforts have not eliminated the gaps, particularly among poor people such as migrant workers (Leung and Xu 2010). Finally, the implementation of development strategies, such as the West Development Programme[5] and large-scale infrastructure projects in the transportation, energy and water conservancy sectors, has created environmental and social risks through large-scale displacement of people due to land acquisition.[6]

Besides the social impacts of the projects themselves, there is the risk of social unrest arising from adverse project effects, which leads to increased social costs, including feelings of resentment, inequality and imbalance.[7] Approximately 8,700 social mass disturbances occurred in China in 1993, increasing to 87,000 by 2005 and to more than 90,000 in 2006 (CSSA 2010). More than 70 per cent of the mass disturbances involved land acquisition, resettlement compensation and environmental pollution related to project investment. China's budget for public security expenses reflects the impact of these events: in 2011, it was RMB 624.42 billion, more than the entire military expenditure of RMB 601.15 billion (Xu, Chen and Li 2011).

With the rapid development of the economy, China has sped up its channels for going abroad and is an increasingly important international financier, engineer and builder. Generally, China has been a positive and responsible player in the international community in the past decades, providing valuable development aid to Asian, African and Latin American countries. However, some projects financed by Chinese enterprises have caused negative social impacts through displacement, as well as adverse environmental impacts (International Rivers 2008). The Chinese enterprises sustained serious losses, spurring Chinese investors to think deeply on how to adopt a still more responsible role in the international community.

Ultimately, the problem has pushed domestic project developers and planners to consider how to make better decisions about the implementation of domestic projects, so international interaction has had a positive impact on the development of social assessment frameworks nationally in China. Evidence of this shift is that the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (2013) issued a notice entitled 'Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation'. In the 1,882-word guideline, the two ministries jointly announced that Chinese enterprises going abroad should be aware of the principles of environmentally friendly, resource-saving, low-carbon green development and sustainable development. The guideline, though it indicates a clear preference, is not a mandatory policy that all enterprises must obey when they invest abroad. Chinese enterprises still have a long way to go to integrate fully into the international community.

Transforming the Concept of Development

The government of China has publicly recognized development's social impacts as externalities caused by rapid economic growth. For example, China's 11th Five-year Plan for National Social and Economic Development (2006–2010) draws attention to the ways rapid economic growth takes place and the changes that accompany it, emphasizing problems of environmental degradation and inequality (Fan 2006: 710). The plan is based upon 'scientific development' and a 'harmonious society', concepts introduced by the Chinese government in 2003. Scientific development may be summarized as people-oriented or 'putting people first', holistic, coordinated and sustainable, with a focus on overall planning. The national government required that all local governments implement the concept of scientific development with the aim of establishing a harmonious society, which conceptually combines economic growth with efforts to reduce inequality between urban and rural areas and among regions. This entails promoting employment, social security, poverty reduction, education, health care, environmental protection and safety, and pursuing specific strategies to achieve 'a new socialist countryside' and a more 'coordinated development among regions' (Fan 2006: 709–12). Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and social assessment (former State Environmental Protection Agency 2006) devote special attention to public involvement.

In their incorporation of concerns about environmental sustainability and inequality, these development concepts resemble the concept of sustainable development applied in the international community and adopted in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.[8] The new Chinese leaders empowered in 2013 are expected to carry the principle of 'scientific development' forward.[9] The concepts of scientific development and a harmonious society generally create a favourable environment for the application of social assessment in the investment and construction fields in China. For example, the official focus in investment project selection and strategy making has shifted from purely financial economic targets alone towards a more balanced development of the economy, society and environment (Fan 2006).

This means that social risks are now officially recognized. The National Development Research Council (NDRC) is the central planning agency of the Central Government of China. Its main functions include overall coordination of economic and social development by formulating and implementing national economic and social development strategies through annual, medium and long-term development plans submitted to the National People's Congress on behalf of the State Council; and by regulating project investments, amongst others.[10] The NDRC has wider functions for supporting social development, including the responsibility to monitor social development trends, formulate and implement social development strategies, and draft laws and regulations on both social and

economic development. This includes efforts, supported by its Social Development Department, to

> coordinate social development policies with national economic development policies; to organize the formulation of strategies, overall plans and annual plans of social development; to participate in the formulation of development policies with regard to population and family planning, science and technology, education, culture, health and civil administration…to study and put forward policies and suggestions of increasing employment, adjusting income distribution and improving the coordinated development of social security and economic development; to coordinate the solution of major issues and policies in the development and reform of social undertakings (NDRC 2012a).

It could reasonably be presumed that the promotion and application of social assessment in China symbolizes an early twenty-first-century transformation in project investments, produced by the concepts of scientific development and harmonious society. However, even though social assessment is now considered necessary in theory, in China it is often disregarded as unnecessary in practice. Hence, the challenge is to recognize social assessment and integrate it into Chinese investment project planning and management procedures. This entails transforming decision-making mechanisms, project appraisal methodologies and project implementation and monitoring mechanisms to accommodate and address potential social risks and opportunities – in effect, incorporating social assessment into the full cycle of investment project preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, through specific, verifiable measures. Sufficient institutional and human resources are needed to ensure the functioning of these mechanisms and fulfil projects' objectives of extending the benefits of growth-oriented investments to hitherto marginalized social groups. The next sections first trace the development of methodologies for social assessment in China in the context of project investments, and then address specific constraints to their broader application in planning and managing projects.

China's Progress in Social Assessment for Project Investment Decision Making

Since 1978 China's centralized planning system for investment decision making has been subject to a series of reforms designed to facilitate 'a new pattern with diversified investment modes, multiplicity of capital sources and market-oriented system' (State Council 2004). China began requiring feasibility studies for significant investment projects in the 1980s (Ping 2009), when it also started developing methods for investment appraisal in line with international standards, focusing initially upon economic appraisal methods (CIECC 2004). The NDRC

plays a key overall role in project investment, by planning, regulating, coordinating and arranging project investment finance; approving, inspecting and reviewing key construction projects; guiding and supervising the use of foreign loans in construction projects; and guiding the development of the engineering consulting industry (NDRC 2012a). All key projects must receive NDRC approval before implementation, and the NDRC also can terminate project investments (Garnaut, Golley and Song 2010). Larger project investments require central-level NDRC approval, while approval of smaller investments falls to either the provincial or the municipal Development and Reform Commission (i.e., the local DRC).

Systematic studies on project social assessment methodology in China, begun in the 1980s, have been primarily conducted by the China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC),[11] the Investment Research Institute of the State Development Planning Commission (now the NDRC), and the Research Institute for Standards and Norms (RISN) under the Ministry of Construction. Publications resulting from these studies include *Social Assessment Methodologies on Investment Projects* (ISPC and RISN 1993); *Social Assessment Guidelines for Investment Projects* (ISPC and RISN 1997); the NDRC-endorsed *Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Studies* (CIECC 2002); the *Manual on Social Assessment in Investment Projects in China* (CIECC 2004); a series of sector guidelines developed by key sector ministries (Gransow and Price 2007: 7); and a Chinese-English bilingual version of the 2004 manual entitled *Turning Risks Into Opportunities: Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China* (Gransow and Price 2007).

The NDRC (formerly State Development Planning Commission (SDPC))-endorsed *Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Studies* (CIECC 2002) (the 2002 Guideline) was the first to present social assessment as an integral part of project feasibility studies that also encompassed economic, financial, technical and other perspectives. The inclusion of social assessment was recommended on a trial basis, but not considered mandatory for all projects. This guideline required that potential social impacts, social benefits, and social acceptability be analysed at the stage of a project's feasibility study so as to understand the project's feasibility from a social perspective. It further required that countermeasures and solutions be proposed to coordinate the project and local community relations, minimize social risks and facilitate project implementation. In 2004 CIECC issued the *Manual on Social Assessment in Investment Projects in China*, which provided more detailed supporting guidance and was later issued as a bilingual manual (Gransow and Price 2007).

Under the former planned economy system, which influenced the content of the 2002 Guideline, all Chinese projects – whether proposed by government or enterprises – were required to go through the same checking and approval system before implementation. The investment management authority (the central and

local DRC) was tasked with approving the project concept report, the project feasibility study report and the preliminary engineering design documents before project implementation.

In 2004, the State Council – the central administrative authority of the People's Republic of China – announced a reform of the investment management system (State Council 2004), intended to separate the approval and management processes for government- and enterprise-funded projects, enhance the market economic system and achieve better macroeconomic control, better supervision, and a more 'scientific and democratic level of the government's decision making over investment' (State Council 2004). Through such measures as 'principal injection, interest-discounted loans and favourable taxes', the reform also encouraged and guided nongovernmental capital into public welfare undertakings and infrastructure projects (ibid.), thereby expanding the role of enterprise capital in more marginal areas dominated by government financing. The reform reserved government investment for 'economic and social fields related to national security and in which the market cannot make effective allocation of resources, including public welfare and public infrastructure, environmental protection and improvement, advancement of economic and social development of less-developed regions, and technological development and high-tech industrialization' (ibid.). The State Council also specified: 'For especially important projects, systems shall be established for soliciting opinions from experts, for keeping the public informed and extensively listening to proposals and opinions from all circles' (ibid.) – which has important implications for social assessment.

For enterprise-financed projects, the government has categorized certain key, large projects as 'important and restricted investment projects relating to public or social interest' (ibid.) and requiring special government scrutiny in the checking and approval system. For these listed project investments, the Project Application Report – which replaces the project proposal, feasibility study report and project opening report – must be prepared to meet specific enterprise-financed project standards. NDRC regulations require that the social assessment and assessment of land acquisition and resettlement impacts be addressed in the Project Application Report. Social assessment is therefore mandatory for the listed enterprise-financed projects. Other enterprise-financed projects that are not listed for checking and approval are usually small or socially and environmentally friendly projects. Since they are not required to submit a Project Application Report they do not need social assessment, but they must still be put on record with the relevant local government.

In 2007, after five years of drafts and trials of the 2002 Guideline, the NDRC decided to amend the old guidelines to formalize these new requirements, but the amendments remain incomplete, largely because the planned *Administrative Regulation On Government-financed Investment* has not been issued yet. China has issued many laws and regulations in the past three decades, but to date China lacks

legislation or administrative regulation on national-level investment projects, such as laws on government investment, overseas investment, and state-owned enterprise investment. The *Administrative Regulation On Government-financed Investment,* which might be issued soon, will be the first national-level regulation. When this regulation is promulgated, a new *Guideline of Government Investment Project Feasibility Study* will be issued to meet the regulations' new requirements.

Regarding enterprise investment, the NDRC issued a new, specifically directed guideline in 2007.[12] This guideline incorporated the requirements for social assessment and the assessment of land acquisition and resettlement impacts that was now mandatory at the project application stage for all large and key listed enterprise-financed projects. Detailed guidelines are still being prepared by different line departments with the assistance of the Department of Investment within the NDRC.

Since 2004, the State Council has also required strengthened management for government-financed investments, including intensified investment risk awareness and risk management mechanisms, as well as establishment of a 'social supervision mechanism … and the public and press shall be encouraged to supervise government-invested projects' (ibid.) – again, with implications for social assessment. To address some of these issues, the CIECC finished drafting a government-financed *Project Feasibility Study Guideline,* which also proposed mandatory social assessment and assessment of land acquisition and resettlement at the project application stage. However, the NDRC has not yet approved and issued this guideline for government-financed projects feasibility studies, so social assessment is still not mandatory at the project application stage for government-financed projects, where it is very much needed (CIECC 2004).

Barriers to Application of Social Assessment in China

A focus on research and development of theory and methodology outweighs consistent application of social assessment in project investment preparation, decision making and management in China, for several reasons. First, although the guidelines developed so far on social assessment play an important role, detailed, government-endorsed operational guidelines for practice have not yet been issued. Likewise, although the chapter setting out the scope and focus of social assessment in the 2002 Guideline required that social assessment be incorporated in investment project feasibility studies, there are no operational guidebook rules that set out specific social assessment methods and skills for application to key sectors such as transportation, water conservancy and energy. The social assessment guidelines for eight types of urban development projects, prepared by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction (2011), are a positive step forward, and are the latest evidence of progress in the preparation on social assessment

guidelines at the sector level in the PRC. More sector guidelines are needed, as is expertise. Yet, secondly, social assessment needs more than methodological studies: it requires a policy framework, legislation and administrative procedures for implementation, as with China's Environmental Law (NPC 2002).[13] Social assessment alone cannot substitute for such frameworks and procedures, although it can provide a basis for formulating and enacting more comprehensive arrangements. A successful social assessment may provide policymakers with useful information and thus help them realize specific social development policy aims, but it does not in itself constitute that policy. Whilst official recognition of the importance of social development is growing, as reflected in official statements and in the functions and structure of NDRC, this recognition is not yet manifested in comprehensive legislation and organization for addressing social development goals. In the absence of such a strong signal, the acute shortage of social assessment professionals persists. People undertaking project assessment activities in China normally have engineering, technical or managerial backgrounds, rather than a professional background in the social sciences.

In this environment, during the project implementation stage, financiers and planners attend mainly to the engineering, technical, financial and economic aspects of the project. Although the importance of social impact has been highlighted at the level of national plans and is incorporated as an integral part of the 2002 *Guideline*, it is invariably sacrificed when it conflicts with the pursuit of rapid economic growth. In this context, social issues related to project investment are seldom taken into consideration in the practical planning and operation of investment projects. Therefore, it appears that social assessment is regarded as important for sensitive projects only and is far from being an automatic, widespread activity.

This reflects the underlying reality that China's economic reform is still market-directed, with emphasis on increasing financial profits, reducing financial risks and establishing a financial management pattern suited to the market economy. This has been even more so since the international financial crisis of 2008, when decision-makers fighting the crisis assigned top priority to maintaining economic growth and embarked on a massive infrastructure spending programme in a wide-ranging effort to offset adverse global economic conditions by boosting domestic demand (Xinhua 2008). The importance of social assessment has been further neglected as a result, so promotion and popularization of social assessment in China is still a long way off.

Feasibility studies conducted for many projects in China do not aim to assess potential future risks for the project, but to secure its early approval and clearance. Government departments normally do not focus on social issues when checking a feasibility study report; rather, they focus on the feasibility of marketing arrangements, technical parameters, engineering proposals, financing arrangements, economic efficiency or environmental protection. The action plan

is implemented during the construction and operation phase. As there is little or no supervision or inspection system at the stage of project construction and operation, the project planner is usually concerned only with the project approval and does not monitor its adherence to initial feasibility plans. The local government usually takes an active role in the preparation of each project, and local officials typically prioritize growth of local GDP above all else. Project investment is the most – and possibly the only – effective incentive to local GDP growth. Thus local officials usually pay special attention to the approval of investment projects and consider social assessment a burden and hindrance to obtaining approval for projects that are expected to generate growth.

The Impact of International Standards on Chinese Investment Projects

In recent decades, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have helped to promote social assessment within China. Sociologists from international organizations realized early on that social factors must be addressed, as a project can produce far-reaching impacts on affected groups and even the whole society (Cernea 1991, 1995). As early as 1980, the World Bank's *Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement* required that social assessment be conducted when people are displaced to make way for an investment project (World Bank 2004). Social assessment is also required in later-issued operational policies – on poverty reduction, environmental assessment, gender equality, cultural heritage, involuntary resettlement, participation by local people and nongovernmental organizations – that all require that social assessment be conducted as an essential part of project preparation. Similarly, ADB has for some years required social analysis in policy documents and operational procedures governing project preparation and implementation, for example, in the *Guidelines for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects* (ADB 1993) and *Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects* (ADB 1994). Social assessment checklists for different sectors have also been developed. In key ADB operational policies on safeguards (ADB 2009), gender and development (ADB 1998a), the role of nongovernmental organizations (ADB 1998b) and social protection (ADB 2002), social assessment is mandated.

For projects in China funded by international financing organizations such as multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank and ADB, social assessment is always carried out as required by those organizations. For domestically financed Chinese projects, however, social assessment is very weak in practice, or not implemented at all. Although the 2007 NDRC guidelines made the inclusion of social assessment mandatory for listed enterprise-financed projects, in practice, we find, most such projects include only 'made-up' social assessment that bears little resemblance to the actual situation. Furthermore, we find that

the social assessments for government-financed projects are not incorporated in most feasibility study reports in practice.

This is problematic, as projects in China are financed by a wide range of international and domestic sources, whereas MDBs and other international development organizations finance only a small proportion of loans (Weiss 2012). For example, in infrastructure projects, which contribute much to China's economic development, investment from international organizations, including MDBs, is quite a small proportion of the total. Therefore, the demonstration effects on projects within China should not be overestimated.

Since international organizations demand social assessment as a precondition for project approval, social assessment is conducted in the preparation and appraisal phase for projects they finance. Generally speaking, the actual benefit provided by social assessment in the preparation of internationally financed projects is much greater than that in domestically financed projects. However, because international efforts – like domestic projects – often focus on the project preparatory phase, they still succumb to the same problem of lack of management oversight. The situational reality of China's rapid social and economic development has outstripped critical thinking and acceptance of issues such as social assessment. Compounding this problem – particularly within foreign investment projects – is the mandatory requirement of social assessment, which some have come to regard as a pressure involuntarily added by the 'outside'. This thinking, along with pressure from stakeholders, can influence project planners to 'make up' a social assessment to secure approval for financing by international organizations. Planners can see this as a viable option, especially when factoring in the lack of oversight after project approval. In such an environment, the making up of social assessment is inevitable. Even in projects funded by international organizations, social assessment in practice is primarily done not to manage social risks, but to respond to the emphasis on approval growth, and it is often limited to the project preparatory phase alone.

In this context, social assessment is less likely to result in actions on the ground and may produce only paperwork. Meanwhile, changes in the social conditions of the project-affected areas can also render measures planned during the preparation of feasibility studies impractical. Alternatively, lack of financial resources can make it impossible to implement the mitigation measures.[14] Social impacts of the project, whether predicted or unpredicted, seldom reveal themselves in full immediately. Nevertheless, it is normal that unexpected social impacts, or even chain reaction and coordination reactions, reveal themselves during the project implementation phase.[15] Therefore, the measures identified in the preparation phase must be readjusted during the project implementation phase to ensure that social assessment is incorporated into all phases of the whole project cycle.

Only when social assessment becomes an automatic activity addressing social risks during the whole project cycle, rather than a compulsory step to obtain

project approval, can social assessment be emphasized and addressed more meaningfully. This requires a fundamental transformation of project approval and management mechanisms and incentives.

Applying Social Assessment in China's Rapidly Transforming Society

China is experiencing a far-reaching social transformation (Peilin 2000; Li 2010; Logan 2008). In a vast country like China, multiple complexities attend the application of social assessment in each specific context. In any one project situation, multiple stakeholders and people at different levels may have quite different priorities, understand the aims and methods of social assessment differently and take different actions in its application. This raises expectations and complicates benefit distribution and conflict resolution. Conflicts that cannot be resolved immediately or avoided indefinitely exacerbate pressure on stakeholder analysis in project social assessment. Social assessment practitioners need to respond to such challenges with methodological advances.

Underlying the need for social assessment is the principle that all projects are rooted in society. Society is ever changing; therefore all planned interventions will lead to social change. The concept of 'scientific development' has put social equality and environmental protection on a par with economic efficiency. A sustainable strategy is a future-oriented development mode, driven largely by action and tools that encourages affected populations to participate in strategizing and implementation. These features invalidate experts' suggestions and pure academic analysis that do not incorporate local voices and local perspectives. Therefore, sustainable development can be seen as a continuous political and social learning process that will both transform traditional decision-making practices and boost the esteem and importance of social impact assessment in revealing possible problems in project implementation and solving various kinds of social problems.

Generally speaking, the cost of foreign and local experts' stimulation of the application of project social assessment in China was justified, if only to make developers, financiers, decision-makers and other stakeholders aware of the issues of social risk in the whole project cycle. But unfortunately, proving that social assessment can fundamentally improve the performance and outcomes of investment projects is still a distant goal. A major reason is that community acceptance is not fully considered in the technical review of project assessment, and project developers pay more attention to the government's approval than to the community's. Communities and key stakeholders still face many obstacles to access to project decision-making processes. At present, project developers still believe that the government's approval of a project authorizes them to proceed, so they have no will to prepare stakeholder communication strategies or proac-

tively communicate with affected communities. Systemic reform is needed to solve such a difficult problem (China Investment Monthly 2013).

The recent progress of social assessment application in China relates to Chinese government efforts to promote assessment of social unrest for major projects. Local governments, however, are still hard put to integrate social assessments into project feasibility study and preparation, and it is still very difficult for local officials to prioritize measures that confront risks like exacerbation of poverty and gender inequity over the profit gained from the projects, even though local governments are very concerned about social unrest caused by investment projects. Definitely, social stability has top priority in China at present. The Chinese government has tried to establish a new project-checking policy especially for social unrest analysis and assessment. In August 2012, the NDRC issued interim regulation measures on social unrest risk assessment for major investment projects and stipulated that all projects requiring NDRC approval must pass the social stability risk assessment (NDRC 2012b). In February 2013, the NDRC issued a notice on how to prepare reports on social unrest risk analysis and assessment for major investment projects (NDRC2013). Several ministries and local governments also issued similar regulations (for example, the Ministry of Water Conservancy (2012) issued interim regulation measures on social unrest risk assessment of major water conservancy construction projects. We believe this represents progress and constitutes an opportunity to promote project social assessment application in China. At the same time, however, project social unrest risk is quite different from a project social risk as normally understood. Many project-caused social risks that require attention might not raise the possibility of significant social unrest. Attention is directed to risks of project social unrest only because social stability has been made the top priority; stability thus has become a very serious social issue in China today. Furthermore, reports on project social unrest risk analysis or assessment tend to be 'fabricated' just to meet the obligation of obtaining NDRC approval for major investment projects. Therefore, the real meaning of social unrest risk analysis and assessment policy for major projects in China should not be overestimated.

This chapter has argued that social assessment forms a critical link between social development policy statements, project investments and achieving results in 'putting people first'. Building social assessment capacity in China calls for attention at several levels (CIECC 2004). First, social assessment requires a strong policy framework specifying objectives, definitions and requirements. Second, it needs an operational framework that sets out laws and regulations for conducting social assessment for various project investment types, as well as identifying the institutional responsibilities for preparation, approval, regulation, supervision and monitoring. These laws and regulations would form the basis of central and local government administrations' examination and approval of social assessments for government-financed projects and verification of those concerning

enterprise-financed projects (CIECC 2004). Third, operational norms for social assessment need further development and adaptation to key sectors, including predominantly government-financed sectors such as social infrastructure, primary industries and public investments. Finally, efforts are required to develop the numbers and skills of social assessment professionals by building networks for practitioners and researchers, and strengthening training institutions, trainers and teaching methods for social assessment.

Notes

1. Social development plans include an expansion of urban insurance coverage to another 100 million people by 2015; construction of 36 million new housing units to increase the availability of affordable urban housing; and, for the first time, a well-being goal to increase average life expectancy by one year over the next five years (Casey and Koleski 2011). The plans also include boosting urban and rural pension schemes to reduce the need for precautionary savings, raising minimum wages and significantly increasing rural basic health-care coverage (KPMG 2011).
2. China has maintained rapid total GDP growth in most years since 1978 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010).
3. The poverty headcount, according to China's national poverty line, has fallen from 250 million to 26.88 million in the past three decades (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010).
4. Shanghai is the richest city in China. Its gross income per capita in 2012 was RMB 85,646.
5. The West Development Programme, initiated at the end of 1990s, aimed to accelerate development of China's middle and western provinces so as to further reduce poverty in minority and border areas. The programme intended to address the needs of minority people in its strategy plan and implementation (Goodman 2004: 8–9).
6. Between 1949 and the late 1990s, 45 million Chinese were displaced by development project construction and required resettlement. This figure includes 12 million people displaced by reservoir construction alone. Since the 1990s, resettlement has taken place in urban areas due to an increase in urban projects with requirements for land acquisition and resettlement (Shi and Chen 1999).
7. Many investment projects implemented in China have been considered less than successful. According to a yearlong study led by former Vice-Minister of Commerce Zhang Xiang and the executive director of China International Exchange Centre (China's preeminent think tank), about 30 per cent of the investment projects involved in a ¥4 trillion stimulus package to boost economic growth over a three year period proved to be failures. http://www.zaobao.com/wencui/2010/12/hongkong101223g.shtml.
8. A sustainable development strategy was agreed on at the World Environment Development Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and later listed in the Millennium Development Goals by the UN General Assembly in September 2000 (Gransow and Price 2007: 4).
9. Chinese President Xi Jinping's remarks in several meetings reaffirmed that the new Chinese government will insist on scientific development, sustainable development and harmonious development.
10. Other functions of the NDRC include carrying out research and analysis on the domestic and international economic situation; proposing targets and policies for developing the national economy by regulating overall price levels and optimizing major economic structures; regulating

project investments; and making recommendations on the use of various economic instruments and policies (NDRC 2012a).

11. The CIECC, an engineering consulting institution founded after China's decision to adopt market-oriented reforms, was originally established under China's State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC now NDRC). Its main task is to provide professional consulting services to the central government regarding decision making on, and implementation of, major national development projects. Between its establishment in 1982 and 2012, various levels of governments in China commissioned the CIECC for over 22,000 cases of consulting services involving investments totalling RMB 40 trillion.
12. The new guideline was prepared by the CIECC and the ADB with support from the World Bank Beijing Office.
13. These contrast with China's EIA legislative and administrative framework, which requires specific reports for investment projects to be prepared and submitted for approval with reference to the relevant environmental protection legislation (see NPC 2002).
14. Governments are often preoccupied with obtaining approval for the large, growth-generating projects that contribute significantly to local GDP growth. Sometimes they reduce the amount of investment required in the cost estimate so that the project can be approved more easily, thus cutting, in practice, the budget provisions needed to meet the real costs of land acquisition, environmental protection and resettlement compensation.
15. For example, during the preparation of feasibility studies for the famous Three Gorges on the Yangtze River, planners did not predict the serious geological disaster that would occur ten years later. In the past five years, China has dealt with more than 4,000 geological incidents related to the Three Gorges project, all with associated social impacts and costs.

References

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 1993. *Guidelines on Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

———. 1994. *Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

———. 1998a. *Gender and Development Policy*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

———. 1998b. *Policy on Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

———. 2002. *Social Protection Strategy*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

———. 2009. *Safeguard Policy Update*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Casey, J. and K. Koleski. 2011. *Backgrounder: China's 12th 5 year Plan, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*. Retrieved 31 August 2014 from http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf.

Cernea, M.M. (ed.). 1991. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 1995. 'Social Organization and Development Anthropology: The 1995 Malinowski Award Lecture', *Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monograph Series* 6. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC) [Zhongguo guoji gongcheng zixun gongsi]. 2002. '*Touzi xiangmu kexingxing yanjiu zhinan bianxiezu*' [Guideline for investment project feasibility studies], 2 vols (Chinese and English). The Compiling Group. Beijing: China Electric Power Press.

———. 2004. *Zhongguo touzi xiangmu shehui pingjia zhinan* [Manual on social assessment in investment projects]. Beijing: China Planning Press.

China Social Science Academy (CSSA). 2010. *Blue-cover-book on Social Development in China*. Beijing.

Fan, C.C. 2006. 'China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010): From Getting Rich First to "Common Prosperity"', *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47(6): 708–23. Retrieved 26 February 2011 from http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/597/300.pdf.

Garnaut, R., J. Golley and L. Song. 2010. *China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development*. Canberra: ANU E Press.

Goodman, D.S.G. (ed.). 2004. *The Campaign to 'Open Up the West': National, Provincial-level and Local Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gransow, B. and S. Price. 2007. *Turning Risks Into Opportunities: Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China*. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Institute of the State Planning Commission and Research Institute for Standards and Norms of the Ministry of Construction (ISPC and RISN). 1993. *Social Assessment Methodologies on Investment Projects*. Beijing.

———. 1997. *Social Assessment Guidelines for Investment Projects*. Beijing.

International Rivers. 2008. *New Financiers and Environment: Ten Perspectives on How Financial Institutions Can Protect the Environment*, Chinese version. Retrieved 10 July 2012 from http://adfiap.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/International-Rivers-New-Financiers-the-Environment.pdf.

KPMG. 2011. 'China's 12th 5-year Plan: Health Care Sector'. Retrieved 5 February 2011 from http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Healthcare-201105-3.pdf.

Leung, J.C.B. and Y.B. Xu. 2010. 'The Emergence of Social Assistance in China', in J. Midgley and K.L. Tang (eds), *Social Policy and Poverty in East Asia: The Role of Social Security*. London: Routledge, pp. 47–65.

Li, C. (ed.). 2010. *China's Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Logan, J. 2008. *Urban China in Transition*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China. 2013. *Guideline for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation*. Retrieved 21 October 2012 from http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml (English version).

Ministry of Water Conservancy. 2012. *Interim Regulation Measures on Social Stability Risk Assessment of Major Water Conservancy Construction Projects*. (Internal document).

National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). 2010. *China Statistical Yearbook 2010*. Beijing: NBS. Retrieved 5 February 2011 from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm.

National Development Reform Commission (NDRC). 2007. *Instruction for Format for Feasibility Study Reports*. Beijing: NDRC.

———. 2010. *The Research Report on the National Economy and Social Development in the 12th Five-Year-Plan*. Beijing NDRC.

———. 2012a. 'Main Functions of the NDRC'. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/

———. 2012b. *Interim Procedures of Risk Assessment on Social Stability for Large-size Capital Asset Investment Projects*. Beijing: NDRC.

———. 2013. Notice on Report Preparation Outlines of Risk Assessment on Social Stability for Large-size Capital Asset Investment Projects. Beijing: NDRC.

National People's Congress (NPC). 2002. *Environmental Impact Assessment Law of the People's Republic of China*, issued on 28 October by the Standing Committee of the 9th Session.

Peilin, L. 2000. 'China in a Period of Social Transformation', *Institute of Sociology Chinese Academy of Social Sciences*. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.cs-en.cass.cn/news/588320.htm.

Ping, Y. 2009. 'Reform in China's Investment System', *Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure PPPI Workshops Series 2009, 23–25 June 2009*. Qingdao: ADB. Retrieved 20 February 2012 from http://www.adbi.org/conf-seminar-papers/2009/09/30/3338.reform.china.investment.system/.

Shi, G. and S. Chen. 1999. *China Resettlement Policies and Practices*. Nanjing: Hohai University National Research Center for Resettlement.

State Council. 2004. *Decision of the State Council on Reform of the Investment System*. Retrieved 30 August 2014 from http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/dotscortis628/.

State Environmental Protection Agency of the People's Republic of China. 2006. *Interim Measures for public participation in Environmental Impact Assessment*. Beijing: State Environmental Protection Agency of the People's Republic of China.

The Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China. 2013. 'Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation'. 18 February 2013.

Ministry of Housing and Rural-Urban Construction. 2011. *Social Assessment Guidebook on Urban Utilities Construction Projects*. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Weiss, M.A. 2012. *Multilateral Development Banks: General Capital Increases*. Congressional Research Service 7-5700. Retrieved 29 February 2012 from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41672.pdf.

World Bank. 2004. *Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank;

Wu, F., C. Webster, S. He and Y. Liu. 2010. *Urban Poverty in China*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Xinhua News. 2008. 'China's 4 Trillion Yuan Stimulus to Boost Economy, Domestic Demand'. Retrieved 20 February 2012 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/09/content_10331324.htm.

———. 2013. 'China becomes largest source of overseas students' Retrieved 28 August 2014 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/02/c_125110114.htm.

Xu, K., X. Chen and W. Li. 2011. 'The Bill of Public Security', *Caijin Magazine*, 9 May. Retrieved 11 April 2013 from http://www.caijing.com.cn/.

7

Turning Risks into Opportunities?
Social Assessment as Governmental Technologies

Bettina Gransow

Despite the crucial role of infrastructure projects in China's development strategy, and despite their far-reaching social impacts on the local populations in their spheres of influence, until now many projects have not included a comprehensive social assessment as part of the usual project management routine. Environmental issues, in contrast, must be addressed in China under the Environmental Impact Assessment Law, effective in 2003, but no similar law requiring social (impact) assessment of infrastructure projects exists in China.[1] Conflicts over land requisition, forced house demolitions, numerous protests and petitions, and extreme reactions, such as project-affected people setting themselves ablaze,[2] clearly signal the need for effective social assessment in investment projects, including measures for avoiding, or at least mitigating, their adverse social impacts. For more than a decade various efforts have been undertaken to develop tools, methods and capacity for social assessment in China.

To examine the role and scope of social assessment in investment projects in China, one must first locate social assessment in the broader context of development strategies and interventions. Are programmatic slogans such as 'Putting people first' (Cernea 1985) or 'Turning risks into opportunities' (Gransow and Price 2007) anything more than appealing catchphrases for 'selling' social assessment that – from the perspective of many project owners – makes projects take longer and cost more than they otherwise would? What are the incentives and constraints to turning risks into opportunities for project-affected people? Is social assessment merely a scientific instrument for social analysis, or can it also be seen as a political tool to simultaneously manage change and maintain political and social stability?

This chapter argues that assessments of social risks in development projects and programmes, undertaken as an integral part of a larger complex of future-oriented sustainability strategies in China, can be analysed as particular 'governmental technologies' in the Foucauldian sense.[3] Based on China's experience with infrastructure projects, the chapter introduces the background and methodology of social assessment in China and suggests – to a certain extent – that the ways in which social risks are defined constitute the ways in which government is exercised. The very process of generating (new) knowledge about social impact and risks, that is, the question of whose knowledge and needs are included or excluded in this process, is not only decisive in defining and assessing social risks but also representative of certain specific governmental technologies. A preliminary typology of governmental technologies of social assessment in China comprises paternalistic, neoliberal and participatory approaches.

The chapter concludes that social assessment is a complex process embedded in local, national and global power structures and political rationalities that can influence the final outcome and impacts of development interventions on project-affected people far beyond the recommendations of the social scientists undertaking the assessment. Despite this limitation, social assessment – used as a tool to incorporate social analysis and people's participation into the design and implementation of investment projects – nevertheless has the potential to avert or minimize social conflicts arising from development interventions. Social assessment can generate innovative, inclusive countermeasures to maximize project benefits for project-affected people. This potential is definitely strengthened by agreement that sustainable development is a fundamental norm of development strategies and interventions both inside and outside China.

Changing State-Society Relations in China and Foucault's Concept of Governmentality

When China began to open up and integrate more closely into the global order since 1978, its transformation to a market economy implied a considerable change in state-society relations, a fundamental reconceptualization of government and a shift to a concept of governance.[4] With increasingly inadequate ways and means of providing public funding,[5] the government became dependent to an ever greater degree on cooperation with civil society. The core of this strategy involved an expansion of the third sector[6] to mobilize societal resources to solve the increasing burden of social problems. These developments were accompanied by more complex control mechanisms becoming active in place of the state, incorporating multilateral development organizations as well as Chinese and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the institutional level. New types of international involvement thereby became evident outside

the realm of the state. New types of cooperation and competitive constellations arose between the emerging third sector and the state, as well as the third sector and the market. Part of changing state-society relations was the proliferation of new information technologies as the Internet provided an arena for renegotiating the boundaries of private and public spheres, opinions and interests.

The transformation from government to governance during the reform period was embedded in the authoritarian framework of the techno-scientific administrative Party-State[7] (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 7). However, as part of this transformation in China, neoliberal rationalities emerged in relation to developments abroad, in at least four ways. First, the concepts of governance and civil society that became widespread in Western writings in the late 1980s and early 1990s were taken up in China at nearly the same time. Second, Chinese scholars who had studied in the West instigated a revival of social sciences. Third, international agencies such as the United Nations, World Bank and Asian Development Bank began working with China on various development programmes, including capacity building for social assessment. Despite ideological differences, the scope for cooperation and transfer of technologies of government was considerable, in large part because they shared a common discourse on development planning. Lastly, the NGO sector has expanded steadily in China, and many of the larger international NGOs have contributed, despite some limitations, to a changing mindset regarding questions of government (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 11).

At the same time, the Chinese government feared that rapid development of civil society organizations would unleash social forces that could no longer be controlled. A stronger emphasis on participatory, bottom-up procedures implies changes in governance at both national and local levels. Such changes could induce development planners in China to take a demand-responsive approach to Chinese citizens – including poor and vulnerable people – in contrast to the top-down approaches of the past. To counteract this and retain control, Chinese legislation on NGOs (Regulations 1998)[8] was devised to keep them under strict control. Within these forms of deliberate and controlled decentralization, the room for manoeuvre between the state and society is being renegotiated. Chinese NGOs' dependence on the government raises the question of whether to see them as an integral part of a crystallizing civil society in China or place them within a model of tightly controlled state corporatism.[9]

Whether these changing state-society relations represent a retreat of the state and a consequent loss of control that the Chinese state must accept as the price for delegating responsibility to other financial sponsors – or whether the emergence of the third sector reflects precisely the converse, namely, a strengthening of the Chinese state via a relief from its financial burden – is still under debate. In any case, these processes can be analysed not only as changing forms of governance in China, but also as new forms of 'governmentalities'.[10]

Drawing on the orientation of the 'governmentality literature' and Michel Foucault's lectures, this chapter treats social assessment as a form of calculative rationality. Foucault's neologism 'governmentality', a semantic combination of 'govern' and 'mentality', comprises the hypothesis of a mutual constitution of technologies of power and forms of knowledge. The concept also indicates a close relationship between the constitution of technologies of power and technologies of self, an alignment of the modern state and the modern subject. Foucault discusses the 'governmentality of the state' as a process of mutual constitution of the exercise of sovereignty over subjects and forms of knowledge (Foucault 1991). His notion of government and the 'governmentality studies' that came into existence in the early 1990s 'displaces a concern for "the state" onto the plurality of governing bodies and the practices, techniques and rationalities through which governing is accomplished and authority exercised' (Dean 1998: 26). The concept of governmentality includes three forms of power that, analytically, form a triangle. Besides sovereign state power in the sense of governance over and through government, Foucault's understanding of power also includes governance through disciplinary institutions usually run by professionals on the basis of particular expertise, and self-governance by individuals themselves (promoted and guided by the state and experts). In the governmentality perspective, modern power is not only negative and repressive, but also positive and productive (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005: 21ff.).

Foucault's approach of tracing the history of modern power in the West under the concept of governmentality is also known as an 'analytics of government'. Unlike most theoretical approaches, an analytics of government pertains to the singularity of ways of governing and conducting ourselves. According to Mitchell Dean (1999) it is a type of study concerned with analysis of the specific conditions under which a particular 'regime of practises' of government emerges, is maintained and changes. Therefore particular practices of government cannot be treated as instances of ideal types and concepts (ibid. 1999: 20–21). Regimes of practices are 'institutional practises, if the latter term means the routinized and ritualized way we do these things in certain places and at certain times. These regimes also include, moreover, the different ways in which these institutional practises can be thought, made into objects of knowledge, and made subject to problematizations' (ibid. 1999: 21) An analytics of a particular regime of practices – here social assessment is part of a particular management routine – analyses the characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices operate, by which they attempt to realize their goals and through which the range of their effects is felt.

Instead of 'applying' Foucault's concept of governmentality to a non-Western or nonliberal context, I use the concept to explore the emergence of social assessment in China and its definition as a specific form of knowledge in the context of a paradigm shift in development thinking – that is, a micro technique embedded

in specific power relations and entangled with a changing self-understanding vis-á-vis the state.

Social Assessment in China: Part of a Broader Agenda of Sustainable Development

China's open door policy made it possible to introduce social assessment knowledge and practices to China. The increasing role of social assessment reflects a strategic shift in development thinking (Gransow and Price 2007: 1). During the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese reform politics centred on economic growth. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese government started to promote a new 'concept of scientific development' suggesting strategic adjustments with respect to problems of development. While economic growth continues as a core task, the new (scientific) development perspective embraces a broader concept of development that includes environmental protection and promotes slogans such as 'focus on people' (Hu 2004) and 'harmonious society'. It comes close to the model of sustainable development, in which economic efficiency, social equity and preservation of nature are considered equally significant interests.[11]

Sustainability strategies are characterized as oriented to future development options; viewing the role of nation states in relation to both supranational and local structures; action- and agent-oriented to a greater degree; and inclusive of affected people in strategy formation and implementation processes. These characteristics diminish the significance of instrumental expert rationality and purely academic analyses unless they are combined with forms of social rationality based on local people's knowledge. Thus, the emergence of social assessment in China can be seen as part of this strategic shift in (Chinese) development thinking, which may also be described as internalizing environmental and social costs instead of externalizing them by aiming primarily at economic growth as before.

As a means more effectively to plan and implement investment projects and development programmes, social assessment is gaining ever greater recognition in China.[12] This applies to both joint international and internal Chinese operations. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and United Nations, as well as bilateral development cooperation institutions and the rapidly growing number of NGOs in China, have begun to promote and perform social assessment. This is true not only for projects with explicit social aims (such as health and education), but also – and especially – for large-scale infrastructure projects such as the construction of railroads, roads, airports and dams.

The publication entitled *Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Studies*, approved by the State Development Planning Commission[13] in December 2001 and released in the spring of 2002 (CIECC 2002), confirmed, and contributed substantially to establishing a policy and legislative framework for social assess-

ment in China. Along with technical, economic, financial and environmental assessment, the guideline lists social assessment as an important component of investment project feasibility studies. This sent a signal indicating that social assessment, like environmental assessment before it, could well become established within a legislative and institutional framework, and consequently be addressed in practical terms as part of large-scale construction and technical cooperation projects. When social assessment came into being alongside other forms of project assessment – technical, financial, economic and (later) environmental – this in itself implied a questioning of the existing project management routine and a problematization of the existing practice of externalizing the social costs of infrastructure projects. Such an identification of problematization is a key starting point for an analytics of government. The techniques and language of social assessment can be used to problematize what is understood as an overly economistic, technocratic procedure for managing investment projects (Dean 1999: 27–28).

The SDPC-endorsed guideline considers social assessment to be an integral part of project assessment. It describes the areas of application and the basic methodology. This is not merely a matter of establishing international standards within China, but also – as in many areas affected by China's joining the World Trade Organization – of creating new legal regulations and institutional infrastructures that function as indirect instruments of control compensating for an anticipated (further) decline in direct state control. The guideline requires social assessment as part of feasibility studies. It considers social assessment necessary for investment projects that entail complex social factors, long-term social impact, notable social benefits, prominent social conflicts and/or major social risks. On the one hand, the guideline refers primarily to projects involving large-scale resettlement or requisition of agricultural land, transportation and key water conservation or mining and oil field projects; on the other hand, it also applies to poverty alleviation projects with explicit public benefits, such as development projects in agricultural areas or projects involving education and public health.

The guideline specifies that social assessment requirements in feasibility studies consist of three parts. The first defines the role and scope of social assessment, the second introduces social assessment's major components and the third overviews procedures and techniques for social assessment. The guideline requires that social assessment include analyses of social impact, the mutual adaptability of the project and its regional social environment, and social risk.

The social impact analysis consists primarily of a study on how the project will affect local residents' income; a study of its impact on their standard of living and quality of life; an analysis of its consequences for local employment; a section on its differing impacts on various stakeholder groups; a study on how the project will affect the interests of disadvantaged groups in the area; an analysis of the impact on local culture, education and public health; a section on how local

infrastructure and social service capacities will be affected; and an analysis of the impact on customs and religious beliefs of local ethnic minorities.

The analysis of the mutual suitability of a project and its regional social environment generally consists of investigating and forecasting different interest groups' attitudes towards the project construction and operation and the degree to which these groups can be expected to become involved. Its aim is to select a participatory method that can guarantee the success of the project. It also assesses and forecasts the attitudes of local organizations at various levels to determine how, and how far, they are likely to support and cooperate with the project. It also examines whether or not locally available technology and the local culture fit in with the project design in a way that ensures sustainable development.

The social risk analysis concerns various social factors that might have a comprehensive, enduring impact on the project and thus represent a possible source of ethnic or religious conflict.[14] It attempts to determine social conditions and settings that could give rise to social risk and to design measures to mitigate them.

Social assessment guidelines are an important step on the way to establishing a legislative and policy framework for social assessment in China. They can help increase transparency in government procedures while also helping to avoid or at least mitigate negative social impacts of project design and maximize benefits by matching to local conditions. Nevertheless, the following measures seem necessary: first, to supplement this guideline, which refers solely to the early stages of project planning, with appropriate guidelines for the project implementation and completion phases; second, to emphasize more clearly that alleviating poverty (or avoiding impoverishment arising from project interventions) is an integral part of the project aims; third, to accord more weight to gender-specific repercussions of projects and their consequences; and fourth, to create the necessary infrastructure for implementing the guidelines in the form of sector-specific guidelines, educational and research institutions, training courses, teaching materials and skilled personnel.

In 2004, the Chinese International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC) published a social assessment manual detailing how to conduct social assessment in investment projects with a focus on participation by project-affected people, especially poor and marginalized groups like minorities and resettlers (CIECC 2004). A revised bilingual edition, published in 2007, defines 'social assessment as an approach and a tool to incorporate social analysis and people's participation into the design and implementation of investment projects. Social assessment examines the potential social impacts arising from such investment projects, assessing the mutual adaptability between these projects and society, analysing the possible social risks, and proposing countermeasures both to eliminate harmful effects and to maximise project benefits' (Gransow and Price 2007: 1).

The manual introduces social assessment as a strategic, action-oriented tool for project assessment. It puts forward the following tasks for social assessment (ibid.: 17):

- Identification and calculation of possible social impacts resulting from the project;
- Identification of factors that could give rise to latent social risks;
- Determination of specific social targets in relation to specific groups of project beneficiaries and project affected people, including gender and minority issues;
- Identification of the contribution of the project to poverty alleviation;
- Identification of opportunities to use participatory development strategies;
- Suggestions for avoiding or reducing negative impacts.

An increasing number of projects have had positive experiences with social assessments and participatory approaches. Some ministries, such as those in charge of water systems and railroads, have begun to apply sector-specific guidelines for social assessment. At least as important are the practical experience and hard lessons drawn from projects that involved no social assessment and, owing to neglect of this dimension, led to health and environmental damage, impoverishment, social dissatisfaction and gender-specific discrimination, which in turn impeded project implementation and generated additional costs. Protests by increasingly rights-conscious Chinese people are on the rise in both rural and urban areas.

In a certain sense, social assessment has gone through a learning process whose realization in China shows that it should be performed throughout all phases of the project cycle, that is, identification, preparation, implementation and completion. In the beginning, social assessment was performed as an ex post evaluation. In such cases, however, it was not possible to intervene in the project proceedings and influence the design, but only to determine and evaluate the consequences ex post. Though this offered useful lessons for future planning, it became clear that the longer it is since the project took place, the more difficult it is to determine which consequences can be ascribed to the project itself and which to other influences external to the project.

The conclusion was drawn that, in the interest of early warning and preventive measures, social assessment needs to start at the earliest possible stage of the project cycle in order to influence project design and thus avoid or reduce potential negative consequences. However, this approach was quickly recognized as insufficient. For one thing, there was a danger that the concrete recommendations existed only on paper and were not always implemented – perhaps because they were not feasible or could not be monitored, or because the necessary funds were simply not available. As a project's social consequences – planned or otherwise – might not be evident until well into the implementation phase, unintended consequences are a normal occurrence during this phase. Chain reactions can be set off and synergy effects activated, lending social development in the project area

an increased speed and dynamism that were difficult to foresee beforehand. The measures proposed in the preparation phase must therefore be reworked in the implementation phase with the use of appropriate information and communication strategies and a corresponding monitoring process for the measures. These experiences strengthened the conviction that social assessment should be applied throughout all the main project phases.

Social Risk Analysis from a Governmental Perspective

While the SDPC social assessment guidelines address social risk analysis as a crucial practice, they do not go into detail about the definition and content of social risks. Social assessment practitioners interested in theoretical and methodological aspects of social risk analysis therefore have to choose from a variety of risk definitions. According to Li Peilin (2004), social risk theories fall into four groups according to their different sources or scientific perspectives:[15]

- The sociological perspective of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens (Beck 1986; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1996);
- The cultural anthropological perspective of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983);
- The perspective of governmental studies according to the Foucault school (Foucault 1991; Dean 1999);
- The perspective of social management theories, which deal with market risks in economic theories (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000).

Here,[16] I briefly introduce the concept of social risk from the perspective of the Foucault school. Risk analysis is of central importance for the theoretical profile of governmental studies, which feature it as a distinctive concept that differs from other definitions of risk analysis. From the perspective of 'governmentality literature', the analysis of risk must rid itself of the opposition between the calculable and the incalculable and instead understand the practices, techniques and rationalities that seek to make the incalculable calculable, and the different ways they do so. As Dean puts it:

> What is important about risk is not risk itself, but the forms of knowledge that make it thinkable from statistics, sociology, and epidemiology to management and accounting, the techniques that discover it from the calculus of probabilities to the interview, the social technologies that seek to govern it from risk screening, case-management and social insurance to situational crime prevention, and the political rationalities and programmes that deploy it, from those that dreamt of a welfare state to those that imagine an advanced liberal society of prudential individuals and communities (Dean 1998: 25).

Here one may add those political rationalities and programmes that expect voluntary commitment towards a semi-authoritarian state that promises to adhere to socialist ideals.[17]

If risk is seen as a form of calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals and populations, then social assessment can be defined as a specific mode, amongst others, of calculating social risks. A key element of social assessment in China focuses on social impacts and risks associated with development projects and programmes, with one major risk being displacement arising from land acquisition and resettlement. Other social risks may include, for example, unaffordable services, job losses, social or geographic barriers to accessing benefits, health risks from increased traffic or pollution, or loss of social/cultural capital. Which kind of knowledge is needed in social assessment? How social risks are defined has strong implications for how government is exercised.

Social assessment can therefore be seen as a particular governmental technology that, instead of neglecting social risks, aims to make them a predictable, identifiable, quantifiable and calculable reality. It may in fact represent at least two different types of governmental technology: from above (technologies of the state) and from below (technologies of citizenship) (Dean 1998: 35; Lemke 2000: 33, 36). These different approaches are manifested in the institutional framework of project organization.

Comparable with Ewald's (1991: 201) classic analysis of insurance as a governmental technology that defines and calculates social risks in specific ways, social assessment is a technology that defines social issues related to development projects and programmes as calculable risks.[18] The very process of generating (new) knowledge about social impact and risks is decisive for defining and assessing social risks but also represents certain specific governmental technologies.

Social Assessment as Governmental Technologies: A Preliminary Typology

The central concern here is to analyse social assessment as a regime of practices, a method to govern and be governed as part of the project management routine of investment projects. Social assessment, as a process of generating knowledge about social impacts and risks arising from development interventions, depends – at least to some degree – on the question of whose knowledge, needs and perception of risk are included or excluded in this process. To start with, social risks, from the perspective of the project's decision-makers, relate to possible obstacles to the project or delays that may cause budget constraints. Those who are negatively affected, on the other hand, experience social risks as external dangers to their way of life. Clearly, what constitutes a social risk frequently differs among project stakeholders, who may not all be participants in all decision-making pro-

cesses. Depending on specific impacts (or specific ways in which these impacts are perceived), project-affected people perceive social risks differently.

Let us take the example of roads bisected by a new railway and thus rendered impassable. Lack of tunnels or bridges can hinder peasants from accessing their fields, or impede national minority peoples trying to reach specific cultural sites. Children might have to take a much longer route to school, which can induce anxiety in them or their families. The elderly or people carrying loads on their backs may find it harder to get to markets. Women fetching water might be affected, and so on. Here, different perceptions depend on a gender-specific division of labour and different modes of using inner and outer spaces in the household environment. Thus risk does not have a single objective and scientific definition, but rather a variety of definitions stressing the objective or subjective aspects of a project intervention to different degrees. Experts and project owners will probably utilize a rationality different from that of the project-affected people. Social assessment, as a particular regime of government, may likewise represent very different combinations of power and knowledge. Three examples of governmental technologies in assessing social dimensions and social risks of investment projects can be identified. This preliminary typology comprises paternalistic, neoliberal and participatory approaches to social assessment in China.

Paternalistic Approaches

Paternalistic approaches entail decision making and risk assessment by officials on behalf of affected people, without their participation. In the first example, taken from a transportation project, resettled households – already relocated several times – were compensated with comparatively large new houses; however, the area of the house plot was reduced. Local cadres responsible for the resettlement of project-affected people were taking into account the burden that multiple resettlements placed on project-affected people and thought to please the households by providing them with extra-large houses. But because different members of the affected households were not questioned during the design stage of the project, it was not discovered until the project's implementation that women in the resettled households were discontent because they no longer had enough land to raise chickens and pigs – which had been their primary source of income. The kind of compensation they received for their loss of land and houses left them unable to generate and maintain the income and living standard they had had before resettlement.

This is a typical case of the paternalistic approach to social assessment. Comprehensive knowledge about a project's design and its possible impacts is decisive for the contingent outcomes for each project-affected household and each of its members. In this case, lower household income may result in a lack of money to

send all the children to school – the first casualty of this usually being the young girls. In my personal experience with social assessments, local cadres responsible for resettlement activities are frequently of the opinion that they know best how to define risks and countermeasures for the local population. They think in patterns of hierarchies dominated by men and cannot see the value added by including the voices of women or poor people – instead, they disregard their input, viewing them as social groups with little education or knowledge. Thus, the male-dominated social hierarchies in which resettlement activities are normally embedded can neglect local and gender-specific knowledge that is crucial to formulating an inclusive framework for assessing and managing social risks. If officials taking the paternalistic approach fail to address the needs of project-affected people appropriately, development interventions may easily result in processes of impoverishment and discontent among resettled households.

Neoliberal Approaches

Neoliberal approaches to social assessment externalize the social costs of development interventions and consider social impacts irrelevant to decision making. In resettlement, for example, any social risk is relegated to those displaced and the responsibility of government is limited to providing cash compensation rather than other measures to address social vulnerabilities arising from displacement. But for various reasons, cash compensation may be insufficient to guarantee the undiminished economic and social living standards of those affected. Not being included in the decision-making process to determine forms of compensation may produce feelings of discontent and injustice on the part of people who have lost their land, been resettled, or had to deal with other negative impacts of development interventions. Therefore, my second example concerns project-affected households receiving cash compensation for their project-induced losses.

In cases of cash compensation, the compensated households can themselves decide how to use the money. Affected households often use the compensation money to build new, better houses. No one other than the household itself is now responsible. The compensation money can turn out to be insufficient to build the new, better house. Should the household need to supplement its building project with its savings, then its funds for income generation and reserves intended for social security are no longer available in the event of illness or other unforeseen events threatening income. Thus, although a household may live in a better quality house, its members' quality of life – in terms of livelihoods and social security – has declined because their lives are now less secure (cf. H. Li 2000: 246ff.). Nevertheless, this example depicts risks that the household undertakes of its own accord – in contrast to households resettled by government or collective agencies

that take on the responsibility while the household members experience new social dangers imposed upon them.[19]

In general, development interventions lead to an intentional acceleration in development processes. This applies not only to economic growth but also, similarly, to processes of social polarization and the production of social risks. Those people who already possess a certain amount of material capital, information, education, social status and/or social networks and contacts are able to position themselves favourably in the event of development interventions and profit from such projects directly and indirectly in various ways. Conversely, development interventions can cause those who are relatively ill-equipped with material, organizational and educational resources to fall even deeper into poverty unless corresponding countermeasures are undertaken. Social risks are highly dependent on the concrete situation, its dynamics and the varying perceptions of risk and opportunities.

Impoverishment as a consequence of project-induced farmland requisition and involuntary resettlement is one of the most consequential social risks of project interventions. Sometimes the opportunity is taken to split the household by building two houses, one with the compensation money and the other with construction materials taken from the old house. If the new houses are located on what will become a shopping street or across from a site where a station will be built, the household can expect additional economic benefits. However, people who lack significant savings and had only small dwellings, and therefore received only slight compensation, are not in a position to use resettlement measures to their benefit. On the contrary, they would probably have to accumulate debt by borrowing money to build the house.

When farmland is taken over for construction projects, those whose technical and social skills do not primarily depend on the land, or who have already made the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural employment, will adapt more easily than those whose subsistence depends on farming for reasons of, say, age or lack of education. These are precisely the people who can end up in extremely perilous situations if they unable to establish new livelihoods. Women in agrarian areas are often particularly affected by the requisition of farmland because many farming families display a gender-specific division of labour, with husbands tending to pursue non-agricultural activities while wives work in the fields.

Project-induced resettlements present greater risks for households headed by women. Under normal to favourable conditions, adequate compensation payments allow a house of equal or higher value to be built. However, households headed by women are frequently among the poorest. Compensation for shabby housing is usually low, and these households are not able to draw upon the savings needed to build new houses. Moreover, women often lack skills needed to help in construction activities. Women-led households also have far greater difficulty ac-

tivating the neighbourhood social networks that could support their construction projects, as patrilocal residence traditions mean they generally do not come from the village where they live. For the same reason, it is hard for these households to provide reciprocal services for projects such as house building, as is customary among men long established in the area. In general, women-led households do not have at their disposal the material or social capital needed to take advantage of resettlement situations (Gransow 2007).

Moreover, compensation can be paid to either a resettled rural collective or an individual household, which creates different patterns of responsibility transferred from the state to the collective or individual. Here the changing understanding of risk – in which the risk is often transferred to the people affected – is a function of transformation in modalities of governing, which can generate new patterns of market competition within collectives and between individual households, shaped by existing local power relations and access to necessary information and other resources. This perspective comes closest to the concerns of governmentality studies (Lemke 2000: 37) and may be described as a neoliberal approach to social assessment.

Participatory Approaches

A participatory approach, as a third example of governmental technologies, can serve very different objectives in project management. It might appear as an instrument for achieving transparency and public participation fostering acceptance of the project, or, alternatively, as a Trojan horse that might introduce unwanted aspects of grass-roots democracy and hinder implementation. In any case, by combining expert knowledge with the local knowledge of project-affected people, as well as scientific with social rationality, social assessment can help identify and define social risks, avoid or reduce undesirable side effects, and anchor alternative development options in the design of projects and programmes.

Compared to assessment methods that rely on experts alone, participatory approaches have the advantage of making social assessment more complete, comprehensive and accurate while also increasing the applicability of its findings. Applying participatory procedures enhances development sustainability by ensuring that projects strive to meet local expectations, even as it fosters a sense of ownership among the community from the outset.

The function of a participatory approach varies depending on the project type. In agricultural development, for example, beneficiaries' participation is crucial to the project's realization, which may require changes to agricultural or marketing practices, among others. Selecting households to participate in the project is an essential part of the procedure. Meanwhile, in projects such as reservoir or transport projects, where affected people's participation is not necessarily a prerequi-

site for building a reservoir or a railway as such, participation is a tool that enables better design, siting and distribution of benefits. Although not always strictly necessary for achieving such a project's economic objectives, participation is a way to identify the needs of the project-affected people and find satisfying solutions that might cost less than those arrived at without participation. Participatory approaches are also important in finding successful new income sources and mechanisms to provide social security and livelihood sustainability following land loss, particularly among previously agricultural communities. Finally, such approaches also contribute to sustainable social and economic solutions that have greater potential to continue even after the project ends.

An agenda of sustainable development not only relies on the expertise of environmental and social assessments but also implies broad understanding and participation from citizens. No participatory mode of governance is self-evident in the governance of large-scale projects even in Western democracies, let alone in the context of semi-authoritarian China. Yet the potential of participatory social assessments goes beyond the framework of single projects. Participatory assessment includes participation not just by people directly affected by a project but also by a broader public. Due to Chinese citizens' growing concern about the negative environmental and social impacts of infrastructure investments, public interest in these projects is increasing and can expand rapidly via the Internet.

As infrastructure investments grew ever more common in urban areas, the concept of 'public interest' became a verbal battlefield. Local governments have acquired land in the public interest and then offered the land for commercial use, outraging residents who lost their homes and often had to leave their familiar neighbourhoods. Residents' resistance to public facilities that could damage the local environment or cause health risks to local residents is another example. 'Not-in-my-backyard' (aka NIMBY) protests against incinerators, for example, have resulted in local officials encouraging public discourse about where to place the unwanted facilities. Public participation is increasing but needs transparent information. Environmental and other public interest NGOs are helping to create a public space for citizens' participation (Yan Y. 2011), but so far, lack of independence and resources prevents Chinese civil society from having a stronger impact on the political and accountability structure of the state (Chan 2013: 197).

A strong civil society is an essential prerequisite for productive social assessment. Participative strategies for providing services and infrastructure may result in more sustainable investment, such as infrastructure relevant to poor people's needs and priorities. The shift in China's national poverty reduction strategy after 2001 ushered in participatory approaches to assess and address the main causes of chronic poverty. This emphasis on participatory, bottom-up procedures is also supporting a stronger civil society at the local level.

Besides directly improving efficiency and effectiveness of project investments, public participation in infrastructure projects can provide opportunities for project clients, users and affected communities to increase government accountability. Participation in infrastructure programmes provides opportunities for participants to learn about their basic rights and develop negotiation and organizational skills (Plummer 2000: 27). Of the three types of social assessment addressed here, participatory approaches come closest to an understanding of governmentality concerned with sustainable development. As such, they can be understood as ongoing political and social learning processes that are altering traditional political fields.

Conclusion

From the perspective of an analytics of government, the three types of social assessment presented here differ in terms of their ways of thinking and questioning; ways of acting, intervening and directing; and ways of forming subjects, selves and identities.

Forms of Rationality

As has been shown, the main body of knowledge supporting paternalistic approaches to social assessment consists primarily of the experience of local cadres and the technical and economic knowledge of experts. Neoliberal approaches are predominately informed by expert knowledge from different disciplines and geared towards smooth preparation and implementation of the project. They externalize all 'additional' social or environmental costs except those required by law. Participatory approaches, in contrast, rely on both expert and local knowledge, including that of a broad variety of stakeholders. The different knowledge bases of these three types of social assessment correspond to different ways of defining and distributing social risks and project benefits among various project stakeholders.

Techniques and Practices

Regarding techniques and practices, paternalistic approaches to social assessment follow top-down routines – technologies of the state – combined with lack of transparency in project management and short-term disclosure of information regarding social impacts such as loss of land or housing. In neoliberal and participatory approaches to social assessment, top-down and bottom-up routines are identifiable in various combinations and degrees, depending on the relevant

laws, safeguard policies and monitoring procedures. Distinctly participatory approaches include more bottom-up elements, that is, technologies of citizenship.

Identities and Agencies

Paternalistic approaches to social assessment envision project-affected people as subjects who are obedient to the authority of the government, normally have little education and are dependent on the will and benevolence of the authorities. In cases of resistance from below – especially from recalcitrant 'nail households'[20] – coercive measures can be used to realize the project in time. In neoliberal approaches to social assessment, the local people affected by a project are presupposed to be individual or collective subjects who will themselves deal with the various social outcomes of the project's interventions, and who normally are in a position to do so. The subject envisioned in participatory approaches is a responsible citizen able to negotiate consensual solutions between various groups of stakeholders. Specific programmes might focus on the empowerment of vulnerable groups affected by project interventions.

Designing Projects Differently

As governmental technologies, these three types of social assessment relate roughly to different stages in the transformation from government to governance and to the paradigm shift in development thinking that was part of this transformation. Embedded in a broader context of authoritarian governmentality under one-party rule, technologies of the state are increasingly combined with technologies of citizenship, problematizing the distinction between purely liberal and purely authoritarian governmentality (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 6). In reality, the three types of social assessment may not appear in their pure form, but in joint or mixed forms of two or three types of governmentality technologies. These three different approaches to social assessment show that the exercise of social assessment in itself is not a guarantee of effectively 'turning risks into opportunities'. When undertaken in the context of paternalistic or neoliberal governmental technologies, social assessment does not necessarily result in satisfactory solutions for affected households. On the other hand, it holds huge potential for investment projects designed differently so that they include the needs of vulnerable local groups and use participatory approaches to explore opportunities for, and distribute benefits to, local people who otherwise are mainly negatively affected.

To really tap this potential, a more general framework of sustainability strategies is needed. It must include both transparency in project planning and a participation strategy to encourage project-affected people to act on and fully realize the opportunities offered by such an inclusive project design. Only under these

circumstances can social assessment be seen as a sociopolitical tool – a governmental technology – that effects change and development without ignoring the needs and views of local people experiencing the impacts of development interventions. This does not automatically imply that social and political stability will be fostered in the short term, as the process of designing a participation strategy may expose hidden interests or conflicts among various project stakeholders. In the long term, though, such a communication and participation strategy definitely constitutes a firmer basis for social and political stability in Chinese society.

Notes

1. See Environmental Impact Assessment Law 2002. More recent guidelines on social assessment have only been formulated as part of EIA or environmental protection. For the situation in China see http://www.erm.com/Analysis-and-Insight/ERM-Publications/New-requirements-for-stakeholder-consultation-and-social-impact-assessment-in-China/, retrieved 11 February 2013; for Chinese investments in foreign countries see http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml (English version) and http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfg/zcfb/dwtz/201302/1735624_1.html, (Chinese version), retrieved 28 October 2013.
2. In 2010 a 92-year-old man and his 68-year-old son in Lianyungang (Jiangsu province) set themselves on fire to protest the demolition of the family's pig farm by the local government. The farm was torn down, the son died and the father suffered severe burns. That year a farmer in Wuhan (Hubei province) also made headlines for firing improvised rockets to repel demolition teams (Guo and Jin 2010: 5; see also Yan J. 2011; Yao, Zhang and Zheng 2010). For more elaborated analyses of infrastructure project-related protests see Ying 2001; Mertha 2008.
3. As detailed below, Foucault (1991) discussed the 'governmentality of the state' as a process of mutual constitution of the exercise of sovereignty over subjects and forms of knowledge.
4. Governance here is understood following the definition of Jude Howell: '…we define governance as the totality of processes and arrangements, both formal and informal, by which power and public authority are distributed and regulated. The study of governance therefore encompasses the analysis of formal political institutions such as the government, the military, and the judiciary at national and local levels, as well as informal processes of rule such as patron-clientism and networks. It embraces not only the study of states, but also the arrangements and processes within political and civil society, the relations between these, and in turn their linkages with the state' (Howell 2004: 2).
5. After the financial reforms in 1994, local governments had to take more responsibility for financing public goods. Attracting foreign direct investment was a favorite channel to generate the necessary resources.
6. The concept of the 'third sector' here is used to describe those institutional segments of industrial societies that differ from market and state institutions, e.g., nongovernmental organizations and nonprofit organizations.
7. The techno-scientific administrative Party-State here stands for the central planning mentality, which is still partially in evidence. This encompasses technocratic reasoning and the imperatives of scientific socialism.
8. As of 1 July 2012, Guangdong province loosened its registration requirements for NGOs so that a single registration procedure with the local Civil Affairs Bureau should suffice. This simplified

process was widely viewed as a sign of liberalization and openness toward civil society organizations in the south of China. However, the single registration procedure seems to apply only to NGOs that are seen as pursuing the sole objective of providing social services and social work. Other organizations, e.g., migrant worker NGOs, have been treated differently and are strictly monitored and constrained (Gransow and Zhu 2014).

9. Cf. Pei 1994: 50; Unger and Chan 1995: 38; Howell 2004: 162ff.; Spires 2011.
10. The concept of governmentality has been applied to various Chinese contexts (e.g., Litzinger 2004; Sigley 2006; Jeffreys 2006, 2009; Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Hoffman 2006).
11. This model was agreed upon at the 1992 World Environmental and Development Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It was also incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals passed by the UN General Assembly in September of 2000. (http://www.developmentgoals.org).
12. For a more substantial introduction to the development of social assessment in China, please refer to Gransow and Price (2007).
13. The State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) merged into the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2003.
14. The formulation in the guideline suggests that the focus is less on risks for project-affected people than on risks to the project. The context is that social conflicts caused by a project may have an impact on the implementation of the project. A translation problem in the paragraph on 'social risks' renders the Chinese version of the 'Guideline' different from the English version, in that the Chinese version speaks of ethnic or religious conflicts (SDPC (now NDRC) 2002: 75), whereas the English version is talking about 'industry-agriculture conflicts' (ibid.: 91).
15. Note that the references given here differ from Li P. (2004). Deborah Lupton (1999) similarly discusses the cultural/symbolic perspective (Douglas/Wildavsky), the risk society (Ulrich Beck) and the governmentality perspective (Foucault school) as three major, distinctive theoretical approaches to risk.
16. For a preliminary comparison between Ulrich Beck's concept of the risk society and the approach of the Foucault school (with regard to China analysis) please refer to Gransow (2003); for a general comparison between the risk concepts of Mary Douglas, Ulrich Beck and the Foucault school, see Lupton (1999).
17. In his later writings, Mitchell Dean extended the original focus on liberal democracies to authoritarian societies, looking into the knowledge and technologies on which understandings of individual and collective norms are based (Dean 1999; Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 4).
18. In the sense that both are possible applications of a technology of risk, that is, formalized practices of a rationality informed by the calculus of probabilities (Ewald 1991: 199).
19. This illustrates Luhmann's argument that social risks and social dangers cannot be clearly isolated from one another (Luhmann 1991: 117).
20. 'Nail household' is the English translation of the Chinese term ‚dingzihu' and literally means households that stick out like nails. The term stands for households that refuse to move out during demolition.

References

Beck, U. 1986. *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Beck, U., A. Giddens and S. Lash. 1996. *Reflexive Modernisierung. Eine Kontroverse*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Cernea, M. (ed.). 1985. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chan, K. 2013. 'The Rise of Civil Society in China', in E. Florence and P. Defraigne (eds), *Towards a New Development Paradigm in Twenty-First Century China: Economy, Society and Politics*. London: Routledge, pp. 179–202.

China International Engineering Consulting Corporation (CIECC) [Zhongguo guoji gongcheng zixun gongsi]. 2002. '*Touzi xiangmu kexingxing yanjiu zhinan bianxiezu*' [Guideline for investment project feasibility studies], 2 vols (Chinese and English). Beijing: China Electric Power Press.

———. 2004. *Zhongguo touzi xiangmu shehui pingjia zhinan* [Guidelines on social assessment in investment projects]. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Dean, M. 1998. 'Risk, Calculable and Incalculable', *Soziale Welt* 49: 25–42.

———. 1999. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage.

Douglas, M. and A. Wildavsky. 1983. *Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Ecological Dangers*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ministry of Environment. 2002. *Environmental Impact Assessment Law of the People's Republic of China*. (Chinese). Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi Press. Retrieved 31 August 2014 from http://api.commissiemer.nl/docs/os/sea/legislation/china_s_ea_legislation_03.pdf.

Ewald, F. 1991. 'Insurance and Risk', in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 197–210.

Foucault, M. 1991. 'Governmentality', in G. Burchell., C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 87–104.

Gransow, B. 2003. 'Social Assessment in China: Action Learning for the Risk Society?' *Berliner China-Hefte* 25: 30–43.

———. 2007. 'The Risk of Impoverishment: The Social Impact of Involuntary Resettlement in Rural China', *China aktuell* 36(2): 40–65.

Gransow, B. and S. Price (eds). 2007. *Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China: Turning Risks Into Opportunities*. Beijing: China Planning Press.

Gransow, B. and Zhu, J. 2014. 'Labour Rights and Beyond - How Migrant Worker NGOs Negotiate Urban Spaces in the Pearl River Delta', *Population, Space and Place* (forthcoming); DOI: 10.1002/psp.1894.

Greenhalgh, S. and E.A. Winckler. 2005. *Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Guo, R. and Z. Jin. 2010. 'Rocket-firing Farmer Lands Unprecedented Compensation', *China Daily*, 9 July, 5.

Hoffman, L. 2006. 'Autonomous Choices and Patriotic Professionalism: On Governmentality in Late-socialist China', *Economy and Society* 35(4): 550–70.

Holzmann, R. and S. Jorgensen. 2000. *Social Risk Management: A New Conceptual Framework for Social Protection, and Beyond*. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0006. Retrieved 17 February 2005 from http://go.worldbank.org/OD43KRXZ60.

Howell, J. (ed.). 2004. *Governance in China*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hu, A. 2004. *Zhongguo: Xin fazhanguang* [China: New development strategy]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People's Press.

Jeffreys, E. 2006. 'Governing Buyers of Sex in the People's Republic of China', *Economy and Society* 35(4): 571–93.

———. 2009. *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*. London: Routledge.

Jeffreys, E. and G. Sigley. 2009. 'Governmentality, Governance and China', in E. Jeffreys (ed.), *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*. London: Routledge, pp. 1–23.

Lemke, T. 2000. 'Neoliberalismus, Staat und Selbsttechnologien. Ein kritischer Überblick über die Governmentality Studies', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 1(41): 31–47.

Li, H. 2000. 'Population Displacement and Resettlement in the Three Gorges Reservoir Area of the Yangtze River Central China', Ph.D. thesis. Leeds: University of Leeds.

Li, P. 2004. 'Cong xiandai shehui dao fengxian shehui' [From modern society to risk society], in H. Zheng (ed.), *Zhongguo shehui fazhan baogao 2004, zou xiang gengjia anquan de shehui* [Research reports on China's social development 2004: Moving towards a more secure society]. Beijing: Chinese People's University Press, pp. 390–401.

Litzinger, R. 2004. 'The Mobilization of "Nature": Perspectives from North-west Yunnan', *The China Quarterly* 178: 488–504.

Luhmann, N. 1991. *Soziologie des Risikos*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Lupton, D. 1999. *Risk*. London: Routledge.

Mertha, A. 2008. *China's Water Warriors*. London: Cornell University Press.

Pei, M. 1994. *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Plummer, J. 2000. *Municipalities and Community Participation: A Sourcebook for Capacity Building*. London: Earthscan.

Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations 1998, issued by the State Council on October 25.

Sigley, G. 2006. 'Chinese Governmentalities: Government, Governance and the Socialist Market Economy', *Economy and Society* 35(4): 487–508.

Spires, A. 2011, 'Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: Understanding the Survival of China's Grassroots NGOs', *American Journal of Sociology* 117(1): 1–45.

Unger, J. and A. Chan. 1995. 'China, Corporatism and the East Asian Model', *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 29: 29–53.

Yan, J. 2011. 'Demolitions Cause Most Social Unrest', *China Daily*, 27 June, 4.

Yan, Y. 2011. 'NIMBY: Environmental Civic Society and Social Fairness in China', in T. Fung, S. Lesbirel and K. Lam (eds), *Facility Siting in the Asia-Pacific: Perspectives on Knowledge Production and Application*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 257–72.

Yao, Y., L. Zhang and Q. Zheng. 2010. 'Suicide Climbs among Elderly: Increasing Medical Costs and Relocation from Family Seen as Causes for Surge', *China Daily*, 28 September, 5.

Ying, X. 2001. *Dahe Yimin Shangfang de Gushi* [The story of the Dahe Dam]. Beijing: Sanlian Press.

8

Participatory Monitoring of Development Projects in China

Xiao Jianliang and David Arthur

China's regulatory requirements[1] are increasingly aligned with international expectations of public consultation during project impact assessment processes. However, a lack of experience in actual implementation and follow-through, combined with a history of 'command-and-control'[2] governance, has presented a challenge to effective public consultation and participation for development projects. Despite this, some successful examples show how civil society can be involved in and beneficially contribute to the implementation of significant infrastructure projects in China. One such example is a major infrastructure development project in the Chongqing municipal area, in which the public participated in the monitoring of environmental and social management through a committee of local advisers and several public workshops. This case shows that projects can benefit when implementing agencies understand how their projects affect communities, and communicate effectively with locally affected people. The benefits can include better management of time schedules and costs, as well as increased public support and improved outcomes that better meet people's needs.

In this chapter we examine the rationale, methodology and procedures adopted for this case study in participatory monitoring, and explore the efforts to overcome the initial reluctance both local government staff and the project developers expressed towards this new mode of operating. We evaluate the outcomes of the public involvement by comparing the approach with traditional monitoring schemes; assess constraints to greater programme effectiveness; make suggestions for improvement; and discuss possible broader applications for projects elsewhere in China.

Since the 1980s the World Bank's project lending programme has required detailed project plans that identify, minimize and mitigate adverse environmental and social impacts, with systematic monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of mitigation measures during project execution. China's government is increasingly attributing political and economic significance to environmental and social issues, driven by mounting public awareness of such issues. Several high-profile events in recent years have drawn grave public concern and scrutiny, including nationally significant capital investment projects that were eventually suspended or relocated due to public protests.[3] Against this growing concern, China's leadership has increasingly stressed the importance of more effective planning, public accountability and civil participation in pursuit of a 'harmonious'[4] and 'well-off'[5] society. The eleventh and now twelfth five-year plans encourage such approaches. Recognizing this changing emphasis, the World Bank office in Beijing initiated a programme of participatory monitoring of the environmental and social performance of a set of urban environmental and transportation projects from 2003 to 2007. The programme was intended to strengthen the effectiveness of project monitoring, make project proponents more accountable to communities that may be affected and provide new opportunities for affected people to participate directly in the development process, promoting a partnership approach to local problem-solving.

Participation is increasingly recognized as an integral part of the monitoring and evaluation process, since it offers new ways of assessing and learning from change that are more inclusive and more responsive to the needs and aspirations of those most directly affected. Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) is a process by which stakeholders at various levels monitor or evaluate a particular project, programme or policy; share control over the content, process and results of the PM&E activity; and engage in identifying and taking corrective actions (World Bank 2010). PM&E is geared towards not only measuring the effectiveness of a project, but also building local ownership and empowering beneficiaries by actively engaging primary stakeholders, building accountability and transparency, and taking corrective actions to improve performance and outcomes. Since the 1990s the World Bank has widely adopted PM&E programmes in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Typically such programmes encompass poverty alleviation, agriculture and health projects, which are vitally concerned with distribution of benefits to end users.

In China, a pilot PM&E programme was initially developed under the Chongqing Urban Environmental Project (2003–2005) and was later extended to include the Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project (CSCIIP) and the Liaoning Medium Cities Infrastructure and Transportation Project (2006–2007). This chapter focuses on the findings of the participatory monitoring programme for the CSCIIP.

Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation of the CSCIIP

The CSCIIP was intended to support emerging small cities within the jurisdictional area of the Chongqing Municipality by improving efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of infrastructure services to accommodate the municipality's rapid urban growth. Vital infrastructural services comprised water supply, flood protection, road construction and environmental sanitation infrastructure. In total, approximately 3,300 households, distributed over several sites and populated by some 13,700 people, were due to be affected by land acquisition and house demolition associated with the project (World Bank 2005). The project was initiated in June 2005 and completed by June 2012.

The PM&E programme was developed based on experience drawn from a pilot project by Environmental Resources Management, a consultant for the World Bank's Chongqing Urban Environmental Project in 2003. This pilot project had an important demonstration effect, showing that a well-selected Advisory Committee could facilitate improved formal and informal communications between key project stakeholders – including affected communities, government departments and the project developers – which other approaches had not been able to accomplish. The improved communications assisted in identifying issues, building understanding and facilitating smooth project implementation, enabling timelines to be met. This pilot experience helped local government and project developers in the CSCIIP area overcome their initial reluctance to engage in what they perceived as risky new operating procedures that would bring them into uncomfortable contact with local people, something they had not been familiar with under previous command-and-control procedures.

The CSCIIP PM&E programme commenced in October 2006, was implemented over the following year and resulted in positive outcomes. It involved a number of activities (Xiao, Touzel and Arthur 2008). First, the CSCIIP Project Management Office (PMO) selected three core members of an Advisory Committee to oversee the entire planning, execution and management of the PM&E programme in all CSCIIP project cities. The core members had worked with the CSCIIP PMO and the World Bank consultant on the earlier Chongqing Urban Environmental Project and had prior PM&E experience from this project. On the previous project, they had accepted an invitation from the PMO, sent to a wide range of potential committee members, to represent the various stakeholders in the project and the local communities it would impact. On that project, these core members had become the driving force behind the success of the Advisory Committee. Second, the committee's core team undertook an initial site reconnaissance visit and community consultation to identify key social and environmental issues, as well as to screen candidates to represent the community on the Advisory Committee.

Third, the committee's core members selected suitable community representatives to become members of a local advisory committee and convened an initial meeting to introduce the PM&E programme. The World Bank consultant conducted PM&E training for committee members so that all of them could understand the programme's methodology and expectations and appreciate their individual and collective roles. Fourth, the Advisory Committee reviewed project documents and site investigations for specific aspects of the project. For each meeting between Advisory Committee and the public, the committee focused on different aspects of the project and consulted with project-affected people through site visits and public workshops to identify and discuss local community concerns related to the given aspects. The consultation was a two-way communication process – project information was distributed to the affected communities, and community concerns were gathered by the Advisory Committee. Fifth, the committee liaised with project developers and relevant government departments to consider the findings from the site visit and public consultations. A Participatory Monitoring Report detailing community concerns was prepared and distributed to the CSCIIP PMO, the project developer, Advisory Committee members, the consultant and the World Bank.

Finally, the Advisory Committee convened meetings with representatives of the project proponent and local communities to discuss public concerns, seek solutions and develop remedial action plans. The process stipulated that these meetings be held in a positive environment, where those affected could propose realistic, implementable solutions to their problems for consideration by the project proponents, rather than focusing solely on complaints. The committee provided feedback on the results of these meetings to all parties, including external resettlement monitoring agencies, through meeting minutes that also reported actions that each party had agreed to undertake. The committee and the community representatives conveyed the information to the affected communities and arranged additional meetings to identify related issues and report on the progress of implementation of the agreed actions.

Figure 8.1 presents the CSCIIP participatory monitoring programme. The Advisory Committee – the main body responsible for implementing participatory monitoring activities – included three core committee members and six to eight representatives of each project city drawn from among people affected by the project, community leaders, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), schoolteachers and representatives of women's and youth associations. One of the core committee members, who came from an influential local environmental protection NGO, was selected by the other committee members as their chairperson. Other members had been screened through the initial site visit and public consultation process conducted by the core members and approved by the CSCIIP PMO. The committee aimed to include people who were representative of each affected community – that is, affected people who were willing and able to voice concerns

and opinions on behalf of the community, could articulate community concerns and could work with other Advisory Committee members to develop potential solutions to problems. In several project cities, local school principals were selected because they had thorough understanding of community concerns and were well placed to pass project information back and forth between the committee and community.

Figure 8.1. The participatory monitoring programme

Advisory Committee Meetings assembled the committee members, other representatives of affected communities, project developers (the water and road companies) and responsible government authorities (normally including city deputy mayors and officers of Bureaus of Land Resources, Planning and Construction, and Environmental Protection). During the meetings, community representatives raised concerns about social and environmental issues that were then discussed among meeting participants. This gave government representatives and project developers the opportunity to offer explanations or initiate potential solutions to address issues of concern.

As indicated above, rather than trying to tackle issues with the whole project at each Advisory Committee Meeting, the normal approach was to focus on specific aspects of the project at each meeting, ensuring that a community's major concerns were discussed and dealt with at the earliest opportunity. A total of three Advisory Committee Meetings were held, each in a different project city, and five Participatory Monitoring Reports were prepared, generally covering all project infrastructure components.

The Advisory Committee members were compensated as individual experts at an agreed daily rate, in line with normal Chinese customs. The World Bank consultant managed the payments to ensure independence from both the PMO and the project developers, thus insuring against any risk of interference by these powerful parties.

Programme Outcomes

The participatory monitoring programme had broad coverage, in terms of public consultation. It actively involved key groups, maintaining ongoing communi-

cations with project-affected communities, relevant government departments, project developers and construction contractors. More than a thousand community members were consulted during the participatory monitoring process.

By promoting government information disclosure, the participatory monitoring process improved the government's image among the affected communities. Over the course of the monitoring, all participating parties had opportunities to share information. Affected communities benefited from the increased transparency arising from discussion of government policies and regulations, as well as strategies for their implementation, at public meetings. The Advisory Committee Meetings gave project-affected people's representatives opportunities to discuss policy details with local government officials, especially in relation to land acquisition and resettlement, the focus of most conflicts. Under the previous, traditional approaches to resettlement management, the details of many government decisions were inaccessible to the affected communities.

Participatory monitoring also helped to solve community conflicts through the timely address of community concerns and grievances. Through consultation with the project-affected people, problems and grievances associated with project implementation were identified, strategies for addressing and overcoming them were discussed and recommendations were made to the appropriate bodies. For example, one component of the project had experienced several stoppages due to local community action prior to the implementation of the participatory monitoring programme. These stoppages caused lengthy delays in the construction schedule. Once established, the Advisory Committee found that the community action had resulted from a misunderstanding over resettlement policies. Developers and government had provided insufficient formal information to the people affected, which, compounded by rumour and misinformation, resulted in these communities' resistance. Through the mediation of the Advisory Committee as part of the participatory monitoring process, the parties reached a mutual understanding and resolved the problems. In this way, the project implementation benefited from improved understanding among all parties and the forum provided for project proponents to hear and resolve disputes, as these elements reduced project conflicts and delays.

Establishing a formal channel of communication between project-affected communities, local government agencies and project developers helped to build mutual understanding and trust among all parties. The Advisory Committee organized a number of consultation meetings, interviews and forums among the project-affected people to identify and document their concerns and issues, which they summarized and reported to the project developers and government staff. Advisory Committee workshops also brought together representatives of these interested parties, facilitating face-to-face opportunities to discuss possible means of resolving issues brought into the open. Although some of the issues raised concerned regulatory and institutional matters that could not be readily addressed – for example, the discrepancy between government-controlled rural and urban

compensation rates for asset loss – project-affected groups tended to be more cooperative when government authorities kept them informed about issues that would affect their lives. The monitoring programme played a key role in this regard by promoting communication between the project developers and local communities and thereby building mutual trust that ultimately achieved broader community support, smoother project implementation and better project outcomes.

The participatory monitoring approach has, in most respects, generated a win-win situation and benefited all parties. World Bank consultant's talks with the affected communities, the responsible government officers, the CSCIIP PMO and the project developers indicated, contrary to some initial concern, that they now welcomed the PM&E programme and were generally satisfied with the way it had been managed and the outcomes achieved. The project-affected communities were typically among the most vulnerable groups within their local society and found the participatory monitoring approach very effective in allowing their voices and concerns to be heard and addressed. In the 2000s, when the central government was trying to promote a harmonious society, institutional arrangements at the time created few opportunities for public participation in the local government decision-making processes. Although China had instituted legal requirements for public hearings and consultation in decision making on developments of public interest, no meaningful guidelines had ever been provided (Wang 2008a). Neither the general public nor project-affected communities typically had much chance to voice concerns to the project proponents, even when projects were likely to impact on their livelihoods considerably.

In CSCIIP, the participatory monitoring programme revealed several cases of project-affected people who lacked a clear picture of their entitlements or of the local authorities' obligations towards them in terms of compensation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, they sought to protect their interests, even going to the extreme of taking action to stop work proceeding. The programme gave them an opportunity to talk to the appropriate levels of government directly, through the public consultation workshops, or indirectly via the Advisory Committee. A key aspect of the programme – besides allowing concerns and issues to be identified for discussion – was to encourage the impacted communities to address their concerns by proposing suitable mitigation measures and solutions, with the assistance of Advisory Committee members. The project developer could then consider implementation of these solutions. For example, in the Shizhou and Rongchang Road components, communities that were concerned that the road construction had affected their access to water and transport asked the project developers to provide alternative water and road access. Action plans were agreed on during the Advisory Committee Meeting, and alternative access to both was afterwards provided to the satisfaction of each party. During the public consultation workshops, project-affected people also had the opportunity to listen to government officials and the project developers describing the rationale behind the projects and some of the challenges faced. Community representatives felt that the proj-

ect developers were sincere in their desire to resolve issues, and a sense of mutual respect developed. This in turn increased affected communities' support of the project implementation.

The participatory monitoring programme directly benefited the government, as the broader community support for projects has reduced community conflicts and promoted an image of responsible governance. Though some government officers might not have felt comfortable talking directly with project-affected people at the Advisory Committee Meetings, they generally regarded the meetings as a good opportunity to disseminate information, gain the support and understanding of the local affected communities and, more importantly, solve problems. In addition, the programme helped to improve the local governments' administrative and governance capacities through experience gained through direct involvement with the affected communities in the decision-making process. In the Qianjiang Road component, Advisory Committee consultation with the local community uncovered knowledge of a primary forest on the road's designated route. This was reported to the project developer, and an alternative route was developed to avoid the forest. A similar case occurred with the Rongchang Embankment component, where sensitive natural river ecology was removed from risk of damage. Project planning and execution that took the affected communities' voice into account through the participatory monitoring programme was well received by local people.

Similarly, project developers benefited from the participatory monitoring programme through reduced conflict with communities and smoother project implementation. It provided project developers with an opportunity to hear first-hand concerns of affected communities and come up with proposals to address the issues they raised. Community concerns frequently stemmed from rumour and misunderstanding, which the project developer and local government could address quickly by clearly explaining the project's intentions. In addition, project developers found that communities were alerting them to some concerns that were very easy to address by simply amending their working practices. The Nanchuan Embankment and Road Component found that a resettlement pamphlet distributed to the entire affected community was well received and contributed to a smooth project implementation. The public consultation forums held prior to the Advisory Committee Meetings were particularly useful in this respect. At these meetings, the project developers had a chance to demonstrate their commitment to resolving issues of concern. Hence, they obtained broader community support. This may be viewed as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is increasingly seen as a 'soft requirement' for Chinese enterprises (Jiang 2010) and adopted more and more broadly, particularly by state-owned and publicly listed companies (An et al. 2010). As yet, however, such initiatives do not include any formal framework or approach for participatory monitoring. During these consultations, project developers and local government represen-

tatives experienced similar challenges in terms of adapting their traditional top-down, government-driven project approach and in having to promote greater openness towards the public.

The World Bank benefited from the participatory monitoring programme through a smoother implementation of its project and the promotion of its image within local society. More transparent and facilitated communication among all parties gradually built up trust and understanding, with the outcome of fewer community protests, stoppages and compensation claims compared with similar developments prior to the introduction of the programme. This way of managing a project also led to improved local government administration and helped to build capacity in participatory governance.

Comparison with Traditional Monitoring Measures

The World Bank requires that the implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures on projects be monitored by external monitors. This is compatible with the participatory monitoring approach. External monitoring is conducted by independent third parties using a number of approaches, including surveys of project-affected people; interviews with project-affected people, local government officials and the project developers; and a review of relevant documents. Whereas external monitoring relies on the monitoring team's independence from the project proponents, participatory monitoring focuses on engagement with the general public, especially those directly affected by the project. Table 8.1 summarizes the major differences between these two monitoring approaches.

Both external monitoring and participatory monitoring seek to identify the concerns of affected communities. However, the participatory monitoring approach is based on solutions rather than procedures. For example, carrying out formal household surveys and statistical analysis of the data collected is not part of the participatory monitoring approach. On the other hand, the participatory monitoring approach is less vulnerable to the influence of the World Bank or local government and provides greater opportunity for sharing project information and promoting public involvement.

In summary, the participatory monitoring programme has the following advantages over traditional monitoring methods:

- Broadening public participation, particularly of project-affected people;
- Promoting accountability within local government;
- Opening a 'pipeline' for ongoing communication and consultation with all stakeholders;
- Providing a collaborative approach to the resolution of community disputes and complaints.

Table 8.1. Comparison of participatory versus external monitoring

Attribute	External Monitoring	Participatory Monitoring
Key players	Key players are external agencies, e.g. university professors, or individual social science researchers. In most cases, they are not local.	The key players are the local Advisory Committee members. In the case of this program, they are representatives of the general public.
Professional background	Monitoring agencies are often qualified professionals, often also engaged in resettlement planning.	Normally the participatory monitoring members have no related academic background or involvement in resettlement planning or monitoring.
Scope of work	The scope of work is to monitor only the implementation of the agreed Resettlement Action Plan.	The scope of work covers monitoring of all safeguard-related mitigation measures, including environmental and social, as well as other community concerns.
Method	Procedural-focussed, rather than solution focussed.	Uses a participatory approach and focuses on resolving the issues identified.
Process and Outcomes	The monitoring process includes household surveys, document review, interviews with government and the project owner; but normally does not include discussion of possible solutions with the project owner or government officials.	Monitoring processes includes site investigation, community consultation, public roundtable discussions and Advisory Committee meetings. The Advisory Committee meetings provide a platform for voicing concerns and seeking possible solutions through discussion among the participants.
Communication among all interested parities	Project affected people are consulted by means of one-way information gathering. After reporting problems to the monitoring agency, those affected may not be informed of whether or how their concerns may be addressed until the next round of monitoring.	Participatory monitoring involves two-way, 'layer-leaping' interactions between those affected and the project implementation agencies via the Advisory Committee meetings. Regular project updates from Advisory Committee members are shared with those affected.
Working period	External monitoring is normally undertaken twice every year and normally stops when project finance is closed.	The participatory monitoring program is an ongoing process, and can be conducted over the life of a project.

Information sharing	Project information is normally restricted to project developers and the Bank. The general public have limited access to project information. The external monitoring report is also not disclosed to project affected people.	Project information is disclosed to all participatory monitoring participants, including project affected people.
Identifying root cause of problems	External monitoring activities are normally restricted by process, project budgets and timing and use people who are often not familiar with the local situation of the project affected people.	Participatory monitoring tends to be more effective in terms of identifying the root cause of issues through the involvement of local community members who have a better understanding of local issues.
Problem solving	Pressures for problem solving are always from the Bank to the project owner who is generally not directly exposed to the public.	With the direct involvement of government and project developers in the participatory monitoring program, especially through the Advisory Committee meeting, participatory monitoring is able to develop practical action plans to resolve disputes/ areas of concern. Even when concerns cannot be readily solved in the Advisory Committee meeting, affected people will normally be given some explanation of the issues involved from the project owner or government.
Speed of Response	Reports may not be reviewed for months which can delay remedial action.	Project affected people are kept informed throughout the participatory monitoring process, and are able to monitor implementation of remedial actions.
Public involvement in decision-making	Public opinion is normally collected only through site consultation and is summarized in the monitoring report.	Public participation is via 'public hearings' and the results contribute to remedial action plans which address the issues raised.
Influence of government & implementing agency	The external monitoring is typically contracted by the implementing agency and may therefore not be truly independent.	The participatory monitoring program can be less influenced than external monitoring as it is not directly contracted by the implementing agency.

Conclusion

Although China's evolving administrative and legal framework is increasingly aligned with international expectations, its history of command-and-control (Wang 2008b) governance via a top-down approach (Hang 2008) and its lack of experience in meaningful public consultation among government, consultants and affected communities present a challenge to the implementation of effective public consultation and participation in development projects in China.

Public participation in the monitoring of environmental and social management of CSCIIP through engagement with an advisory committee that met regularly resulted in increased awareness of how CSCIIP's various infrastructure projects affected communities and how improved communication can lead to better project outcomes. The project developer, local communities, project financiers and local government all benefited from public participation, in that it

- Established a formal channel of communication between project-affected communities, local government and project developers;
- Minimized misunderstanding among all parties, reducing project conflicts and delays and facilitating smoother project implementation;
- Improved the government's image in the affected communities and led to broader community support for the project;
- Helped to address community concerns and grievances;
- Built administrative and governance capacity within local government.

The participatory monitoring approach resulted in greater community support for CSCIIP than would have been achieved through the normal approach of external monitoring alone.

The long-term vision is for participatory monitoring approaches to be adopted by other internationally or even locally financed infrastructure projects in China. In the short term, however, project developers' reluctance to buy in poses a particularly high barrier to widespread adoption of participatory monitoring across the country. Moreover, legislation in the early 2000s provided little in the way of guidelines for meaningful public consultation (Wang 2008a). In Chongqing, government officials and the project developers initially resisted adopting the participatory monitoring approach, as it differed greatly from the way they were used to operating. Many simply considered it yet another task to be accomplished to secure World Bank funding. On the other hand, the pilot scheme found that given the opportunity, the general public and affected communities were eager to contribute where formerly their involvement had not been possible. The programme initially encountered resistance when consulting local government and the project management, especially when sensitive issues were raised – for ex-

ample, questions about compensation standards and allocation of responsibilities between government agencies. Most parties interested in the participatory monitoring programme lacked prior experience with participatory approaches, which made the assignment challenging for the consultant. The success of the CSCIIP PM&E programme was greatly facilitated by the experience that the earlier Chongqing Urban Environment Project PM&E programme provided for major players, the Advisory Committee core members, the PMO and the consultant. The consultant's ongoing technical support enabled timely responses to any questions raised by the stakeholders. Nevertheless, the need to overcome such challenges will undoubtedly raise a similar 'roadblock' to adoption of a participatory monitoring approach in development projects elsewhere in China. China's legal framework already includes requirements to identify and address public concerns during a project's approval process. Experience obtained from implementation of these regulations is expected to lead to a breakthrough for participatory monitoring.

Postscript

Following the completion of this study, similar projects financed by international financial institutions were initiated in China, mainly in the following sectors:

- Poverty alleviation projects, especially community-driven development pilot projects financed by the World Bank (Wong 2012);
- Small watershed management projects (Li, Wang and Li 2012);
- Forest development projects (Ding and Han 2007);
- Rural development and livelihood restoration projects (Song and Fen 2013).

The implementation of these participatory monitoring projects has provided the consultants, project developers and government agencies involved, as well as the affected communities, with further experience. However, the lessons learnt from this experience have yet to reach the broader public.

Furthermore, in the past five years China's legal system on impact assessment has evolved towards increasing alignment with international standards, such as the IFC's Environmental and Social Sustainability Performance Standards (2011). This evolution includes the promulgation of the following important regulations and standards:

- State Environmental Protection Agency of the People's Republic of China (now the Ministry of Environmental Protection). 2006. *Interim Measures for public participation in Environmental Impact Assessment*.
- The NDRC's 2007 *Project Application Report (See Chapter 10 this volume)*;

- Ministry of Environmental Protection's 2011 *Technical Guidance for Public Consultation in EIA* (disclosed for consultation);
- The Ministry of Environmental Protection's 2011 *Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guideline: Overview (HJ2.1 - 2011) Sector 7, 8*. It requires stakeholder consultation throughout the EIA process and an integrated social impact assessment for certain projects.
- The NDRC's 2012 *Interim Measures on Social Stability Risk Assessment for Major Capital Projects* requiring a social stability risk assessment to be carried out for fixed asset investment projects approved at the state level.
- The Ministry of Water Conservancy's 2012 *Interim Measures for Social Stability Risk Assessment for Major Water Conservancy Construction Projects*;
- The NDRC's 2013 '*Report Requirements for Social Stability Risk Assessment Report for Major Capital Projects (Trial)*';
- The Ministry of Environmental Protection's 2013 *Guideline on Government Information Disclosure of Environmental Impact Assessment for Construction Projects (Trial)*.

All the above regulations apply to major projects developed in China, that is, large-scale projects that require a full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report. They do not apply to small- or medium-scale projects that require an Environmental Impact Assessment Form (a very brief EIA) or an even briefer EIA registration, except for the *Guideline on Government Information Disclosure of Environmental Impact Assessment for Construction Projects (Trial)* issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection on a trial basis that requires public disclosure of a full EIA report or form.

In addition, China's government has acknowledged criticisms, raised by international NGOs or host countries, of irresponsible management of overseas development projects' environmental and social performance. A strategic framework for Chinese companies investing overseas has been established and is rapidly evolving. It includes CSR guidelines for state-owned enterprises, published in 2008, that emphasize how important it is for Chinese enterprises to establish 'a "responsible" public image … and have more international influence in spreading the image of China as a responsible nation.' China also published guidance on protecting the overseas investment environment in February 2013, requiring companies that invest overseas to pursue sustainable development in the host county, respect local cultures and traditions, promote local harmonious development and cooperate with host countries based on principles of mutual benefit. A further regulation, the *Social Impact Assessment Guideline*, is expected to be issued in the future.

These regulations provide a legal framework for improving public consultation and participation in China. The remaining challenges include the lengthy pro-

cess of equipping the general public with more experience in becoming engaged and breaking through the old mindset of the 'top-down' decision-making process.

Notes

1. See Postscript.
2. We define 'command-and-control' governance as the making of decisions without recourse to public opinion or any form of public participation in the decision-making process. China is moving away from this former approach. The Ministry of Environmental Protection's (2006) *Interim Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment Process* are a good example of how public consultation and participation has now become a major requirement in the permitting process for new developments. In recent years, lack of public support has caused several high-profile development proposals to be abandoned or relocated in China.
3. The Xiamen PX chemical project, for example, was originally to be located near a densely populated area. Poor information disclosure and stakeholder consultation during the project approval process resulted in a massive community demonstration that forced the Xiamen municipal government to suspend the project approval process, and the project had to be relocated. In another example, Beijing residents protested against the proposed construction of a solid waste incineration power plant in the residential area of Liulitun. The protests resulted in the project's suspension on the advice of the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
4. The construction of a 'harmonious society' is a Chinese government socioeconomic vision featuring democracy and the rule of law; fairness and justice; integrity and fraternity; vitality, stability and order; and harmony between mankind and nature. Proposed by Chinese leader Hu Jintao at the 2005 16th Communist Party of China National People's Congress, it aims to change the focus from economic growth to overall societal balance and harmony (Hu 2005).
5. At the 2007 17th Communist Party of China National People's Congress, Chinese leader Hu Jintao (2007) defined the goal of 'a well-off [Pinyin: Xiaokang] society' in China as one that aims to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020. It embodies five main requirements: to balance economic growth, enhance socialist democracy and social justice, promote cultural development, improve people's well-being and construct a conservation culture.

References

An, J., et al. 2010. *A Journey to Discover Values 2010: A Study in Sustainability Reporting in China*. Beijing: Syntao Contact. Retrieved 10 July 2011 from http://www.syntao.com/SyntaoServiceDetail_E.asp?Page_ID=14172.

Ding, W. and T. Han. 2007. 'Monitoring the Performance of the Policy on Return Grain for Green through SMART and PM&E: A Case Study of Dingxi City and Pingliang City in Gansu Province', *Inner Mongolia Social Sciences* 2: 99–104.

Hang, C. 2008. 'The Future of Soft Law. Tending toward Reflective Law: Taking the Theory and Practice of Deliberative Democracy as Background', *Journal of Baoding University* 21(1): 62–66.

Hu, J. 2005. '*16th CPC National People's Congress Report*' *16th CPC National People's Congress Documentation*, People's Publishing House: 1–54.

———. 2007. *17th CPC National People's Congress Report, 24 October. 17th CPC National People's Congress Documentation*, People's Publishing House: 1–52.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2011. *Update of IFC's Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Access to Information Policy*. Washington D.C: International Finance Corporation.

Jiang, J. 2010. 'On the Legalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility', *China Legal Science* 5: 123–32. Retrieved 10 July 2011 from http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-ZGFX201005013.htm.

Li, D., P. Wang and P. Li. 2012. 'Application Research on Community Driven Multi Level PM&E Model Practiced in Watershed Management Project', *Journal of Anhui Agricultural Science* 37(26): 12741–743, 12787.

Song, H. and C. Feng. 2013. 'Participatory Monitoring on Impacts of Community Sustainability Livelihood Project', *Yunnan Geographic Environment Research* 10: 88–92.

State Environmental Protection Agency of the People's Republic of China. 2006. *Interim Measures for public participation in Environmental Impact Assessment*. Beijing: State Environmental Protection Agency of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved 31 August 2014 from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/22/content_207093_2.htm.

Wang, X. 2008a. 'Public Participation and Motive of China's Legal Reform', *Jurists Review* 6: 90–100.

———. 2008b. 'The Public, Experts and Government in the Public Decision-making Process: A Case Study of China's Price-Setting Hearing System and Its Practice', *Peking University Journal of Legal Studies* 1: 71–117.

Wong, C. 2012. *Performance, Monitoring, and Evaluation in China*. World Bank, Washington, D.C. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17083. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

World Bank. 2005. *Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (ISDS)*. Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project, No. 31938. Retrieved 8 March 2012 from http://www.worldbank.org/projects/documents/2005/03/5704584/china-chongqing-small-cities-infrastructure-improvement-project.

———. 2010. 'Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation', in *Topics: Participation and Civic Engagement*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved 8 August 2010 from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTPCENG/0,,contentMDK:20509352~menuPK:1278203~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:410306,00.html.

Xiao, J., P. Touzel and D. Arthur. 2008. *Facilitating Participatory Project Monitoring: Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project and Shenyang Medium Cities Infrastructure and Transportation Project*. ERM Report for World Bank.

9

How Social Assessment Could Improve Conservation Policy and Projects

Cases from Pastoral Management in China

Wang Xiaoyi

In this chapter, I examine why social factors can cause conservation projects to fail, reflecting on lessons from two cases in Inner Mongolia. I further discuss the importance of social assessment in conservation, recommending the introduction of social assessment in the planning and implementation of conservation policy and projects, especially in areas where vulnerable minorities live. Social assessment could reduce the projects' negative impacts and allow inclusion of local knowledge to improve project design.

In the context of China's rapid economic growth, environmental threats and impacts have been a major cause of social conflicts in rural China (Sun and Zheng 2009). In 2006, Vice-Minister for Environment Protection Pan Yue mentioned that social conflicts caused by environmental problems had increased by as much as 30 per cent annually (Pan 2006) and insisted that this issue would remain a threat to social harmony until 2011 (BEPE 2011). Chen Xiwen, the director of the Central Leading Group of Rural Work, expressed the similar view that environmental pollution had caused more social conflicts in the rural sector than had other issues (Chen 2009). Highlighting the importance of conserving the environment, the central government initiated a series of new conservation policies and projects at the end of twentieth century (NEPA 2004). For instance, logging in most natural forests was stopped, and measures to reduce livestock grazing for grassland conservation were applied in pastoral areas. Unfortunately, the newly introduced conservation measures did not realize their goal, as social conflict erupted from their implementation. China is no isolated case; conflicts

caused by conservation occur globally on a frequent basis (Hammill et al. 2009). In China, conflict mostly emerges between government agencies and local communities, usually when conservation measures cause damage, rather than benefit, to the communities in which they were implemented. Such conflict is apparent in rangeland conservation, where poorly implemented policies have caused conflicts and community resistance in pastoral areas of China (X. Wang 2005).

Of the grasslands that cover 41 per cent of mainland China, about 90 per cent were reported as degraded to some degree in 2004 (NEPA 2004). Over the past thirty years, reduced grass growth and expanded desertification in grasslands have brought difficulties not only for herders but also for threatened urban residents because reduced grass coverage has meant more sand and dust storms. Since 2000 the government of China has focused more on pastoral conservation, because grasslands degradation is considered a major threat to both urban and rural areas of northern China. A series of policies were issued and investments made, mainly to promote annual or seasonal grazing bans with rotation grazing, but the results were not effective. In this chapter, I provide the background to these pastoral conservation efforts and investigate why these conservation policies and investments failed. My research, conducted on regular visits over a five-year period, took place in Inner Mongolia within communities of traditionally nomadic herders who belong mainly to the Mongol ethnic minority.

In the early 1980s, livestock owned by rural collectives during the People's Commune period was privatized to individual herder households. Privatization was considered an incentive for economic development. Livestock numbers thus increased rapidly after the dismantling of the rural collectives, particularly after 1990 due to both privatization and the rising prices of livestock products, including wool, cashmere and lamb. This increase in value led villagers – especially the relatively better-off ones – to invest more in livestock holdings. However, whereas the livestock was privatized, until the late 1990s the pastoral land for grazing was still held as common land owned by the communities. Individual herders' gradual overuse of the pastoral land was a leading cause of grassland degradation and resultant sandstorms in the late 1990s.

The degradation attracted the attention of policymakers, and the government promoted the lease of pastoral land to individual herders to overcome the problem of overuse of common pastoral land. The rangelands were divided into smallholdings enclosed by fencing. This grassland leasing policy did not improve the quality of rangeland overall because increased fragmentation, decreasing precipitation and individual overgrazing continued. In other words, no effort was spent to establish institutions for sustainable grassland use; policymakers focused only on reform of grassland tenure. Policymakers tended to blame herders for overgrazing, herders tended to blame drought and scholars tended to blame grassland fragmentation. Though they did not agree on the reasons for degradation, all acknowledged that rangeland leasing did not improve the quality of grassland.

With the failure of grassland conservation by the grassland contract leasing system, in 2000 policymakers devised a new solution for Inner Mongolia. They implemented a policy banning grazing and putting a carrying capacity cap on livestock, at the same time introducing a subsidy compensating for herders' losses from the grazing ban. The grazing ban was designed specifically to stop households grazing their livestock on pastures and instead keep livestock in stall-feeding pens. The policy of carrying capacity management was designed to reduce the livestock population kept by each household. The logic behind these policies was that, since the herders grazed too much livestock at the wrong time, the herders' behaviour should be changed to foster grassland conservation. When implementing these conservation policies, the government invested in infrastructure, including pens, fences and forage storage, to promote the development of 'modern livestock husbandry'. The government assumed that once the policies were implemented, the grasslands would naturally recover and herders' livelihoods would benefit because the 'backward' livestock husbandry – free-range grazing – was replaced by modern livestock feeding techniques.

Two Case Studies

In this section, I describe the failure of two cases: a grazing ban implemented in all pastoral area in China, and a project for rotational grazing in Inner Mongolia. These illustrate the issues surrounding conservation policy implementation in China.

The Hunshandake Sandy Land

The first case concerns an agro-pastoral community in Inner Mongolia in northern China. It is located in the Hunshandake sandy land, where precipitation is less than 350 mm annually. Sandy land easily degrades to desert when the surface vegetation is damaged. Villagers had relied on rainfed crops for their grain consumption and on livestock husbandry as a primary source of cash income. As of the early 1980s, livestock numbers increased rapidly in the village and villagers concurrently experienced hastened grassland degradation in the region.

In the late 1990s, the rangeland degradation threatened herders' livelihoods. When the author visited, villagers recalled how, as a large area in the village lost vegetation, moving sand dunes expanded so that animals did not have enough forage, whilst the roads and even houses in the village were partly buried by moving sands. Policymakers attributed this desertification mainly to overstocking (Da and Narengaowa 2010). The number of livestock in the village had increased from around 400 to more than 3,000 animals in a period of fifteen years (early 1980s to mid-1990s). The total area of the village was about 2,000 ha, half of

which was pasture. All the livestock grazed and tramped in the limited pasture every day, so most vegetation was eaten, even the roots. When the vegetation cover disappeared, the formerly fixed sands started to move.

The combination of animals was a secondary factor leading to rangeland deterioration. Traditionally, herders kept five kinds of livestock – sheep, goats, horses, cattle and sometimes camels. These animals consumed different grasses and shrubs and overall maintained equilibrium in the grassland. In the 1990s, incentivized by high prices for cashmere, the formerly diversified animals were almost entirely replaced with goats that denuded the grassland of their preferred species, breaking the equilibrium of the grassland and aggravating desertification. In fact, goats were seen as a major cause of desertification in sandy land because they ate both grass and shrubs.

To stop the desertification, a seasonal grazing ban was introduced in the village in 2000. This policy forbade grazing on natural pasture in spring, from March to early June. Spring is a key period for vegetation growth, and policymakers believed that vegetation that was not eaten in the early period would be more resilient to grazing subsequently. Herders viewed the seasonal ban policy as damaging to their interests, believing that animals could not increase their weight quickly without eating the early spring flush of new growth. They often ignored the ban and kept to their former grazing practice. When local government officials penalized them for grazing in spring, herders changed their grazing time and place to avoid the monitoring team and maintain their grazing – for instance, grazing their animals at night to avoid government supervision. They also shortened the grazing distance so they could return their animals to their pens when they were warned the monitoring team was coming. Despite such strategies to avoid the supervision team, sometimes herders were still caught and fined for the illicit grazing. These penalties reduced villagers' income. But whereas the fines worsened the plight of poor herders, relatively rich households expanded their herds for more income to compensate for the fines.

The seasonal grazing ban did not improve the grassland, so a year-round grazing ban was implemented in 2006. Policymakers wanted to replace what they considered 'backward' traditional grazing practices with modern stall-fed livestock production, believing this would allow grassland regrowth. In their perspective, stall-feeding both protected the grassland and increased village productivity through faster animal growth from a richer diet of fodder and fattening due to less exercise.

The root cause of the new policies' inadequacy was that traditional pastoral livestock husbandry had relied on cheap grazing on natural grasslands. When this grazing was banned, first seasonally and later year-round, the animals had to be fed by manual labour, necessitating a large investment in finding and cutting fodder. Hiring labour meant a larger cash investment, and herding households normally lacked sufficient available labourers. Even when labourers were available in the

area, they could have trouble locating sources of fodder where grasses were short and sparse. Herders sometimes were forced to use their limited income to purchase fodder, those who lacked cash having to borrow money. Research indicated that stall-feeding increased costs by between 20 and 200 per cent, depending on the grazing period and availability and price of fodder (Guangmei et al. 2006). Stall-feeding also presented other problems for livestock: the animals' growth became slower, and they were weaker and easily fell ill. Herders believed that the animals maintained better condition when they continued to graze, and that keeping animals in pens for a long time caused them harm. Villagers therefore often purposefully ignored the policies and kept grazing even during the bans.

An additional cause of the problems facing the new policies was simply the measures taken to implement them. The villagers interviewed expressed the view that the grassland supervision teams did not aim so much to control the grazing, but rather to collect the fines. For each sheep or goat impounded by the supervision team, herders usually had to pay more than RMB 30 (around U.S. $4) – about 5 per cent of the value of the animal. When the supervision team came to villages frequently and caught some animals grazing in pastures every time they visited the village, collecting fines became their main task. Conflicts between herders and supervision teams over grazing fines became frequent. Eventually, almost all herders grazed their animals illegally, and the fine became a regular part of the livestock production cost. Livestock grazing practices remained largely unchanged, grassland degradation continued and, importantly, herders' expenditure increased. This had a particular impact on poorer herders, who had to reduce their livestock numbers because they could not afford the increasing costs from additional labour and fines. Richer herders, with their greater resources, continued to increase their livestock holdings.

Confronting the serious desertification, most villagers agreed that there were too many animals for the grassland resources they had available. Reducing the number of animals was necessary, but it was complex. How many animals should be reduced? Whose animals should be reduced? How reasonably to use the pasture and how to maintain herder livelihood while implementing a conservation policy? Because it ignored these complexities, the grazing ban was simplistic and brought conflicts between the supervision team and local herders (Wang and Zhang 2011).

The government had expected to achieve a 'win-win' situation of environmental protection and increased income generation for herders. But, as has already been described, the results were the opposite: herders' incomes decreased and grasslands were still degrading. Villagers still grazed in the grassland where grazing was banned, and grassland degradation became more serious. When it became apparent that the grazing ban was not an effective way to achieve environmental conservation, policymakers introduced rotational grazing. This meant dividing the whole pasture into many plots and grazing animals in a certain plot

for few days, then moving them to the next plot. Rotational grazing was trialled in experimental fields. In the trial, a large pasture was divided into smaller enclosed pastures. For instance, if the division was into eight such pastures, animals would be kept in one pasture normally for seven days, after which they would be moved to the next pasture. Policymakers expected the rotational grazing to allow grasses to regrow when animals moved to other pastures (Li et al. 2003), thus improving the grassland. However, although the trial achieved better results in grass regrowth, this improvement did not translate when the strategy was scaled up, despite the government's commitment to heavy supportive investment – as in the next case.

Rotational Grazing Trial

The second case study is one of the rotational grazing trials. In this project in Inner Mongolia, the government invested approximately U.S.$1.2 million in fences, well digging and development of enclosed pastures (personal interview with Mr. Jia Youling, the former director of Husbandry Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). The project was implemented on 100,280 ha of pasture. According to the official reports, the pasture owned by two villages was divided into thirty-one subsections, each of which was further divided into nine enclosed pastures. Some 193 herder households were organized into various groups to graze their animals in a total of 279 enclosed pastures. Each of these would be grazed for eighteen days. It was estimated that grass output would increase by 15 to 20 per cent and animal growth would increase by 20 per cent. At the very least, annual cash income for each herder was expected to increase by ¥1,950 – almost two thirds more than the current average household income (Shi and Qi 2010).

These expectations, however, were not realized in the project area. Though each pasture was enclosed with fences, herders were still following their traditional grazing practices. When the project was implemented, the decision-makers had a plan to reorganize the individual herders into various groups to fit the divided pastures, but herders still grazed as individual households. The larger pastures were divided into standard-sized pastures, enclosed with fences and equipped with wells. But herders would not graze their animals in such a standard rotation because of the diversified features of the pasture. Environmental differences included rivers, slopes, low productive pastures and high productive pastures. The enclosed pastures had been created without regard for actual conditions by planners in offices who had never visited the sites. They simply drew lines on a map, regardless of the real situation in field.

The project designers did not know the diverse context of the pastures. Herders used the various pastures at different times and for different purposes. For instance, as sloping pasture was warmer, it could be used in winter, whilst pas-

tures along rivers could be used in summer. The project design did not reflect this diversity. Replacing the natural borders and paths, the project used barbed wire fences to create geometrically shaped pastures that ignored many factors that herders considered important to grazing practice – water, species of forage, temperatures and terrain, and so on. Unwilling to forgo these elements, herders maintained their traditional herding practices by cutting the fences.

It was not only the pasture that was complex. Pastoral society was also complex. The local people belonged to two villages, which had different natural resource endowment. Most herders accepted the individual household livestock production. Herders had their own traditional organizations – cooperation among relatives or friends – in their daily life. It was not easy to reorganize the herders into standard herding groups to fit the rotational herding project. When I first visited the project most fences were still standing, though some parts were cut where they obstructed the traditional herding paths. Pumps were still working. Water was pumped up, but no animals drank the water. Before my second visit, two years later, most of the fences had collapsed. No water poured from the pumps. The investment had totally failed. A cadre in the local livestock husbandry observed: "If the designers had more knowledge on the local society, including their culture, organization and norms, the design would be not so standardized and unrealistic" (personal interview to Mr. Jia Youling, 2010)

Conclusion

These two examples demonstrate that the newly implemented policies failed not only because of poor technical design, but also because of a lack of social acceptability. Policymakers and planners failed to consult the local population in decision making on the design, ignoring local knowledge and interests. As in most conservation policies and projects originating from the central government, high-level government officials designed the policies and projects focusing only on the government's purpose – not local interest, let alone local knowledge. This top-down strategy of policymaking often followed general rules that were simplified and standardized, offering no flexibility and failing to recognize that local societies are complex and require a degree of flexibility to work under regional conditions.

In both case studies, the simplified design of the policy or project clearly could not fit the local conditions. In the first case, a uniform policy was applied in the area regardless of the difficulties it brought to local communities. Project designers in the second case, which involved significant investment, were working in such a limited period that they did not have time to consult with local herders. The design was finalized in a city office with a map. The designers assumed the whole rangeland was of uniform quality for animals as well as herders and thus

could be divided into the number of plots in their plan. In an interview with me, the highly placed official who had initiated this project recalled that obtaining project approval took so long that that not enough time was left for the design stage. In meeting the perceived need for 'modernization', officials often ignored local knowledge and practice, considering store-feeding and rotational grazing to be modern livelihood production methods. And these case studies are hardly unique: many policies and projects have failed because indigenous knowledge was neglected.

Conflicts of interest were a third reason for the failure of the two case studies. Most policies and projects implemented in the grasslands of northern China focused solely on reducing sandstorms in urban areas. Local herders were blamed for the destruction of the grassland environment, so all the policies designed to protect the rangeland focused on controlling herder behaviour by reducing herder access to natural resources while also providing alternatives that herders knew little of and could seldom turn to advantage. In the decision-making process, local communities' voices were not heard, and their interests were ignored. Affected people were not provided with a forum for expressing their ideas or interests at any stage of the planning, design or implementation.

The case studies illustrated here indicate that ignoring local voices that reflect the knowledge and interests of local communities can cause conservation policies and projects to fail. Absent local communities' participation, the policies and projects were too simplistic to fit the complex and diverse local situations. To avoid such failures in design and implementation, participatory social assessment should therefore become part of the design and implementation of conservation policies and projects.

Social assessment can improve the formulation and implementation of conservation policies and projects by fulfilling the following functions:

- Reflecting local knowledge and incorporating it into policy and project design processes. Incorporation of local knowledge is an effective way to make policies and projects more adaptable to the local situation.
- Reflecting the local interest and resolving potential conflicts of interest. Ignoring the interest of local communities can lead to social conflict. Social assessment would highlight the potential for conflicts and provide solutions for those conflicts in advance.
- Respect and encourage local initiatives for conservation. Local pastoralists relied on natural grasslands regeneration to maintain their livelihoods. Social assessment could help advance their initiatives.

In pastoral areas where most residents belong to ethnic minorities, communities are much more vulnerable to the environmental and social changes brought about by implementation of policies and projects. In a period of rapid economic

development, the communities in these case studies were gradually marginalized and weakened. Social assessment could provide a channel for their voices, protect their rights to natural resource use and achieve the goals of the policy and project. The appendix to this chapter describes some tools that can be applied in social assessment.

Further Discussion

Although policymakers have highlighted the issue of social impacts, social assessment is still a weakness in the design and implementation of environmental projects. The *Interim Measures for Public Participation in EIA,* issued by the State Environmental Protection Agency (now the Ministry of Environmental Protection) in 2006, required public participation in the EIA of each project; and the 2012 revised *Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guideline* (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2011) require forms of social environmental assessment. Social environmental assessment includes 'the impact assessments on land procurement, resettlement of residents, human landscape, health, historic sites and infrastructures (for instance, transportation, water resource facilities and communication) … the positive and negative impact must be analysed and adequate measures to deal with negative impact should be recommended' (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2011). The same document required public participation in EIA and mandated that detailed information be disseminated to stakeholders, and their ideas collected by various methods. It also promoted inclusion of social assessment in investments made abroad by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection 2013). And the State Council Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development promoted poverty impact assessment as an aspect of social assessment. With the *Poverty Reduction Plan (2011–2020),* the office decided to introduce poverty impact assessment in China, which was highly relevant to environment conservation as most poor areas were located in remote, ecologically vulnerable areas.

Despite these measures, the social assessment in the design and implementation of conservation policy and projects is still weak, for two main reasons: (1) unlike EIA, social assessment in China has neither legal framework nor official technical guidelines; (2) public participation is still weak, information on the impact of policies/projects is not transparent and the procedure for publication is unclear in most cases (P. Wang 2013). Compared to environmental assessment, social assessment has received insufficient attention. When conservation policies and projects cause social conflicts in addition to the conflicts already caused by environment degradation, participatory social assessment should be introduced to alleviate the social conflicts and achieve the goal of conservation.

Appendix: Tools for Social Assessment

(1) Natural resource maps. During the project feasibility study, the social specialist works with community members to draw a map that identifies natural resources and describes their resource management practices. The focus is to identify two specific types of points:

- Key resources and features, which in pastoral areas include pastures, wells, grazing tracks, settlements, sacred sites and land features. The project planners and decision-makers should not change the community's access to, or use of, key resources without thorough consultation with the community.
- Key cultural sites for minority communities. In pastoral areas of northern China, for example, certain natural features may have geographical, cultural and religious significance, and play an important role in cultural expression and landscape orientation The use of natural resources should recognize such points of significance in the landscape to avoid conflict relating to cultural sites.

(2) Stakeholder analysis. Potential conflicts during policy and project identification, planning and implementation can become apparent through stakeholder analysis, which can identify the potential for conflicts not only between community and local government, but also within a community of herders, who have their own interests. Stakeholder analysis in social assessment should focus on certain perspectives:

- Engaging community interest and support in developing culturally sensitive conservation measures that will benefit both herders and urban residents. The analysis should find a way to protect the environment while providing maximum community engagement. When community members must lose access to assets or resources, timely compensation and other assistance should be provided to ensure their continued sustainable livelihoods.
- Social assessment should consider potential conflicts of interest within the community. Responses to implementation of conservation policies and projects vary among different herders because of their diverse positions, knowledge, resources and interests within the community. Social assessment should identify any potential conflicts and recommend ways to protect the vulnerable, particularly poor households and women, by identifying their priorities, preferences and constraints, and guaranteeing their access to natural resources.

(3) Participation in decision-making. The conservation policies and projects described in this chapter failed because of top-down decision-making and implementation. Through a participatory approach using social assessment, herders'

opinions on conservation would start to count during project design and implementation. The design could begin with evaluating best practice in communities, using participatory techniques such as problem tree analysis and community resource use mapping. The decision-making process should be reversed, starting from the community level. During the implementation phase, feedback links should be established to allow adjustments to projects following feedback from local herder communities.

(4) Feedback in implementation. In policy and project planning, utilizing social assessment only during the feasibility study is not enough. By extending the social assessment to the implementation stage, monitoring and assessment may be used to assess the policy's or projects social effects and provide further recommendations for adjustments in line with community responses.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to acknowledge the support for this research from the Ford Foundation Beijing Office.

References

Bureau of Environment Publicity and Education (BEPE). 2011. 'Pan Yue Stressed the Challenge and Innovation in National Environment Propaganda and Education in His Speech'. Website of Ministry of Environment (in Chinese). Retrieved 2 July 2011 from http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/201104/t20110407_208675.htm.

Chen, X. 2009. 'Corruption of Local Cadres Was the Cause of Farmers' Collective Incident', *Xinhuanet* (in Chinese). Retrieved 2 July 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-02/02/content_10750731.htm.

Da, L. and Narengaowa. 2010. 'Reflections on the Theory and Institution of Overstocking in Inner Mongolia' (in Chinese), *North Economy* 6: 32–35.

Guangmei, Y., et al. 2006. 'Analysis of Herders' Willingness to Accept a Grazing Ban Policy: The Case of the Xilinguole Grassland' (in Chinese), *Ecology and Environment* 15(4): 747–51.

Hammill, A., et al. 2009. 'Conflict-sensitive Conservation'. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

Li, Q., et al. 2003. 'Role of Rotation Grazing in Sustainable use of Grassland Resource' (in Chinese), *Journal of Agriculture Engineering* 19(3): 224–27.

Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection 2013, *Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation*, Beijing: Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection. Retrieved 1 March 2013 from. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml.

Ministry of Environmental Protection. 2011. *Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guidelines Overview (HJ 2.1-2011); Section 7*, 8. Beijing: Ministry of Environmental Protection.

National Environment Protection Administration (NEPA). 2004. *Report of China Environment Situation* (in Chinese) Beijing: Ministry of Environmental Protection. Retrieved 2 July 2011 from

http://www.mep.gov.cn/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_57250E4BBAC91B3A9E4A0FE1AB092DAF249D0F00/filename/2004gb.pdf.

Pan, Y. 2006. *Considering China's Environmental Problem* (in Chinese). Ministry of Environmental Protection. Retrieved 2 July 2011 from http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/200910/t20091030_180621.htm.

Shi, C. and X. Qi. 2010. 'Design of Rotational Grazing in Keshiketeng Banner' (in Chinese), *Livestock Husbandry and Feed Science* 31(6–7): 306–8.

Sun, J. and F.T. Zheng. 2009. 'Review of Research on Social Conflicts in Rural China' (in Chinese), *Rural Survey* 1: 8–93.

Wang, P. 2013. 'Exploring the Application of SIA in an Environmental Protection Project', *Environmental and Sustainable Development* 1: 54–56.

Wang, X. 2005. 'Bad Management under Conservation Policies' (in Chinese), *Journal of Huazhong Normal University* 6: 19–28.

Wang, X. and Q. Zhang. 2011. 'Adaptation and Innovation Under Re-centralized Policies: Grassland Management through Democratic Consultation in an Agro-Pastoral Village', in M.E. Fernández-Giménez, X. Wang, B. Baival, J. Klein and R. Reid (eds), *Restoring Community Connections to the Land*. Oxfordshire: CABI.

10

Improving Social Impact Assessment and Participatory Planning to Identify and Manage Involuntary Resettlement Risks in the People's Republic of China

Scott G. Ferguson and Wenlong Zhu

Rapid economic development in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has brought widespread, project-induced involuntary resettlement as an important component of many infrastructure and urban redevelopment projects' implementation. Involuntary resettlement is still, globally, one of the most challenging fields, particularly for emerging economies like the PRC. This chapter provides constructive suggestions for improved management of involuntary resettlement in the PRC – especially the management of social and impoverishment risk – through better application of social impact assessment (SIA). It argues that in the context of resettlement, SIA can focus on the people in the way of project investments, filling a current gap by determining the type and degree of risks and impacts they face, their concerns and opinions, and mitigation measures to offset identified risks and impacts – especially losses to their livelihoods, living standards and social networks – as well as informing monitoring of whether policy objectives have been met after resettlement is completed.

In the PRC, since the first Land Administration Law of 1986, the national policies, regulations and practices for land acquisition and resettlement have steadily improved for people affected. Compensation, however, dominates current resettlement approaches, which focus on valuation of lost or damaged assets, rather than on social impact identification and rehabilitation planning. Cash

compensation is determined solely on the basis of physical asset loss (for example: land, trees and houses) rather than the degree of social impact or impoverishment risk to households. Although adequate compensation can substantially recompense for lost assets, it may be insufficient to cover rehabilitation costs (such as house reconstruction, replacement land, relocation costs or restoration of livelihoods and living standards) or intangible losses (such as loss of ancestral lands, burial grounds or psychological stress). Chinese policy intends to rehabilitate livelihoods and living conditions with cash compensation. Once payment is made, rehabilitation is the responsibility of the recipient, which may be a village collective or an individual household.

The recent shift towards increased transparency and awareness of resettlement-related impacts and losses in the PRC led the news media to publicize many land acquisition disputes. Subsequent projects have met with increasing complaints about land acquisition and resettlement that need attention from local government officials. Affected persons' reluctance to relocate and their stronger demands for fair compensation have resulted in escalating compensation standards and rates for land and housing. Meanwhile, despite the higher compensation payments, social issues that still arise during implementation can increase social stress and force delays in land acquisition and house demolition.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has contended with resettlement-related delays in expressway, wastewater-treatment and other urban projects. The focus on physical impacts and compensation, rather than on assessment of social impacts and careful formulation of relocation and rehabilitation plans, often means physical impacts occur before preparation of planned housing sites, livelihood restoration schemes and replacement farmland. SIA could identify such problems much earlier by combining participatory project planning and design with analysis of the potential physical impacts and intangible losses to affected households' livelihoods, living standards and social networks. However, local officials often delay engaging with affected persons until the infrastructure project commencement is approved, by which time valuable opportunities for resettlement planning have been lost. Furthermore, at the planning stage, many affected persons do not realize the degree of likely social risks or impact upon their livelihoods and living standards.

When consultation does occur, most affected persons are primarily concerned about the need to relocate, the potential loss of part or all of their farmland, and the amount of compensation they will receive. The ADB has even observed that some local people outside the project scope hope the project assessment will include their lands and houses and thus qualify them for cash compensation, the amount of which has rapidly increased in recent years. This fixation with cash compensation has undermined efforts to assess properly the related social dimensions during the planning stage and even during implementation. Affected persons and implementing agencies do not realize the full extent of

social problems until the impact has occurred. Yet social issues can be identified in advance through SIA conducted during project preparation, rather than as problems arise.

Over the past decade, the ADB has supported enhanced resettlement planning and implementation capacity in the PRC, including the quality of SIA, beginning early in project planning. But because neither resettlement planning nor environmental assessment procedures mandated SIA, such expertise was limited. After five years of drafting and trials, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) – responsible for approving all national-level projects and their feasibility studies – issued instructions (NDRC 2007) that mandated SIA, as well as land use and resettlement impact assessment, at the project application stage for key public and private sector projects. The instructions give very general requirements for SIA; sectoral guidelines provide more details. The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (2011) issued social assessment guidelines for eight types of urban development projects in 2011. Guidelines for other sectors, such as thermal power, highway and water-resource projects, are still in preparation. Despite these important advances in the policy requirements and guidelines, some Chinese resettlement practitioners still view SIA as distinct from resettlement planning, rather than an integral part of it.

In 2006 the ADB worked[1] on resettlement risk management with the Ministry of Land and Resources. Despite the central government and local officials' growing awareness of resettlement impoverishment risks at the time, the resulting policy recommendations and regulations still emphasized compensation standards – albeit with expanded provisions for social security, for which only households in extreme poverty and 'land-loss' households losing all their farmland were eligible. Apart from the land-loss households, however, the resulting regulations did not recognize that resettlement's impoverishment risks could apply to any other affected household simply based on the degree of impact, timing or local circumstances. Consequently, the proposed revisions to the current *Land Administration Law* (National People's Congress 2004) would integrate other social rehabilitation features, such as the provision for social security ('endowment') insurance for rural households losing all or most of their farmland, and a provision to allow rural households to register as urban residents and thus gain urban social benefits. ADB has also assisted the Ministry of Land and Resources with the improvement of land acquisition procedures (ADB 2008).

In August 2012, NDRC (2012/13) issued interim guidelines requiring social stability risk assessment for large national investment projects, including risks in land acquisition and resettlement, but these do not extend to comprehensive SIA. Despite increased awareness of social risks, there are still no specific local guidelines for rehabilitation measures. Local governments' support and financing for rehabilitation measures is limited. Instead, the burden for rehabilitation falls directly on the affected village or household, whose most vulnerable members are

also the least capable of taking adequate rehabilitation measures and hence risk impoverishment.

The ADB emphasizes special measures for vulnerable groups. The PRC central government uses a narrow official definition of vulnerable groups – households designated *wubao* (extreme rural poor) and *dibao* (urban and rural poor)[2] – for whom a standard social safety net is provided by government, rather than the public or private sector project sponsor or proponent – the 'project owner' – who caused the social impacts. Project owners are mainly responsible for paying compensation and fees to the local government. However, because the local government is not required to finance additional support, it tends to rely on existing social security provisions, which are unrelated to resettlement impacts. In practice, some township officials or village leaders have provided additional support for such vulnerable households, but it is not mandatory. Nor is it the responsibility of the project owner. The ADB has often found that project implementing agencies resist including special measures in resettlement plans due to lack of understanding of the need, specific regulations to permit such measures, budget provision and implementation capacity.

Since 2010, local regulations have provided for endowment insurance[3] for land-loss farmers. The routine focus on cash-based compensation arises mainly because township or village level officials cannot easily justify rehabilitation measures – why take responsibility for such complex risks when it offers no rewards to them? Furthermore, most of the affected households have no confidence in local government's ability or commitment to restore their livelihoods, particularly in poor areas. Without a rigorous SIA, most problems are not identified until project implementation – that is, usually after compensation has been determined and paid. So township officials, village leaders or individual households are left to solve those problems afterwards, often without additional funds.

This chapter does not intend to explain how to conduct SIA, as many guidebooks are available.[4] Instead, this chapter's focus is first, how to improve the assessment of social dimensions in project design and resettlement plans in the PRC; and second, how to build capacity to conduct SIA, formulate mitigation plans and implement the plans properly. Involuntary resettlement is well understood and frequently practised in the PRC. Since 2007, the NDRC's mandatory requirement of (1) assessment of land acquisition and resettlement and (2) social impact analysis has provided opportunities to improve SIA skills and applications so as to contribute to better project implementation, ensure social safeguards and enhance social conditions.

The essay goes on to describe the regulatory framework and procedures for resettlement in the PRC, then summarizes the frequently encountered social issues and impoverishment risks for project-induced resettlement. Next, it explains the currently used approach to social analysis and its shortcomings, reviewing the experience to date, and finally recommends improvements using SIA techniques

during the planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) stages for projects with land acquisition and resettlement.

Resettlement Legal Framework and Procedures in the PRC: Relevant Laws and Regulations

Land Acquisition

The NDRC has mandated a procedural requirement of pre-examination of land use before approval of project feasibility studies. Local officials are required to investigate the types of land to be acquired by the proposed project; to assess whether this acquisition is consistent with and included in the current Land Use Plan; and to assess whether the Land Use Plan has a surplus farmland quota sufficient to allow conversion of some collective lands to state-owned construction land and still maintain the provincial farmland targets. With this requirement, the Ministry of Land and Resources aims to preserve farmland, rather than to assess impacts on affected households.

The PRC divides arable land into 'basic' and 'other' farmland.[5] The government requires a minimum total of 120 million ha[6] of farmland to ensure food security. Acquisition of any basic farmland, more than 35 ha of other farmland or 70 ha of land in additional categories requires State Council approval. Indirectly, this new requirement fostered greater recognition of the livelihoods of farmers who depend upon the land. The past decade has witnessed unprecedented loss of farmland to infrastructure, industrial and urban development or to ecological restoration of forests, grasslands and wetlands. Other farmland can be redesignated, or new basic farmland created, to maintain the minimum requirement in each administrative area. However, sometimes land acquisition has not been accurately reported or redesignated, and/or new land has not been created.[7] To discourage this, in 2006 the Ministry of Land and Resources established an independent Supervision Office to ensure land acquisition is carried out with the proper approvals.

The national and provincial land regulations follow the Land Administration Law, which stipulates that land compensation and resettlement subsidies be calculated purely on the basis of a multiple of the average annual output value of the land.[8] Requirements to base compensation amounts or support measures on SIA are still quite limited. The main rehabilitation options permitted by law include land adjustment, cash compensation, provision of jobs, provision of equity or shares[9] in the proposed development project; and transfer to urban registration and the benefits of the urban social security system. Only in cases of severe land loss do regulations provide for specific social safeguards (e.g., permitting urban registration or providing endowment insurance for land-loss farmers), partly because land loss is an easily defined, verifiable indicator, unlike many other social

impacts, such as partial impact on livelihood and loss of income; increased expenditures due to relocation and new production means or livelihoods; or psychological loss and stress with related health impacts.

Since 2004, the State Council and Ministry of Land and Resources have issued decrees, decisions and notices to strengthen administrative procedures (SC 2004) and oversight for land acquisition and resettlement, and to clarify and expand the social safeguard entitlements (SC 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). These have led to improved consultation and disclosure, higher compensation standards and expanded provisions for endowment insurance, but there is still no requirement for SIA or social M&E of impacts and rehabilitation measures in land acquisition legislation.

Urban House Demolition and Relocation

The Land Administration Law does not specify legal provisions for urban house demolition because urban land is already state-owned construction land.[10] Urban house demolition, compensation and relocation procedures are specified in the *Management Regulations for Urban Building Removal* 2001, administered by the then Ministry of Construction and implemented by urban authorities. In January 2011, the State Council (SC 2011) approved a new *Housing Expropriation Regulation,* now administered by the renamed Ministry of Rural and Urban Housing and Construction. The regulation sets out compensation procedures and urban house relocation options that include cash compensation or housing exchange. The new regulation, which requires social risk assessment to help governments identify key social risks due to house expropriation, has clarified that local government is to carry out house expropriations, which should improve accountability for decisions and actions. Compensation is strictly based on the location, physical dimensions, facilities and house decorations, but within these parameters, officials now have more flexibility to negotiate fair settlements with affected households.

Without signed compensation agreements and full payment, housing cannot be demolished unless there is a court order for expropriation. The regulation specifies when notifications to vacate must be issued to affected people, how compensation is to be paid to them and the procedures for demolition, which is normally handled by an authorized demolition company. Whilst the new regulation has strengthened provisions for disclosure and consultation, the affected household is primarily responsible for many relocation and rehabilitation measures – although the local government does provide support if the household prefers to exchange its home for housing in an existing building or newly built housing at a resettlement site. Despite the strict administration and registration in the process of house relocation, no social monitoring or evaluation is required to determine whether people have been relocated successfully. More time is needed to assess how the new regulation will be implemented and how it will improve urban resettlement.[11]

Regulation of Medium- and Large-scale Water Resource Projects

This sector-specific regulation addresses the substantial resettlement impacts of medium and large-scale hydropower and water resources projects. Throughout the developing world, dams and reservoir projects have often caused large-scale intensive resettlement and social problems – which were a driving force behind the World Bank's formulation of its *Policy on Involuntary Resettlement* in 1980.[12] The ADB (1995) approved its own policy in 1995,[13] which was updated as a *Safeguard Policy Statement* (2009). The PRC acknowledged the need for water sector regulations beyond the Land Administration Law due to the large number of dam projects, the large scale of resettlement impacts and the difficulty of resettling and rehabilitating the economic systems of entire inundated villages and towns. The first regulation, approved in 1991 by the State Council and revised in 2006, is administered by the Ministry of Water Resources. It specifies three stages for resettlement planning and approvals: (1) a resettlement plan outline, (2) a resettlement plan and (3) a resettlement implementing plan/annual plan. The approved resettlement plan is a precondition for feasibility study report approval.

Preparation of an adequate resettlement plan requires investigation of the socioeconomic conditions, inventory of the land acquisition and demolition impacts, estimation of resettlement costs, and plans devised for relocation and restoration of livelihoods. The complexity of reservoir-induced resettlement has necessitated SIA to quantify losses and formulate relocation and rehabilitation plans that local governments can implement. This sets the water resource sector apart from all other sectors in the PRC, because resettlement plans are not required for other large-scale infrastructure or urban development projects. The water sector has the best experience with SIA for planning and monitoring, although the results of resettlement implementation have been mixed due to the inherent difficulties of large-scale resettlement and the tendency of the Ministry of Water Resources to approve minimum compensation standards[14] without additional financial support from local government. Recognizing continuing resettlement problems in earlier reservoir projects, this regulation uniquely requires post-resettlement support[15] (see below) for households that were not adequately resettled. It also requires long-term social M&E. So far, this monitoring is still internal – that is, it is not conducted by a fully independent third party – but it has provided the best experience for numerous resettlement specialists and practitioners in the PRC.[16]

Steps in the Planning and Implementation of Projects Involving Land Acquisition and Resettlement

All Chinese projects go through a planning and implementation cycle of project concept approval, feasibility study approval, design approval, land acquisition

approval, construction and supervision and, finally, project completion audit. Prior to approval of a proposed project's feasibility study, the Ministry of Land and Resources must conduct its pre-examination of land use. Project proponents activate their responsibility for mitigating impacts primarily through payments to the local government agency that implements the land acquisition, compensation payments, house demolition and resettlement activities. Except in medium and large reservoir projects, preparation of a project-level resettlement plan that includes some form of SIA is not required. The August 2012 and 2013 NDRC requirements for social stability risk assessment for large-scale national projects does not encompass rigorous SIA.

Prior to land transfer, the Ministry of Land and Resources must approve the land acquisition certificates, based on a detailed measurement survey of affected land and private assets conducted to confirm both the amount of land acquired and the buildings to be demolished, identify affected persons and estimate amounts of compensation entitlements for each village/group and household. As this administrative procedure is tedious and lengthy, for many key projects this provision appears to have been waived or ignored so that land acquisition could commence before the land authorities' formal approval was obtained. Once a project is formally approved, land acquisition and resettlement can begin in a matter of weeks; however, this practice is becoming less common as the government has started to give greater weight to human concerns versus the need for rapid development. On 15 May 2010, the State Council (2010) issued the 'Urgent Notice to Improve the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Management and Guarantee the Legitimate Rights of Affected Persons'. Because of this notice, projects take longer to start in order to ensure that land acquisition and house demolition procedures are carried out in accordance with regulatory requirements – but this increased attention still does not necessarily address the social risks that would be covered by rigorous SIA.

The implementation procedures require a first formal notification to the affected persons, whereupon the detailed measurement survey is conducted and compensation amounts are estimated. After a second notification advises affected persons of the compensation amounts, they sign village and household agreements. Compensation is paid, and land transferred. Construction contractors or urban demolition companies then commence land clearance and demolition of structures. This process leaves little time to conduct SIA and in any case does not require it.

Most affected persons are concerned about the compensation payments and consider livelihood rehabilitation options only after receiving their compensation. Once cash compensation has been paid directly to affected persons, responsibility for rehabilitation planning lies with them, so there is little need for village collective or community action. Whilst legally a village meeting should decide on the use and allocation of land compensation funds that are paid to the collec-

tive, often, the compensation payment goes directly to affected households and leaves the village collective with little or no funding for rehabilitation assistance – or responsibility for such actions. Another option is land adjustment, whereby affected households receive replacement land from the village's remaining land; in such cases all villagers share the losses equally and the compensation is often distributed equally amongst all villagers participating in land adjustment. Very rarely do villagers agree to pool the compensation to invest in livelihood schemes collectively, owing to reported past experiences of misspent or misappropriated funds, and their prevailing lack of trust or confidence in village leaders. Exceptions do occur – in suburban areas, for instance, the village collective may change into an urban cooperative that can invest funds in commercial activities, such as a hotel. Most villagers in such cases already have non-land-based livelihoods, so the loss of land becomes a windfall for commercial investments with little downside risk of livelihood impact. Given such procedures and practices, local officials, village leaders and affected households do not often see a need for detailed SIA and the formulation of livelihood rehabilitation plans.[17] Furthermore, some households want to keep their investment plans confidential and would object to these being openly discussed or publicly disclosed. Yet SIA and rehabilitation planning remains essential to address the social risks inherent in large-scale resettlement impacts and impacts on vulnerable groups.

Resettlement Issues, Practice and Impoverishment Risks in the PRC

Key Resettlement Issues

Local government defines the key resettlement parameters as the amount and type of land to be acquired, the demolition of houses and subsequent relocation needs, and the replacement or compensation for affected infrastructure. Although project proponents, local government and affected persons recognize that loss of farmland will affect incomes and livelihoods, the design institute – typically engaged by local government to scope and plan the resettlement – usually assesses such impacts only cursorily. Design institutes, consequently, generally formulate only a very broad rehabilitation strategy, recommending, for example, the payment of cash compensation so that farmers can seek employment on their own. Even for reservoir projects, design institutes will, following specific guidelines, make only theoretical estimates of likely livelihood losses rather than conduct a full social assessment of the affected households. There is no detailed survey of household incomes and income sources, nor assessment of the degree of impact that each household suffers in terms of land and income loss.

Other social impacts – loss of social infrastructure, social networks, community resources, psychological stress and health impacts – are rarely considered or even acknowledged. Instead, the local government focuses on the physical pro-

cess of resettlement and addresses social issues as they arise during implementation (e.g., finding suitable resettlement sites; assisting in relocation; temporarily replacing affected infrastructure like roads, irrigation systems, water and electricity supply; resolving problems with new housing site selection and development; and providing employment assistance and training for land-loss farmers). Because such impacts are not identified in advance, nor any necessary mitigation measures prepared early on, many such implementation issues are not addressed in a timely manner. In addition, contractors sometimes would rather neglect steps to further avoid or minimize social impacts than delay construction, and local government does not closely supervise resettlement activities once compensation has been paid. This approach enables project construction to proceed quickly but can be detrimental to affected households, which must cope on their own with relocation and the restoration of their living conditions and livelihoods, which can take several months or even years.

In most developing countries, restoration of livelihoods after involuntary resettlement is very challenging. In the PRC, rapid economic growth combined with improved compensation payments has generally enabled the vast majority of affected households to invest in new agricultural production or sideline businesses, or to seek employment and use the compensation as an income safety net. Except in the case of large-scale reservoir-induced resettlement, this success has obviated the need for a more systematic approach to livelihood rehabilitation. However, a small but significant proportion of affected persons struggle, suffering loss of income and asset values, and subsequent impoverishment due to these severe losses and/or their inherent vulnerability. It is important to identify these households and take measures to ensure they are not left worse off. This requires some form of targeted SIA, conducted in one of three ways: identifying those at risk prior to impact and planning appropriate mitigation measures in advance; identifying affected persons after impact and taking necessary remedial measures; or identifying those at risk prior to impact and closely following them during and after mitigation to ensure full restoration.

Impoverishment Risks

Michael Cernea (1997, 1998) introduced his model of resettlement impoverishment risks in 1997. It includes eight risks: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common property and social disarticulation. All or some of these risks can arise in project investments that encompass resettlement. In the PRC, most rural transport projects cause some loss of land, housing and livelihoods, but as they are linear in nature, the impacts on villages may be less severe and thus mitigable; consequently, other social risks also tend to be moderate. However, creating a large reservoir can cause significant, widespread, intensive impacts, triggering most of the

eight impoverishment risks. Urban projects can cause varying degrees of severity of impact that can be mitigated, often at significant cost, provided the affected households have legal entitlements to their properties. Overall, however, impacts on livelihoods tend to be less severe for urban residents.

The ADB (2007) considered Cernea's model in the context of the PRC, proposing an initial assessment of these eight risks based on its experience with Chinese projects (see Table 10.1, which includes an additional risk – increased costs and expenditures after relocation).

The Chinese Land Survey and Planning Institute[18] further analysed impoverishment risks and decided to focus on three key risks stemming from land loss: decline in incomes; difficulty in finding employment; and long-term livelihood insecurity. Table 10.2 summarizes the results of the institute's investigations. These risks vary according to the degree of land loss. Clearly, Chinese experts perceive these as the main impoverishment risks, but their views are limited by the lack of empirical data and research that could be achieved through improved understanding and application of SIA. Nonetheless, the focus on land-loss farmers did result in new provisions for endowment insurance.

Table 10.1. Resettlement impoverishment risks for farmers affected by land acquisition and house demolition

	Various Types of Households at Risk				
Conventional Risks*	Elderly couple with no labourers	Middle-aged couple with working age children	Young couple with young children	Young couple with no children	Economically vulnerable households**
1. Landlessness					
2. Joblessness					
3. Homelessness					
4. Marginalization					
5. Increased morbidity					
6. Food Insecurity					
7. Loss of access to common property					
8. Social disarticulation					
9. Increased costs					
Overall Risk	**Very high**	**Moderate**	**Very high**	**Moderate**	**Very high**

Note: Dark shading means higher risk.

* Refer to Michael Cernea's *Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations* (1997). Depending upon the type of displacement, affected persons may experience some or all of the eight basic risks, and certain groups suffer more than others.

** These include single parent households, households with infirm or handicapped adults.

Table 10.2. Degree of risk for land-loss farmers

Degree of Land Loss		Income	Employment	Long-term Livelihood Guarantees
Full land loss	Urban/Suburban	▲▲▲	▲▲	▲▲▲
	Rural	▲▲▲	▲▲▲	▲▲▲
Significant land loss	Urban/Suburban	▲▲	▲▲	▲▲
	Rural	▲▲	▲▲▲	▲▲
Small land loss	Urban/Suburban	▲	▲	▲
	Rural	▲	▲	▲

High risk = ▲▲▲

Note: This degree of risk has been divided into risks for farmers in rural areas and risks for farmers on the fringe of urban expansion because the two types of resettlement tend to be handled very differently in the PRC. Farmers close to urban centres are much more aware of their rights and land development markets, and urban investment projects tend to have better financial resources to meet farmers' demands. Rural infrastructure projects are often implemented on the promise of economic benefits to local people; also there may be no active land or housing markets, so compensation rates are lower, and there are limited funds for social support measures.

Source: China Land Survey and Planning Institute, Research conducted in 2005 (ADB2007a).

Constraints to Targeting Measures to Address Social Risks

Constraints in many spheres – requirements, responsibilities, incentives, costs and expertise – hinder the targeting of vulnerable households and determination of specific measures to address the social risks induced by land acquisition and resettlement in the PRC.

The policy chapter of the Land Administration Law articulates the principle of costing measures to address social risks – yet such measures are never included in the overall project budget because regulations do not require them. Consequently, even when resettlement personnel formulate measures to address social risks, the absence of specific budget items limits the prospects for their implementation. Land acquisition and resettlement is often one of the most important components of the project costs and implementation schedule, yet project decision-makers still do not give it sufficient attention during project preparation. During the feasibility study period, national regulations require only rough estimates of project impacts and the compensation budget. The focus on tangible, physical loss means that the resettlement budget often falls short of addressing less tangible social risks. No central agency monitors whether social risks have been successfully mitigated during and after implementation, in contrast to the case of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and environmental impacts. One positive feature of involuntary resettlement in the PRC is that land acquisition and house demolition activities do not proceed until full payment of com-

pensation has been paid to affected persons, and payment of land transfer taxes and fees has been paid to the relevant agencies.

Since agreements between the project owner and the local government rarely include specific measures to address social risks, it is unclear who is responsible for formulating, financing and applying such measures during resettlement implementation. Sponsors lack clear requirements to pay the cost of implementing targeted measures, and it is difficult to include the costs of these extra measures in the project cost or in the local government resettlement implementation budget. In contrast, the provisions for endowment insurance are clear and easy to implement.

New regulations could specify responsibilities for social mitigation, but this would only be implementable if some form of social assessment was made mandatory. The challenge is to develop an effective, yet simplified, SIA method that can be incorporated into regulations and guidelines. Although the NDRC has issued guidelines (NDRC 2007), mainstreaming SIA into planning procedures countrywide remains a challenge. The newly issued sector guidelines primarily help justify project approval, rather than requiring rigorous, household-level SIA to assess specific impacts on affected persons and formulate and determine eligibility for project-specific social mitigation measures. Chinese officials prefer clear implementation guidelines, as in the case of endowment insurance; however, such provisions do not always target or satisfy the needs of the most vulnerable affected persons.

The complexity of social impacts and the required SIA procedures do not lend themselves to generic guidelines. However, a simplified approach to resettlement-specific SIA could be extremely effective, provided that skills in SIA are widely developed to support it, because the strong Chinese administration system potentially enables measures to be replicated countrywide very quickly. SIA guidelines form a crucial first step, but ultimately the key will be the acceptance of the social mitigation plans and related costs of implementation and monitoring. Chinese project developers make timely payments for increased physical losses and rising compensation standards. They have learned that these additional costs must be absorbed into the project costs, which is one reason why the final costs of resettlement are often higher than the estimate in the feasibility study. This praiseworthy response does not extend to addressing social risks.

It will take time to build capacity for SIA within planning and design institutes and among local government officials who implement resettlement. Resettlement personnel currently have poor knowledge and experience of the range of specific measures that may be used to address unique social risks, and they may lack incentive to take innovative measures that are not specified in regulations or guidelines. Moreover, without a sufficient number of skilled practitioners, guidelines will be difficult to implement in a way that addresses all social risks. Because

so few resettlement specialists with expertise in SIA work in the engineering design institutes, the resulting feasibility studies' main focus on physical losses rather than social risks reflects the technical expertise of engineers and planners. For the new sector guidelines, design institutes will need to gain experience in social risk assessment for land acquisition and resettlement. Outside of water resource projects, however, these institutes will not be required to conduct rigorous SIA and formulation of mitigation measures.

Until specific regulations require the project proponent or local government to conduct project-level SIA and formulate mitigation measures, affected people will continue to address the social impacts largely on their own. Given their dispersed and limited resources, they are hard put to formulate a set of integrated measures to address the social risks. The ADB has observed that most land-loss farmers, left to their own efforts, have sought to restore their livelihoods with off-farm employment, which may not be a long-term or stable solution.

Limited Participation of Affected Persons

Persons affected by land acquisition and resettlement engage in participation that is limited in process and effectiveness. Participatory processes in the PRC mainly comprise policy disclosure and information sharing, whereas effective participation and consultation that can influence decision-making are still lacking and not encouraged in a country that still relies heavily on top-down planning for infrastructure projects. State Council Document No. 28 (SC 2004) requires public notice and confirmation of project impacts and compensation policy prior to the submission of the land acquisition application for approval, and a public hearing to discuss land acquisition and resettlement issues. It is not mandatory, however, so it occurs only on special request. Nonetheless, this regulation is the first to correct the legal provision of 'disclosure after approval' to 'disclosure before approval'. The new *Housing Expropriation Regulation* (SC 2011), though it too strengthens the consultation requirements, still focuses on compensation, negotiations with individual households and plans for resettlement housing. It should also focus more on consultation with the community and holding town hall meetings to discuss project design alternatives that avoid or minimize social impacts, and to discuss livelihood restoration strategies.

The mechanisms to encourage effective public participation need to be much stronger. According to surveys conducted by the Chinese Land Survey and Planning Institute in 2006, lack of detailed provisions to enforce information disclosure and encourage participation can cause large differences between the disclosed information and affected persons' expectations. Feedback about public concerns may be inadequate because government and affected persons are not actively engaged in consultation and decision making. Consequently, the participation stipulated

in Document No. 28 has not been very effective to date. Also, in some places, the land compensation policy and resettlement schemes are still not disclosed until their approval by the relevant government departments. Previously, even when the affected persons had different opinions about the issued compensation policy, it was difficult to influence decision making during the implementation. More recently, this has been changing as affected persons' awareness increases and as national policies shift to allow increased flexibility for those affected to negotiate higher compensation – at least, for their tangible, physical losses.

A better understanding of affected persons' conditions, needs and opinions could be obtained through SIA conducted prior to the formulation of the project compensation policy. During implementation, SIA can provide a systematic process for ensuring that the approved policy and plans are being properly carried out to meet requirements vis-à-vis the affected persons. Where problems arise, SIA can help to identify common problems and formulate solutions in a more timely and equitable manner. The ADB continues to finance the cost of consultants to introduce better consultation and participation processes, as they are not adequately performed by local government or the project proponent, or are only started just prior to implementation of resettlement activities.

Current Approach to Understanding SIA in the PRC

Chinese scholars have different views on SIA and refer to it by different terms, such as social assessment or social analysis, socioeconomic assessment or social benefit assessment, as well as social impact assessment. The scope often depends on the study's objective and focus, which could be to maximize positive impacts and social benefits from project investments, to mitigate adverse social impacts; or to combine both positive and adverse impacts.[19] Most Chinese project planners misunderstand SIA: some think it identifies only adverse impacts, which are then cited to oppose the project; others believe SIA should also address social benefits, which are then used to justify the project. Some believe the image of SIA needs to change to become just and impartial, not prejudiced in opposition to specific projects.

The standard template of the Project Application Report, issued by the NDRC in 2007 (NDRC 2007), requires a separate and distinct chapter on the SIA, which covers social impact analysis (mainly for negative impacts); social adaptability; and social risks and measures. Social impact analysis identifies potential direct and indirect impacts of the proposed project's construction and operation. Social adaptability analysis examines whether the project is acceptable under local social and cultural circumstances, and evaluates the mutual adaptability of the project and local social conditions. Social risk and measures analysis identifies all the social risks caused by the project and formulates measures to coordi-

nate between the project and local social circumstances and mitigate social risks in order to ensure smooth implementation of the project. SIA must also include a stakeholder analysis and document the position of each key group.

Application of SIA in the PRC

ADB Experience

To satisfy the requirements of ADB's *Safeguard Policy Statement* (ADB 2009), which encompasses environment, involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples, SIA is currently conducted during project preparation in all ADB operations and sectors in the PRC, with slight variations between sectors.

Safeguard impacts are addressed to satisfy both national regulations and ADB policy requirements. The PRC's – and until recently, the ADB's – environmental impact assessment requirements address social dimensions only minimally,[20] often providing only a general overview of the existing conditions with little or no SIA or mitigation measures. The exception was assessment of noise and construction disturbances in local communities, but even then, identified impacts tend to be generically based on types of construction methods. Thus mitigation and management plans become mainstreamed into construction procedures without the need to consult with the affected people. The ADB expanded its *Safeguard Policy Statement* requirements for environmental assessment (Appendix 1) to include health and safety, and to address social impacts caused by environmental media, rather than land acquisition (e.g., downstream impacts of dam projects).

For involuntary resettlement, Appendix 2 of the ADB's *Safeguard Policy Statement* sets out the requirements and guidelines for SIA, including household surveys for a representative sample of the affected persons. Further assessment is required when there are impacts on indigenous peoples (or, in the PRC, ethnic minorities) – as set out in Appendix 3.

Additionally, a separate Poverty and Social Analysis (ADB 2012) focuses on the project's impacts on socioeconomic development, poverty reduction, gender assessment and labour impacts. Socioeconomic profiles for the project area and some household surveys assess poverty levels and potential project benefits in terms of social inclusiveness, focusing on beneficiaries as well as adversely affected households, and additionally identifying many community impacts. Some of these impacts may be indirect but are no less important – for example, the influx of a large construction workforce will affect whole communities. Increased traffic flows when a highway opens will also affect communities, some positively and others negatively, if traffic is diverted; meanwhile, induced impacts such as increased tourism will have significant and lasting impacts on communities.

Community impacts may necessitate shared responsibility between the project owner and local government agencies, but this is often lacking in the PRC.

Without the support of local government, affected villages are left to their own resourcefulness; however, a combined effort to rebuild affected communities and districts would generate better economic and social benefits. Social risk assessment covers the spread of HIV/AIDS, labour issues, affordability of proposed services and inclusiveness of benefits. The collected data help to establish the project justification and identify relevant performance monitoring indicators. Each project is designed to avoid identified negative impacts as far as possible; otherwise, mitigation measures are formulated in a social development action plan, community development plan, gender action plan or similar documents.

ADB Experience with Impoverishment Risks in Chinese Projects

Over the past fifteen years, the ADB has approved loans for about a hundred projects in the PRC with significant involuntary resettlement impacts. SIA has, in some form, been conducted for each of these, but its effectiveness has varied. The focus of government procedures for estimating compensation standards bears little relationship to SIA. The ADB's SIA helps formulate rehabilitation strategies for affected persons, but often it only determines types and degrees of risk and may simply recommend mitigation strategies for them. For social safeguards, the ADB requires more rigorous SIA to identify and assess the needs of the most vulnerable groups and identify appropriate measures to ensure all affected persons are better off, particularly those vulnerable groups. During resettlement, these vulnerable groups are targeted in M&E. Local government normally proposes and implements special measures or safety nets for registered vulnerable households, but identifying other at-risk households and ensuring that local government takes special measures to address such risks remain difficult.

One problem is that the ADB's SIA may be conducted too early, before the project's detailed technical design and measurement survey ascertains the precise impact on each household. As neither project owners nor local officials conduct their own SIA as part of the detailed measurement survey, they cannot easily identify at-risk households until resettlement has commenced. More systematic, timely SIA is needed to identify at-risk households, formulate special measures and follow up to ensure results. This effort required is often too much for the project's appointed external M&E agency, and it is ineffective without the close involvement of the local government. To ensure that local government follows up after making compensation payments, however, the Ministries of Land and Resources and of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction would need to issue new regulations and guidelines. Whilst ministry personnel have observed the experiences of World Bank and ADB projects, they have not required local governments to conduct social monitoring for PRC projects outside the water resource sector. This is partially due to the immense resources required just to supervise land use and approve land acquisition.

Experiences from the Water Resources Sector: 'The Best Practice to Solve the Worst Problems'

Recognizing the aforementioned challenges of reservoir-induced resettlement, in 2007 the Ministry of Water Resources required water resource projects to direct some of the revenue they derive from power generation into reservoir-affected households for twenty years to help restore their livelihoods over time. The resulting expanded scope of SIA in the water resource sector is still lacking in other sectors.

Most institutes with good resettlement expertise evolved from early experiences with water resources planning. At the outset, educational institutions did not train students for the sociological study of involuntary resettlement, so most resettlement experts were water resource engineers and planners, or agricultural specialists. Today, although some specialized resettlement programmes at Chinese institutions include a broader range of disciplines, such as sociology, economics and land management,[21] such project-related SIA skills are still very limited in the PRC. Water resources projects plan for the relocation of entire housing and livelihood production systems, including all related infrastructure. For large projects, this task is immense, and yet the emphasis is still on physical infrastructure rather than social dimensions. The social problems are much better appreciated today, but they are assumed rather than based on project-level empirical studies.

Social surveys and consultation with affected persons have improved, but given the scale of the task, it is difficult to carry out a thorough SIA on which to base both the decision to approve the project feasibility and the preparation of the resettlement plan and detailed implementation plans and measures for affected communities and special groups.[22] Instead, costing resettlement still relies mainly upon planning estimates, drawn from the feasibility study, which often necessitates revisions upwards later at the detailed design stage, when likely impacts become more apparent. If the project is economically and/or financially viable at the feasibility stage, it normally proceeds regardless of the magnitude of impacts on affected persons and the risk of impending difficulties with resettlement. Even when resettlement costs rise, the overall project's viability is rarely reassessed because the initial capital costs are already invested and the expected benefits are closer to being realized. Appendix I summarizes the shortcomings of resettlement planning, implementation, M&E in the PRC.

Improving SIA for Resettlement Planning, Implementation and M&E

Alternative Views on How SIA Would Improve Resettlement

One view is that more sophisticated SIA would enable Chinese decision makers to assess the project's social viability at the feasibility stage, given that in the

PRC, implementation of a project is rarely stopped after a project feasibility study is approved. This is a rational approach, but it assumes that appraisal of feasibility is based on adequate technical, economic, financial, environmental and SIA input, and unfortunately, the SIA is still weak. Indeed, this problem persists in most countries[23] due to limited skills and the inherent complexities of conducting a sophisticated SIA at the feasibility study stage. When SIA is applied well, it can generate design or mitigation measures to avoid or manage the adverse impacts. It can also facilitate effective comparison of project alternatives, although other parameters may outweigh social aspects in selecting the preferred alternative. For these reasons, some countries depend on community support more than the PRC does to determine whether projects should proceed or not. However, such support might not be based solely on the scientific facts, but rather upon the persuasion of key stakeholder groups. For example, project decisions in the United States have a relatively high degree of political and community input, rather than relying on the decisions of technocrats who study the project documents (this latter approach is more common in Canada). Ultimately, the communities and public will have their say as the project moves forward; whether their concerns can delay or reverse a project decision depends on many circumstances that are beyond the scope of this chapter.

A second view is that good SIA will enable better resettlement plans and implementation measures to be formulated to ensure that negative impacts on affected persons are avoided or minimized, that affected persons receive support to relocate and rehabilitate their livelihoods and communities, and that affected persons will be better off in a timely manner. Consequently, the project will also benefit from smoother implementation due to fewer social conflicts and disruptions.[24] By changing the focus from compensation to rehabilitation, better SIA conducted with the participation of affected persons and village leaders would provide an improved basis for relocation and rehabilitation schemes, thereby establishing whether the proposed compensation is adequate to cover those resettlement and rehabilitation costs. In recent years, the ADB has been pleased to observe some good practices in urban projects. In addition to negotiation for higher compensation rates, affected persons have also requested replacement urban land for construction of new houses and markets. However, this means more frequent delays in project implementation, which again could be resolved through timely SIA and preparation of detailed mitigation/resettlement plans prior to project commencement.

The third view is that SIA, when performed well prior to project implementation, provides a suitable baseline for M&E to determine whether the resettlement has been successfully implemented. SIA can set the baseline for social monitoring and audits to confirm whether agreed mitigation measures were implemented and effective, including the identification of outstanding issues and required remedial actions.

Fourth, some see better SIA as helping to relieve social tension and ensure smooth, safe implementation of land acquisition and resettlement. The involuntary nature of land loss and house relocation could be assessed at several key stages prior to commencement of land acquisition and resettlement. This assessment would identify the concerns of affected persons, evaluate the effectiveness of information disclosure and consultation, and consider the appropriate timing of land acquisition and resettlement. The social risk assessment required by the new *Housing Expropriation Regulation* is the same as the 2012 NDRC requirement. Prepared by local government as part of the feasibility study report, it will influence decision making by identifying the category of risk and likely scope of mitigation measures.

SIA for Resettlement Planning

The SIA required for feasibility and approval of projects with significant involuntary resettlement impacts should be much more sophisticated than the current requirements, while also systematic and practical to implement. Since the final project impacts (sites, alignments and indirect impacts) are seldom well defined at the feasibility study stage, SIA practitioners should investigate the proposed project sites to collect and analyse sample data that can sufficiently inform the decision makers' approval or rejection of the project proposal. The required type of data, set out in Appendix II, is obtainable from various sources.

The data can be collected by a design institute or a separate specialist SIA institution and used in formulating the initial resettlement plan, augmenting the SIA data from water resource projects. These data may not be detailed enough to permit the formulation of resettlement implementation plans but would still enable better assessment of resettlement impacts on the affected persons, formulation of rehabilitation strategies and verification of compensation standards and estimates of resettlement and rehabilitation costs. In turn, these data would influence the consideration of project alternatives, the project approval decision and subsequent design refinements to further reduce social impacts, and would expedite detailed resettlement planning.

SIA for Resettlement Implementation

Resettlement implementation requires more detailed, household-specific SIA data. For many projects in populous parts of the PRC, this is a huge but necessary task that nevertheless can be simplified by focusing on seriously affected villages (or groups) as well as seriously affected individuals and/or vulnerable households. As noted, the data in the detailed measurement survey required for all PRC projects – which focuses on physical losses and identifies entitled persons – do not quantify households' significant losses, for example, by establishing how many

households lose more than 50 per cent of their farmland or more than 20 per cent of their income. Nor does this survey determine whether those households are also vulnerable and in need of special support or entitlements. Yet these social impact data could be recorded in the same forms as the detailed measurement survey data, which is the basis for ensuring delivery of entitlements to affected people. The specific type of information could concern social risks posed by *wubao* and *dibao* households, degree of farmland loss, degree of dependency on farming for income, education and skills to restore the livelihoods of working-age adults, identification of vulnerable people and of people not registered locally or identification of property that is not legally registered.

However, the main reason for the lack of SIA is that implementing agencies – primarily local government – approach resettlement as a largely administrative issue to be solved through compensation-based procedures.[25] This approach leaves the decisions on relocation and livelihood restoration to affected village leaders and households. Local officials neither perceive a need nor possess the capacity to apply SIA methods to formulate plans. Where necessary, village and group representatives sketch out collective plans to be approved at a formal village meeting, mainly determining whether to pay cash compensation to the land-loss households or adjust landholdings to offset the losses of affected households by sharing the losses equally amongst the village or group. In the latter case, affected villagers must also decide to either utilize the compensation for collective benefits such as improved roads, irrigation or schools, or distribute the cash compensation equally among all households. Increasingly, most compensation goes to households, so formulating collective investment plans is considered unnecessary.

Even so, it would still be useful to formulate relocation and rehabilitation strategies and options-based impact assessments at the village or group level,[26] as this would guide the affected households to invest funds in viable livelihood measures. The village could then formulate a livelihood training plan based on the livelihood development strategies. Government provides such training, but it does not always suit the needs of people affected by land acquisition and resettlement, nor is the training adequately targeted or intensive.[27] Affected persons are often occupied with the resettlement and rehabilitation process and do not find time for livelihood training. Hence, the training programme prepared under the resettlement plan must closely target needs in each affected village. Furthermore, whereas village leaders have a key role to play in resettlement planning and implementation, they do not always have the skills or local government support to coordinate the 'softer', nonphysical aspects of resettlement and rehabilitation. Village leaders are often unable to respond systematically to different cases, especially those involving vulnerable groups or gender differences, due to lack of skills or preference for equal compensation based on physical losses – or simply because they do not see this as their responsibility. Some village leaders are not familiar

with the Land Administration Law and its local regulations. Others are inexperienced or reluctant to take responsibility for investing compensation funds collectively for livelihood development. These shortcomings are particularly evident in the poor villages that most need this knowledge. Therefore, village leaders and government officials also need training.

Policies and technical improvements should be applied simultaneously. Policies can specify the regulations and entitlements for special groups. Local government and village leaders must have the capacity to understand the regulations, conduct the SIA, and formulate and implement specific actions or entitlements. The Land and Resources Bureaus could build capacity through a top-down approach, but despite the introduction of policy requirements to protect the rights of affected persons, in practice it will take time to change the Ministry of Land and Resources from a land administrator to a social safeguard agency.[28] Still, many officials at the grass-roots level do have a good practical understanding of and experience with resettlement and rehabilitation. They would benefit from guidelines setting out social protection measures for project-induced impacts. Once trained, they could become trainers themselves, disseminating procedures and good practices to other officials. Current resettlement institutions could facilitate the training and disseminate it via local governments at the county, township and village levels.

SIA can be conducted at several points throughout the process of land acquisition and resettlement: during preparation, compensation delivery, relocation, rehabilitation and M&E, as well as after completion (e.g., by social audit). Should a project sponsor or local government face serious or persistent social risks, a rapid SIA can focus on a specific problem to determine appropriate actions. SIA does not have to be complicated; indeed, it can be streamlined and used as a tool to help understand the social dynamics of resettlement operations.

SIA for Resettlement M&E

Projects funded by the ADB and the World Bank require that an external institute conduct M&E. Prior to resettlement, the appointed external institute first conducts a sample socioeconomic survey, which provides the baseline for subsequent evaluations. When coordinated with the detailed measurement survey, these survey data are also useful in resettlement planning. Used in conjunction, with the sample survey providing in-depth, representative socioeconomic data, the two data sets could constitute a valuable basis for formulating rehabilitation plans for seriously affected villages.

To date, most SIA experience has come from ADB- or World Bank-financed projects. These lending agencies require analysis of social dimensions,[29] so they have engaged professional institutes to conduct surveys and analysis, and produce quality reports for public disclosure on websites. This approach to M&E limits the scope for participatory inputs from affected people, and may also do little to

provide specific feedback for monitoring and supervision. Nonetheless, the ADB regards such expert review as essential.

It would also be helpful to engage communities in participatory M&E,[30] which would support the village leaders already involved in planning and implementation. To ensure independence, village representatives could be selected from among affected persons to monitor resettlement implementation, including grievance procedures. Their focus would not be on reporting to meet the requirements of a lending agency, but rather on simple, regular reporting at the village level in a format designed to provide feedback to local government representatives, enabling timely, local-level discussion and resolution of findings and issues. The results of these meetings and any unresolved issues could be passed to higher authorities for further review and action. In this way, part of the M&E process can become internalized, enhancing the quality of implementation through the increased accountability of local officials and village leaders.

Improvements in Participatory Planning, Implementation and Monitoring

Regulations require public meetings regarding land use and livelihood restoration for project-affected people. However, these meetings, if conducted at all, involve too few stakeholders or else lack full and timely dissemination of relevant information in advance, as local government personnel are often reluctant to relinquish information and decision-making powers to affected persons. Meanwhile, the growing public criticism of resettlement implementation signals that the time for more participatory approaches has already arrived. The question now is how to make the participatory process systematic and effective, while still maintaining social harmony. This challenge calls on local government to improve its procedures and methods for engagement with the public to achieve the objective of 'putting people first' (Cernea 1997).

SIA to Identify and Manage Social Risks

SIA can be used to identify and manage social risks throughout the project cycle. If SIA cannot be made part of mainstream procedure in all projects, the next best alternative would be to identify those projects with high social risks and manage them more closely through the use of SIA. The ADB has already started to do this by focusing more on projects that affect vulnerable groups. SIA allows analysis of whether resettlement implementation is progressing well. Social monitors, at present, often identify social problems but lack specific channels to the local officials who can ensure effective actions to address them. The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction, and perhaps the Ministry of Land and Resources, could ensure that local governments have a regulatory basis for

actions that address social risks in a timely manner by increasing the emphasis on SIA as described. This would also require the provision of contingency funds to finance remedial actions as part of the resettlement budget. The key to improved outcomes for people affected by projects is clearly defined, systematic, and well-supported means for addressing social risks, which SIA can provide (see Appendix III).

Appendix I. Shortcomings of Resettlement Planning, Implementation and M&E in the PRC

- Lack of legal and regulatory framework to incorporate social dimensions into project planning, design, implementation and monitoring;
- The complexity of social issues, which means significant expertise and resources are needed to conduct and utilize SIA effectively;
- Lack of social development professionals;
- The insufficient time that Chinese procedures provide for SIA at the critical stage of detailed project design;
- Affected persons' (and local officials') lack of full awareness of the potential social impacts and tendency to focus mainly on compensation issues;
- The project proponent's lack of direct involvement with resettlement implementation;
- Local government's sense that its involvement with resettlement implementation generally ends with payment of compensation or provision of resettlement housing (where applicable);
- Local government officials' and village leaders' reluctance to intervene in issues that affect households, and many affected households' low level of trust in these leaders;
- Households' reluctance to work collectively to resolve problems within villages and village groups, especially in the absence of strong leadership;
- Government regulations based on physical losses, not social impacts;
- Internal monitoring and supervision focused on physical progress and compensation payments, not social impacts and rehabilitation;
- Absence of a requirement for external M&E in domestic projects;
- Absence of a system to certify qualified social development institutes or experts to conduct SIA or resettlement planning.

Appendix II. Sources of Data for SIA

- Township government statistics on socioeconomic indicators of living standards, income levels and production systems;

- Village data collected from village records and from interviews or focus group discussions with village leaders or other representatives;
- Household surveys on socioeconomic conditions, livelihoods and production systems that may be affected by land acquisition or house demolition; and
- Opinion surveys of the local affected persons.

Appendix III. Recommendations for SIA Capacity Building in the PRC

- Speed up the formulation of relevant sector policies and guidelines addressing SIA;
- Reform the Land Administration Law and its regulations to institutionalize SIA and participatory resettlement planning for seriously affected villages and for vulnerable groups;[31]
- Require preparation of resettlement plans for all national-scale projects that significantly impact large numbers of people;
- For frequently encountered social risks, mandate standard social security measures to be included in the Land Administration Law and implemented by local labour and social security bureaus (i.e., endowment insurance and others);
- Prepare a PRC guideline on SIA for Resettlement, covering scope, responsibilities, key points, methods and tools, with sample questionnaires;
- Provide SIA training for government officials and technical experts, e.g., in design and monitoring institutes, promote awareness of SIA among civil society (which is currently very limited) and strengthen SIA's role in project decision making;
- Include SIA in the university curriculum to meet the future demand at design institutes, consulting firms, local government and communities;
- Establish an SIA forum or association in the PRC.

Notes

(c) 2015 Asian Development Bank. All rights reserved.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use.

By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term 'country' in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.

ADB encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and non-commercial use with proper acknowledgment of ADB. Users are restricted from reselling, redistributing, or creating derivative works for commercial purposes without the express, written consent of ADB.

1. A regional technical assistance (RETA 6091) study grant covered the PRC, India and Cambodia (2007).
2. *Wubao*, or 'five-guarantee households', refers to a special social security policy (since 1956) under which the government provides impoverished rural households with the most basic of five needs: housing, food, clothing, medicine and funerary costs. *Dibao* is a social security system for the poor based on the minimum living standards (MLS). This is a national system that covers both urban and rural poor, although the MLS levels vary because they are set by local administrations.
3. Often, the local funds for endowment insurance come from the land compensation, but in Guangdong province they are an additional cost item that the project proponent must pay. Benefits must be calculated at the village level, based on set criteria of each household's landholdings, total funds available and the economic need of each household, not necessarily on the incremental social impacts of each project.
4. These include: *Social Impact Assessment – International Principles* (IAIA 2003); the *Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects* (ADB 1994); the *Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice* (ADB 1998); *Social Analysis in Private Sector Projects* (ADB 2009); *Handbook on Poverty and Social Analysis: A Working Document*. (ADB 2012); 'Good Practice Note: Addressing the Social Dimensions of Private Sector Projects' (IFC 2003); the World Bank's *Social Assessment Guidelines* (1994), *Social Analysis Sourcebook* (2003) and *Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook* (2004); and 'Principles and Guidelines for SIA in the USA' (ICPGSIA 2003).
5. Both 'basic' and 'other' land categories are arable, but most farmland is designated basic to fill the quota. Securing approval to convert basic farmland is difficult, and whenever it is given, some other farmland or newly created farmland is designated basic to maintain the quota.
6. In 2006, the PRC had 121.8 million ha of farmland (12.6 per cent of the total land area), of which 106 million ha or 87 per cent was basic farmland (fully arable land).
7. The Ministry of Land and Resources has made new inventories and is trying to improve its monitoring of farmland conversion to construction land, but given the size of the PRC and the rapid pace of development, it is not possible to control all activities.
8. In 1986, the minimum multiple was 6; in 1998, it was raised to 10; in 2004, the State Council Document No. 28 (SC 2004) raised it to 16.
9. Local governments have used this option, but the Ministry of Land and Resources has questioned this approach and does not seem to support it because it could be abused.
10. The Land Administration Law addresses only the state's acquisition of collective land for construction use. Urban land is already state-owned or already converted from collective land. Thus, all urban housing is located on state-owned land.
11. In the PRC, it takes time to transform this type of national regulation into implementation regulations for local government, as each municipality has to formulate specific procedures, provisions and standards.
12. The World Bank has revised this policy twice (see their Operational Directives at http://www.worldbank.org), but the fundamental principles were formulated as early as 1980. They initiated another review/update in 2013.
13. For information on the ADB's Safeguard Policy Statement, see http://www.adb.org/site/safeguards/main.
14. This is because many water resource projects have multipurpose benefits at the regional or even national level, but many of these benefits (e.g., flood management, improved navigation) do not generate revenue. The state finances these national projects but aims to minimize total costs. The local governments that benefit from projects could finance higher resettlement costs, but they rarely do because the affected people are often poor and have little political influence. Consequently, low compensation standards and lack of local government support measures have generated many resettlement problems.

15. The 1991 Ministry of Water Resources regulations mandated that medium- and large-scale water resources projects provide financial support to affected counties in amounts based on power revenues. However, owners of projects with no or limited power revenues, though willing to pay to improve the infrastructure in the reservoir area and resettlement sites, were reluctant to make direct payments to affected households, as evidenced in the ADB-financed Mianhuatan Hydropower Project in Fujian province. In 2007 the Ministry of Water Resources approved a new regulation requiring payment of direct subsidies from power generation to affected households for twenty years.
16. Hence, involuntary resettlement experience in the PRC is strongly based on reservoir-induced resettlement.
17. The ADB has observed that Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region have experimented with innovative livelihood measures to ensure affected persons benefit from urban developments.
18. This institute, established as a research institute under the Ministry of Land and Resources, is now independent but still conducts much research for that ministry.
19. Since involuntary resettlement is a social safeguard, SIA normally estimates adverse impacts and formulates appropriate measures to avoid, minimize or mitigate such impacts.
20. For this reason the ADB has an operational policy for *Incorporating Social Dimensions into Project Operations* (ADB 2010).
21. The National Research Centre for Resettlement of Hohai University in Nanjing, Wuhan University, Southwest Jiaotong University in Chengdu and some Academies of Social Science have master's degree programmes in resettlement planning.
22. 'Special groups' include seriously affected people, vulnerable groups, women, ethnic minorities, etc.
23. In Canada, SIA is incorporated into the environmental assessment process, but the problem remains that social science practitioners do not readily translate social complexities into the kind of quantified impacts produced by environmental scientists.
24. Some officials fear that earlier consultation with affected persons will simply raise their expectations and demands, thereby leading to more delays. This may occur until the government finds a good balance between national development rights and the rights of affected people and communities. Generally, however, conflicts arise because affected people believe they are not treated fairly and with dignity.
25. By contrast, new legislation in India focuses more on social risks and rehabilitation measures for affected persons.
26. Many ADB projects adopted this approach, targeting only the most severely affected villages. However, the village plans included in the resettlement plan are preliminary and require further consultation and formulation of implementation details. This approach needs to be institutionalized because it is an ongoing process that can only be implemented at the local level.
27. Training programmes are available through local labour bureaus, but most programmes last only a few days. Occupational skills training programmes are longer and more costly, and currently require financial inputs from the trainees. The Land Administration Law and regulations should mandate financial support for occupational skills training.
28. Similarly, for urban resettlement, municipal housing demolition agencies would need to refocus their efforts on rehabilitation of affected persons.
29. See, e.g., the World Bank's *Social Assessment Guideline for Investment Projects in the People's Republic of China,* especially chapter 7, on involuntary resettlement (World Bank 2005).
30. As in, e.g., the World Bank's experiences in the Guangdong Pearl River Delta Urban Environment Project in Guangzhou; the Liaoning Medium Cities Infrastructure Project; and the Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project (CSCIIP) (see also Xiao and Arthur this volume).

31. In June 2011, the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Land and Resources requested that social risk assessment be conducted before large-scale land acquisition.

References

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 1994. *Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects*. Manila: ADB.

———. 1995. *Policy on Involuntary Resettlement*. Manila: ADB.

———. 1998. *Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice*. Manila: ADB.

———. 2007. *Capacity Building for Resettlement Risk Management: Final Report, Capacity Building for Resettlement Risk Management: People's Republic of China Country Report*. Regional Technical Assistance 6091. Manila: ADB.

———. 2008. *Study on Reform of Land Acquisition Approval Procedures in the People's Republic of China*. Technical Assistance No. 4790-PRC. Manila: ADB.

———. 2009. *Safeguard Policy Statement*. Manila: ADB.

———. 2009. *Social Analysis in Private Sector Projects*. Manila: ADB.

———. 2010. *Incorporation of Social Dimensions into ADB Operations*. Manila: ADB.

———. 2012. 'Handbook on Poverty and Social Analysis: A Working Document'. Manila: ADB.

Cernea, M.M. 1997. 'The Risks and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations', *World Development* 25(10): 1569–587.

———. 1998. 'Impoverishment or Social Justice? A Model for Planning Resettlement', in H.M. Mathur and D. Marsden (eds), *Development Projects and Impoverishment Risks: Resettling Project-Affected People in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA). 2003. 'Social Impact Assessment – International Principles'. *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*, 21 (1): 5–11.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2003. 'Good Practice Note: Addressing the Social Dimensions of Private Sector Projects'. Washington, D.C.: IFC.

Interorganizational Committee on Principles and Guidelines for Social Impact Assessment (ICPGSIA). 2003. 'Principles and Guidelines for Social Impact Assessment in the USA', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 21(3): 231–50.

Ministry of Land and Resources (MOLR). 2004. *Guidelines for Improvement of Land Requisition and Resettlement System*. Document No. 238. Beijing: MOLR.

Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. 2011. *Guidelines of Social Assessment for Urban Public Service and Infrastructure Projects*. Beijing: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development.

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 2007. 'Instruction for Format of Project Application Report'. Beijing: NDRC.

———. 2012. *Interim Measures for Social Stability Risk Assessment for Major Capital Projects*. Beijing: NDRC.

———. 2013. *Report Requirements for Social Stability Risk Assessment for Major Capital Projects*. Beijing: NDRC.

National People's Congress. 2004. *Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China*. Beijing: National People's Congress.

State Council. 2004. *Deepening Reforms and Strictly Enforcing Land Administration*. Document No. 28. Beijing: State Council.

———. 2006a. *Regulation for Land Requisition Compensation and Resettlement of Large and Medium Water Conservancy and Hydropower Projects*. Beijing: State Council.

———. 2006b. 'Notice for Several Issues on Strengthening Measures to Control Land Use'. Decree No. 31. Beijing: State Council..
———. 2006c. 'Employment Training and Social Insurance for Land-Loss Farmers'. Document No. 29. Beijing: State Council.
———. 2010. 'Urgent Notice to Improve the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Management and Guarantee the Legitimate Rights of Affected Persons'. Beijing: State Council.
———. 2011. *Regulation on the Expropriation of and Compensation for Houses on State-owned Land*. Beijing: State Council.
World Bank. 1994. *Social Assessment Guidelines*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
———. 2003. *Social Analysis Sourcebook: Incorporating Social Dimensions in Bank-supported Projects*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
———. 2004. *Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
———. 2005. *Social Assessment Guideline for Investment Projects in the People's Republic of China* (Chinese version). Beijing: CIECC.

11

Stakeholder Participation in Rural Land Acquisition in China

A Case Study of the Resettlement Decision-making Process

Yu Qingnian and Shi Guoqing

With the rapid socioeconomic development in China, agricultural land is increasingly being set aside for the development of infrastructure such as roads, water resources, industries and mines, in addition to more general urban development. In many such cases, land acquisition and house demolition are unavoidable. In recent years, media attention has focused on the suffering of 'land-loss' farmers – those who lose all of their productive land and other assets to investment projects. In some places local governments have exacerbated the suffering by abusing their powers to exploit these farmers' vulnerability. Recognizing this reality, academics have explored the possibility of reforming the current land system and establishing a social security framework for land-loss farmers (Bao and Wu 2002; Chen and Qu 2002; Lu 2003; Qian and Qu 2004). In addition, scholars initiated studies examining, from various perspectives, reasonable compensation (Liu and Peng 2006), resettlement modes (Yang 2004), interests distribution (Jia and Zhang 2002; Luo et al. 2004), and other such issues. Most of these studies concentrated on how the central government might develop good macro-level national policies for the affected farmers. In recent years, ever more studies have addressed the perspective of farmers affected by land acquisition (Guo 2001; Liao 2005; She 2008; Wang et al. 2009), but few link farmers with public participation.

In many developed countries, public participation in planning infrastructure has been a widely accepted strategy for some time. Less developed countries, however, are still far from full acceptance of public participation in project plan-

ning and implementation. In these countries exposure to public participation is generally attributable to the requirements for project investments financed by international development banks – particularly concerning the issue of resettlement. Introducing a public participation mechanism has been a good way to give farmers greater say in rural land acquisition and house demolition actions. However, in our observations of the decision-making process and relocation strategy in relation to one particular rural village – henceforth called 'East Village'[1] – we found that public participation within rural resettlement is still in its infancy.

In this chapter we seek to define and analyse the complexities of the decision-making process of rural resettlement within the context of East Village, attempting to understand the actions and motives of the key participants in the rural resettlement, and exploring the relationships among these participants. Using East Village as a case study, we will illustrate and aid understanding of the gap between resettlement policy and the reality of its implementation, with broader relevance for other resettlement projects in China.

The Water Project and East Village

Located in the southern part of China, 'Bright City' faces serious water supply shortages due to rapid economic development and the increasing demand for domestic water. In 2006 Bright City signed a loan agreement with an international bank to finance a project to increase the city's water supplies, henceforth simply termed the 'Water Project'. The Water Project planned to solve supply issues by transferring water from several water sources under the jurisdiction of Bright City. It involved rebuilding or expanding the existing reservoirs and building new water conveyance systems.

The project required the acquisition of land and the demolition of houses. The permanent land acquisition was planned to be 6,702 mu[2] (446.8 ha – including 3,070 mu or 204.66 ha of farmland), and the house demolition covered 80,891 m^2. The Water Project affected two counties, seven townships, twenty-one administrative villages and 1,374 households totalling 5,147 persons. Villages were affected to varying degrees due to natural variance in resources and the differential impacts of land acquisition and house demolition. Among them, however, East Village was the most severely affected – most of the village would be submerged under a planned reservoir – and the issues of land acquisition and house demolition had become evident during the project preparation stage.

East Village, affiliated to 'South Township' under the 'Pine County' of Bright City, included 407 households with a population of 1,517. For many years, East Village was dominated by agricultural production and had underdeveloped manufacturing and service sectors. Over the past decade, due to the village's proximity to Bright City (only 1.5 hours' drive), many villagers – frequently at least

one individual per household – commuted to the city for off-farm work, predominately in the construction or business sectors. Villagers generated their main agricultural income by raising pigs and cultivating tobacco, fruit, wheat and corn; supplementary income came from migrant worker remittances.

According to official statistics, East Village encompassed 24,870 mu (1,658 ha) of land, including 2,040 mu (136 ha) of farmland on which the average farm was 1.3 mu (0.08 ha) per capita. Forested areas amounted to 17,835 mu (1,189 ha), accounting for 71.7 per cent of the total village land. Of this the project permanently acquired 1,231 mu (82.06 ha) of farmland, or 60 per cent of the total village farmland; furthermore, the project also had to demolish 63,828 m^2 of structures including housing – 78.9 per cent of the total village residential area. In all, 360 households making up 88.5 per cent of the total village households were to be affected – a serious impact on East Village.

Stakeholders and Their Responsibilities

The major stakeholders in the relocation decision-making process included the international bank granting the loan; the Bright City, Pine County and South Township governments;[3] the affected East Village people and their group leaders; the project owner; and the design institute (see Figure 11.1). In this section we explore the roles and perspectives of the stakeholders.

International Bank

The chief involvement of the international bank involved the loan of funds to cover project costs, conditional on the project's adherence to the bank's safeguard policies. The bank's policy on involuntary resettlement required that project-affected people's living standards be either maintained or improved, that social risks be mitigated and that affected people be entitled to participate in the whole resettlement process through various channels. The involvement of an international bank, though not uncommon, served to focus attention on the participation of the people directly affected by land acquisition, highlighting this issue in a way that would not normally be expected of the majority of projects in China, which are financed through domestic sources.

Bright City Government

Although the Bright City government had sufficient financial capacity to implement the project, it preferred to use foreign capital, partly because attracting foreign investment could be regarded as a political achievement. It was also believed

that local governments would have the opportunity to learn advanced international concepts and good practices from the foreign stakeholders. The Bright City government therefore established a temporary project leading group comprised of the vice-mayor and heads of pertinent municipal government departments. This group was responsible for major decision making and coordination among various governmental departments during the process of land acquisition and resettlement.

Initially the Bright City government was the project owner, and the City Water Resources Bureau handled project details. Then, as the project progressed, ownership was transferred to the 'City Water Supply Company', a state-owned enterprise in Bright City that had been restructured as a self-supporting corporation but was still under the guidance of the Bright City government. The company was responsible for the loan application, project implementation and loan repayment. It was required to participate in the resettlement process and to arrange for the Provincial Design Institute to do a physical indicator survey of the project area and the resettlement planning. As the implementation agency, the company was also in charge of the resettlement fund management and delivery as well as supervision of the fund's utilization.

Provincial Design Institute

Engagement of the Provincial Design Institute – a stipulation of the service contract with the project owner – was necessary to address the tasks assigned by the provincial and municipal governments. The project owner paid the institute to draw up the physical indicator survey, feasibility study, preliminary design and construction blueprints. As for the resettlement, the institute was also responsible for conducting the physical indicator survey, calculating the compensation standards for land acquisition and house demolition, and preparing the budget for the resettlement plan.

Pine County Government

Since the impact of the Water Project would be felt primarily in Pine County, which is affiliated to Bright City, the Pine County government established a temporary project leading group, similar to the one at the city level. A Project Management Office (PMO) was set up to deal with the practical matters that occurred throughout project design and implementation. The PMO was mainly responsible for assisting the project owner and the design institute in project implementation, coordinating the county and township governments as well as other agencies, organizing public consultation for affected farmers and promoting the resettlement policies to the affected people.

South Township Government

The South Township government was the local-level agency responsible for implementing resettlement activities. It was also responsible for assisting higher-level government agencies, helping the project owner and the design institute conduct the physical indicator survey, organizing workshops and promoting resettlement policies at the resettlement planning stage, delivering compensation to affected people, organizing house rebuilding and production rehabilitation measures at the implementation stage and providing post-resettlement support.

East Village

The villagers who were directly affected by the project were required to support it, although they derived no direct benefit from it. As the medium for conveying messages between farmers and the local governments, village leaders had to facilitate all resettlement activities relevant to villager households – for example, providing the design institute staff with information relevant to measuring the loss of land, housing and other structures of each affected household, and calling on the villagers to attend public meetings.

The Decision-making Process for Selecting the East Village Relocation Site

Since the majority of the houses were to be submerged, the question of where to relocate the villagers involved a major decision-making process. This process was extensive, so we have divided it into five phases (see also Figure 11.1 in Chapter 11).

Phase 1: Early Project Preparation Stage

The provincial government first proposed the Water Project in the 1990s. In 1993 the design institute was contracted to perform some preliminary field surveys and design. The government of Bright City began reviewing the project in 2003 and commenced preparations the following year. Assigned by the city government, the City Water Resources Bureau was directly responsible for the project's preparation and implementation, and the Provincial Design Institute was responsible for technical support. At that time, the project was a domestic venture that did not involve international banks.

From February to March 2005, the design institute conducted a survey of physical indicators and also prepared a feasibility study report that included the scope of land acquisition, house demolition and resettlement. As for the relocation site, the design institute proposed relocating the affected people to a village in

another town in Pine County. The completed feasibility study report was circulated in the relevant Bright City and Pine County governmental departments for comments by staff related to the Water Project. By the end of May 2005, the Pine County government doubted the feasibility of the Provincial Design Institute survey, noting in writing that the report had been prepared without consultation with the relevant county, towns, villages and village groups – or the affected farmers. It also noted that the proposed compensation standards were too low and the surveyed physical indicators – household composition, structures and other assets, land areas and crops – were inconsistent with the actual situation. For example, survey data for some potentially affected households was missing.

Consequently, Pine County did not agree to the proposed relocation scheme and furthermore stated that there was insufficient capacity to accommodate the affected people elsewhere within its territory. Instead, it suggested, the Bright City government should relocate affected people to the 'beneficiary area' – that is, the urban and suburban area of Bright City, which would benefit directly from improved water supplies provided by the project.

Phase 2: Discussion of a Relocation Site before the Official Involvement of an International Bank

Prior to mid-2006 progress on the Water Project was slow, as its sources of funding were uncertain. In the second half of 2006, the Ministry of Finance approved the Bright City government's application to apply for foreign funding. The project was revived, and the question of the relocation sites resurfaced. In September 2006 the County Water Resources Bureau, on behalf of the Pine County government, proposed three options for relocation sites to the city government. The first was to purchase a state-owned farm to resettle the affected people; the second was to relocate the affected villagers to another township of Pine County as per the design institute's original recommendation; the third was 'backward relocation', that is, relocating the affected people within their original village by adjusting the village land use rights to accommodate them. Pine County preferred the third option, as a survey conducted by the county had found that over 90 per cent of the affected farmers were unwilling to move from their original villages.

In response to this and to Pine County's previously noted comments of May 2005 on the inaccurate physical indicators, low compensation rates and inappropriate relocation site in the initial design institute survey, designers at the institute wrote directly to the Bright City government. They did not agree to the suggestion of backward relocation because after the submergence of land by the new reservoir, East Village's environmental capacity would be too limited to support the new village. Also, they argued, the new area would become a water-source protection zone and thus be subject to land use restrictions. They preferred the first option but suspected that transferring ownership of the state-

owned farm might be difficult and the application procedures, time-consuming. Based on these considerations, they recommended the second option. Thus Pine County and the design institute both insisted on the suitability of their own proposals and refused to compromise.

Phase 3: Early Stages of Project Preparation after the Involvement of the International Bank

In December 2006 the Bright City government signed a draft agreement with the international bank. This agreement included some changes to project management, particularly the requirement that a government agency could not act as the project owner, according to international practice. Project ownership was consequently transferred to the City Water Supply Company. The bank also engaged an international consulting company to help Bright City with the project preparation. By this time, the relocation site was an urgent problem. A decision was imperative because arrangements for land adjustment, compensation distribution, living and production rehabilitation schemes, and preparation of a resettlement plan could not begin without first deciding how and where to relocate.

The international bank hired a consultancy firm to oversee operations. Their resettlement specialist held a workshop in February 2007 in East Village attended by a working group from Pine County consisting of South Township officials, village and group cadres, some farmer representatives and representatives of the project owner and design institute. At the workshop, a South Township official and the village leader gave presentations on behalf of the local government and the affected people respectively. Both maintained that moving the affected people of East Village and into the Bright City 'beneficiary area' was preferable, reiterating Pine County's proposal in Phase 1 and arguing against the options discussed in Phase 2. In addition, they demanded non-agricultural jobs for young villagers and social security for the elderly, since otherwise the affected people would be sacrificing their livelihoods for the sake of the city, without any benefits accruing to them.

At a subsequent meeting held in Pine County, participants included the initial working group in addition to the county governor, the County Water Resources Bureau and the resettlement specialist. The South Township representatives repeated their recommendation from the workshop: the affected people needed to move out to protect the purity of the drinking-water supply. Pine County agreed with South Township. The design institute, for its part, presented its original option – relocating villagers within Pine County – and advanced some new suggestions, comparing them with the three options put forward by the County Water Resources Bureau in Phase 2. Pine County continued to reject many of these suggestions, reiterating that it had insufficient capacity to accommodate resettlement.

In February 2007, the county PMO officially submitted written comments to the Bright City government, recommending the option of moving people out and highlighting the problems of backward resettlement: the impossibility of the village retaining sufficient arable farmland to feed so many people, the reduced grain production due to decreased land, the small-scale climate change to be caused by the reservoir, and the negative environmental impact on water quality.

Phase 4: Interim Stage of Project Preparation

In early March 2007, the Bright City government announced that Pine County should solve the resettlement issues within its own jurisdiction. At an interim meeting with representatives of the international bank that same month, Pine County suggested a compromise: a major resettlement of East Village outside the original site, supplemented by partial backward resettlement. Specifically, Pine County had located a state-owned farm it wanted to buy for the affected people's relocation. Since the farm had enough fertile land to ensure the affected people could maintain their living standards and safeguard their social security, Pine County explained, it had contacted the farm leaders, who had agreed to sell the land.

Both the design institute and the resettlement specialist supported the option of purchasing the state-owned farm. Although such a purchase would increase project costs significantly, it would also reduce the potential environmental and social risks. Both groups considered the remaining East Village land insufficient to support all the villagers, who would overburden the environment if they stayed. More importantly, the granting of a state farm was better than direct cash compensation because farmland also represented employment and social security. The proposed state-owned farm had fertile land, and its proximity to Bright City would allow the affected people to both recover their agricultural production and sales, and find off-farm jobs in the urban area. At this interim meeting, the project owners did not express clear opinions on these options but said only that they would carefully consider all possible courses of action.

Phase 5: Final Stage of the Project Preparation

By the end of April 2007, in response to opposition from Bright City government, the Pine County Government had grown hesitant about the state-farm proposal, citing increased costs required by the purchase. In early May 2007, a county working group comprising the township officials, the resettlement specialists, the project owner and the design institute representatives conducted another field visit. Although South Township and East Village still hoped for East Village's relocation, the Bright City government was in fact in the process of finalizing


Phase
Changes of Relocation Site Proposals
The Roles of
County Government
Other Stakeholders
Move out of original village, relocated in the County (by the Design Institute)
Opposed: No acceptable relocation site in the county.
Phase 1
Move out to beneficiary area (by County Gov.)
Changed:
a. The relocation site suggested by the Design Institute was not suitable
b. The affected people opposed the suggestion of the Design Institute.
Phase 2
Backward resettlement (by County Gov.)
The Design Institute opposed because of the low environmental capacity.
Changed:
a. The beneficiary area should be responsible for the affected people
b. No suitable relocation site in the county for the affected people
c. Not enough environment capacity for the backward resettlement
Phase 3
Move out to beneficiary area (by County Gov.)
The Project Owner opposed: Impossible to arrange off-farm jobs for so many affected people or move them to the City.
Changed:
a. No suitable relocation site in the county for the affected people
b. Not enough environmental capacity for backward resettlement
c. Buy fertile farmland to resettle the APs well and avoid social risks
Phase 4
Move out and buy the farmland of a state-owned farm (by County Gov.)
The Project Owner opposed: Purchase of farm land cost too much.
Changed:
Actually East Village had enough remaining land for backward resettlement
Phase 5
Full backward resettlement (by City Gov.)

Figure 11.1. Decision-making process for the East Village relocation site and stakeholders' roles

the backward resettlement decision. The only remaining issue was the relocation site. Before long, a relocation site was finally decided within East Village.

Stakeholder Participation: Motives, Strategy, Actions and Their Relationships

Pine County and South Township Governments

The county government played an important role in the relocation decision-making process. Administratively and theoretically, the governments of Pine County and South Township were required to show strong support for the tasks the Bright City government had assigned them to ensure smooth implementation of the project within their jurisdictions. In reality, however, there were vested and conflicting interests between these levels of government.

The Water Project was set to benefit the urban area of Bright City, but the project design had a negative impact on the remainder of Pine County. Not only would the county lose farmland, but it also had to take responsibility for resettling the affected people and assuming the associated social risks. Moreover, the county government agencies had to provide support for the project implementation on top of their routine workload. Taking these costs into account, the county adopted a strategy of striving to obtain benefits from the project while simultaneously minimizing its losses. The actions taken by the county were explained as follows.

Governments at the lower level do not provide support and coordination to higher levels of government free of charge. The funds needed for this support and coordination exceeded the routine county budget, so the deputy county governor clearly stated at the first meeting that funds were required from the outset to pay the salaries of the assigned staff, office rental, stationery, transportation and other costs. The county PMO solicited additional funds for any project activities that required coordination. For example, when the design institute conducted the physical indicator surveys, it had to pay the county PMO for coordination. The reimbursement included the costs of communication, meals and subsidies for the PMO staff, the South Township government and East Village.

However, the PMO and the South Township government normally asked for more money than they actually spent. For instance, for meals for ten people that actually cost about ¥150, the PMO claimed ¥500 from the design institute, which the latter paid out of a negotiated lump sum contract. Thus, during the process of the physical indicator surveys, the county and township governments acted as paid service providers in an unequal negotiating position with higher authorities, rather than as watchdog, supervisor or public manager. This is reflected in how the process unfolded. In Phase 1, Pine County stated it did not have enough space to resettle the affected people. In Phase 2, designers at the Design Institute discovered that in 2002, the county had accepted about 2,000 affected people from another county at Bright City's request, as part of a different project. Those people had not integrated well with local people, which caused multiple social problems. The Pine County government was thus aware of the difficulties of dealing with resettlement issues and considered itself to have already sacrificed for other governments on that prior occasion – a primary reason behind their recommendation in Phase 1.

Other proposals besides those mentioned previously are also relevant here. They show how the Pine County government changed its proposals in the decision-making process to maximize benefit to its members whilst minimizing costs and its responsibility for risk. In Phase 1, county officials proposed that the affected people should be compensated according to the higher urban compensation standards for land acquisition and house demolition, even though they clearly knew this was almost impossible. In Phase 3, the county again proposed this option, despite having abandoned it in Phase 2 upon realizing an international bank was going to finance the project, possibly bringing more benefits. In Phase 4, after Bright City clearly requested Pine County to relocate the people affected within its own jurisdiction, Pine County officials proposed to purchase the land from a state-owned farm. This proposal would benefit them most, as the cost would be borne by the project and it minimized their responsibility for social risks. Finally, seeing little sign of support for the state-farm solution from the project owner and Bright City, the county adopted the option of backward resettlement. In order to minimize its own workload and difficulties, Pine County

strongly rejected suggestions such as resettlement in other suitable villages within the county, partial resettlement and partial backward resettlement.

Then the county tried various ways of bargaining with the city government, from its lesser position within the government hierarchy. Although it ultimately adopted backward resettlement, the Pine County government further requested some form of compensation from the Bright City government to offset the difficulties it would face during resettlement implementation, together with the efforts and sacrifice it expected to make for the project. This compensation would preferably take the form of more finance and investment within the county, inclusion in other profitable projects and official promotions.

The South Township government followed the same logic as Pine County. It had an obligation to support the higher-level governments. In practical terms it was responsible for resettlement implementation and interacted closely with village leaders and affected people. In rural areas of China, farmers normally appeal to village leaders or, if they find no solution, to township officials. Affected people unsatisfied with these appeals might resort to conflict or violence, so South Township – like Pine County – wanted the affected people moved out of the area, reducing the potential for conflict within their jurisdiction. From Phase 1 to Phase 5, the township was in step with Pine County, as they had the same interests and the coordination fund was proportionately allocated between them. Although in Phase 5 South Township still wanted to move the affected people more than did than the county, it had to accept the decision for backward resettlement made by other, more powerful stakeholders.

The Project Owner

The City Water Supply Company was nominated as the project owner following the international loan application in Phase 3. Although it was a state-owned enterprise, it had to follow the city government's directives. Thus it faced a quandary of being required to fulfil the tasks assigned by the city government while also, as a self-supporting enterprise, having to manage the loan and increase profits.

Support from the city government put the Water Supply Company in a strong negotiating position. When Pine County, South Township and East Village proposed increased compensation standards; resettlement in the beneficial urban area; and provision of non-agricultural jobs to affected people, Water Supply Company representatives made no promises but merely indicated that they would relay these suggestions to the company management and Bright City government. In fact, the Water Supply Company could neither provide the jobs for the affected people nor readjust suburban land for them. The company assumed that the locals had exaggerated their demands to improve their bargaining position in later stages of negotiation.

In Phase 4, Bright City directly requested Pine County to relocate the affected people within its own jurisdiction, indicating that the project owner had influenced the city government's decision making. At that point Pine County started to change its bargaining strategy and considered purchasing farmland from the state-owned farm. However, the project owner quickly and unofficially expressed its opposition to city officials: the total cost estimate of the project was only ¥1.6 billion, and the purchase would raise the resettlement cost by ¥200–300 million – a budget increase of up to 25 per cent. The project owner was unwilling to take on this additional loan burden and furthermore considered the state-owned farm's asking price too high and the land too much for the affected people. It also suspected the Pine County government and state-owned farm of conspiring to obtain undue benefits from the resettlement activities. Therefore, the project owner preferred the backward resettlement: the moving cost was much lower, and it was a safer solution than relocation in a new area. Cognizant of lessons learnt from previous reservoir projects, the project owner had reservations about the affected people's capacity to integrate into a new host area.

In Phase 5, Pine County and South Township had to accept the option of backward resettlement, which again points to the project owner's strong influence over the decision-making process. Meanwhile, the project owner normally did not have direct contact with the affected people. At the consultation meetings with them, it simply listened without voicing its ideas. Instead it delivered its proposals at private meetings with the Bright City government, where local stakeholders had no say. It provided lump-sum resettlement funds to local governments according to compensation standards calculated by the design institute on the basis of national and provincial laws, regulations and relevant policies,[4] and negotiated with local governments. The project owner supervised the fund utilization but left the task of directly negotiating with affected people to local governments. This arrangement greatly reduced the project owner's workload. It was also a commonplace means of land acquisition in a province where local governments had the ultimate responsibility, sometimes acquiring land and demolishing houses by force. The project owner also solicited additional support from the Bright City government, for example by successfully lobbying the city government to waive certain land acquisition-related taxes and fees levied by the City Land Resources Bureau and the Forestry Bureau.

The Provincial Design Institute

The design institute was a relatively neutral unit. It was supposed to be the authority on technical aspects of the relocation site selection: topography, geology, environmental capacity, calculation of the compensation standards. But although technical feasibility was important, the institute could not make binding decisions but only recommendations. In reality, selection of the relocation

site for East Village was not a purely technical issue but a social, economic and political problem shared by many stakeholders. From a technical perspective, the institute preferred to resettle the affected people in a new location, but it had to compromise with the governments and the project owner and accept backward resettlement.

Having signed the contract with the project owner, the design institute provided technical services for the latter. But apart from the technical support, it also had to consider the project owner's requirements and sometimes speak for the project owner. For example, the designers had to consult with the project owner about compensation standards, which had to comply with national and local policies and also be seen as affordable by the project owner.

At the same time, the designers had to consult and coordinate effectively with the local governments. They had to work closely in organizing workshops with the affected people, conducting the physical indicator survey in the village, and managing the entire resettlement preparation and implementation. Successful cooperation could open opportunities for future collaborative ventures. With its heavy reliance on local assistance, the design institute was in a position to compromise, provided it did not exceed its basic mandate or bring about further problems.

The institute had relatively few opportunities to deal directly with the affected people, but relied on local governments to channel its communication with them, especially when disputes arose. It preferred to focus on technical issues, leaving coordination to local officials. Moreover, preferring to remain neutral, it was reluctant to be in close contact with the affected people. This arrangement prevented the affected people from gaining deeper understanding of the technical aspects of the project and reduced their opportunities to participate.

The Affected People and Village Leaders

Land acquisition and house demolition directly affected most farmers in East Village. Both the compensation standards and the relocation site selection were central to their interests. However, the affected people had limited power in discussions about compensation and a relocation site, and in fact were little involved in the process during Phases 1 and 2. After Phase 3, some representatives of the village had opportunities to attend the group meetings held in the village, but they were never invited to meetings held in Pine County or Bright City. In principle, the county PMO was supposed to represent their interests, but in practice the county aimed to maximize its revenue position rather than represent the interests of constituent villagers.

Village leaders had more opportunity to participate than did ordinary farmers, but they were still subordinate to County and Township government officials. The village leaders' primary role in the process was that of intermediary between

the governments and the affected farmers. They were uniquely positioned because they had dual identities. Legally, the village committee was a self-governed organization. In fact, however, the South Township government often held sway in the promotion or dismissal of village leaders, who thus were required to carry out activities to the benefit of the South Township government, such as promoting certain policies to farmers, arranging village meetings and delivering compensation funds. Village leaders could themselves benefit somewhat from these interactions as they were remunerated for the additional work and could attend working lunches with the South Township and Pine County officials, which helped them to strengthen relationships. At the same time, though, village leaders and their relatives were directly affected by the project and had the same interests as other affected people. They had responsibilities both to their fellow villagers and to government – yet even if they opposed government demands, compliance was expected of them.

In Phase 3, for example, the village leaders supported the option of resettlement in beneficiary urban areas, favoured by the South Township and Pine County governments. Yet a field survey had found that many affected people did not want to move out; some preferred backward resettlement and others had no idea whether the relocation site and compensation would be satisfactory. Another important factor was the village's significant holdings of forested land. Farmers worried that they would lose control of this property if they were moved out. In Phase 3, therefore, the village leaders' positions were supportive of the government rather than their fellow villagers, suggesting that they were responding to government expectations and perhaps hoping to benefit thereby.

In Phase 5, in view of the anticipated diminishment of East Village's environmental capacity, the resettlement specialist proposed moving some affected people out at a meeting attended by the county PMO, project owner and village leaders. The village leaders showed interest in the suggested move, which would also have provided the affected people with more alternatives. However, it was vigorously rejected by the county PMO, which insisted that the same policies should apply to all affected people, reasoning that different options would increase its workload and thereby complicate its implementation of the land acquisition and resettlement. Also, the project owner maintained that all parties concerned had accepted the backward resettlement scheme in principle and said it did not want to go back to square one. Under these circumstances, East Village had to accept backward resettlement.

To support the option of backward resettlement, at Phase 5 in the field visit composed of various stakeholders the county PMO asked the village leaders to provide the design institute staff with the genuine land area[5] of the village. The village leaders then revealed that the actual land areas were three times the official figure, meaning that the acquired land made up only 20 per cent of the

total farmland, not 60 per cent as previously estimated. Thus, the remaining land after the reservoir submergence would be sufficient for resettling the affected villagers. From the very beginning, the village leaders and the local governments had clearly known that backward resettlement was feasible. Facing the risk and uncertainty of involuntary land loss due to inundation, they had significantly under-reported the true extent of their land assets, partly to strengthen their bargaining position with respect to higher levels of government. It is common practice to under-report farmland statistics in China – whether to seek promotion by reporting high farm yields, or to protect this critical asset in unequal negotiations over land use – but only at this meeting in Phase 5 did the full extent of the true figures emerge.

The Bright City Government

The Bright City government played a decisive role in the decision-making process and had to strike a balance among various stakeholders' different ideas. Although the Bright City government was the ultimate authority for Pine County and South Township, it still had to rely on the project owner, the Pine County and South Township governments and the design institute to facilitate its policies and carry them out in practice. Further, the Bright City government had a political obligation to maintain social stability and reduce social risks potentially caused by land acquisition and house demolition.

In the present case, realizing the complexity of the resettlement issues, the Bright City government strategically decided not to voice its opinion too early. Instead it let all the parties argue their case and negotiate first, listening to their suggestions and concerns. Only at the end did it make its final decision, which was not open to appeal. At this point the stakeholders had no choice but to adapt their positions and continue with the project.

Conclusions

This chapter has described the decision-making process of selecting a relocation strategy for East Village and has further analysed the main stakeholders (the international bank, governments at different levels, project owner, design institute, village leaders and affected farmers), their behaviours, motives, strategies, performances and interactions. The main stakeholders and their respective roles in the project are shown in Table 11.1. Table 11.2 presents their respective relationships.

In this case, the affected people's involvement and participation was at a nascent level. To meet the requirements of the international bank, the Bright City government encouraged the people affected to participate but controlled the level and depth of their participation, rendering it far removed from active, col-

Table 11.1. Main stakeholders and their roles in the relocation site decision-making process

Level	Stakeholders	Roles in Water Project	Benefits	Costs	Strategies adopted
International	International Bank	Provide the loan; project preparation; technical assistance; supervision	Loan interests; Promote its management style		Actively promote public participation; Facilitate the decision-making process
Municipal	City Government	Facilitate the project; Promote the foreign fund application; Resettlement policy-making; Coordinate local governments/departments	Public benefits; Political achievements		Listen to the ideas of the stakeholders concerned and make the decision at the right time
Municipal	Project Owner	Practical matters of project preparation and implementation; Participate in resettlement policy-making; Engage the Design Institute; finance and implement the resettlement plan	Complete the assigned tasks by City Government; Future profits	Cost of resettlement; Workload increase; Loan risk	Cost saving; Pursue profit; Reduce the workload and its difficulties
Provincial	Design Institute	Provide technical support; Conduct physical indicator surveys; Prepare the resettlement plan	Technical service provider; complete the tasks assigned by the City Government	Workload increase	
Township	Township Government	Assist the Project Owner, the Design Institute and the County Government in project preparation and implementation in the Township; Carry out the practical resettlement matters, such as policy promotion, compensation delivery; Help the affected people in house rebuilding and production rehabilitation; Maintain close communication with the village leaders and farmers	Complete the assigned tasks by the County Government; Take the fund support	Workload increase; Directly face the potential environmental risks and social conflicts	Ask for more benefits (resettlement compensation and coordination fund); Reduce its workload and difficulties; Reduce the possible environmental and social risks
Village	Village leaders/ village group leaders	Assist the Project Owner, the Design Institute and the County/Township Government in project preparation and implementation in the village; Assist the County/Township Government in resettlement activities; Coordinate the relationship between farmers and governments	Cooperation subsidy; Closer communication with the county/township officials	Collective-owned land acquired; Workload increase; Possible conflicts between village leaders and farmers	Apply for more compensation; Take advantage of information asymmetry (e.g. the actual versus claimed land area); Support the County and the Township Government when they had the same interests; Attempt to voice their own ideas when they were not supported by the governments
Village	Affected farmers	Accept the resettlement and rehabilitation arrangement by local government	No benefits, but mandatory compensation and rehabilitation measures for losses suffered	Land Acquired and houses/structures demolished	Demand more compensation

Table 11.2. Matrix of relationships among stakeholders in the relocation site decision-making process

Stakeholder A→B		B							
		Foreign Bank	**City Government**	**Project Owner**	**Design Institute**	**County Government**	**Town Government**	**Village Leader**	**Farmer**
A	**Foreign Bank**	——	Provision of Recommendations; facilitating the project	Provision of Recommendations; facilitating the project	Provision of Recommendations; facilitating the project	Provision of Recommendations; facilitating the project	Provision of Recommendations; facilitating the project	Encourage participation	Encourage participation
	City Government	Facilitate the project based on the requirements of Foreign Bank	——	Directly nominated	Indirectly engaged	The superior authority	——	——	——
	Project Owner	Facilitate the project based on the requirements of Foreign Bank	The influence on decision-making (Major)	——	Employed	Cooperation (Provision of Fund)	Cooperation (Provision of Fund)	——	——
	Design Institute	Refer to the requirements of Foreign Bank	The influence on decision-making (Medium)	Employed but technically neutral	——	Cooperation (Technology)	Cooperation (Technology)	——	——
	County Government	Refer to the requirements of Foreign Bank	The influence on decision-making (Medium)	Cooperation (in-kind support); Raising the requirement	Cooperation (in-kind support); Raising the requirement	——	The Superior	Provision support	——
	Township Govt	Refer to the requirements of Foreign Bank	The influence on decision-making (Minor)	Cooperation (in-kind support); Raising the requirement	Cooperation (in-kind support); Raising the requirement	The Inferior authority	——	Provision support	Provision support
	Village Leader	——	The influence on decision-making (Minor)	Voice ideas	Voice ideas	Voice ideas	Voice ideas	——	Provision support
	Farmer	——	The influence on decision-making (Minor)	Voice ideas (few opportunities)	Voice ideas (few opportunities)	Voice ideas (few opportunities)	Voice ideas (few opportunities)	Voice ideas (few opportunities)	——

laborative decision making, let alone empowerment. In reality, the outcome was a government-dominated process involving compromise by various stakeholders. That the negotiations unexpectedly resulted in resettlement in the home village, reflecting not only the wishes of both primary decision-makers – the city government and project owner – but also, according to the field survey, many of the people affected, was a fortuitous convergence rather than a conscious move to address the wishes of people affected.

Governments – especially at the higher level of the city – the project owner and the design institute all had more influence than the local villagers who were directly affected. Neither higher-level officials nor even the design institute staff responsible for preparing the resettlement plan had much direct contact with the affected people. Village leaders and local officials, faced with the risks and uncertainties of land acquisition, acted to protect their most important asset – the land itself – by under-reporting. When the township and county-level governments proposed resettlement strategies that maximized their own revenue benefits and minimized their responsibility for the social risks of resettlement, village leaders were expected to support the local government position rather than side with their fellow affected villagers in promoting a local solution. These stakeholders' influence on the decision making varied according to their authority, resources and bargaining capacity. The strategies they deployed determined the relative success of their involvement and the degree of benefits they were able to obtain.

This is not a unique case in China. It reflects several commonly encountered features, most notably the rapid pace of acquisition of land – including valuable farmland – in response to development imperatives, and the widespread, protective under-reporting of this critical asset by local-level cadres. It also illustrates the pressure on all levels of government in such circumstances and the strategies they employ, at different levels, to maximize their revenue positions and minimize their responsibilities for managing the risk of social discord during a resettlement – *before* ascertaining the preferences of affected people. The case reveals the importance of the negotiation process in determining outcomes, as well as the stakeholders' unequal bargaining positions in those negotiations, in which the people affected most by the project have the least bargaining power of all. In this context it appears difficult to ensure affected people's participation in making fundamental decisions that will impact their livelihoods, living standards and futures, such as where and how to relocate. This case demonstrates the constraints on participation even in an internationally funded project that are not domestically financed but involve international financiers that condition loan financing on commitment to meeting international resettlement policy standards. Even in this case there is a gap between policy and practice in participation in resettlement planning.

How, then, to improve public participation in the process of land acquisition and resettlement? How might affected people be provided with more opportunities to protect their rights and interests formally and substantially? How to

maintain the legal basis of local governments' decisions on public affairs so as to maintain communication and faith between these governments and farmers? These questions merit further exploration. For example, a top-down institutional reform by the central government could reduce the social risks of displacement and resettlement by mandating participation and providing frameworks for a participatory process. Programmes could be designed to improve participation by raising awareness among local governments and the affected farmers themselves. However, the mindset cannot be expected to change quickly; revenue-maximizing and risk-minimizing imperatives at the local government level must also be addressed. Supporting policies and measures from central government are needed to induce local government to widen and deepen the participatory process in resettlement, and to create a better sociopolitical environment that encourages affected people to take part.

Notes

1. Due to privacy issues, all names used in relation to the project are aliases.
2. A mu is a Chinese unit of land measurement, whereby 1 mu = 15 ha.
3. As per the resettlement policies and regulations in China, local government and its pertinent governmental departments are responsible for land acquisition and house demolition.
4. See, e.g., the Land Administration Law, effective 1 January 1999 and revised 28 August 2004; the *Regulations on Land Requisition Compensation and Resettlement for Construction of Large and Medium-sized Water Conservancy and Hydropower Projects*, issued 1 July 2006; the *Provincial Land Administration Regulation*, issued 24 September 1999; the *Provincial Administration Measures on Resettlement for Construction of Large and Medium-sized Water Conservancy and Hydropower Projects* of 2005; and the *Provincial Government's Reply on Compensation and Resettlement Rate of Acquiring National or Collective-owned Unused Land for Construction of Large and Medium-sized Water Conservancy and Hydropower Projects* of 2003 (all in Chinese).
5. The land area remaining after the reservoir submergence was an important indicator of environmental capacity and strongly affected the decision whether to move out or carry out backward resettlement.

References

Bao, H. and C. Wu. 2002. 'Construction of Land-loss Farmers' Social Security System' (in Chinese). *Management World* 10: 37–42.

Chen, J. and F. Qu. 2002. 'A Theoretical Analysis of Land Acquisition and the Land Acquisition Institution Reform in China' (in Chinese), *Jiangshu Social Science* 2: 55–59.

Guo, X. 2001. 'Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China', *China Quarterly* 166: 422–39.

Jia, S. and H. Zhang. 2002. *The Demonstration Study of China Land Non-agricultural Process and Mechanisms* (in Chinese). Shanghai: Shanghai Communication University Press.

Liao, X. 2005. *Study on China Land-loss Farmers* (in Chinese). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.

Liu, W. and J. Peng. 2006. 'Rational Calculation of the Land Expropriation Compensation Standard' (in Chinese), *China Land Science* 1: 7–11.

Lu, H. 2003. 'Land for Security: Basic Thoughts to Resettle Land-loss Farmers Properly' (in Chinese), *China Rural Survey* 6: 48–54.

Luo, D., et al. 2004. 'A Comparative Study of Different Benefit Distribution Mechanisms in the Non-agricultural Model of Rural Farmland' (in Chinese), *Management World* 9: 87–96.

Qian, Z. and F. Qu. 2004. 'Land Expropriation System in China: Introspection and Reform' (in Chinese), *China Land Science* 5: 5–11.

She, X. 2008. 'Cooperation and Unconfrontational Resistance: Tenacious Weapons of the Weak' (in Chinese), *Sociological Studies* 3: 1–28.

Wang, W., et al. 2009. 'Land Requisition Will of Farmers in Developed Regions and Its Influential Factors: A Case Study of Farmers in Suzhou' (in Chinese), *China Land Science* 4: 76–80.

Yang, W. 2004. *China Reservoir Rural Resettlement Model Study* (in Chinese). Kunming: Yunnan Fine Arts Press.

Conclusion

Susanna Price

This conclusion summarizes the legacy of social assessment in relation to people-centred development paradigms and practices, based on a range of perspectives from evaluators, researchers and civil society groups. Asking what comes next, given the changing global architecture, it concludes by highlighting the articulation of new discourses in recent initiatives in country regulatory frameworks and corporate self-regulation.

This book has contended that investment projects may trigger complex social impacts, which go well beyond the usual business risk assessment. But how effective are the 'texts' that promote people-centered development paradigms, as they are produced and enacted, or not, through multiple levels of actors, agents and management strategies? A slim body of evaluation studies provides some clues; social researchers provide other clues – with resultant dilemmas for practitioners.

The new global terrain features differentiated development practice in aid and investment, from new and re-emerging investors and donors. China's 'Going Out' policy orientation increasingly encounters Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards, which invoke sociological knowledge and encompass forms of social assessment, SIA and social due diligence. Would the adoption of such standards serve to reverse negative perceptions – whether justified or not – of China's global projects and programs, so providing a firm basis for continued global expansion? Addressing these questions resonates with the central contention of this book, which is that growth strategies have social consequences that need to be understood and addressed through sociological knowledge.

Artefacts, Abstractions or Obstructions?

Investment projects, the primary focus of this book, are a tangible manifestation of development, constituting a visible, often contentious arena for transforma-

tion. People in China, as elsewhere around the globe, question specific proposals for local sites: what impact will it have on my family's lifestyle, our community, our health, our livelihood, our security, our future?

Evolving global responses to such questions emerge from the people affected, civil society advocates, national regulatory frameworks and financiers from the public and private sectors. In this mix International Financial Institutions (IFI), have emerged as key agents of global governance (Sarfaty 2012). Civil society groups have mounted global campaigns addressing sites of contention about these questions, pressing developers to change the projects' design, location or scope – or to stop the projects altogether. Sometimes they have succeeded in stopping the IFI financing, but not the project, as in the Narmada case (Oliver-Smith 2010; Fisher 2009). Sometimes one IFI withdraws whilst another continues as financier (Rich 2013).

As financiers, IFIs have had significant opportunity to develop globally influential policies, methods and practices, and indeed, IFI 'texts' for social assessment have been closely informed by these questions and campaigns. Social assessment guidelines cast sociological knowledge into a new form – as instrumentalist practice with potential agency in development domains. The guidelines emerged through a powerful mix of elements: debates about the ethics of 'doing development'; aspirations to 'make a difference'; analyses of post-colonial power relations; deconstruction of development and its institutional embeddedness; changing policy worlds; and the growing strength of human rights standards. Detailed case studies of the social costs borne by vulnerable people demanded a response. Internal pioneers of social assessment aimed to make these social actors visible in planning, designing projects proactively for them and so making a difference to outcomes (Cernea, chapter 1, this volume). Such cases constituted an original impetus for the work of constructing social assessments, especially those deployed in support of the social safeguards established against the risks of impoverishing displacement and destruction of indigenous and minority people's ways of life. Social analysts continue to propose enhanced methods for safeguard policy application based upon their experience in local spaces (Ferguson and Zhu; Shi and Yu, this volume). Social analysts have also contributed more widely to developing policies and practices in social protection strategies and projects that address vulnerabilities directly (ADB 2013).

Risk assessment, risk minimization and mitigation have not been the sole focus of social assessment, however. Case studies of projects that failed to engage local interests or to fit in with local features, user preferences and priorities have generated new approaches for working with user groups, local planning groups and other local interests. This work has opened up creative possibilities and new energies for enhanced local directions in planning, budgeting and management, for example through community-driven development and community-based approaches (Robinson and McWilliam; McWilliam et al., this volume) and participatory monitoring (Arthur and Xiao, this volume). Social analysts have taken

the lead in pioneering new types of intervention that address social factors of poverty directly – for example, selecting projects through country-based poverty and social analysis, and designing social development programmes for social equity and productivity (IDB 2013). In a strengthening interface between social assessment and the discourse of human rights, social analysts are beginning to explore methods for integrated or stand-alone human rights assessments, whether aiming to avoid rights violations or to document contributions to rights achievement (Kemp and Owen this volume; Kemp and Vanclay 2013).

When such 'texts' for social assessment are designed within and for organizations, they become part of those organizational domains. The domains feature magnified vision statements on poverty reduction, participation and social development that draw upon and complement the 'texts'. Are the IFIs' 'texts' for social assessment – creative and inclusive as they are – merely abstractions without agency, window dressing disguising business as usual or policy artefacts that, by aligning with concepts such as poverty reduction, participation and social development, conjure an erroneous impression of 'putting people first'?

Organizational Culture

Organizational culture proves resilient. Sarfaty (2012) found that even after decades of carefully framed advocacy by social analysts, some World Bank staff still viewed social development as an obstruction to lending. By the late 1990s economists had, in counterpoint to policy changes, criticized the World Bank for becoming soft, fuzzy and unfocused as it responded to civil society critiques (Cao 2005: 35). Borrower governments and defenders of economic growth strategies criticized the increasing role of nonstate actors such as NGOs at both national and international levels, especially when some NGOs challenged the twin pillars of free trade and liberalization.

Lending imperatives place extraordinary pressures upon IFI operational staff and processes. The question of a culture that rewards loan approvals has dogged not only the World Bank, where for several decades it has been well documented but never fully tackled (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005), but other IFIs as well. This culture prioritizes loan approvals – the bigger and more speedily processed the better. Appraisal analyses comprising economic, financial, social, environmental, institutional and other analyses may have very little to do with the rationale for loan approval; whilst stopping new lending proposals can kill careers. Following project approval, supervision barely rates attention – certainly, major breaches of social, environmental and governance covenants may occasion little or no investigation (ibid.).

This means an extraordinary disconnect can prevail between policy rhetoric and social reality. Rich, for example, describes a World Bank African project

in which bank staff argued for financing an oil and gas pipeline on grounds of poverty reduction, new democratic institutions and newly minted participatory decision-making processes, whereas in fact the project accumulated a disturbing record of human rights abuses that included not only restrictions on free speech but also forced labour, beatings, rapes, torture and extra-judicial killings by state security forces (Rich 2013: 87–88). The project was finally abandoned in 2008. Whereas IFIs generally now adopt a supportive, albeit non-specific, human rights rhetoric, the detailed operational provisions for addressing human rights and penalizing violations are unevenly developed due to a mix of political, legal and internal resistance (Sarfaty 2012). In the forefront, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has pioneered the non-mandatory concept of human rights impact assessment, reflecting a recent boost in business interest in the topic following the issuance of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011.

Such detailed assessments of institutional embeddedness in the well-scrutinized World Bank Group, valuable though they have been, need to be replicated elsewhere amongst other public and private sector organizations. This would build comparative understanding of how sociological knowledge is animated in different domains; how it is constructed, conducted, managed, resourced, monitored and reported upon within different organizations at different levels. It would help in identifying any tensions in the strategic framework, management systems and planning processes that constrain social assessment; or unsupportive structural arrangements and lines of communication that resist change, as anticipated by Kemp and Owen in chapter 2.

New sources of aid and investment financing flows diminish the share of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in total global flows. Their management staff strive for new streamlined, more efficient lending modalities that are faster largely because they are subject to less scrutiny during what Cernea (this volume) regards as a key step in a project life cycle: project appraisal. Certain new modalities increasingly shift the bulk of the preparation work for sub-projects to the implementation stage – that is, after approval – where, inevitably under the pressure to lend, resources are scarce and in-country social regulatory systems are often undeveloped. In another strategy, the IFIs deploy fast-disbursing programme loan modalities with significantly less stringent safeguard standards. Increasingly, also, IFIs channel resources through their private sector branches, leaving fragile communities at the mercy of commercial practice.

Even as streamlined lending gains ground, a recent evaluation of IFC private sector lending found extensive knowledge gaps regarding poverty impacts (Rich 2013), while another evaluation observed a risk of 'compliance orientation on the part of the client', in which the management approach becomes merely a box-ticking exercise rather than a means of enhancing environmental and social performance outcomes on the ground (CAO 2012: 37). The latter evaluation

(ibid.: 38) also found that financial intermediaries likewise were not improving their sub-clients' performance as intended – in 40 per cent of its lending, therefore, IFC staff did not know the intended impacts of the lending or whether it was 'doing no harm' or reducing poverty. Meanwhile, several IFIs have streamlined safeguards into umbrella policies. The World Bank, the originator of these trademark policy bastions against impoverishment (Cernea, this volume), may contemplate something similar on grounds that the safeguards represent critical bottlenecks, or obstructions, leading to slow delivery and higher loan preparation costs (World Bank 2012).

The contiguous positioning of social assessment within the IFI institutional domain also raises questions about the fundamental philosophy of development and the broader arena in which it plays out, privileging economic growth above all. This factor influences the way social analysts have presented their 'texts'. It has also entailed various forms of deregulation and privatization of lending modes over several decades, with the effect of diminishing governance, environmental and social controls amongst borrower countries and increasing inequality (Rich 2013). Though IFI social staff and their partners strive to make a difference, they work within certain economic paradigms that have weakened regulatory frameworks in many of the borrower countries upon which implementation depends.

The growing interest in corporate social management plans opens up new possibilities for demonstrating a longer term commitment to social perspectives. In setting such plans, corporations explicitly enunciate support for certain social goals – mitigation of residual social risks, creation of opportunities for local people – and assign budgetary and staffing resources over time. Such plans can encompass adaptive management strategies over the project life, building on stakeholder engagement, and link to government and community priorities, backed by monitoring and reporting with independent verification (Franks and Vanclay 2013).

Evaluating the Record

Given these organizational ambiguities, one might ask whether social assessments contribute creatively to new approaches that result in better outcomes for people. Do these approaches actually reduce poverty, as is so often the articulated overall IFI objective? Evaluation studies, conducted in notionally independent IFI evaluation offices, may be considered either too critical or too uncritical, depending on the viewpoint. IFIs generally seldom undertake detailed social impact evaluation studies that could illuminate location-specific dynamics underlying social factors of poverty in relation to their programmes (ADB 2013). Regular assessments of progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals are largely delinked

from the contributions of specific projects and programmes. The common perception that evaluation is marginal to core lending imperatives arises from the absence of measures to hold staff accountable for project results (Weaver and Leiteritz 2005).

Social analysts have made strategic use of scarce, and significant, evaluation results to support the rationale for social analysis, couching the case in the instrumentalist terms of the dominant economic paradigm. In a classic example, an early study of completed projects found that incorporating sociocultural analysis into project design from the beginning not only improves the chances for project success but also, significantly, boosts economic rates of return (Cernea 1991: 429). Social analysis demonstrated its ability to 'add value' to understanding social and political realities amongst new borrowers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 1990s, leading to more positive project elements and practices in World Bank lending in these regions – even though the letter of the 'texts' was not always followed elsewhere amongst other borrowers (Cernea and Kudat 1997).

Where they have addressed the question, institutional evaluation studies have consistently demonstrated that use of social assessment has led to positive impacts for people affected by projects – up to a point. Social assessments have consistently suffered from being separate from mainstream planning (a recurring theme in evaluations that inform the use of social assessments in organizational contexts) as social assessment practitioners, working at both country and project levels, strive to overcome disciplinary differences, administrative separation, turf competition, geographic barriers and hierarchical distinctions (Rew 1997; World Bank 2005; 2010a; 2010b, 2011; ADB 2013). For example, despite new programming approaches and project-specific innovations arising from analysis of sociopolitical realities and local institutions, problems with the focus, timing and unused recommendations for social analysis merited discussion in the World Bank's 2005 mega-evaluation of 2,577 evaluated projects in nine thematic portfolios. This evaluation concluded that the potential massive contribution to poverty reduction could only be realized with more comprehensive exploration of the important link between social development inputs and poverty reduction outcomes. A related recurring pattern is the insufficient time and resources deployed for processing and implementation (e.g., IDB 2013).

Whilst no doubt a deeper and more systematic investigation into social evaluations – together with related thematic evaluations, for example, on gender equity – would present a far more nuanced result, this foray into the IFI evaluation record generally shows that social assessments make a difference in improving project social outcomes and people's lives. But, broadly, it appears that forms of social assessment as devised in multilateral spaces and regulatory practice still have untapped potential to address the social factors of poverty and to address social costs of projects that markets cannot resolve.

Social Research Perspectives

How have social researchers responded to the strengthened poverty paradigm and the possibilities for research into social factors of poverty that might have been expected to open up? Writing in the year 2000 from the perspective of a bilateral aid agency, Eyben charted shifts in the dominant thinking that, she believed, provided greater opportunities for the application of sociological knowledge: 'If the development discourse was about GNP then the post-development discourse is about relations' (Eyben 2000: 13). Departing from the focus on physical and economic targets, she posited a development discourse that allowed greater, if not exclusive, focus on process and relationships: from quantifiable outputs to qualitatively defined processes of change; from formulations exclusively about economic growth to formulations about beneficiaries. In a globalizing world of connectedness, new spaces had begun to foster alternative viewpoints, whilst nonstate agents such as NGOs were increasingly prominent and had begun to influence the setting of development agendas (Fisher 2009).

As poverty-focused projects and programmes roll out, critics have challenged the 'buzzwords' in the new vision statements as potentially meaningless as long as context, culture, power and difference remained unaddressed (Cornwall and Brock 2005). Echoing the post-development critique that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s to contend that seemingly benign, well-motivated, supposedly 'neutral' technocratic discourses often result in deeper inequality and expanded global poverty, many saw the new vision as a way to justify organizational existence, strengthen power and intrude into new social domains (Sarfaty 2012). The apparent subservience of the World Bank's new business models to an underlying neoliberal market paradigm was decried – as was the extent to which instruments of social development contributed to a wider consensus affirming market-led growth and poor countries' integration into global capitalism. Craig and Porter (2006) presented a Polanyian case of the dangers of overextending the neoliberal market that had led to the new agenda: the 'Poverty Reduction Paradigm', which had failed to substantively address the factors of poverty. Although the new agenda intensified poverty reduction strategies to create a more human face through opportunities for global market integration, the authors rated these strategies as no more than 'vague compromises with territorial governance around community, local partnerships and some kind of decentralization' (ibid.: 24–27). Deployed in peripheral local spaces, however, these strategies would, they contended, all too easily fall prey to elite capture, becoming 'weak, ephemeral, and easily re-colonized not by citizens but by NGOs, patrimonial powers, rogues and masqueraders' (ibid.: 253). In authoritarian regimes, participatory democratizing efforts 'could be easily co-opted as signs of regime openness' (ibid.: 16).

Others contested the use of participatory methods in the new agenda. Such methods generally aim to empower the poor by bringing their voice into decision-

making, thereby making development more responsive to their needs – yet social researchers questioned their efficacy in poor communities. Pottier, for example, argued for 'an empirically grounded understanding of how knowledge (s) is (are) produced through the mediation of unequal power relations' (Pottier, Bicker and Sillitoe 2003: 3) based on the understanding that knowledge cannot be separated from the social context and its power relations. Without due recognition of social processes and local power and politics, participatory approaches, in this view, risk becoming merely an add-on in analytical and policy agendas that are extraneous to the local situation. If production of knowledge is acutely political, then misreading local knowledge means misreading the potential for empowerment, resulting in a voice without influence.

By highlighting the political and social context in which such participatory poverty reduction strategies are located and employed, these critiques reinforced the importance of the social domain, whether addressed in the context of social knowledge, social inequalities and social class relations, or of reterritorialized and socially accountable governance of local communities. This served to refocus attention on development professionals and their milieu of operation – the perspective of those engaging in development discourses and often formulating policies and strategies, and the institutional dynamics that apply.

Anthropology has a long history of connecting local developments to those of international and global scale, or to macro-level-oriented disciplines such as politics and economics. Ferguson (2009: 1) identified a renewed focus on making such links, suspecting that 'the discipline has been trapped in this sort of valorization of the local … quite a disempowering kind of position for anthropology to occupy. It led to a sort of political impotence'. Edelman and Haugerud (2005) contended that, by focusing on cultural flows and project outcomes, social scientists may lose sight of the contentious world of development debates and simply absorb the 'seismic change' of neoliberal globalization by 'culturalizing and dehistoricizing the effects'. In this way, they might ignore the steeply rising inequality witnessed in economic, political and legal dimensions between 1960 and 1990 (ibid.: 4). Their work drew upon that of economists who first argued that the neoliberal paradigm had both failed and damaged the developing world – and then posited creative alternatives (Chang and Grabel 2004). How do such ambiguities impact on practitioners?

The Dilemmas of the Practitioner

In the specifics of lending practices, blurred linkages between goals and means create ambiguities in practitioner roles as well as potential liabilities for different stakeholders (Kemp and Owen; Dennis and Guldin; Gransow; this volume). There are serious questions about whether the 'texts' have, in terms of results

and outcomes, changed the development configuration and its priorities. In practice, entrenched interests may neglect or undermine the policy narratives formulated and adopted by institutions. Reflecting on experience at the World Bank, Bebbington et al. (2006: 5) recognized the magnitude of the challenge to change institutions through human agency in its 'reflexive, tactical and strategic dimensions'. Informed by their detailed grasp of social processes, social researchers might create novel approaches, but the organizational culture might deter recognition of real problems and fail to back the solutions.

Social development specialists facing dilemmas grapple with their own marginal positions within an organization. Mosse (2011: 85) has painted a picture of their marginality in institutions dominated by economists, which means that social specialists have to 'reinvent themselves and acquire new perspectives, methods and skills. They may experience profound professional disjuncture'. Organizations prize loyalty, but successful social analysts must be entrepreneurs. Their social policy models and strategies must be 'saleable', justifiable according to economic and operational criteria and able to meet institutional goals of moving more money faster whilst also satisfying external critics on social concerns (ibid.: 90). The increased importance of participatory process has made the 'constitution of expert development identities yet more complex' (ibid.: 17), as professionals recast themselves as 'facilitators' of participatory process. This recasting may conflict with their other roles as directors of programme delivery, responsibile to institutions for data quality, reporting, program implementation, budgets, and schedules, for translation of models and frameworks; and for turning the messy realities of aid delivery into the best possible light for potential financiers. Undoubtedly, these differing perspectives on the purpose, means and outcomes of development raise difficult issues for practitioners. Based on frank and reflexive assessments of underlying agendas, Dennis and Guldin, chapter 3, recommend abandoning notions of universal applicability, rather to highlight the need for greater awareness of and respect for local socio-political realities. They recommend strategic retreat if, due to contextual problems, the work is doing local people more harm than good. Gransow (chapter 7) highlights how participative practices can be construed in different contexts and for differing purposes. Kemp and Owen in chapter 2 highlight the challenge facing social specialists in transposing their findings and recommendations into quantitative planning domains when fuzziness is decried, qualitative interpretations are not favoured, and social outcomes are diffuse, often difficult to quantify and predict. Sociological knowledge can, in such circumstances, appear vague and fluid, revealing more problems than resolutions. Reflecting on different uses and understandings of knowledge between development practitioners and social scientists – and the fundamentally different rules about what kind of knowledge can be recognized and represented by each – Green (2012: 42–43; 55) suggested a two way exchange to bridge the divide: that development practitioners make knowledge

work in less instrumental ways, whilst social practitioners work reconstructively on sharing their more creative interpretations in new contexts.

Commenting on the mismatch between development ideals and their outcomes, McKinnon (2012: 174) highlighted the constant challenge to development workers, who face the prospect that their ostensibly pure and neutral methods will be co-opted by political agendas, through the 'messy politics of institutions, communities and nations'. Rather than insisting upon a 'universalising discourse of development' she advocated that development workers consciously adopt a particular set of ideals and desired outcomes in each case, acknowledging political realities and consciously engaging with the politics of development (ibid. 178).

Calls for more nuanced understandings are breaking the longstanding and seemingly unproductive deadlock of mutual critique between the 'texts' of practitioners and the 'texts' of their critics. Such understandings would encompass the ethnographic contexts in which ideas of development are made to matter and to acquire resonance in different social contexts so as to open up more productive 'spaces for hope' (Venkatesan and Yarrow 2012: 12). The articulation of reflexive social assessment may hold most promise in the opening up of new spaces that reflect the growing complexity of society.

The New Practitioners

Two key changes merit attention in this conclusion: business and aid engagement; and states' regulatory enhancement. Firstly, business has become a significant development partner, adopting voluntary codes of conduct and ethical behaviour. The United Nations (UN)'s Special Representative of the Secretary General for Business and Human Rights described a 'new global public domain' of broader governance systems, which encompass states, certainly, but also civil society as well as self-regulating business (Ruggie 2004:8). New investors – both public and private – from emerging economies, including China, are steadily increasing their share of investments globally. They must comply with criteria for environmental and social performance set out in both national legislation and inter-governmental agreements in their head office and countries of operation. Beyond this, there is an increasingly compelling rationale to comply with the new 'soft law' CSR standards between business strategy, civil action and public law and policy, comprising norms and expectations set in international spaces by citizens, including consumers, employees, investors and advocates. These 'soft law', non-statutory norms work through 'blended market signals and political processes that can be unfamiliar and uncomfortable for Chinese business' (Long et al 2009) – they can impact the financial bottom line. They may involve negotiations between states, business, civil society and labour organizations,

going beyond finance and technology to seek international competitiveness and broader societal goals, expressed in voluntary standards. Kemp and Owen (chapter 2) explored, within this context, the possibilities for social assessment or SIA to open up new alignments for creative initiatives and partnerships in a business context.

Secondly, in terms of new initiatives in state regulatory change, Mathur, for example, has described how, although India's government introduced the concept of SIA into the *National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy* of 2007, the concept has been only cursorily implemented in practice (Mathur 2011). However, the passage in September 2013 of the *Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act* may, if not altered, change outcomes for people displaced significantly, as it mandates SIA for certain types of displacements, and introduces a range of other innovations.

China's incremental steps towards social assessment within China, examined closely in several chapters in this volume (especially Price, Li, Xiao and Arthur, Wang and Ferguson and Zhu), are echoed in China's international operations, where projects remain the key modality of aid and financing operations. China's rapidly growing role as an international financier, engineer and builder, especially in large infrastructure development requiring resettlement, often in minority or indigenous areas (International Rivers, 2012), has brought these issues into sharp relief. Through such activities Chinese companies and financiers increasingly intersect with international standards in resource extraction, infrastructure development and other projects around the globe.

To take a major example, Chinese hydropower companies and banks are now the largest dam builders in the world. Chinese companies or financiers are involved in more than 300 dam projects (mostly for hydropower generation) in 70 seventy different countries around the world, nearly half of them located in Southeast Asia (International Rivers 2012: 4). Since many of the easier, low-impact dam projects have already been built, Chinese dam builders building take projects tend to be in remote, politically unstable areas that have with important significant ecological values, where often in countries often have with low environmental protection requirements, weak human rights protection, and high levels of corruption and weak regulatory requirements (ibid.). This immediately raises the question of environmental and social standards. According to observers, Chinese financiers have provided funding for projects previously rejected by other financing institutions due to noncompliance with social and environmental standards (examples include the Merowe Dam in Sudan, Gibe III in Ethiopia and the Bakun Dam in Malaysia). China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs requires dam builders and financiers to follow local laws and regulations, but in fact those standards may be low.

To combat such negative perceptions the Chinese government has attempted to 'regulate its national companies abroad and reorient investment strategies

to bring them in line with the concepts of sustainability and corporate social responsibility' (Maurin and Yeophantong 2013: 283). Chinese agencies are now taking a number of initiatives derived from international practice. A good track record with corporate social responsibility (CSR) standards can lower the cost of capital in terms of a firm's debt and equity (Leung et al. 2013). Adopting transparent environmental and social risk management systems and sustainability concerns can lead to competitive advantage in global markets – this helps to protect brands and secure capital sources, and also potentially enhances profits through better labour and community relations and through innovative product development. The notion of 'harmonious society' (Introduction to this volume), for example, encompasses a balance between growth, social equity and environmental protection.

China's former State Environmental Protection Agency and the IFC agreed to introduce the voluntary Equator Principles in China in 2008, which one Chinese bank has joined. Several Chinese banks have joined other global CSR reporting initiatives such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the UN Global Compact (Bai, Faure and Liu 2014). In February 2012, the China Banking Regulatory Commission released new *Green Credit Guidelines* that strengthen the 2007 Green Credit policy (ibid.) by focusing on environmental and social risk management in both domestic and overseas lending. Challenges to be addressed include those of integrating CSR reporting requirements into transaction procedures; developing social risk management experience and procedures; and broadening the information disclosure systems (ibid.).

The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which regulates the overseas investments of key state-owned enterprises (SOEs), has issued corporate social responsibility guidelines (2007) and requires enhanced risk assessment and mitigation; it is also building SOE capacity in risk management in overseas investments. Significantly, Chinese state-owned banks represent more than 50 per cent of all Chinese bank lending (ibid.). This commission oversees the performance of many Chinese dam building enterprises, such as Sinohydro, China Three Gorges Corporation and Gezhouba, auditing SOEs annually and reprimanding companies that perform poorly financially or violate safety and environmental standards in China.

In 2011 Sinohydro, the largest Chinese overseas hydropower enterprise, adopted its own policy framework for sustainable development, setting out a vision, commitments and timeline for implementation along with supporting policies on the environment, community relations, sustainable development and safety. Sinohydro has adopted the World Bank's safeguard policies as its minimum standard for resettlement and environmental issues, and recognizes the IFC performance standards on community relations. As for consultation, participation and access to information policies Sinohydro adopted free, prior, informed consent and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

However, little detail is available on how Sinohydro will implement these international standards.

Another actor in this sphere, the National Development Reform Commission, announced plans in 2012 to increase its jurisdiction over outward investments and streamline the approval process for both inbound and outbound investments. In late 2012, it released new draft regulations updating its 2004 overseas investment regulations.

Most recently, in February 2013, the Ministries of Commerce and Environmental Protection (2013) issued a 'Notification on Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation'. Though they deal mainly with environmental issues, the guidelines include social responsibilities. Article 3 requires efforts to respect the 'religious beliefs, cultural traditions and national customs of community residents of the host country', also to safeguard legitimate rights and interests of labourers, offer training, employment and re-employment opportunities to residents in the surrounding areas, promote harmonious development of local economy, environment and community, and carry out cooperation on the basis of mutual benefits.' Article 9 requires enterprises to take full account of the impacts that their developments, construction, production and operation activities have on features of the social environment, such as 'historical and cultural heritages, scenic spots and folk customs, and to take reasonable measures to reduce possible adverse impacts'. Article 20 instructs enterprises to establish a 'way of communication and dialogue mechanism' to effect social responsibilities, to take the initiative to strengthen contacts and communications with communities and relevant social groups, and to hear opinions and suggestions concerning the environmental impacts of their construction projects and operation activities through forums and hearings according to requirements of laws and regulations of the host country.

Leung et al. (2013) hail this notice as an initiative that could revolutionize the environmental and social impacts of Chinese institutions investing abroad. Though they recognize that the guidelines focus primarily on environmental issues and do not address social safeguard issues significantly, they represent an important first step towards developing a consistent approach across China's overseas investments. But whilst the policy terrain is undoubtedly expanding through intersection with civil society in new spaces, international standards and repetition of the key phrases, challenges remain. According to Leung et al. (ibid.) they are, first, lack of understanding of the market conditions, business custom, regulatory and legal environments in host countries; second, supervisory and coordination challenges amongst Chinese ministries; and third, implementation, raising questions about the sufficiency and coordination of resources, costs and time. To this might be added lack of effective risk management systems, and mechanisms for addressing customer preferences and complaints; lack of research and development experience, and absence of longer-term profit

strategy (Long et al. 2009). China's global operators may also lack experience in working with strong civil society advocates, and experience in robust stakeholder engagement.

The Reemerging Social Terrain

The Introduction to this volume noted China's extraordinarily successful rise, on a huge scale and in a compressed timeframe, marked by a diverse set of social impacts – widespread, initial poverty reduction, but also instability, anxiety, inequality and dislocation. The Introduction also found that China's rich tradition of local experimentation and local trials of state-initiated policies, built upon by the 1978 reformers, offers scope for testing and refining the application of sociological knowledge in local spaces. China's remarkable gains are often presented globally in a one-dimensional growth perspective, limiting our understanding of the multiple lessons from the experience. This volume has endeavoured to contribute to broader understandings.

This huge developmental experience, and its significant social transformation, is inevitably externalized, mostly implicitly, through its bourgeoning global interactions of aid, trade and international co-operation. Rather than taking a monolithic 'China Inc' form, the externalization has varying multi-dimensional forms involving values and visions of modernity by different public and private sector actors in different locations. This very diversity undermines recent efforts by key State agencies to address negative perceptions by setting uniform, responsible social and environmental standards both at home and abroad. In policy terms, global CSR frameworks appear, in adapted forms within China, translating back into domestic spaces unevenly, as set out in the Introduction and other chapters in this volume. Reflecting on the parameters of social assessment in global terrain thus converges with a more nuanced reflection on the social dimensions of the rise of China – dimensions which were originally set aside in the single minded search for growth.

The call for people-centred policy rhetoric – for 'putting people first' – still resonates, even in new initiatives in country regulatory frameworks and the private sector alike, and in the context of new discourses such as human rights. Will these calls remain in the purview of vision statements and policy rhetoric, or will they be backed by clear operational procedures, allotted the requisite time and resources, and detailed social impact evaluations that underpin future actions? Working in this complex terrain, practitioners addressing the social underpinnings of poverty and inequality face continual dilemmas demanding reflexivity, ethnographic savvy, political awareness and honest assessment of likely outcomes. Creating meaningful 'spaces for hope' is the challenge that lies ahead.

References

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2013. *2013 Annual Evaluation Review*. Independent Evaluation. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Bai, Y. M. Faure, and J. Liu 2014. 'The Role of China's Banking Sector in Providing Green Finance' in *Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum*, 24(89):90–140.

Bebbington, A., S. Guggenheim, E. Olson, and M. Woolcock. 2004. 'Exploring Social Capital Debates at the World Bank', *The Journal of Development Studies*, 40:5, 33–64.

Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO). 2012. *Audit of a Sample of IFC Investments*. Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman / IFC / Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency / Members of the World Bank Group. Retrieved 15 August 2014 from http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/documents/Audit_Report_C-I-R9-Y10-135.pdf.

Cao, L. 2005. 'An Evaluation of the World Bank's New Comprehensive Development Framework', in M.B. Likosky (ed.), *Privatising Development: Transnational Law, Infrastructure and Human Rights*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 27–64.

Cernea, M. (ed). 1991. *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development*, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Cernea, M.M. and A. Kudat (eds). 1997. *Social Assessments for Better Development: Case Studies in Russia and Central Asia*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Chang, H.-J. and I. Grabel. 2004. *Reclaiming Development: an Alternative Economic Policy Manual*. London: Zed Books.

Cornwall, A. and K. Brock. 2005. 'Beyond Buzzwords: "Poverty Reduction", "Participation" and "Empowerment"', in Development Policy, UNRISD, Overarching Concerns: Programme No. 10. Geneva: UNRISD.

Craig, D. and D. Porter. 2006. *Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Edelman, M. and A. Haugerud. 2005. *The Anthropology of Development and Globalisation: From Classical Political Economy to Contemporary Neo-liberalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Eyben, R. 2000. 'Development and Anthropology: A View from Inside the Agency', *Critique of Anthropology* 20(1): 7–14.

Ferguson, J. 2009. *James Ferguson on Modernity, Development and Reading Foucault in Lesotho*. Retrieved 8 August 2014 from http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/11/theory-talk-34.html.

Fisher, W.F. 2009. 'Local Displacement, Global Activism: DFDR and Transnational Advocacy', in A. Oliver-Smith (ed.), *Development and Dispossession: The Anthropology of Displacement and Resettlement*. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, pp. 163–80.

Franks, D. and F. Vanclay. 2013. 'Social Impact Management Plans: Innovation in Corporate and Public Policy' in *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 43: 40–48.

Green, M. 2012. 'Framing and Escaping: Contrasting Aspects of Knowledge Work in International Development and Anthropology' in Venkatesan, S. and T. Yarrow (eds). *Differentiating Development: Beyond an Anthropology of Critique*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 42–57.

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2013. *IDB 9: Assessment Strategy for Equity and Productivity*. Washington, D.C.

International Rivers. 2012. *The New Great Wall. A Guide to China's Overseas Dam Industry*. Online report. Retrieved 19 August 2014 from http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/intlrivers_newgreatwalls_2012.pdf.

Kemp D. and F. Vanclay. 2013. 'Human rights and impact assessment: clarifying the Connections in practice', *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal*, 31(2): 86–96.

Leung, D. and Zhao, Y. 2013. *Environmental and Social Policies in Overseas Investments: Progress and Challenges for China*, in collaboration with T. Hu and A. Ballesteros. World Resources Institute.

Retrieved 12 December 2014 from http://pdf.wri.org/environmental_and_social_policies_in_overseas_investments_china.pdf.

Long, G, S. Zadek, and J. Wickerham, 2009. *Advancing Sustainable Competitiveness*. Accountability, DRC, International Institute for Sustainable Development. Retrieved 20 August 2014 from http://www.accountability.org/images/content/0/7/070/AccountAbility%20-%20ADVANCING%20SUSTAINABLE%20COMPETITIVENESS%20OF%20CHINA%20.pdf.

McKinnon, K. 2011. Development Professionals in Northern Thailand: Hope, Politics and Practice, ASAA Southeast Asia Publications Series, Singapore: Singapore University Press, University of Hawaii and Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.

Mathur, H.M. 2011. 'Social Impact Assessment: A Tool for Planning Better Resettlement', *Social Change* 41(1): 97–120.

Maurin, C. and P. Yeophantong, 2013. 'Going Global Responsibly? China's Strategies Towards "Sustainable" Overseas Investments' in *Pacific Affairs*: 86 (2): 281–303.

Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China. 2013. *Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation*. Retrieved on 20 August 2014 from http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml.

Mosse, D. (ed.). 2011. *Adventures in Aidland: the Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Oliver-Smith, A. 2010. *Defying Displacement: Grassroots Resistance and the Critique of Development*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Pottier, J., A. Bicker and P. Sillitoe. 2003. *Negotiating Local Knowledge: Power and Identity in Development*. London: Pluto Press.

Rew, A. 1997. 'The Donor's Discourse: Official Social Development Knowledge in the 1980s', in R. Grillo and R. Stirrat (eds), *Discourse of Development: Anthropological Perspectives*. Oxford: Berg, pp. 82–102.

Rich, B. 2013. *Foreclosing the Future: The World Bank and the Politics of Environmental Destruction*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Sarfaty, G. 2012. *Values in Transition: Human Rights and the Culture of the World Bank*. Stanford Studies in Human Rights. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Weaver, C. and R. Leiteritz. 2005. 'Our Poverty Is a World Full of Dreams': Reforming the World Bank', *Global Governance* 11: 369–88.

World Bank. 2005. *Putting Social Development to Work for the Poor: An OED Review of World Bank Activities*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2010a. *Safeguards and Sustainability Policies in a Changing World: An Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2010b. *Analyzing the Effects of Policy Reforms on the Poor: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of World Bank Support to Poverty and Social Impact Analyses*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2011. *Implementation of the World Bank's Indigenous People's Policy: A Learning Review (FY 2006-2008)*. OPCS Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

———. 2012. *World Bank Safeguard Policies*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Venkatesan, S. and T. Yarrow (eds). 2012. *Differentiating Development: Beyond an Anthropology of Critique*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Contributors

David Arthur is a Senior Partner with Environmental Resources Management (ERM) and the Regional Manager of ERM's Shanghai office. He is a Chartered Civil Engineer and has specialized in engineering and environmental management for more than forty years, leading a wide range of environmental and social consultancy projects for governments, the World Bank, the ADB and the private sector.

Michael M. Cernea, Research Professor of Anthropology and International Affairs at George Washington University, is also Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. He served at the World Bank from 1974 through 1997 as the bank's first-ever sociologist and as Senior Adviser for Social Policies and Sociology. He formulated several of the World Bank's fundamental social safeguard policies, including the involuntary resettlement policy, the operational policy on social analysis in development projects and the policy on cultural heritage and development. Some of these social safeguard policies have been widely adopted by other international financial institutions and by bilateral aid agencies of all countries in the OECD. Dr. Cernea is a full member of the National Academy of Sciences of Romania since 2012. Prizes include the American Anthropological Association's Kimball Award for Public Policy (1998), the Society for Applied Anthropologists' (SfAA's) Bronislaw Malinowski Prize (1995); and the Sociological Society of Romania's Omnia Opera prize (2012). He has authored and edited over thirty collections and monographs on development issues and more than 300 studies on social organization, population resettlement, risks analysis, land tenure systems, social methodologies and the role of sociological knowledge in development. Cernea's diagnostic model on impoverishment risks and reconstruction has been influential in many countries. His publications include *Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Development* (1985, 1991), translated and published in Japan, China, France, Indonesia and Mexico.

Marcelino de Jesus da Costa received a bachelor's degree in socioeconomic science in agriculture from the National University of Timor-Leste in 2007 and is currently studying for an M.Sc. in agricultural science at the University of Western Australia, Perth. From 2006 to 2009 he worked on the Seeds of Life programme as a data management assistant involved in analysing agronomic and social science survey data.

Aaron Kyle Dennis (M.Sc.) is Director for Business Development and Research at Cross Cultural Consulting Services. Specializing in anthropological analysis of social development policy and operational initiatives, especially indigenous peoples' safeguards, he has assisted with the ADB Safeguard Policy Update and the World Bank Study on Vulnerable Groups Safeguard Policies.

Scott G. Ferguson is currently a Principal Social Development Specialist (Safeguards) in the East Asia Department of the Asian Development Bank, Manila. He is responsible for oversight and guidance of social safeguard aspects of the East Asia Department's loan processing and loan administration portfolios, which include projects in the PRC and Mongolia. He reviews new project proposals to ensure they meet the ADB's safeguard policy requirements and supervises project implementation to ensure safeguard compliance. He has worked on social development issues since 1981 and since 1986 has specialized in the field of project-induced involuntary resettlement, particularly in the PRC.

Diana Glazebrook worked collaboratively with Timorese researchers to do anthropological research on subsistence agriculture and health-care-seeking behaviour in Timor Leste. Before that, she carried out independent fieldwork in Papua New Guinea to produce an ethnography of a settlement for West Papuan refugees, and in Iran and Australia, where she investigated the resettlement strategies of Hazara asylum seekers from Afghanistan. Diana's current work focuses on the detention, processing and resettlement of asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea under the Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Diana has a Ph.D. in anthropology from the Australian National University.

Bettina Gransow is a Professor in the Freie Universität Berlin and is currently teaching at the School of Sociology and Anthropology at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, PRC. She studied sinology, sociology and political science at Freie Universität, where she was awarded her Ph.D. and postdoctoral habilitation. Her research focuses on contemporary Chinese social issues, including internal migration (voluntary and involuntary) and megacity development, civil society in China, social risk analysis and social assessment in investment projects. She has

written extensively on social issues in contemporary China, including social research social assessment, health and migration.

Gregory Eliyu Guldin is an applied anthropologist with expertise in urbanization, rural-urban migration and international development projects in many regions, especially China and elsewhere in Asia. Cross-cultural facilitation has been a major part of his professional approach; he has organized international workshops and training seminars on a wide array of topics ranging from delivery of urban social services to marginalized communities, to urban research methodology. An internationally recognized authority on the development of the social sciences in China, he is the author of *The Saga of Anthropology in China: From Malinowski to Moscow to Mao* (1994); and *Anthropology in China: Defining the Discipline* (1990).

Deanna Kemp is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining at the University of Queensland, Australia. She has researched issues of mining and human rights, conflict, gender, and development and social assessment. For the past fifteen years, her work has concentrated on social-justice-related issues in large-scale industries (primarily mining). She has a particular interest in industry responses to community relations and development challenges. She has published in the *Journal of Cleaner Production* (water and human rights), the *Journal of Business Ethics* (conflict and human rights), the *Community Development Journal* (human rights and development) and *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management* (human rights and community relations), where she is also a member of the editorial board.

Li Kaimeng is the Director of the Centre for Investment Project Feasibility Studies and Evaluation within the China International Engineering Consulting Corporation and a pioneer of the introduction and application of project social assessment in China. His research interests include project appraisal theory and methodology, social assessment of investment projects in China and macroeconomic policy and development planning. He is the editor or author of over twenty books and more than 100 research papers on the feasibility of enterprise investment, macroeconomic policies, social development and financial assessment of development projects, as well as strategic development of Chinese industry.

Modesto Lopes is currently undertaking a Master-level degree in agriculture at the University of Western Australia's School of Agriculture and Resource Economics. He is from Dili in Timor-Leste and worked as a social science researcher and monitoring and evaluation officer in the Seeds of Life programme within the Timor-Leste Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries from 2006 to 2010.

Andrew McWilliam is currently Senior Fellow and Head of Department in the School of Culture, History and Language at the Australian National University, Canberra. His experience ranges from academic research at the ANU, the University of Leiden, and Cornell and Yale Universities to development-focused research and technical advice for the Australian Agency for International Development (1997–2004), among others. His current research interests, focused on Indonesia and East Timor, include ethnography, minorities and governance; customary land and resource tenures; social impacts of mining and other extractive resource industries; religious practice and conversion; and applied anthropology in economic development.

John R. Owen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining at the University of Queensland, working primarily in the fields of resettlement, social monitoring, community engagement and social development, largely in the Asia Pacific. His research interests also include community-based conflict, local economic development and community relations practice. He has published two books: *Voices from the Coalface: Practitioner Perspectives on the Challenges of Community-Based Work* (2008) and *The History of the Moral Economy* (2009), in addition to several recent articles examining the contemporary conceptual and practical dilemmas of operationalizing corporate social responsibility in the mining sector.

Susanna Price, currently a Research Associate in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University, was the first social development specialist recruited by the Asian Development Bank, Manila, to implement ADB's 1995 policy on involuntary resettlement. Before that, she was a Senior Specialist in AusAID, the Australian bilateral development assistance programme. International prizes include the Praxis Award of the Washington Association of Professional Anthropologists (2003) for her work on resettlement policy enhancement in the Asia Pacific region. She publishes on displacement, resettlement and social assessment, and has written numerous operational guidelines and handbooks on social development and resettlement issues.

Kathryn Robinson is Professor in Anthropology at the Australian National University in the School of Culture, History and Language, College of Asia and the Pacific, and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia. Until recently, she was editor of the *Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* and was President of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. Since 1976 she has done research in Indonesia on issues including mining and development, gender relations, migration and the Internet. Since 1980 she has worked extensively in development in Southeast Asia, focusing especially on social, gender and community issues, providing advice for NGOs, AusAID and the ADB.

Shi Guoqing is Professor and Dean of the Public Administration School of Hohai University, Nanjing, and Director of the National Research Centre for Resettlement and Social Development Institute. He received a bachelor's degree in water conservancy and hydropower in 1982 and a master's degree from Hohai University in 1989. He worked in Delft University of Technology, Netherlands as a resource person and was Team Leader in Integrated Water Resources Management in 2000 and 2003. He is the Chair of the Membership Committee and was a Member of the Boarding Committee (2010–2012) of the International Water Resource Association. He has been an adviser to the World Bank and ADB since 1994 and in 2000 became one of the founding members of the International Displacement and Resettlement Network. He is also a Member of the *International Association for the Study of Forced Migration*, Chairman of Resettlement and Migration Committee of the Chinese Sociology Association and Vice-Chairman of the Resettlement Committee of the Chinese Hydropower Engineering Association. His academic fields include involuntary resettlement, social development, applied sociology and economics and integrated water resources management. He has published ten books and more than 200 papers, and received ten national or provincial Science Awards.

Wang Xiaoyi is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Rural Environmental Social Studies, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He began his studies of rural development in 1987 after graduating from Nankai University, China, focusing on rural enterprise development, rural finance, poverty reduction and, recently, environmental conservation. He has published four books on China's eastern coastal countryside (which has experienced rapid economic growth over the past thirty years), discussing the role of informal institutions – informal finance, lineages and small enterprises – in rural development. Shifting his research focus to western China, considered a less developed area confronting rapid economic growth in the past two decades, he concentrated on certain government policies and efforts, asking why they had not worked well to reduce poverty and promote conservation.

Xiao Jianliang (Elisa) is a Principal Consultant with Environmental Resources Management in China and leads the company's resettlement and social practice. Her expertise includes resettlement planning and monitoring; stakeholder consultation; environmental, social and health impact assessment; environmental due diligence; social auditing; and community engagement. She has an M.Sc. in marine chemistry from China Ocean University and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in sociology at Hohai University, specializing in resettlement.

Anita Ximenes is a Social Science Researcher and Monitoring and Evaluation Officer in the Seeds of Life programme in the East Timor Ministry of Agriculture

and Fisheries, where she has worked since 2006. Previously she was a research assistant in the USAID-supported Agriculture Rural Development Program. She received a bachelor's degree in socioeconomics in agriculture from the National University of East Timor in 2009.

Yu Qingnian is Associate Professor and Director of the Land Resource Management Institute, College of Public Administration, Hohai University, Nanjing. She completed her Ph.D. in the Department of Geography at the University of Liverpool. In 2006 she joined the National Research Centre for Resettlement at Hohai University. In the past five years, she has been involved in many internationally financed projects in China as a resettlement or social specialist conducting resettlement planning, monitoring and evaluation, and social evaluation. Her current research areas include resettlement, land policy, rural development, public participation, climate change and migration.

Wenlong Zhu, currently a Senior Safeguard Officer (resettlement) of the Asian Development Bank based in the Resident Mission in the PRC, is responsible for supervision and administration of land acquisition and resettlement implementation under ADB-financed projects in the PRC. As the PRC Resident Representative's leading authority on social safeguard policy, he also assists ADB Headquarters in conducting resettlement policy dialogue with the PRC government through various technical assistance projects.

Glossary

Community Development (CD): CD approaches typically support communities as they identify, articulate and pursue their own development objectives. Whilst CD approaches encompass different methods of engagement in different relational circumstances, they also emphasize accountability – to local communities for outcomes, and to aid agencies for funds received.

Community-driven Development (CDD): A World Bank initiative, CDD aims to give community groups control over decision making and the use of block grant resources for local development, especially in infrastructure projects. Operating on the principles of local empowerment, participatory governance, demand-responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability and enhanced local capacity, CDD intends that communities should become active participants prioritizing their own development needs and acting upon them.

Empowerment: Whilst meanings vary in different sociocultural and political contexts, most definitions of empowerment focus on gaining power and control over decisions and resources that determine the quality of one's life, usually to overcome structural inequalities that affect entire social groups. In development financing this means placing decision making for design and implementation of certain project activities and budgeting in the hands of communities.

Gender and Development: Promotes women's economic and social empowerment based on the concept of gender equality as both a fundamental human right and an essential element of poverty reduction and improved living standards, sustainable economic growth, and effective and accountable governance.

Involuntary Resettlement: Development-forced displacement generates risks as people displaced face impoverishment upon the loss of their homes, productive assets, resources, socio-economic networks and/or income sources. Com-

pensation alone may be insufficient to address the full range of losses, shifting the risks to often vulnerable people affected. Rehabilitation strategies that aim to achieve developmental outcomes must deal with a range of risk for those displaced: their productive skills may be less applicable to new contexts and competition for resources greater; their community institutions and social networks may be weakened; kin groups may be dispersed; cultural identity and traditional authority and the potential for mutual help may be undermined. Policies on involuntary resettlement include safeguards to ensure no-one is worse off, to address and mitigate these impoverishment risks through socio-economic census and survey, participative resettlement planning, management, and monitoring and evaluation.

Participation: Definitions vary. Broadly, in the context of project investments, this term signifies strategies for sharing information with, consulting with and involving stakeholders, including the people affected by project investments, in decision making on the project's design and implementation.

Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E): A process by which stakeholders at various levels monitor or evaluate a particular project, programme or policy; share control over the content, process and results of the PM&E activity; and engage in identifying and taking corrective actions.

Social Analysis: In the context of development interventions, social analysis is the conscious application of sociological methods, tools and approaches to predict outcomes, screen out social risk, enhance sustainability, and maximize benefits for identified social actors, especially affected people, through specific strategies and planning measures. During the project investment cycle, social analysis can be used in impact identification; preparation and design for measures and programmes; implementation, management and review. It can also apply in country, sector, thematic or policy analysis and decision making, as well as in project selection, and may be closely linked to achieving social development objectives.

Social Assessment: The actions that borrower countries, agencies or corporations take to enhance a project's social sustainability through identifying social risks early, designing countermeasures, and managing them actively throughout the life of a project and, if necessary, beyond. In an earlier usage it meant social analysis with pronounced emphasis on participatory approaches. In the Chinese context, social assessment often means a focus on human factors, the potential social impacts arising from projects, assessment of the mutual adaptability between projects and society, and analysis of possible social risks and countermeasures to eliminate any harmful impacts.

Social Development: Definitions vary, but the term generally denotes the promotion of policies and institutions that support greater inclusiveness and equity in access to services, resources and opportunities; empowerment of poor and marginalized groups to participate in social, economic and political life; and security to cope with chronic or sudden risks, especially for poor and marginalized groups.

Social Impact Assessment (SIA): Originally introduced as part of a regulatory framework of investment planning, SIA meant analysis – conducted before an investment project's approval – of likely project impacts on human and cultural environments. The SIA was presented in an environmental impact statement, together with actions to address and monitor those impacts. More recently, SIA means the processes of analysing, monitoring and managing intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, programmes, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions. Its primary purpose is to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment. SIA can extend beyond a regulatory framework to signify initiatives by communities, governments or corporations to undertake their own assessment of social impacts as a participative planning exercise to shape and address their development objectives.

Social Policy: Policy and operational procedures for protecting the world's vulnerable groups and communities and/or achieving social development objectives.

Social Protection: Policies and programmes that aim to reduce people's vulnerabilities by promoting efficient labour markets, reducing people's exposure to risks and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves from hazards and interruption or loss of income.

Social Safeguards: Policies introduced to protect individuals and groups from the negative impacts (primarily defined as involuntary resettlement or disruption of indigenous peoples' traditional land use and livelihoods) of project and programme investments.

Index

A

accountability, viii, 8, 10, 72, 87, 103, 104, 122, 179, 186
Administrative Regulation on Government-financed Investment (China), 153–54
affected community. *See* project-affected people
agricultural land converted to urban land. *See* land acquisition in China
agriculture in Timor-Leste, 126–41
aid harmonization, 8
Aidland, 4
'aidnography', viii, 36
American Sociological Association meetings, 43
Amnesty International, 67
anonymity, 95–96
anthropology and anthropologists
definitions of 'community', 105
development anthropology, 38
linking local and global developments, 269
practice and research, 62–64
public anthropology, 36
at World Bank, 43, 45, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 56n12
Apthorpe, R., 4, 5
Aronson, Dan, 55
Arrighi, G., 13
Arthur, David, 19, 145
Asia Pacific region
Asian financial crisis, 23n8
AusAID work (*see* AusAID projects)
metals and mining revenues, 60
mining sector, 60–78
Asian Development Bank, 52, 99n9
China activities, 166, 168, 214–16, 219, 223, 228–29
Millennium Development Goals adopted, 8
observation on land-loss farmers, 226
and participation processes, 227
policy documents, 156
policy 'text', 7–8
project social impact assessment, 228–29, 231, 234–35, 239n26
social analysis concept, 2
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, China, 273
asymmetric bargaining power, 14, 21
AusAID, 104, 124n3, 139
Advisory Group, 105, 106, 117
Country Programme Strategy, 115, 116
independent review of, 107, 116
Policy Advisory Group, 106
AusAID projects, 33–34
community development approaches, 104–5, 106, 117
effectiveness and achievements, 106–7, 122–23
review of community development approaches, 105–24
technical assistance, 115–16
Australian Agency for International Development. *See* AusAID
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, 139
Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme (ACCESS),

Indonesia 2002–2007, 108–14, 117, 119, 120, 122
Australian National University, 67–68, 139
authority and legitimacy, 86, 97, 98

B

Barrick Gold, 66
baseline studies. *See* socio-economic baselines
basic human needs, 5–6, 21
battlefields of knowledge, 45–46, 55
Batu Hijau mine, Indonesia, 66, 68
Baum, Warren, 51
bilateral agencies, 3, 6, 52, 83, 103, 106, 111, 115–19, 124n11–12
Brazil, 48–49
business aid engagement, 32–33, 271–72

C

Canada, 74–75, 239n23
capacity-building, 62, 103, 109, 111–24. *See also* participation
  social assessment capacity in China, 159–60, 225, 234, 237
capitalist practices, 7, 12–13, 15–16, 19, 268
cassava, 132, 134, 136, 140n6
Centre for Legumes in Mediterranean Agriculture, University of Western Australia, 140n5
Cernea, Michael M., 6, 20, 32, 68–69, 222–23
Chaogang Wang, 57n15
Chen Xiwen, 201
China
  Australian aid, 105
  Chinese people travelling abroad, 148
  conservation policy and projects, 145, 201–11
  development projects, 144, 147–61, 164–82, 185–99
  development strategy, 150–51
  economic and social development planning, 16–22
  environmental law and guidelines, 155, 161n13, 274
  Five-year Plans, 16–18, 22, 148, 150, 186
  governmental technologies, 144–45, 164–82
  hydropower and dams projects, 53, 160n6, 219, 230, 238n14–16, 272, 273
  in international community, 149
  investments overseas, 149, 198–99, 272–73
  involuntary resettlement, 145
  mining and minerals demand, 60
  Ministries (*see* Ministry of ...)
  modes of governance, 14–16
  overseas students, 148
  population, 12
  post-1978 transformation, 1, 12–22, 148–51, 158–60, 165–67, 275
  poverty, 148–49
  regulations and standards, 151, 156–58, 197–99, 273–74
  social analysis adoption, 52–53
  social costs of economic growth, 11–14, 17, 22, 148–49, 168, 169
  social development practices, 84, 85–86, 94–95, 151, 196–97 *see also* social assessment in China
  social protest and complaints, 13–14, 35, 164, 171, 178, 181n2, 201–2
  sociological knowledge in planning, 18–22
  state-owned enterprises, 273
China Academy of Social Sciences, 99n9
China International Engineering Consulting Corporation, 152, 161n11, 170
Chinese Land Survey and Planning Institute, 223
Chinese social reality, 18
Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project, 186–97, 239n30
Chongqing Urban Environmental Project, 186, 187, 197
Christoffersen, Leif, 56n5
civil society, 8, 14, 62, 91, 92, 119, 121, 165–66, 178, 181n4, 185
civil society organizations, 54, 65, 88, 92, 93–94, 112–14, 118, 120, 166, 181n8, 263
command-and-control, 16, 145, 185, 187, 196, 199n2
Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, 124n3, 139
community development, 103–24
  achievement of development goals, 117–21
  approaches, 104–5
  Asia Pacific region, 33–34, 105–17
  Australian funding, 105
  defined, 284
  operational principles of good practice, 109–17

Community Development Scheme (CDS), Papua New Guinea 1998–2007, 107, 111–14, 116–17, 119, 120, 121, 122
community-driven development, 8, 10, 84, 104, 115, 284
community empowerment. *See* empowerment
community engagement. *See* participation
Community Peace and Restoration Fund (CPRF), Solomon Islands 2000–2005, 107, 113, 114, 120, 122
Community Sector Programme (CSP), Solomon Islands 2005–2007, 108, 113, 114, 115, 120
Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project (CWSSP), East Timor 2002–2005, 108, 113, 114, 120, 121, 122
compensation for resettlement, 149, 161n14, 174, 175–77, 213–36. *See also* resettlement
complaints. *See* grievances; social protest and complaints
conduct of conduct, 14
conservation policy and projects in China, 145, 201–11
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research, 128
Cook, Cynthia, 55
corporate capture, 67
corporate self-regulation, 3, 262, 271
corporate social responsibility, 61, 64–67, 69, 70, 74, 76–78, 262, 265–66, 271, 273–75. *See also* private sector development
crop productivity, 129, 131
crop varieties, 127, 128, 130, 134
  variety testing, 128–29
  variety trials on-farm, 129–30, 132–36
Cruz, Chona, 55
cultural heritage, 3, 74–75, 76, 156
cultural sensitivity, 210
cultural sites, 210

D

dams projects, 12, 53, 95, 160n6, 161n15, 219, 230, 238n14–16, 272, 273
Dani, Anis, 55
Davis, Gloria, 55, 57n12, 99n9
Davis, Sheldon, 49, 55
de Regt, Jacomina, 55
de Sardan, J.O., 4
Dean, Mitchell, 167, 169, 172–73, 182n17
decentralization, 119
demand-driven principle, 103, 110, 111–12
Deming cycle, 70, 72
Dennis, Aaron, 33
development agencies. *See* AusAID; international financial institutions; USAID; World Bank
development anthropology, 38. *See also* anthropology and anthropologists
development discourse, ix, x, 1, 4–7, 61–64, 69, 84
development-forced displacement and resettlement, xi, 3, 21–22, 48–49, 53, 149, 153, 154, 160n6. *See also* involuntary resettlement
development goals, 103, 107, 117–21
development projects in China. *See under* China
development sociology, 38, 45. *See also* sociological knowledge
development thinking, paradigm shift, 180–81
developmentalist configuration, 4–5
dialogue. *See also* development discourse
  between disciplines, 45–46
  on role of social assessment, 61, 73
Didipio, Philippines, 66
Disclosure Policy (IFC), 8–9
discourse. *See* development discourse
displacement. *See* resettlement
dryland agriculture, Timor-Leste, 134
due diligence, 2, 70, 83, 262

E

East Timor
  AusAID projects, 108, 113, 114, 120, 121, 122
  Seeds of Life project, 34, 126, 128–41
ecological civilization, 16
economic development
  and poverty alleviation, 106, 117–18
  and social development planning, 16–22
  trickle-down effects, 106
  World Bank policy and projects, 37–38
economic displacement, 83, 88. *See also* development-forced displacement and resettlement; project-affected people
economic growth
  paradigm, viii, 1, 3–5
  and social development, 7–8
economics, 64–65
Elkington, J., 65

empowerment, 2, 8, 10, 84–85
defined, 284
local communities, 104, 106, 111, 112
enterprise-financed projects in China, 153–54, 156–57
entry points
for social scientific engagement with mining, 71
for sociological knowledge into World Bank project cycle, 43–46
Environment Resources Management (consultant), 187
environmental and social policy standards. *See* social and environmental performance standards
environmental impact assessment, 9, 16, 19, 161n13. *See also* social impact assessment
environmental pollution and degradation, 13, 24n24, 149
environmental protection
Chinese foreign investment guidelines, 149, 274
social and environmental performance standards, viii, 2–3, 8–9, 65, 272–74
World Bank policies and procedures, 9, 186
Equator Principles for financial institutions, 3, 63, 273
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 52
ex-post evaluation, 43–44, 52
expected beneficiaries. *See* project beneficiaries
extractive industries. *See* mining sector

F

failed projects. *See* project failure
farmers
land-loss farmers in China, 14, 21, 215, 216, 217, 222, 223–24, 226, 242
Timor-Leste, 129–37
farming systems, Timor-Leste, 34, 127, 130–32, 134, 136, 138
Ferguson, J., 4
Ferguson, Scott G., 20, 21, 22, 145
fertilizers, 140n8
Fiji, 66
financiers, 88, 90–91. *See also* international financial institutions
Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, China, 16–18, 22, 148, 150, 186
food insecurity, 13, 127, 222
food security, 13, 22, 34, 127, 129, 134–37
Foucault, Michel, 165–68, 172–73
fragile and post-conflict states, 120–21
free, prior, informed consent, 3, 71, 273

G

Gag Island, Indonesia, 66
gender and development, 170, 171
ADB policy 'text' changes, 7–8
defined, 284
gender equity, 1, 2, 50, 171
in China, 149, 159
community development, 108, 111–12, 117, 121, 123
in IFI policies, 7–8, 10, 156
gender-specific division of labour, 174, 176
gender-specific knowledge, 175
Ghani, Ashraf, 55
Gill, Maninder, 55
global architecture, xi, 262
Global Reporting Initiative, 273
Going Out Policy, 262
good governance. *See* governance
Goodland, Robert, 49
governance, 10–11
defined, 181n4
good governance, 7, 8, 106, 114–22
new modes in China, 14–16, 165–68
government-financed projects in China, 152–54, 156–57
governmental technologies, 14–16
in China, 144–45, 164–82
conduct of conduct, 14
Foucauldian, 4, 165–68
governmentality, 165–68
grain consumption, 136
Gransow, Bettina, 19, 20, 144
grant funding, 104–5, 112, 115–16, 117, 118, 119
small grants, 103, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114–16, 117, 120, 123
grazing land management in China, 201–11
grievances, 92, 93–94. *See also* social protest and complaints
Guggenheim, Scott, 43, 55
Guideline for Investment Project Feasibility Studies (CIECC), 152–53, 154, 155, 168–69
Guideline of Government Investment Project Feasibility Study (China), 154

Guidelines for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects (ADB), 156
Guldin, Gregory, 33, 85–86, 92, 93–94, 96

H
Handbook for Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Projects (ADB), 156
harmonious society, 16–17, 18, 19, 150, 151, 160n9, 168, 186, 273
harvest. *See* yields (harvest yields)
Harvey, Bruce, 67
high yield cultivars, 128
households, 180
  development impacts, 174–77 *see also* project-affected people
  headed by women, 176–77
  'nail households', 180, 182n20
  surveys of Timorese farmer households, 130–37
Howell, Jude, 181n4
Hu, A., 13
Hu Jintao, 16
human capital, 8
Human Development Index, 7
human rights, 7, 10, 90, 265
Human Rights Watch, 66
Hunshandake sandy land, 203–6, 207–9
hydropower projects, 12, 53, 95, 160n6, 161n15, 219, 230, 238n14–16, 272, 273

I
IFIs. *See* international financial institutions
impoverishment. *See* poverty
improved living standards, 7, 12, 17
inclusive engagement, 70–72. *See also* participation
India, 60, 239n25, 272
indigenous peoples
  development projects' impacts, 40, 49, 74–75
  free, prior, informed consent, 3, 71, 273
  plans, 92, 93
Indo Muro, Indonesia, 66
Indonesia, 60, 66, 68, 74, 84, 95
  AusAID projects, 108, 109–13, 117, 119, 120, 122
inequality, 13, 111, 149. *See also* gender equity
Inner Mongolia, 201–11
Institute of Standards and Norms, China, 53
Inter-American Development Bank, 52
international administrative law, viii
international and national industry membership and certification bodies, 67
International Association for Impact Assessment, 10
International Center for Tropical Agriculture, 140n6
international community
  Chinese involvement, 149
International Council on Mining and Metals, 67
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, 140n6
International Finance Corporation, 62, 67
  Environmental and Social Management System, 2, 3
  human rights impact assessment, 265
  lending practices, 265–66
  outcomes-based approach, 8–9
  Policy and Performance Standards, 8–9, 70
  social assessment concept, 3
  social due diligence, 2
  stakeholder engagement guidelines, 71
  standards, 3, 62, 63, 70
international financial institutions, viii–ix. *See also* Asian Development Bank; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Finance Corporation; World Bank
  business practices, 1–2, 268
  Chinese projects, 156–57
  development objectives, 7–9
  environmental and social policy standards (*see* social and environmental performance standards)
  goals and interests, 90–91
  key agents of global governance, 263–64
  lending imperative, 2, 264, 267
  lending modalities, 265–66
  loan funding and technical assistance, 115
  organizational culture, 264–66
  social analysis practices, 52, 83–84, 90–91, 266
  and social development practitioners, 92
  social safeguards, 3
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre, 140n6
International Potato Center, 140n6
International Rice Research Institute, 140n6

international standards, 62, 67, 70
Chinese investment projects, 151, 156–58, 197–99, 273
International Standards Organization, ISO 14001, 70
Investing in Development: Lessons of World Bank Experience (World Bank publication), 54
involuntary resettlement, 2–3, 6–8, 83, 213–39. *See also* development-forced displacement and resettlement; resettlement
defined, 284–85
World Bank policy, 2–3, 6–7, 40, 54, 56n1, 156

J
Jiang Zemin, 12, 16
Jones, Sue, 46–47

K
Kakegawa, Michiyo, 56n2
Kaltim Prima Coal, 67–68
Kardam, N., 38, 46, 47, 48
Kelian, Indonesia, 66
Kemp, Deanna, 32
key resources, 210
Koch-Weser, Maritta, 55
Kudat, Ayse, 54–55
Kvam, Reidar, 55

L
land acquisition in China, 14, 20–22
constraints to addressing social risks, 224–26
policies and standards, 213–19
project planning and implementation, 219–24
public participation, 226–27
rural land acquisition, 242–60
social impact assessment, 149, 153, 154, 173, 213–39
land-loss farmers, 14, 21, 215, 216, 217, 222, 223–24, 226, 242
legal rights, 14
legitimacy, 86, 97, 98
lending. *See* loans and lending
Lesotho, 4
Leung, J.C.B., 13
Li Kiameng, 20, 144
liability insurance, 87, 88
Liaoning Medium Cities Infrastructure and Transportation Project, 186, 239n30
Lihir Island, PNG, 68
livelihood assistance. *See* social security
livelihoods, Timor-Leste, 127, 132, 138–39
living standards, 7, 12, 17
loans and lending, 37, 46, 51, 115, 264, 265–67. *See also* grant funding
local communities. *See* participation; project-affected people
local knowledge, 175, 201, 206–8

M
McNamara, Robert, 36
McWilliam, Andrew, 33–34
maize, 132, 134, 136, 140n7
Manual on Social Assessment in Investment Projects in China (CIECC), 152, 170–71
Marinduque, Philippines, 66
Mark, Alexander, 55
Mauritius, 56n6
Mejia, Maria Clara, 55
methodologies, 84, 85–86, 94–95
Mexico, 56n6
Millennium Development Goals, 7, 8, 60, 69, 103, 150, 160n8, 182n11, 266
Minahasa Raya mine, Indonesia, 68, 74
Minerals Council of Australia, 67
mining sector, 32–33, 60–78
Asia Pacific revenues, 60
community relations management, 70–72
social assessment, 69–78
social researchers, 65–69, 76–78
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Timor-Leste, 138, 139, 140n5
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Timor-Leste, 128
Ministry of Commerce, China, 274
Ministry of Construction, China, 85, 152, 218
Ministry of Environmental Protection, China, 19, 224, 274
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 272
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, China, 215, 229, 235
Ministry of Land and Resources, China, 215, 217, 218, 220, 229, 234, 235
Ministry of Rural and Urban Housing and Construction, China, 218

Ministry of Water Resources, China, 219, 230, 238n15
modes of governance. *See* governance
Mongolia, 66, 201–11
monitoring and evaluation. *See* project monitoring and evaluation
Moser, Caroline, 55
multilateral agencies, 84, 93, 99n2, 103, 124n13, 156–57. *See also* international financial institutions
mutual adaptability, 147–48
mutual labour assistance groups in Timor-Leste agriculture, 136

N
'nail households', 180, 182n20
Narayan, Deepa, 55
National Development Reform Commission, China, 20, 85, 144, 150–54, 159, 160n10, 182n13, 274. *See also* State Development Planning Commission, China
National Environmental Protection Act, 1969, USA, 23n13–14
national industry membership and certification bodies, 67
National People's Congress, China, 150
natural resource maps, 210
neoliberal approaches to social assessment, 175–77, 179, 180
neoliberal economics, 7, 23n7, 23n9, 84, 268, 269
neoliberal synchronization, 12
the new social, 15
Newcrest, 68
Newmont, 68, 74
non-economic factors, unquantifiable, viii–ix
nongovernment organizations, 8, 40, 54, 62, 65–67, 92
  in AusAID community development initiatives, 111–12, 113, 118, 119–20
  in China, 165–67, 168, 179, 181n6, 181n8
  'third sector', 165, 181n6

O
Ok Tedi, PNG, 66
120-day rule, 9
operating rationales (funding agencies), 103, 124n1
operationalization of social policy, 84–85
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
  Guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee, 22n1
organizational culture, 73–74, 77, 264–66
Our Common Future (UN Brundtland Report), 7
outcomes-based approach (IFC), 8–9
Owen, John, 32
Oxfam, 66, 67
Oxfam Australia Mining Ombudsman, 66

P
Pakistan, 56n6
Pan Yue, 201
Papua New Guinea, 60, 65, 66
  AusAID projects, 105, 107, 111–14, 116–17, 119, 120, 121, 122
participation, 9–11, 18–20, 104, 105, 268–69
  absence, in development projects, 38
  definitions, 84, 86, 285
  development discourse, 62
  and empowerment, 84–85
  land acquisition in China, 226–27, 242–60
  mining sector, 70–72, 75–76, 77
  political contexts, 85–100
  practices in China, 85–86, 94–95, 145–46, 147, 150, 196–97, 226–27
  principle, in World Bank policy, 50, 156
  resettlement decision-making, 242–60
participatory monitoring and evaluation, 185–86. *See also* project monitoring and evaluation
  comparison with traditional measures, 193–96
  definitions, 186, 285
  development projects in China, 145, 185–99
participatory planning processes, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111–12, 118, 119–20
  China, 145–46, 147, 158, 178–79, 180
participatory social assessment, 3, 19–20, 177–81, 210–11
partnerships and networks, 112–14
Partridge, William, 55
pastoral land management in China, 201–11
paternalistic approaches to social assessment, 174–75, 179–80

Peabody, Stan, 55
peace building, 107–8, 110–11, 118, 120–21
peanuts, 132
Pelosi Amendment, 9
people-oriented development, 150, 275. *See also* 'putting people first' concept
People's Commune, 202
People's Republic of China. *See* China
Philippines, 60, 84, 92, 95
  AusAID projects, 105, 108, 110–17, 118, 119, 121, 122
Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP), 1986–1997, 108, 110–17, 118, 119, 122
Philippines-Australia Local Sustainability Program (PALS), 1999–2005, 108, 111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122
Pickering, Dou, 56n5
pigeon pea, 132
planning
  command-and-control, 16, 196, 199n2
  economic and social development planning, 16–22
  top-down, 207, 210–11
Polanyi, Karl, 64–65, 268
Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Disclosure Policy (IFC), 8–9
political and social stability, 164, 181
political contexts, 33, 85–100
Porgera, PNG, 66
post-1978 transformation in China, 1, 12–22, 148–51, 158–60, 165–67, 275
post-conflict and fragile states, 107–8, 110–11, 114, 117, 118, 120–21
post-modernism, 4
post-Washington Consensus, 7, 15
poverty
  in China, 148–49, 209
  impoverishment risks, 213, 214, 215–16, 222–24, 229
  result of project intervention, 176–77
  rural poor, 36, 39, 216
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis, 10
poverty reduction, 7–9, 10, 267
  AusAID community development approaches, 103–24
  China, 12, 150, 160n3, 169, 170, 178
  effectiveness, 209, 265–69
  market engagement, 106
  stakeholder goals, 87, 91
  World Bank policies and practices, 36–39, 156
Poverty Reduction Strategy papers, 8
private sector development, 7, 32–33, 271–72
private sector regulation. *See* corporate self-regulation
programme approach to aid delivery, 109–11
project-affected people, 77, 84–85, 88, 91–92, 99n7, 147, 254–56. *See also* development-forced displacement and resettlement; indigenous peoples; participation; resettlement
  China, 164–65, 168, 170–71, 174–77
  participation, 226–27
Project Application Report, China, 20, 153, 227
project appraisal, 2, 6–7, 19
  economic justification of projects, 36–39, 264–65
  models for considering social aspects of projects, 43–44
  World Bank procedures (*see* project cycle (World Bank))
project approval, 19, 264
project beneficiaries, 38, 50, 147, 171, 177
project cycle, 11, 151, 157–58
project cycle (World Bank)
  entry points for social knowledge, 40, 43–46
  people's participation, 50
  pre-project work, 8, 52
  project appraisal, 40–42, 49–52
  project implementation, 50, 52
  project monitoring and evaluation, 52
  sociological analysis from project beginning, 40–50
  stages, 45
project decision-making
  conservation policy and projects, 206, 207–8, 210–11
  investment decision making, 149, 151–54, 158–59
  resettlement decision-making, 242–60
  sociological knowledge and, 69–72
project donors, 88, 90–91. *See also* international financial institutions
project failure, 5–6, 48
Project Feasibility Study Guideline (CIECC), 154

project monitoring and evaluation, 71–72. *See also* participatory monitoring and evaluation
in community development practice, 116–17
shortcomings in China, 236
social impact assessment techniques, 218, 219, 229, 231, 234–35
World Bank project cycle, 52
project proponents, 87, 88, 90
project stakeholders, 84, 88, 90, 99n6, 147, 157, 158–59, 173, 179, 244–46, 257–58. *See also* participation
project sustainability, 147–48
projects
appraisal (*see* project appraisal)
implementation, 2, 10, 211
phases for community relations management, 71–72
risk management (*see* social risk management)
sociological knowledge and decision-making, 69–72
stakeholder analysis, 87–92
World Bank project cycle (*see* project cycle (World Bank))
protests. *See* social protest and complaints
public anthropology, 36
public interest, 21, 22
public participation. *See* participation
public protest campaigns. *See* social protest and complaints
public sociology, 36. *See also* sociological knowledge
'putting people first' concept, 6, 16, 54, 57n14, 164, 275
Putting People First (World Bank), 43, 45, 53, 54, 57n16

Q

qualitative data, 75
quantitative data, 75

R

Rajagopalan, V., 51
rapid assessment, 63–64, 75–76, 85–86
Rapu Rapu, Philippines, 66
rationality, 174, 179
calculative, 167, 173
expert, 168
social, 168, 177
redistribution with growth, 5–6
reputational 'liability insurance, 87, 88
Research Institute for Standards and Norms, China, 152
resettlement. *See also* development-forced displacement and resettlement; involuntary resettlement
China, 149, 153, 154, 160n6, 213–37, 242–60
compensation, 149, 161n14, 174, 175–77, 213–36
decision-making process, 242–60
planning, 21–22, 48, 49, 53, 219–24, 230–35
resilience, 34, 114, 118, 119, 121, 138
resources sector. *See* mining sector
Responsible Jewellery Council, 67
rice, 132, 134, 136, 140n6
risk assessment, 172–73. *See also* social risk management
social stability, 13, 20, 35, 53
social unrest, 144, 159
risk management. *See* social risk management
risk society, 74, 182n15–16
Robinson, Kathryn, 33–34, 66
rotational grazing trial, Inner Mongolia, 206–9
ruling from afar, 15
rural households and communities, Timor-Leste, 127–39
rural poor, 36, 39, 216. *See also* poverty
rural-to-urban land transfers. *See* land acquisition in China
Russia, 54–55, 92, 93–94

S

Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan, 93–94
scientific development concept, 150, 151, 158, 160n9, 168
'scientific' management, ix
seed germplasm, 126, 128–29, 136
seed mapping, 131, 136
Seeds of Life project, 126, 128–41
Senegal, 56n6
service delivery (community development), 108, 111–14, 116, 119–21
Shi Guoqing, 21, 146
Shuikou Dam, Fujian province, China, 53
Sinohydro, 273

situational analyses. *See* socio-economic baselines
small grants, 103, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114–16, 117, 120, 123
Sobradinho Dam, Sao Francisco River, Brazil, 48–49
social analysis, 6
  defined, 285
  definitions, 2
  former Soviet republics, 54–55
  introduction by World Bank, 35–57
  in investment planning and appraisal, 18, 267
  political context, 33
  and poverty reduction, 7–9, 10
social and environmental performance standards, viii, 2–3, 8–9, 70, 156, 272–74
social assessment, viii–xi, 265–67. *See also* social impact assessment
  China (*see* social assessment in China)
  definitions and usage, 1–3, 285
  in development assistance, 116, 120, 121
  legacy, 262–75
  methods and tools, 105, 117, 210–11, 214
  in mining, 69–78
  neoliberal approaches, 175–77
  participatory approaches, 177–79
  paternalistic approaches, 174–75
  political context, 33, 85–100
  poverty impact assessment, 209
  rapid assessment, 63–64, 75–76, 85–86
  SIA and, 11
  'texts', 262, 263–64, 266, 267, 269–70, 271
  typology, 173–79
Social Assessment Guidelines for Investment Projects (China ISP & RISN), 152
social assessment in China
  application, 150–51, 156–60, 227–35
  barriers to, 154–56
  capacity-building, 159–60, 225, 234, 237
  conservation policy and projects, 145, 201–11
  development of, 18–20, 52–53, 85–86, 147–48, 150–54, 168–72, 272–75
  domestic development projects, 144, 149, 150–58
  governmental technologies, 144–45, 164–82
  impact of international standards, 156–58
  in land transfers and expropriation, 20–22
  participatory monitoring of development projects, 145, 185–99
  social development practices, 84, 85–86, 94–95, 151, 196–97
  social risk identification, 235–36
  sources of data, 236–37
Social Assessment Methodologies on Investment Projects (China ISP & RISN), 152
social baseline data. *See* socio-economic baselines
social capital, 8, 10, 55, 99n3–4, 104, 111–12, 119
social costs, 6, 7, 175
  of economic transformation in China, 11–14, 17, 22, 148–49, 168, 169
social determinants of economic activities, 46–47, 50
social development
  absence from World Bank policy/projects, 36–39
  definitions and usage, 98n1, 286
  planning in China, 160n1
  policy agendas, 7–9, 11
  political context, 33, 85–100
social development practitioners, 36–37, 40, 44–47, 51, 85–87, 92–98, 269–75
social disarticulation, 222–23
social disorientation and alienation, 13
social due diligence, 2, 70, 83, 262
social harmony. *See* harmonious society; social stability
social impact assessment, ix–xi, 2–3, 9–11
  in China, 18–20, 21, 22, 145–46, 173–74, 213–39
  definitions and usage, 69–70, 286
  and organizational issues, 73–74, 77
  scope and methods, 70
  suitability for World Bank work, 43–44
  typology, 173–79
social infrastructure, 46–47, 50
social instability. *See* social unrest
social license to operate, 3
social management, 90, 91
social mapping, 69
social mobility, 13
social networking, 66
social policy. *See also* social development
  approaches, viii–ix, 9–11
  defined, 286

economic and social development planning (China), 16–22
element of international governance, 16
IFIs, 83–84
operationalization, 84–85
political legitimacy, 86, 97, 98
World Bank (*see under* World Bank)
social protection, 7, 8, 13, 21, 234, 263, 286. *See also* social safeguards; social security
social protest and complaints, 7, 13–14, 35, 164, 171, 178, 181n2, 201–2. *See also* social unrest
social research, 268–75
in mining, 65–69, 76–78
in Seeds of Life project (Timor-Leste), 130–39
social science–informed research, 32–33, 34
social risk management, viii, 5, 50–51, 70, 72–77, 159, 164–82, 219–26
social safeguards, 2–3, 5–7, 9, 11. *See also* social protection; social security
China, 216, 217–18, 228–29
defined, 286
policies, standards, documents, 2–3, 63, 93, 219, 228
practices, 93
social science. *See also* social research; sociological knowledge
social science–informed research, 32–33, 34
theory and practice, ix–x
in Timor-Leste government planning, 126–27, 130, 137–39
social security, 237n2. *See also* social protection; social safeguards
China, 149, 150, 160n1
livelihood assistance, 22
social soundness analysis, 6
social stability, 164, 181. *See also* social unrest
risk assessment, 13, 20, 35, 53
social transformation in China, 1, 12–22, 148–51, 158–60, 165–67, 275
social unrest, 147–48, 149, 159. *See also* social protest and complaints; social stability
risk assessment, 144, 159
socialist rule, 15–16
socio-economic baselines, 2, 23n14, 69
sociological knowledge, 1–11, 265, 270–71
entry points into projects, 43–46
within IFIs, viii–ix
introduction of social analysis, 32
in mining project management, 69–72
models for considering social aspects of projects, 43–44
in planning in China, 18–22
Sociology Group (World Bank), 40, 43, 45, 47–49, 51
Solomon Islands
AusAID Country Programme Strategy, 115
AusAID projects, 107–8, 110–11, 113–15, 120–21, 122
Soroako nickel mine, Indonesia, 66, 68
South Korea, 60
Soviet republics, 54–55
stability, political and social. *See* social stability
stakeholder analysis, 87–92, 210
stakeholder participation. *See* participation; participatory social assessment
stakeholders, 84, 88, 90, 99n6, 147, 157, 158–59, 173, 179, 244–46, 257–58. *See also* participation
staple crops, Timor-Leste, 126, 132, 134
State Council, China, 150, 153, 218, 219
State Development Planning Commission, China, 20, 53, 99n9, 152, 161n11, 168–69, 182n13. *See also* National Development Reform Commission, China
state regulation, 197–99, 272–75. *See also* international standards
strategy for persuasion, 48
structural adjustment, 7, 99n4
subsistence agriculture, 127
Summit on World Development 2000, 7
Sustainability Framework (IFC), 8–9
sustainable development, 61, 65, 67, 70, 77, 99n4, 160n8. *See also* Millennium Development Goals
in China, 150, 158, 160n9, 168–72
Chinese foreign investment guidelines, 149
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach to development, 104
sustainable peace, 77
sweet potato, 128–29, 132, 134, 140n6
swidden farming systems, 127, 133

T

Tanzania, 56n6
target groups, 38, 40–41

targeted people. *See* project-affected people
targets (passive recipients), 38
technical assistance and grant funding, 115–16
technologies of power, 167
technologies of self, 167
'third sector', 165, 181n6
Three Gorges project, China, 12, 95, 161n15
Tilt, B., 14
time frames (programmes), 114–15, 122–23
Timor-Leste
  AusAID projects, 108, 113, 114, 120, 121, 122
  Seeds of Life project, 34, 126, 128–41
toll-gating, 70
Tolukuma, PNG, 66
triple bottom line, 65
tubers, 134, 136. *See also* cassava; sweet potato
'turning risks into opportunities' concept, 164
Turning Risks Into Opportunities: Social Assessment Manual for Investment Projects in China (Gransow & Price), 152

U
United Kingdom planning regime, 23n17
United Nations
  Brundtland Report, 7
  China activities, 166, 168
  Global Compact, 273
  Human Development Index, 69
  Millennium Development Goals (*see* Millennium Development Goals)
  social development agenda, 15–16
  Summit on World Development 2000, 7
  World Summit for Social Development 1995, 7
United Nations Development Programme, 23n11
  Human Development Index, 7
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 23n11
United States of America
  EIA and investment planning, 9
  participatory development, 84
University of Queensland, 68
University of Western Australia Centre for Legumes in Mediterranean Agriculture, 140n5
upland agriculture, 126, 129, 139
urban house demolition and relocation, 218
urbanization, 13, 14, 20–22, 24n24
USAID, 6, 43

V
Vatokula, Fiji, 66
Vietnam, 66, 84, 95
  AusAID projects, 105
vulnerable groups, 10, 84–85, 111, 201, 208–9, 210. *See also* poverty

W
Wang Xiaoyi, 19, 145
Washington Consensus, 7, 12, 23n7
Wen Jiabao, 16, 17
West Development Programme, China, 149, 160n5
Western standards and values, 4, 33, 84
wild foods, 132, 137
World Bank, 186, 262
  aid harmonization, 8
  China activities, 156, 166, 168, 239n30
  China manuals, 85, 99n9
  community-driven development approach, 104, 115
  criticisms of, 7, 40, 268
  Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (AGR), 38, 41
  development discourse, 5–6
  environmental policies and procedures, 9, 186
  and former Soviet republics, 54–55
  indigenous peoples policy, 3, 40, 49, 54
  internal hostility to social knowledge, 45–46, 48, 56n12
  International Finance Corporation (*see* International Finance Corporation)
  involuntary resettlement policy, 2–3, 6–7, 40, 54, 56n1, 156
  Millennium Development Goals adopted, 8
  objective, 37, 51
  participatory monitoring programme in China, 186, 189, 191–93
  policy documents, 37–38, 40, 49, 50–55, 62
  Rural Development Division, 36, 38
  social analysis definition, 2
  social analysis introduced to policy and projects, 6–7, 10, 37, 39–57
  social development agenda, 8, 15–16
  Social Development Department, 57n14

social needs and objectives absent from policy/methodology, 36–39
social policies, 40, 49, 56n1, 99n4, 186, 193, 264–65, 273
Sociology Group, 40, 43, 45, 47–49, 51
technical assistance, 104, 115
training and seminars, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51
World Environment Development Summit, 160n8, 182n11
World Summit for Social Development 1995, 7
World Trade Organization, 169

X
Xi Jinping, 160n9
Xiao Jianliang, 19, 145
xinfang system, 14
Xu, F., 16
Xu, Y.B., 13

Y
yields (harvest yields)
and economically stronger households, 139
factors, 127, 135
food security reports, 134–35
higher yield cultivar characteristics, 128
variety testing, 128–30, 132
Yu Qingnian, 21, 146
Yudelman, Montague, 56n5

Z
Zheng, H., 18
Zhu, Wenlong, 20, 21, 22, 145

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Within influential development institutions such as international financial institutions (IFIs), knowledge-generating 'text' evolves and, via their investments, impacts on the local level through complex social and political processes that are increasingly attracting attention. People question the right of the dominant institutions, elites and experts to define development – and the epistemological basis on which their definitions are based (Oliver-Smith 2010). Even as the emerging concept of 'aidnography' explores the representations through which practitioners, especially social researchers, understand and order their world and their work (Mosse 2011), that world is changing. In turn, a rapidly moving global landscape and aid architecture challenges the way development is conceptualized, processed and realized. Cognizant of such changes, this volume focuses on Asia and particularly China, casting a wide net to encompass the private sector operations that increasingly dominate the development landscape.

berghahn
NEW YORK OXFORD